{ "id": 8523123, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES CURTIS VONCANNON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Voncannon", "decision_date": "1980-12-02", "docket_number": "No. 8020SC539", "first_page": "637", "last_page": "642", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "49 N.C. App. 637" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3500", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 U.S. 657", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6161923 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/353/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 U.S. 97", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6174831 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/427/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 S.E. 2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561617 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 N.C. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8694653 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/24/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 S.E. 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 N.C. 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8662808 ], "year": 1918, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "801" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/175/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 S.E. 2d 62", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563197 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 S.E. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564205 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0249-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 600, "char_count": 12704, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.954446944660798e-08, "percentile": 0.3710351452922545 }, "sha256": "a3211bf9c6687064b2e619dd59c5236b0fb1e61d86c9d1042100639b7f9215c5", "simhash": "1:b2c2c211c24c954a", "word_count": 2129 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:45:37.060516+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge Arnold concurs.", "Judge Hedrick dissents." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES CURTIS VONCANNON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HILL, Judge.\nDefendant has brought forth thirteen assignments of error. In reviewing defendant\u2019s conviction, we must first address defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court erred when it denied defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss the case. We find there was sufficient evidence of felonious larceny for the case to be submitted to the jury and that defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss as of nonsuit were correctly denied.\nThe evidence taken in the light most favorable to the State tends to show that defendant went to the home of his sister and her husband on 5 June 1979 at approximately 10:30 p.m. Defendant asked his sister if he could speak with her husband, John York Jr. Defendantthen went into the living room where York was watching television, told him that a man was having trouble with a tractor the man had purchased for resale and asked if the man could park the tractor at York\u2019s home overnight. York gave his permission; and in response to defendant\u2019s further question, stated that his landlord would not care if the tractor was parked at York\u2019s home overnight.\nDefendant left the house. Subsequently, the tractor was driven in. Neither defendant\u2019s sister nor her husband saw defendant drive the tractor or saw the man defendant referred to, although defendant\u2019s sister did see defendant leave in his Toyota truck. The State\u2019s evidence further shows that a tractor was stolen from the premises of Kinlaw International sometime after Sunday afternoon, 3 June, and that the tractor parked at the York home on 5 June was the same tractor that was stolen from Kinlaw.\nThe State relies, in this case upon the doctrine of recent possession. The doctrine is well established and provides that a \u201cdefendant\u2019s possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is a circumstance tending to show the defendant is guilty of the larceny.\u201d State v. Eppley, 282 N.C. 249, 253, 192 S.E. 2d 441 (1972).\nThe doctrine does not apply automatically, however. \u201cIt applies only when the possession is of a kind which manifests that the stolen goods came to the possessor by his own act or with his undoubted concurrence.\u201d State v. Foster, 268 N.C. 480, 486, 151 S.E. 2d 62 (1966). Furthermore, the inference of guilt is one of fact, not of law. State v. Ford, 175 N.C. 797, 801, 95 S.E. 154 (1918).\nWe find a three part analysis to be helpful in reaching our conclusion that the judge did not err in submitting the case to the jury. The threshold issue is whether defendant ever possessed the tractor. We find that he did.\nDefendant was in such physical proximity to the tractor that he had the power to control it to the exclusion of others and had the intent to control the tractor. See Eppley, supra, at p. 254. Although the evidence does not show who drove the tractor up to the York house, defendant testified that he told the stranger where to park the tractor close to the barn. Taken in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that defendant meant for the tractor to be parked at the York home and was physically close enough to the tractor to direct its placement.\nBefore we can infer that the possessor, defendant, wrongfully took the tractor, we must answer a second question. Does the possession show a taking or privity in taking on the part of the possessor? State v. Smith, 24 N.C. 402, 408. Also see Foster, supra, at p. 486. Stated differently, does the fact that defendant was in possession, late in the evening, of a recently stolen tractor manifest that the tractor came into his possession by his own act or with his undoubted concurrence? Ford, supra, at p. 800. We believe so.\nIt is important to realize at this step in our analysis that we are not asking whether defendant\u2019s possession conclusively points to a guilty taking. Rather, we are asking if the tractor came into defendant\u2019s possession by his own action or by the action of one under his direction.\nSmith, supra, is illustrative of this step in the analysis. In Smith, p. 408, tobacco had been stolen from a warehouse and placed in defendant\u2019s warehouse. The Court held that before the doctrine of recent possession could be applied and the inference made that defendant had participated in the theft, it would have to be shown that the tobacco could not have been placed in defendant\u2019s warehouse \u201cwithout his agency or privity.\u201d In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence that defendant came into possession of the tractor by his own action.\nThe third step in our analysis is the inference itself. When it is shown that defendant came into possession of recently stolen property, through his own action, the jury may infer a guilty taking. The trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss was proper.\nWe have carefully examined each of defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error and find one to be meritorious. Defendant correctly argues that the trial court violated his due process rights when it denied his counsel\u2019s motion, made prior to cross-examination of State\u2019s witness John York Jr., that counsel be allowed to examine any witnesses\u2019 statements that had been reduced to writing, and failed to make an in camera inspection of the writing.\nMr. York is defendant\u2019s brother-in-law. York testified much as we have already stated the State\u2019s evidence to be. York further testified that the morning after the tractor was parked at his home he went to work around 6:00 a.m. York returned home at 4:00 p.m. and backed the tractor away from his shed so he could get some tools and do some gardening. York testified that he moved the tractor by just \u201ctouching the two wires in the front together.