{ "id": 8551442, "name": "LEOPOLD HERMAN HAANEBRINK and JACQUELINE E. CORNEY HAANEBRINK v. LOUIS B. MEYER, TRUSTEE, and THE LELY CORPORATION OF DELAWARE", "name_abbreviation": "Haanebrink v. Meyer", "decision_date": "1980-07-15", "docket_number": "No. 807SC19", "first_page": "646", "last_page": "651", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "47 N.C. App. 646" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "261 S.E. 2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573312, 8573253, 8573227, 8573293, 8573273 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0568-05", "/nc/298/0568-02", "/nc/298/0568-01", "/nc/298/0568-04", "/nc/298/0568-03" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E. 2d 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 N.C. App. 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554675 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/42/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 N.C. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8686349 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1879, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/81/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E. 2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561041 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 S.E. 2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 N.C. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624191 ], "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/219/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 S.E. 41", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1896, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654747 ], "year": 1896, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/119/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 S.E. 149", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1930, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N.C. 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615812 ], "year": 1930, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/200/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 S.E. 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1933, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 N.C. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8612687 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1933, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/204/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E. 242", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1935, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 N.C. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611315 ], "year": 1935, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/208/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E. 2d 39", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575046 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0253-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 462, "char_count": 8453, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6257594143361682e-07, "percentile": 0.6880671421384027 }, "sha256": "07a8415192d048f3ee76f5116005762d9a6dd3a7d2ab233f0184ce52c3b7db31", "simhash": "1:2230c460b9a7985a", "word_count": 1455 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:44:12.655592+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Arnold and Hill concur." ], "parties": [ "LEOPOLD HERMAN HAANEBRINK and JACQUELINE E. CORNEY HAANEBRINK v. LOUIS B. MEYER, TRUSTEE, and THE LELY CORPORATION OF DELAWARE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN (Robert M.), Judge.\nThe issue presented by this appeal is when the two year statute of limitations on the forfeiture of all interest for usury begins to run.\nG.S. 24-2 on the penalty for usury provides in pertinent part:\nThe taking, receiving, reserving or charging a greater rate of interest than permitted by this chapter or other applicable law, either before or after the interest may accrue, when knowingly done, shall be a forfeiture of the entire interest which the note or other evidence of debt carries with it, or which has been agreed to be paid thereon. And in case a greater rate of interest has been paid, the person ... by whom it has been paid, may recover back twice the amount of interest paid in an action in the nature of action for debt.\nG.S. 1-53 contains the applicable statute of limitations:\nWithin two years \u2014\n* * *\n(2) An action to recover the penalty for usury.\n(3) The forfeiture of all interest for usury.\nIt is well settled that the statute of limitations on the recovery of twice the amount of interest paid begins to run upon payment of the usurious interest. The right of action to recover the penalty for usury paid accrues upon each payment of usurious interest giving rise to a separate cause of action to recover the penalty therefor, which action is barred by the statute of limitations at the expiration of two years from such payment. Henderson v. Finance Co., 273 N.C. 253, 160 S.E. 2d 39 (1968); Ghormley v. Hyatt, 208 N.C. 478, 181 S.E. 242 (1935); Trust Co. v. Redwine, 204 N.C. 125, 167 S.E. 687 (1933).\nThe question, however, of when the statute of limitations begins to run on the forfeiture of all interest has not been directly addressed by this Court. G.S. 1-53(3) pertaining to the forfeiture of interest was enacted in 1931. Prior to 1931, the statute of limitations mentioned only an action to recover the penalty for usury, the recovery of twice the amount of interest paid, and was held inapplicable to a defense demanding the forfeiture of interest in Pugh v. Scarboro, 200 N.C. 59, 156 S.E. 149 (1930). As a result of that decision the two year statute was amended to add \u201cthe forfeiture of all interest for usury.\u201d 1 T. Wilson & J. Wilson, McIntosh N.C. Practice and Procedure \u00a7 502 (2nd ed. 1956). We are persuaded that this is indeed the proper construction.\nIt is indicated that the time runs from forfeiture, and this would seem to take place when an agreement or charge for usurious interest is first made. If this is the proper construction, the statute will bar the forfeiture in many cases before the principal debt matures, unless the debtor brings an action for forfeiture within the two years.