{ "id": 2673989, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KEVIN MICHAEL TILLETT and STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHESTER WARDELL SMITH, JR.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Tillett", "decision_date": "1981-02-03", "docket_number": "No. 801SC717", "first_page": "520", "last_page": "526", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "50 N.C. App. 520" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "263 S.E. 2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575380 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 S.Ct. 26", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 L.Ed.2d 120", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "404 U.S. 874", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6348970, 6349347, 6349126 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/404/0874-01", "/us/404/0874-03", "/us/404/0874-02" ] }, { "cite": "403 U.S. 443", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12027286 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/403/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E.2d 551", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568503 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 U.S. 347", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11339173 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/389/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 N.C. App. 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552600 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/43/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 N.C. App. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552233 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/47/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 S.Ct. 220", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 L.Ed. 2d 143", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "444 U.S. 907", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11384974, 11385039 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/0907-01", "/us/444/0907-02" ] }, { "cite": "252 S.E. 2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570136 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187389 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that occupants or vehicle somehow subject to seizure for violation of law" }, { "parenthetical": "at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that occupants or vehicle somehow subject to seizure for violation of law" }, { "parenthetical": "at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that occupants or vehicle somehow subject to seizure for violation of law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/440/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 47", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179718 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0047-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 653, "char_count": 14152, "ocr_confidence": 0.802, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.5242834001554787e-07, "percentile": 0.923727985685652 }, "sha256": "8bf935a74477bedfd1c1a0346f9be1991c82e54aaa5e003ce6e4d066e91fe386", "simhash": "1:95d9604bac4551ce", "word_count": 2294 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:39:05.008611+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN (Robert M.) and CLARK concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KEVIN MICHAEL TILLETT and STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHESTER WARDELL SMITH, JR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nDefendants first contend, based on their first, second, fourth, fifth, seventh, and ninth assignments of error, that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress because the findings of fact made by the trial judge after a hearing on the motions do not support the court\u2019s conclusion that \u201cOfficer Wagoner had reasonable suspicions based upon definite facts that the defendants were engaged in or had engaged in criminal conduct\u201d when he stopped defendants\u2019 vehicle. We disagree. Generally, in deference to the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable \u201cseizures,\u201d before a police officer can conduct an investigatory stop and detention of an individual, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 61 L.Ed. 2d 357, 99 S.Ct. 2637 (1979). This protection has been extended to occupants of automobiles. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 59 L.Ed. 2d 660, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979) (at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that occupants or vehicle somehow subject to seizure for violation of law). See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 296 N.C. 703, 252 S.E. 2d 776, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907, 62 L.Ed. 2d 143, 100 S.Ct. 220 (1979); State v. Greenwood, 47 N.C. App. 731, 268 S.E.2d 835 (1980). Therefore, in examining whether the officer\u2019s conduct was proper in this situation, we must examine both the objective and articulable facts known to the officer at the time he determined to approach and investigate the activities of the occupants of the vehicle, and the rational inferences which the officer was entitled to draw therefrom. State v. Thompson, supra.\nRelying on the findings made by the trial judge, which are supported by competent evidence and thus conclusive, State v. Prevette, 43 N.C. App. 450, 259 S.E.2d 595 (1979), upon what facts and inferences were the officer\u2019s actions based? While in the course of his duties, Officer Wagoner saw defendants in their vehicle on a one lane dirt road in Nags Head Woods, a heavily wooded, seasonably unoccupied area. The hour was late, approximately 9:40 p.m., and the weather was rainy. The officer knew that the dirt road led to a number of seasonal residences, only one of which was occupied at that time of the year. The officer also was aware of reports of \u201cfirelighting\u201d deer in that area on several previous occasions. After seeing defendants\u2019 vehicle go into the wooded area, the officer left for a short time, and when he returned, defendants\u2019 vehicle was coming out of the wooded area. To infer from these facts that the occupants of the vehicle were engaged in some sort of criminal activity, such as \u201cfirelighting\u201d deer or burglarizing the unoccupied dwellings, would clearly not be unreasonable.These facts, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, when viewed through the eyes of an experienced police officer, would, we believe, justify the reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle might be engaged in or connected with criminal activity. The findings of the trial judge do therefore support the conclusion challenged by these assignments of error, and Officer Wagoner acted within the limits of the Fourth Amendment in making the investigatory stop of defendant\u2019s vehicle. These assignments of error have no merit.