\u201d\nYork left the tractor where he had parked it and went to work the next day, 7 June. Upon his return, York\u2019s wife informed him that carloads of people had stopped to examine the tractor that day. York then looked at the tractor, along with his landlord Baxter Varner, and asked Varner to call Kinlaw International. Varner called, and it was at this point that Maxwell Kinlaw, owner of Kinlaw International, first learned that his tractor was missing.\nWhen the prosecution concluded its direct examination of York, defense counsel moved to examine any witnesses\u2019 statements that had been reduced to writing. The trial judge denied the motion, and defendant objected. The denial violated defendant\u2019s due process rights.\nOur Supreme Court points out in State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 127, 235 S.E. 2d 828 (1977), that the United States Supreme Court has held \u201cthe prosecutor is constitutionally required to disclose ... at trial evidence that is favorable and material to the defense.\u201d See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 96 S.Ct. 2392 (1976). Due process is concerned that the suppressed evidence might affect the outcome at trial. Hardy at p. 127.\nThe issue then becomes: Who is to decide what evidence is favorable and material to the defense? The federal government has answered the question by providing that a defendant is automatically entitled to inspect, immediately prior to cross-examination, any prior statement of a material State\u2019s witness. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1103, 77 S. Ct. 1007 (1957); See also 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3500.\nThe North Carolina Supreme Court has mandated a different procedure. The Court held in Hardy, at p. 128, that when a specific request is made at trial for disclosure of evidence in the State\u2019s possession, the judge must \u201cat a minimum, order an in camera inspection and make appropriate findings of fact.... [I]f the judge, after the . . . examination, rules against the defendant . . . , the judge should order the sealed statement placed in the record for appellate review.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe procedure outlined by our Supreme Court is imminently logical. It insures defendant that no material, exculpatory pretrial statement will be suppressed. The procedure also provides the appellate branch with the text of the statement so that upon review we may effectively determine whether the defendant\u2019s substantive due process rights have been protected.\nThe trial court failed to follow the Hardy procedure when it denied defendant\u2019s motion and failed to make the in camera inspection prior to cross-examination.\nDefendant\u2019s procedural due process rights were violated.\nFor the reason set out above, defendant must be granted a\nNew trial.\nJudge Arnold concurs.\nJudge Hedrick dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "HILL, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge HEDRICK\ndissenting.\nI respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which awards defendant a new trial on the grounds that defendant\u2019s due process rights were violated. Since the procedure suggested by our Supreme Court in Hardy with respect to the in camera inspection of the statement was not followed by the trial judge in the present case and we do not have in the record before us the statement of the witness in question, we cannot say that the error committed was not prejudicial. I can say, however, in my opinion the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The obvious purpose of letting the defendant examine the statement immediately before cross-examination is to allow the defendant to use such statement to impeach the witness. The evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt in the present case is not at all dependent upon the testimony of the brother-in-law. The record is replete with other evidence that the tractor was stolen and the defendant\u2019s own sister described in detail the circumstances surrounding the tractor being brought to their home and parked near the barn until the following day. The testimony of the witness John York is essentially identical to that of his wife, except that the wife\u2019s testimony is more detailed with respect to the fact that defendant was present when the tractor was brought to the house and parked near the barn. John York did not even testify that the defendant was present when the tractor was brought to his home. Obviously, the wife\u2019s testimony is more damaging to defendant than that of her husband. The husband was not present when defendant talked to the wife, but the wife was present when defendant talked to her husband.\nI realize, however, that the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt is largely circumstantial; however, any impeachment of the testimony of John York which might have been accomplished by defendant by the use of the statement John York gave the investigating officers would not make the circumstantial evidence against defendant any less convincing.\nIn my opinion any error committed by the court\u2019s not requiring the District Attorney to allow defendant to see the statement of John York was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(b).", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge HEDRICK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Spe'cial Deputy Attorney General John R. B. Matthis and Assistant Attorney General Acie L. Ward, for the State.", "Joe D. Floyd for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES CURTIS VONCANNON\nNo. 8020SC539\n(Filed 2 December 1980)\n1. Larceny \u00a7 7.4\u2014 larceny of tractor \u2014 possession of recently stolen property\nThe State\u2019s evidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury on the issue of defendant\u2019s guilt of felonious larceny of a tractor under the doctrine of possession of recently stolen property where it tended to show that defendant went to the home of his sister and her husband, told the husband that a man was having trouble with a tractor the man had purchased for resale, and asked if the man could park the tractor at the home of the sister and her husband overnight; the husband gave his permission; defendant left the home and the tractor was subsequently parked at the home; neither defendant\u2019s sister nor her husband saw defendant drive the tractor or saw the man referred to by defendant, although defendant\u2019s sister did see defendant leave in his truck; and the tractor parked at the home of defendant\u2019s sister and her husband at 10:30 p.m. on 5 June had been stolen during the afternoon of 3 June.\n2. Constitutional Law \u00a7 30\u2014 motion at trial to examine witness\u2019s written statements \u2014 absence of in camera examination \u2014 due process\nDefendant\u2019s due process rights were violated when the trial court denied defense counsel\u2019s motion, made at trial prior to cross-examination of a material State\u2019s witness, that counsel be allowed to examine any statements by the witness which had been reduced to writing, and failed to make an in camera inspection of the writing.\nJudge Hedrick dissenting.\nAppeal by defendant from Mills, Judge. Judgment entered 8 January 1980 in Superior Court, STANLY County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 October 1980.\nDefendant was indicted and tried for the felonious larceny of an International tractor, the personal property of Kinlaw International. Defendant was found guilty and now appeals his conviction.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Spe'cial Deputy Attorney General John R. B. Matthis and Assistant Attorney General Acie L. Ward, for the State.\nJoe D. Floyd for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0637-01", "first_page_order": 663, "last_page_order": 668 }