\nThere shall be no forfeiture of interest for usury after the expiration of two years from the date of forfeiture under the provisions of G.S. 24-2. Trust Co. v. Redwine, 204 N.C. 125, 167 S.E. 687 (1933). The forfeiture under G.S. 24-2 is the \u201ctaking, receiving, reserving or charging\u201d of a usurious rate of interest. In Smith v. Building and Loan Assn., 119 N.C. 249, 255 26 S.E. 41, 42 (1896), the Court stated that \u201c[t]he statute makes the charging or contracting for usury a forfeiture of all interest ...\u201d and in Mortgage Co. v. Zion Church, 219 N.C. 395, 397, 14 S.E. 2d 37, 38 (1941) the Court stated that \u201c[a]s exaction for the release, the defendants were required to promise to pay a part of the old as well as additional usury. This was a clear imposition upon the borrower. All interest is forfeited when usury is knowingly exacted.\u201d Similarly in Kessing v. Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E. 2d 823 (1971), the Court confirmed that the \u201ccharging\u201d which constitutes a forfeiture is the contract, promise or agreement to a usurious rate of interest as opposed to the actual payment of that interest. In Kessing,\n[a] greater rate of interest than allowed by law was charged by means of the partnership agreement required, but no profit has yet inured to the defendant under this agreement. The only interest actually paid by Kessing Company was the 8% provided for in the note. This in itself was a legal rate. No usurious interest has been paid, and Kessing Company is not entitled to recover double the amount of the interest. (Citations omitted). The statutory penalty for charging usury is the forfeiture of all interest on the loan. The charging of usurious interest as provided for by the partnership agreement in this case is sufficient to cause a forfeiture of all the interest charged.\nId. at 532, 180 S.E. 2d at 828-29. Therefore, the two year statute of limitations begins to run from the time an agreement or charge for usurious interest is first made.\nThe case of Grant v. Morris, 81 N.C. 150 (1879) relied on by plaintiffs is not to the contrary. In Grant, the court did not consider \u201cthe mere entry of a usurious claim upon the account as either \u2018a taking, receiving, reserving or charging.\u2019 within the meaning of the amending act. These words imply something more to be done, to the loss or detriment of the debtor, than the mere presentation of an illegal claim which is neither recognized nor paid.\u201d Id. at 154. In Grant, however, there was no usurious stipulation found in the contract itself, plaintiff did not otherwise agree to a usurious rate of interest and none was paid. After advances were made to the plaintiff by defendant, the defendant in an account rendered to plaintiff included a charge of usurious interest to which the plaintiff objected. Because there was no promise to pay a usurious interest rate by the debtor in exchange for the advance of money by the lender, there was no detriment to the debtor. A usurious rate of interest is charged when the debtor agrees or promises to pay it. Hence, the signing of a note calling for usurious interest is a charging within the meaning of the statute which would cause the period of limitation to begin.\nIn the present case, the plaintiff signed a promissory note for $13,185.83 bearing interest at the commercial prime lending rate of interest, plus four percent per annum on 7 June 1976. According to the deposition of the corporate defendant\u2019s vice president, the prime commercial lending rate plus 4% was approximately 12% at that time. The maximum legal interest rate under G.S. 24-1.1(3) was 9%. Defendant\u2019s third assignment of error that it lacked the necessary \u201ccorrupt intent\u201d to charge a greater rate of interest than allowed by law is without merit. Kessing v. Mortgage Co., 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E. 2d 823 (1971); Equilease Corp. v. Hotel Corp., 42 N.C. App. 436, 256 S.E. 2d 836, cert. denied 298 N.C. 568, 261 S.E. 2d 121 (1979).\nWe find that the charging of usurious interest dates from the agreement on 7 June 1976. Plaintiffs brought this action for the forfeiture of all interest on 21 August 1979. Consequently, plaintiffs\u2019 action is barred by the two year statute of limitations.\nSummary judgment in favor of plaintiffs is\nReversed.\nJudges Arnold and Hill concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN (Robert M.), Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Narron, Holdford, Babb, Harrison & Rhodes, by William H. Holdford, for plaintiff appellees.", "Parker, Miles & Hinson, by C. David Williams, Jr., for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LEOPOLD HERMAN HAANEBRINK and JACQUELINE E. CORNEY HAANEBRINK v. LOUIS B. MEYER, TRUSTEE, and THE LELY CORPORATION OF DELAWARE\nNo. 807SC19\n(Filed 15 July 1980)\nUsury \u00a7 4- forfeiture of interest for usury - statute of limitations\nThe two-year statute of limitations on the forfeiture of all interest for usury, G.S. 1-53(3), begins to run at the time an agreement or charge for usurious interest is first made. Therefore, plaintiff s action for the forfeiture of all interest on a promissory note was barred by the statute of limitations where the note was signed on 7 June 1976 and the action was instituted on 21 August 1979.\nAppeal by defendant from Reid, Judge. Judgment entered 23 October 1979 in Superior Court, Wilson County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 May 1980.\nThis is an action for declaratory judgment in which plaintiffs request the court to determine the rights of the parties with respect to a promissory note executed by plaintiffs to the corporate defendant and deed of trust securing the note. Plaintiffs seek to have the interest in the promissory note declared usurious and to have the deed of trust cancelled by the trustee upon payment by the plaintiffs to the corporate defendant of the principal without interest. From summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, defendant Lely Corporation of Delaware appealed.\nNarron, Holdford, Babb, Harrison & Rhodes, by William H. Holdford, for plaintiff appellees.\nParker, Miles & Hinson, by C. David Williams, Jr., for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0646-01", "first_page_order": 682, "last_page_order": 687 }