{ "id": 8519271, "name": "In the matter of: HOWARD LEWIS MONROE a/k/a MUHAMMED ABDUL", "name_abbreviation": "In re Monroe", "decision_date": "1980-10-07", "docket_number": "No. 8012DC236", "first_page": "23", "last_page": "32", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "49 N.C. App. 23" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122-58.3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "228 S.E. 2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 N.C. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547380 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/31/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 S.E. 2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 N.C. App. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548106 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/34/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E. 2d 792", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 N.C. App. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551586 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/26/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 S.E. 2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 N.C. App. 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551047 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/32/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 S.E. 2d 74", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 N.C. App. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549178 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/28/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 S.E. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 N.C. App. 659", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551717 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/28/0659-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 S.E. 2d 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555146 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 S.E. 2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553754 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122-58.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(i)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 716, "char_count": 17128, "ocr_confidence": 0.733, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.621807901734775e-07, "percentile": 0.8887141682777645 }, "sha256": "abe5a3b30fd263a23802f366a127cff3797b28406fdc5687e83cb538ded6a2dd", "simhash": "1:c3c1242edaafadf3", "word_count": 2875 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:45:37.060516+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Vaughn and Webb concur." ], "parties": [ "In the matter of: HOWARD LEWIS MONROE a/k/a MUHAMMED ABDUL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN (Robert M.), Judge.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122-58.7(i) requires as a condition to a valid commitment order that the district court find two distinct facts by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence: first, that the respondent is mentally ill or inebriate and second, that the respondent is dangerous to himself or others. Prior to 1 October 1979 the statute required a finding that respondent is imminently dangerous to himself or others.\nIt is for the trier of fact to determine whether evidence offered in a particular case is clear, cogent, and convincing. Our function on appeal is simply to determine whether there was any competent evidence to support the factual findings made. In re Underwood, 38 N.C. App. 344, 247 S.E. 2d 778 (1978).\nRespondent concedes in his brief that there is sufficient evidence to support the court\u2019s finding on the issue of mental illness. He contends, however, that there is no competent evidence to support a finding or conclusion of dangerousness to self or to others, either in the facts recorded in the court\u2019s order or in the record.\nThe phrase \u201cdangerous to himself\u2019 when used in Article 5A is defined in G.S. 122-58.2(1) as follows:\na. \u201cDangerous to himself\u201d shall mean that within the recent past:\n1. The person has acted in such manner as to evidence:\nI. That he would be unable without care, supervision, and the continued assistance of others not otherwise available, to exercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his daily responsibilities and social relations, or to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety; and\nII. That there is a reasonable probability of serious physical debilitation to him within the near future unless adequate treatment is afforded pursuant to this Article. A showing of behavior that is grossly irrational or of actions which the person is unable to control or of behavior that is grossly inappropriate to the situation or other evidence of severely impaired insight and judgment shall create a prima facie inference that the person is unable to care for himself ....