{
  "id": 8548860,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HOWARD EUGENE SAFRIT",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Safrit",
  "decision_date": "1980-06-03",
  "docket_number": "No. 8017SC8",
  "first_page": "189",
  "last_page": "192",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "47 N.C. App. 189"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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  "jurisdiction": {
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "249 S.E. 2d 805",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": -1
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    {
      "cite": "296 N.C. 107",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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        8564992,
        8565098,
        8565077,
        8564955,
        8565055
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    {
      "cite": "248 S.E. 2d 472",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": -1
    },
    {
      "cite": "38 N.C. App. 391",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": -1
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    {
      "cite": "246 S.E. 2d 71",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "37 N.C. App. 394",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8552973
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      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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        "/nc-app/37/0394-01"
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:44:12.655592+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Martin (Robert M.) and Arnold concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HOWARD EUGENE SAFRIT"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HILL, Judge.\nHere we have another example of the right of unbridled, unrestrained and unlimited appeal, which demonstrates the further need for the North Carolina General Assembly to consider whether the present method of appellate review should be changed in this State. The defendant works (voluntarily) in the law library within the Department of Correction, has the opportunity to read extensively and to seek advice from \u201cjail house lawyers\u201d who, like the defendant, have read much and understand little. In addition, defendant has the benefit of skilled attorneys, provided by the State at great expense to the taxpayers, coupled with the constitutional guarantees provided to all who seek justice in our courts.\nSafrit complains at this time that the trial judge committed error by (1) failing to sentence the appellant as a youthful offender at the re-sentencing hearing, and (2) by considering the imposition of a harsher sentence during the re-sentencing hearing. Upon consideration of the evidence presented at the re-sentencing hearing, the trial judge made the following finding:\nThis Court finds that the defendant is now 21 years of age, and would not benefit from treatment and supervision pursuant to G.S. 148, Article 3B, as a Committed Youthful Offender, and, therefore, this Court expressly does not sentence this defendant as a Committed Youthful Offender.\nThe question before the re-sentencing court was whether the defendant would benefit from a committed youthful offender sentence. The defendant contends the court improperly considered the defendant\u2019s age at the time of re-sentencing, made it the primary reason for denying defendant the many benefits afforded under an Article 3B sentence, and erred by doing so. We do not agree. There is no particular form or wording required of the trial judge in making a determination that a defendant will derive \u201cno benefit\u201d from sentencing under the statute. State v. White, 37 N.C. App. 394, 246 S.E. 2d 71 (1978). From the record, it is apparent the re-sentencing judge considered defendant\u2019s violent nature in making his decision. The finding is sufficient.\nThe appellant next contends the trial judge considered imposing a harsher sentence on the appellant in the amended judgment and commitment, and thereby violated G.S. 15A-1335. This contention is not borne out by the facts. Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment following his re-sentencing hearing identical to that ordered in the original sentencing of the appellant. The trial judge\u2019s amended judgment and commitment did include a notation that the maximum penalty for the offense charged was ten years\u2019 imprisonment, but this was only for the purpose of showing that the sentence imposed was within the maximum statutory penalty.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Martin (Robert M.) and Arnold concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HILL, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General James L. Stuart, for the State.",
      "Howard Eugene Safrit, defendant appellant pro se."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HOWARD EUGENE SAFRIT\nNo. 8017SC8\n(Filed 3 June 1980)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 134.4- resentencing proceeding - determination of no benefit from treatment as committed youthful offender\nIn a resentencing proceeding to determine whether defendant should be sentenced as a committed youthful offender, the trial court\u2019s finding that \u201cdefendant is now 21 years of age, and would not benefit from treatment and supervision ... as a Committed Youthful Offender\u201d did not show that defendant\u2019s age at the time of the resentencing was the primary reason for failure of the court to resentence defendant as a committed youthful offender, and the court\u2019s order was sufficient without giving reasons for the \u201cno benefit\u201d finding.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 138.11- resentencing \u2014 harsher punishment statute not violated\nA notation in an amended judgment and commitment that the maximum penalty for the offense charged was ten years did not show that the court considered imposing a harsher sentence on defendant when he was resentenced but was for the purpose of showing that the sentence imposed was within the statutory maximum, and the harsher punishment statute, G.S. 15A-1335, was not violated where defendant was given the same indeterminate term of imprisonment at his resentencing as that imposed at his original sentencing.\nAppeal by defendant from Albright, Judge. Judgment entered 10 May 1979 in Superior Court, Caswell County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 May 1980.\nThe defendant Safrit and two other men were convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, inflicting serious bodily injury upon Sampson McNeil, while all were inmates at Blanch prison. McNeil testified that when his cell door was opened at breakfast time Safrit and a man named Cagle entered his cell while a man named Spry stood guard at the door. Cagle called McNeil a \u201crat\u201d and stabbed him with a home-made knife. Safrit dragged McNeil by his feet from the left side of the dormitory to the right side. After the assault, threats were made by the attackers toward McNeil to keep him from testifying against them. Defendant was sentenced to prison for not less than eight years nor more than ten years, to begin at the expiration of any sentences presently being served. Defendant appealed.\nThis Court, in an unpublished opinion, found no error in Safrit\u2019s conviction. State v. Cagle, 38 N.C. App. 391, 248 S.E. 2d 472 (1978). Thereafter, the defendant\u2019s Pro Se Petition for Discretionary Review was denied by the North Carolina Supreme Court. 296 N.C. 107, 249 S.E. 2d 805 (1978).\nDefendant subsequently collaterally attacked his conviction by petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petition was denied, but after considering the petition as a motion for appropriate relief, the judge ordered that defendant be returned to Caswell County for re-sentencing. The trial judge in sentencing defendant had failed to take into account defendant\u2019s eligibility for status as a committed youthful offender. The re-sentencing proceedings were limited to the question of whether the defendant should be sentenced as a committed youthful offender.\nAt the re-sentencing hearing, the State offered evidence concerning numerous infractions committed by the defendant since he went to prison in 1973. The defendant testified that he was sentenced to 12 to 15 years for armed robbery and breaking and entering when he was 15 years old. The defendant is now approximately 21 years of age and incarcerated in Central Prison.\nFrom the re-sentencing judgment imposing the same terms, the defendant pro se, but with court appointed counsel standing by, objected and excepted to the judgment and rulings of the court, and the matter is now before this Court.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General James L. Stuart, for the State.\nHoward Eugene Safrit, defendant appellant pro se."
  },
  "file_name": "0189-01",
  "first_page_order": 225,
  "last_page_order": 228
}
