{
  "id": 8520829,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANNIE RAY ODOM",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Odom",
  "decision_date": "1980-10-21",
  "docket_number": "No. 8012SC289",
  "first_page": "278",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:45:37.060516+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judge Whichakd concurs.",
      "Judge Hedkick dissents."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANNIE RAY ODOM"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HILL, Judge.\nDefendant first argues that it was a violation of her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to allow the State to question her and one other witness concerning her refusal to submit to the paraffin test. Defendant further argues that the trial court erred when it permitted the State to cross-examine her about a fight she had with State\u2019s witness Nancy Ezell the day prior to Robert Moore\u2019s shooting. After due consideration, we find both arguments to be without merit.\nAlthough defendant has not raised the issue, we do find, however, that the State\u2019s solicitation at trial of evidence concerning defendant\u2019s refusal to submit to the paraffin test before consulting with her attorney violated her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.\nIn the case sub judice, the State neither compelled defendant to submit to a non-testimonial identification proceeding nor introduced physical evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. Rather, the State introduced evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that defendant\u2019s refusal to submit to a paraffin test until she had consulted with her attorney constituted a \u201cstatement\u201d by defendant, inconsistent with her plea of not guilty.\nDefendant\u2019s refusal to submit to the test until she could speak with her attorney came only after the arresting officers told her that she had a right to consult an attorney. It would appear, therefore, that the defendant relied on the statements of the officers when she requested the opportunity to consult with retained counsel prior to submitting to the test. We find that it would be fundamentally unfair and a violation of defendant\u2019s federal and state constitutional rights to allow the State to use her request to consult with an attorney, made in reliance on the State\u2019s declaration of her right, as an implication of defendant\u2019s guilt.\nWe are persuaded, in reaching our decision, by the reasoning in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L.Ed. 2d 91, 96 S.Ct. 2240 (1976), and in State v. Lane, 46 N.C. App. 501, 265 S.E. 2d 493 (1980). In each of those cases, defendant exercised his right to remain silent during custodial interrogation and did not give his explanation of exculpatory circumstances until his trial. The prosecution in each case argued that if defendant were not guilty he would have asserted his alibi defense prior to trial. The courts granted the defendants new trials and found that it would be \u201cfundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process\u201d to allow the prosecution to use defendant\u2019s reliance on his right to remain silent to impeach defendant\u2019s assertion of innocence. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 98.\nMs. Odom, like the defendants in Doyle and Lane, merely exercised what she had been told, and believed to be, her right to consult with an attorney when she refused to submit to the paraffin test. We are concerned by such a situation where the State tells the defendant upon arrest that she has a right to see her lawyer, the defendant justifiably relies on that assertion, and the State then uses defendant\u2019s reliance on her perceived right as an affirmative inference of guilt. We find that such practice violates defendant\u2019s due process rights under the United States and North Carolina Constitutions.\nWe further find the State\u2019s violation of defendant\u2019s due process rights to have been prejudicial.\nA violation of the defendant\u2019s rights under the Constitution of the United States is prejudicial unless the appellate court finds that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden is upon the State to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless.\nG.S. 15A-1443(b). Also see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 17 L.Ed. 2d 705, 710-11, 87 S.Ct. 824; reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967).\nThe State\u2019s evidence tends to show that defendant shot Robert Moore. The defendant took the stand and denied her guilt, but the credibility of the denial was lessened when the State pointed out that defendant refused to take a test that could have conclusively proven her innocence. This Court cannot find that the State has demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper impeachment of defendant\u2019s denial was not prejudicial.\nThe case must be remanded for a new trial.\nNew Trial.\nJudge Whichakd concurs.\nJudge Hedkick dissents.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HILL, Judge."
      },
      {
        "text": "Judge Hedrick\ndissenting:\nI am unwilling to extend the principle enunciated in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L.Ed. 2d 91, 96 S.Ct. 2240 (1976), to say that the trial judge committed error in allowing the State to introduce evidence concerning defendant\u2019s refusal to take a paraffin test because she did not have her lawyer present. Assuming, arguendo, that any error was committed with reference to such evidence, I am satisfied that under the circumstances of this case, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I would vote to hold that defendant had a fair trial free from prejudicial error.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "Judge Hedrick"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten, by Special Deputy Attorney General John R.B. Matthis and Assistant Attorney General Acie L. Ward, for the State.",
      "Seavy A. Carroll for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANNIE RAY ODOM\nNo. 8012SC289\n(Filed 21 October 1980)\nConstitutional Law \u00a7 28; Criminal Law \u00a7 57-refusal to take paraffin test-reliance on right to consult attorney - use of refusal to impeach defendant improper\nIn a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious bodily injury where defendant was advised that she had a right to consult with her attorney and defendant relied on that assertion in refusing to take a paraffin test to determine if there was gunpowder residue on her hands, the State violated defendant\u2019s due process rights by introducing evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that defendant\u2019s refusal to submit to the test until she had consulted with her attorney constituted a \u201cstatement\u201d by defendant which was inconsistent with her plea of not guilty, and such violation was prejudicial to defendant where it improperly impeached her denial that she had shot the victim.\nJudge Hedrick dissenting.\nAppeal by defendant from Preston, Judge. Judgment entered 18 October 1979 in Superior Court, Cumberland County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 September 1980.\nDefendant was arrested without a warrant on the evening of 16 March 1979 for the shooting of Robert Lee Moore. The shooting occurred between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m. At 9:30 p.m., the police arrived at defendant\u2019s home and began to question her about the shooting. Defendant stated she knew about the fight that had preceded the shooting, but knew nothing about the shooting. Defendant told the police she was not going to say anything else until she got in touch with her lawyer, although at some point during the questioning she did sign a waiver of her Miranda rights.\nAfter the preliminary questioning, defendant was taken to the Law Enforcement Center in Fayetteville. At her initial appearance, while standing before the magistrate, defendant was asked if she would submit to a gunshot residue test, otherwise known as a paraffin test. It was explained to defendant that the test would show whether there was any gunpowder residue on her hands. Defendant refused to take the test until she had spoken with her lawyer.\nSubsequently, defendant was charged in a proper bill of indictment with assaulting Robert Moore \u201cwith a deadly weapon, to wit: a gun, with intent to kill the said Robert Moore, inflicting serious bodily injury\u201d and was tried in superior court. The prosecution asked defendant on cross-examination whether she had refused to take the paraffin test. Defendant\u2019s counsel objected; but after an extensive voir dire, the State was allowed to question defendant concerning her refusal to submit to the gunshot residue test.\nDefendant was found guilty of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious bodily injury and was sentenced to not less than five nor more than seven years in the Department of Correction for Women. Defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Special Deputy Attorney General John R.B. Matthis and Assistant Attorney General Acie L. Ward, for the State.\nSeavy A. Carroll for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0278-01",
  "first_page_order": 306,
  "last_page_order": 310
}