\nThe statutory language establishes a two prong test for dangerousness to self. The first prong addresses self-care ability regarding one\u2019s daily affairs. The second prong, which also must be satisfied for involuntary commitment to result, mandates a specific finding of a probability of serious physical debilitation resulting from the more general finding of lack of self-caring ability. We have held that pursuant to G.S. 122-58.7(i) the facts supporting danger must be recorded by the trial court. In re Jacobs, 38 N.C. App. 573, 248 S.E. 2d 448 (1978); In re Neatherly, 28 N.C. App. 659, 222 S.E. 2d 486 (1976); In re Crouch, 28 N.C. App. 354, 221 S.E. 2d 74 (1976).\nWe must agree with respondent that neither the facts recorded by the trial court nor the record supports a conclusion or ultimate finding of dangerousness to self. Alternatively, even if indicative of some danger, the facts do not support the finding that \u201c[tjhere is a reasonable probability of serious physical debilitation to the Respondent within the near future .... \u201d\nThe court found that respondent is irregular in his sleeping habits and is up from three to six times per night; that he disregards his nutritional needs by fasting for some periods and then eating a whole chicken or a whole loaf of bread; that respondent eats about five pounds of sugar every two days, sometimes consuming five or six glasses of \u201csweet water\u201d in a day. These facts may be evidence of mental illness, or, under the broad language of \u00a7 122-58.2(1) a. 1.1., danger characterized by inability to \u201cexercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his daily responsibilities .... \u201d However, these facts do not meet the second prong of the test, a reasonable probability of serious physical debilitation to him within the near future. The State presented no evidence showing the present or future effect of these irregular dietary habits on respondent. No testimony was presented as to how long or consistently respondent had been eating in this manner. Unusual eating habits alone do not amount to danger as contemplated in the controlling statute.\nRespondent\u2019s conduct as described by Patrick Monroe relative to speaking to persons passing by his home evinces no danger to himself. The chance that someone will harm respondent in response to this action cannot be found to be evidence of danger to self in accord with In re Hogan, 32 N.C. App. 429, 232 S.E. 2d 492 (1977).\nThis Court has addressed the issue of danger to self on numerous occasions. In In re Benton, 26 N.C. App. 294, 215 S.E. 2d 792 (1975), where the trial court had found the respondent to be \u201cdangerous to herself only in that her illness negates her ability to meet her personal needs,\u201d we reversed the order of commitment because inability to meet personal needs is not a finding that respondent is imminently dangerous to herself.\nWhen Benton was decided the statute required a finding that respondent was imminently dangerous. In the present case there is no clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of danger to self regardless of whether one is evaluating \u201cimminence\u201d or \u201cnearness.\u201d\nHaving determined that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of danger to self, we now consider whether the evidence will support a finding that respondent is dangerous to others.\nPrior to 1979, the phrase \u201cdangerous to others\u201d was not defined by statute. G.S. 122-58.2(1) b. now defines \u201cdangerous to others\u201d as follows:\n\u201cDangerous to others\u201d shall mean that within the recent past, the person has inflicted or attempted to inflict or threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on another or has acted in such a manner as to create a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another and that there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be repeated.\nThus, the trial court must find three elements present in order to find that respondent is dangerous to others:\n(1) Within the recent past\n(2) Respondent has\n(a) inflicted serious bodily harm on another, or\n(b) attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another, or\n(c) threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on another, or\n(d) has acted in such a manner as to create a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another, and\n(3) There is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be repeated.\nThis Court has not required \u201covert acts\u201d under the former standard of \u201cimminent\u201d danger and the present statutory definition of \u201cdangerous to others\u201d does not require a finding of \u201covert acts.\u201d In re Ballard, 34 N.C. App. 228, 237 S.E. 2d 541 (1977); In re Salem, 31 N.C. App. 57, 228 S.E. 2d 649 (1976).\nRespondent argues that the threats by respondent to his mother do not amount to threats of \u201cserious bodily harm\u201d as required by the statute. We need not decide, however, whether respondent\u2019s words, \u201cI\u2019m gonna get you all yet\u201d are sufficient alone to support the finding of dangerousness to others. We must consider respondent\u2019s statements in conjunction with all of the other evidence and determine whether the trial court\u2019s finding was supported by any competent evidence. In re Underwood, supra.