{ "id": 8550762, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANNIE KATE WATKINS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Watkins", "decision_date": "1980-03-18", "docket_number": "No. 7917SC709", "first_page": "661", "last_page": "666", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "45 N.C. App. 661" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "97 S.Ct. 301", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 L.Ed. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "429 U.S. 912", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6211, 7260, 7615 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/429/0912-01", "/us/429/0912-03", "/us/429/0912-02" ] }, { "cite": "224 S.E. 2d 537", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572654 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 S.E. 2d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 N.C. App. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550254 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/43/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562628, 8562759, 8562731, 8562704, 8562681, 8562655 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0114-01", "/nc/277/0114-06", "/nc/277/0114-05", "/nc/277/0114-04", "/nc/277/0114-03", "/nc/277/0114-02" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E. 2d 132", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 N.C. App. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550240 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/8/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 S.E. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565230 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 S.E. 2d 535", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 N.C. App. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548892 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/40/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 S.E. 2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 746", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569924 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0746-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570252 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 S.E. 2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562124, 8562189, 8562254, 8562223, 8562159 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0162-01", "/nc/293/0162-03", "/nc/293/0162-05", "/nc/293/0162-04", "/nc/293/0162-02" ] }, { "cite": "235 S.E. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 N.C. App. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549619 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/33/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 S.E. 2d 734", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 N.C. App. 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549775 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/27/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 S.E. 2d 620", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 N.C. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8607966 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/237/0233-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 621, "char_count": 11365, "ocr_confidence": 0.82, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.227950706284127e-07, "percentile": 0.8675148628356325 }, "sha256": "87a921684c746fc98d3b41c2911ca17c3b7d48ec9f0d79790f7fc5c15982dcd0", "simhash": "1:9321102e520a847b", "word_count": 1923 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:44:38.339487+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Parker and Hill concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANNIE KATE WATKINS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MORRIS, Chief Judge.\nThere are fourteen assignments of error in the record. However, only four are brought forward and argued in defendant\u2019s brief. We consider only those assignments.\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the alleged murder bullet over defendant\u2019s objection without establishing chain of custody. A medical doctor from the office of the Chief Medical Examiner in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, testified that he recovered a bullet which had been lodged in deceased\u2019s arm as a result of the shooting. The doctor was given a cellophane bag with the alleged bullet in it, which he identified as the bullet he had taken from deceased\u2019s arm. Regarding the bullet, he testified further:\nThis is a large caliber lead bullet which is pointed on one side due to the fact in its course through the body it passed through one of the ribs and also it struck the right upper arm bone. It is badly mutilated as a result of passing through the bones.\nThere is nothing in the record which indicates who had possession of the bullet from the time it was extracted from deceased\u2019s body to the time it was introduced into evidence at trial. In this regard, we express no opinion as to whether the doctor\u2019s in-court identification of the bullet was sufficient to establish chain of custody of that evidence. However, assuming arguendo, that chain of custody was not properly established, we find little prejudice in the testimony concerning this exhibit. As seen above, the doctor merely explained the shape of the bullet and traced its passage through the body. He expressed no opinion as to whether the bullet was fired from the gun found at the murder scene. Furthermore, the exhibit was relevant to the issue of cause of death and was consistent with the other exhibits admitted without objection. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant\u2019s next assignment of error is that the court improperly failed to charge the jury on self-defense or the burden of proof for self-defense. Defendant argues that there was clear evidence supporting an instruction on the doctrine of self-defense in that defendant stated that she \u201cdid not mean to shoot\u201d her husband; that the shooting was \u201caccidental\u201d; and that deceased had previously threatened her. Upon review we find no merit in defendant's contention. The applicable rule is stated as follows:\n[TJhere must be evidence . . . that the party assaulted believed at the time that it was necessary to kill his adversary to prevent death or great bodily harm, before he may seek refuge in the principle of self-defense, and have the jury pass upon the reasonableness of such belief.\nState v. Rawley, 237 N.C. 233, 237, 74 S.E. 2d 620, 623 (1953). See also State v. Allmond, 27 N.C. App. 29, 217 S.E. 2d 734 (1975). Upon review, we find no construction of the evidence which would support such an instruction. Nothing in the evidence indicates defendant believed she was in real or apparent danger of death or serious bodily injury. Further, defendant stated in her statement to the police that, although he had threatened her on prior occasions, her husband had not threatened her on the day of the shooting. This assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.\nDefendant also assigns error to the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of murder in the second degree at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and at the close of all the evidence. In this case, defendant offered evidence, thereby waiving the motion for nonsuit made at the close of the State\u2019s evidence. State v. Mosley, 33 N.C. App. 337, 235 S.E. 2d 261, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 162, 236 S.E. 2d 706 (1977). We, therefore, consider only the motion lodged at the close of all the evidence.\nIn ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court is concerned only with the sufficiency of the evidence and not its weight. State v. McNeil, 280 N.C. 159, 185 S.E. 2d 156 (1971). The evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the State-, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. State v. Bell, 285 N.C. 746, 208 S.E. 2d 506 (1974).\nIf the trial court determines that a reasonable inference of the defendant\u2019s guilt may be drawn from the evidence, it must deny the defendant\u2019s motion and send the case to the jury even though the evidence may also support reasonable inferences of the defendant\u2019s innocence.\nState v. Smith, 40 N.C. App. 72, 78, 252 S.E. 2d 535, 540 (1979); State v. Bell, supra.\nWhen taken in a light most favorable to the State, we find the evidence sufficient to go to the jury on the charge of second degree murder. \u201cMurder in the second degree is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice, but without premeditation and deliberation.\u201d State v. Cates, 293 N.C. 462, 466, 238 S.E. 2d 465, 468 (1977). These elements may be presumed present where the State carries its burden of satisfying the jury from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally used a deadly weapon and inflicted wounds proximately resulting in the death of another. State v. Drake, 8 N.C. App. 214, 174 S.E. 2d 132, cert. denied, 277 N.C. 114 (1970). Here, there was some evidence to indicate that defendant intentionally shot deceased during a domestic quarrel. We, therefore, conclude that the evidence before the court, although contradicted by defendant\u2019s evidence, provided a reasonable basis upon which the jury could find that defendant had committed the crime charged. It was then for the jury to determine whether the facts taken singly or in combination satisfied them beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was in fact guilty. See State v. Barbour, 43 N.C. App. 143, 258 S.E. 2d 475 (1979); State v. Smith, supra.\nDefendant finally assigns error to the trial court\u2019s denial of her motion for \u201cjudgment notwithstanding the verdict\u201d. We note that G.S. 15A-1414 and G.S. 15A-1415 set out some of the errors of law committed by the trial judge which may be the subject of a post-trial motion for appropriate relief. However, regardless of the name given the motion by defendant, it was properly denied. The evidence was supportive of the verdict returned by the jury. Disposition of such post-trial motions is within the discretion of the trial court and the refusal to grant them is not error absent a showing of abuse of that discretion. See State v. McKenna, 289 N.C. 668, 224 S.E. 2d 537, death penalty vacated, 429 U.S. 912, 50 L.Ed. 2d 278, 97 S.Ct. 301 (1976). We find none here. This assignment of error is overruled.