\nThe trial court found as facts that respondent had become uncontrollable at all times and that he frequently had made threats to his aged and nervous mother. This finding was supported by Mr. Patrick Monroe\u2019s testimony that he had heard respondent state to his mother \u201cI\u2019m gonna get you all yet\u201d and that the number of threats made by respondent had increased over the last three to four weeks. The court found as fact, based on Dr. Kalina\u2019s testimony, that respondent was suspicious of his family, that respondent believed that his family had sexually seduced him, and that respondent believed that all of his relatives were against him. The court also found as fact, based on Patrick Monroe\u2019s testimony, that respondent was \u201cready to fight\u201d if someone pointed out that he had done something out of order.\nThese findings, supported by the evidence, support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that respondent was dangerous to others by acting \u201cin such a manner as to create a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another.\u201d Therefore, we conclude the judge did not err in signing the order of involuntary commitment.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Vaughn and Webb concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN (Robert M.), Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Steven F. Bryant, for the State.", "Dorothy E. Thompson, for the respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In the matter of: HOWARD LEWIS MONROE a/k/a MUHAMMED ABDUL\nNo. 8012DC236\n(Filed 7 October 1980)\nInsane Persons \u00a7 1.2\u2014 involuntary commitment - dangerous to self - dangerous to others\nNeither the facts recorded by the trial court nor the record in an involuntary commitment proceeding supported the court\u2019s conclusion that respondent was \u201cdangerous to himself\u2019 where the findings and record showed that respondent was irregular in his sleeping habits and was up from three to six times per night; respondent disregarded his nutritional needs by fasting for some periods and then eating a whole chicken or a whole loaf of bread; respondent ate about five pounds of sugar every two days, sometimes consuming five or six glasses of sweet water per day; and respondent often stood outside his home and made comments to persons passing by the home. However, the court\u2019s conclusion that respondent was \u201cdangerous to others\u201d was supported by findings that respondent had become uncontrollable at all times and frequently made threats to his aged and nervous mother that he would \u201cget you all yet;\u201d respondent was suspicious of his family and believed that his familly had sexually seduced him; respondent believed all his relatives were against him; and respondent was \u201cready to fight\u201d if someone pointed out that he had done something out of order.\nAppeal by respondent from Bason, Judge. Order entered 20 November 1979 in District Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 September 1980.\nThis is a proceeding pursuant to G.S. Chapter 122, Art. 5A, for involuntary commitment of the respondent, Howard Lewis Monroe, to a mental health facility.\nOn 12 November 1979 Dennis E. Monroe, brother of respondent, petitioned for the involuntary commitment of respondent pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122-58.3 et seq. He alleged respondent was a mentally ill person who was dangerous to himself or others.\nThe magistrate found reasonable grounds to believe that the facts alleged in the affidavit were true and ordered that respondent be taken into custody for examination by a qualified physician. Pursuant to this order, respondent was taken into custody on 13 November 1979 and on the same day was examined by a qualified physician who found respondent to be mentally ill or an inebriate and imminently dangerous to himself or others. Respondent was taken to Dorothea Dix Hospital in Raleigh for temporary custody, examination, and treatment pending a hearing in the district court.\nThe matter was heard at Dorothea Dix Hospital, Wake County, on 20 November 1979, respondent being present and being represented by counsel. At the hearing Patrick Monroe, another brother of respondent, testified that in his opinion respondent was dangerous to himself and to others. Patrick Monroe stated that respondent was \u201cuncontrollable at all times.\u201d Respondent often disturbed people in the neighborhood by standing outside the house and making inappropriate comments such as telling them \u201cto hold up their head.\u201d Respondent had refused to take medication prescribed for his mental illness. Furthermore, when respondent had taken the medication he was \u201cunder control of himself,\u201d but when he quit taking it respondent began to \u201cgo down\u201d even though the family had encouraged him to continue taking the medication.\nMr. Monroe also testified to respondent\u2019s irregular sleeping habits. Respondent was getting up as many as six times during the night which disturbed respondent\u2019s elderly mother so she could not sleep. Respondent cooked food at night, often burning it. In addition, respondent\u2019s eating habits were irregular. He \u201cfasted\u201d on some occasions and then would eat as much as a whole chicken or a whole loaf of bread. Respondent would eat five pounds of sugar every two days.\nFinally Mr. Monroe related that respondent had made threats to other family members. He had heard respondent say to his mother, \u201cI\u2019m gonna get you all yet.\u201d Respondent made further threats to his mother like \u201cWell, I\u2019ll get you yet.\u201d Respondent would do the opposite of anything his mother told him. Respondent became \u201cupset\u201d and \u201cready to fight\u201d any time a family member mentioned to respondent that he had done something inappropriate. Respondent\u2019s condition had deteriorated gradually but the threats had been increasing over the last three to four weeks.\nPetitioner\u2019s next witness was Dr. Kent Kalina, respondent\u2019s treating physician. Dr. Kalina testified that in his opinion respondent was suffering from a mental illness characterized by changes in attitude and in behavior. Another symptom was the fact that respondent was suspicious of his family and had related to Dr. Kalina that he believed his family had seduced him sexually. While in the hospital, respondent remained suspicious towards his relatives. Dr. Kalina had seen examples of behavior showing that respondent had not exercised proper self-control and judgment. Moreover, respondent was refusing any medication, even though respondent had responded to medication in the past.\nRespondent testified in his own behalf as follows:\nMy name is Muhammad Abdul. I have looked at the commitment papers in this case. I have seen that the name of the petitioner is Dennis Monroe. That person is my brother. That person is not here today. I live with my brother, Dennis Monroe and my mother. I have not lived with my brother Patrick Monroe. I never stayed there. I have lived with my mother a long time. It\u2019s been about five or six years.\nI usually do drink sugar with water, just like any drink really.\nAs to what Mr. Patrick Monroe testified to about molesting the neighbors, I told him not to scare the neighbors. He seemed to be in a rush to get to his car. That is the neighbor was in a rush to get to his car. I told him not to scare them.\nAs to what Mr. Patrick Monroe said about me cooking. He has never seen me cook. He has never been to the house and seen me walking the floor. He lives in a different house on Rufus Street.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the Court made the following findings of fact:\n1. The Respondent has been hospitalized at Dorothea Dix Hospital two times since 1975 prior to his current admission.\n2. At the time of his last discharge from the hospital the Respondent\u2019s physician prescribed medicine for him to take, and his brother purchased the medicine for him. The Respondent took the medicine for only three weeks. The Respondent then refused to take any more of his medicine and stated to his brother, \u201cYou might as well give me the money because I will not take that. I don\u2019t need it.\u201d\n3. As long as Respondent was taking his medicine he was in control of himself; but, once he stopped taking his medicine he started going down.\n4. He has become uncontrollable at times.\na. During the night he is irregular in his sleeping. He is up from three to six times a night.\nb. At other times he is in his front yard or on his porch making all kinds of loud noises or calling inappropriately to anyone passing by and telling them to hold their head up or telling them how they should do.\nc. He disturbs the neighborhood at any time.\nd. He is frequently making threats to his aged and nervous mother, saying \u201cWell, I\u2019ll get you yet.\u201d \u201cI\u2019m gonna get you all yet.\u201d\ne. He gets upset if he is told he is doing something out of order. This makes him \u201cready to fight.\u201d His family must avoid these situations as much as they can.\nf. Respondent will do the opposite of what he is asked to do.\n5. Respondent disregards his nutritional needs by fasting for some periods and then eating a whole chicken or a whole loaf of bread.\nRespondent eats about five pounds of sugar every two days. He will sometimes consume five or six glasses of sweet water.\n6. Respondent often cooks late at night and burns the food.\n7. On admission to the hospital Respondent was found to be extremely suspicious about his family.\n8. Respondent has the paranoid and delusional belief that his family is sexually seducing him and he has accused them of that. He believes that all of his relatives are against him.\n9. On a previous hospital admission, Respondent was noted to be lying in bed all day staring up at the ceiling. He wouldn\u2019t move. This same type of behavior has been exhibited on his present admission.\n10. Respondent has refused medication on this admission.\nFrom the foregoing findings the court concluded as a matter of law that respondent was mentally ill and dangerous to himself and to others and ordered that respondent be committed to Dorothea Dix Hospital for a period not to exceed ninety (90) days.\nRespondent appealed to this Court from the foregoing order.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Steven F. Bryant, for the State.\nDorothy E. Thompson, for the respondent." }, "file_name": "0023-01", "first_page_order": 51, "last_page_order": 60 }