\nThe defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges Parker and Hill concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MORRIS, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney T. Michael Todd, for the State.", "White and Crumpler, by Fred G. Crumpler, Jr., V. Edward Jennings, Jr., G. Edgar Parker, Harrell Powell, Jr., Edward L. Powell, Jr., and Frank J. Yeager, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANNIE KATE WATKINS\nNo. 7917SC709\n(Filed 18 March 1980)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 42.6; Homicide \u00a7 20\u2014 bullet taken from body \u2014 failure to show chain of custody \u2014 no prejudice\nEven if the chain of custody of a bullet taken from deceased\u2019s body was not sufficiently established to permit its admission in evidence, defendant was not prejudiced by its admission or by testimony of the doctor who removed it from deceased\u2019s body where the doctor merely explained the shape of the bullet and traced its passage through the body but expressed no opinion as to whether the bullet was fired from a gun found at the murder scene, and the bullet was relevant to the cause of death and was consistent with other exhibits admitted without objection.\n2. Homicide \u00a7 28.1\u2014 self-defense \u2014 insufficient evidence\nEvidence that defendant stated that she \u201cdid not mean to shoot\u201d deceased, that the shooting was accidental, and that deceased had threatened her on another occasion did not require the court to instruct on self-defense.\n3. Homicide \u00a7 21.7\u2014 second degree murder \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe State\u2019s evidence was sufficient for the jury in a prosecution of defendant for the second degree murder of her husband where there was some evidence that defendant intentionally shot her husband during a domestic quarrel.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 132\u2014 motion to set aside verdict \u2014 discretion of court\nMotions to set aside the verdict are addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and the refusal to grant them is not error absent a showing of abuse of that discretion.\nAppeal by defendant from Smith (David I.), Judge. Judgment entered 26 March 1979 in Superior Court, STOKES County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 January 1980.\nOn 29 January 1979, defendant was indicted on the charge of the first degree murder of her husband, Donald Edward Watkins. Defendant pled not guilty, was tried and convicted of murder in the second degree, and sentenced to a prison term.\nAt trial the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that between two and three o\u2019clock in the afternoon on 3 December 1978, defendant and deceased visited the home of Barbara Ann Welch, where they had \u201ca little beer to drink.\u201d At about three o\u2019clock defendant and deceased returned to their home. Police officers were summoned to defendant\u2019s residence around three-thirty and found defendant\u2019s husband lying on the kitchen floor with a gunshot wound in his chest. He died shortly thereafter. An officer testified that, after being warned of her Miranda rights, defendant said that \u201cshe was tired of him lying to her. She said that she shot him. She kept saying four or five times that she was tired of him lying to her.\u201d Defendant\u2019s sworn statement was also admitted into evidence, wherein defendant stated that just before the shooting she and deceased were \u201carguing about some other women that Mr. Watkins had apparently been dating and that [she] was talking on the phone with one of the women and her husband was cursing her at that time.\u201d She also stated that her husband \u201chad cut her with a knife and that he had also shot at her on [a] previous occasion, but that [deceased] had not threatened her on the day of 12/3/78 the day of the shooting.\u201d Defendant \u201cadmitted shooting her husband but said that she did not mean to shoot him.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s evidence tended to show that deceased had threatened to kill her on a prior occasion. Sometime before the incident, she found deceased\u2019s pistol between the mattresses of their bed and, to protect herself, she hid it. On the day in question, defendant placed the gun in her pocketbook shortly before they visited Barbara Welch. Upon returning home, defendant telephone a relative while being interrupted by deceased. When deceased left the house, defendant attempted to remove the gun from her pocketbook and hide it elsewhere. Deceased appeared and tried to gain control of the gun, which went off in the ensuing struggle. Throughout the trial, defendant maintained that her husband\u2019s death was accidental; that she never stated to anyone that deceased had lied to her; and that she loved her husband very much. Defendant\u2019s daughter testified that she was in the house at the time of the shooting but did not hear defendant and deceased argue before she heard the gunshot.\nDefendant\u2019s motions to dismiss, to set aside the verdict, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for a new trial were denied.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney T. Michael Todd, for the State.\nWhite and Crumpler, by Fred G. Crumpler, Jr., V. Edward Jennings, Jr., G. Edgar Parker, Harrell Powell, Jr., Edward L. Powell, Jr., and Frank J. Yeager, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0661-01", "first_page_order": 689, "last_page_order": 694 }