\nDefendants next contend, based on their third, sixth, eighth, and ninth assignments of error, that the court erred in denying their motions to suppress since the evidence was seized pursuant to a warrantless and thus unconstitutional search of their vehicle. Defendants argue that the court\u2019s findings do not support a conclusion that the warrantless search was justified under any of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment prohibition against warrant-less searches. We disagree.\nThese assignments of error purport to be based upon an exception to a finding of fact that \u201cat the time [when vehicle searched] each defendant was placed under arrest...\u201d and to the conclusions of law that \u201cthe rolled cigarette appeared in plain view...\u201d and that \u201cthe discovery of the items was inadvertent and that the officer did not know the location beforehand and had not intended to seize them.\u201d We note at the outset that defendants do not argue that the evidence does not support the findings of fact made by the trial judge on their motions to suppress. Whether the statements by the trial judge that the cigarette was \u201cin plain view\u201d and that \u201cthe discovery was inadvertent\u201d are finding of fact rather than conclusions of law, is of no significance. In any event, the findings made are supported by the evidence.\n\u201cIt is basic that, subject to a few specifically established exceptions, searches conducted without a properly issued search warrant are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 19 L.Ed. 2d 576, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967), ...\u201d State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 92, 257 S.E.2d 551, 556 (1979). One such exception is the \u201cplain view\u201d doctrine, under which a law enforcement officer may properly seize evidence in plain view without a search warrant if the officer has prior justification for the intrusion onto the premises being searched, other than observing the object which is later contended to have been in plain view, and the incriminating evidence must be inadvertently discovered by the officer while on the premises. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed. 2d 564, 91 S.Ct. 2022, rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 874, 30 L.Ed.2d 120, 92 S.Ct. 26 (1971); State v. Williams, 299 N.C. 529, 263 S.E. 2d 571 (1980). Another exception was discussed by this Court (Morris, Chief Judge) in State v. Greenwood, supra:\nThe law is settled in North Carolina that a law enforcement officer may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile if the officer has a reasonable belief that the automobile contains contraband materials, [citations omitted] Such probable cause to search is established where, from the surrounding circumstances, there exists at least a \u201cprobability\u201d that contraband substances are contained within the vehicle, [citation omitted]\nId. at 741, 268 S.E.2d at 841.\nAs pointed out above, Officer Wagoner was justified in stopping defendants\u2019 automobile and detaining defendants. The findings made by the trial judge demonstrate that the officer was merely investigating defendants\u2019 activity in Nags Head Woods when he shined his light into the vehicle and inadvertently saw what he, an experienced law enforcement officer, perceived to be a marijuana cigarette. Contraband was thus in plain view subject to lawful seizure. Furthermore, given the cigarette in plain view, the gray plastic film container on the ground next to defendant Tillett\u2019s foot and the defendants\u2019 response of \u201cyes\u201d when asked if anything was in the vehicle, the findings clearly establish a \u201cprobability\u201d that other contraband was contained in the vehicle, therefore justifying the warrantless search of the vehicle in which the balance of the contraband was discovered and seized. The findings of fact made by the trial judge support the conclusion that defendants\u2019 Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the warrantless search of the vehicle under the circumstances of this case, and these assignments of error are without merit.\nThe court did not err in denying defendants\u2019 motions to suppress. The judgment appealed from is\nAffirmed.\nJudges MARTIN (Robert M.) and CLARK concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HEDRICK, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General William F. Briley, for the State.", "Kellogg, White & Evans, by Thomas N. Barefoot, for the defendants appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KEVIN MICHAEL TILLETT and STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHESTER WARDELL SMITH, JR.\nNo. 801SC717\n(Filed 3 February 1981)\n1. Arrest and Bail \u00a7 3.4\u2014 warrantless detention of defendants \u2014 officer\u2019s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity\nThere was no merit to defendants\u2019 contention that an officer did not have reasonable suspicions based upon definite facts that defendants were engaged in or had engaged in criminal conduct when he stopped their vehicle, where the evidence tended to show that, while in the course of his duties, the officer saw defendants in their vehicle on a one-lane dirt road in a heavily wooded, seasonably occupied area; the hour was late, and the weather was rainy; the officer knew that the dirt road led to a number of seasonal residences, only one of which was occupied at that time of year; the officer also was aware of reports of \u201cfirelighting\u201d deer in that area on several previous occasions; after seeing defendants\u2019 vehicle go into the wooded area, the officer left for a short time, and when he returned, defendants\u2019 vehicle was coming out of the wooded area; and these facts, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, would justify the reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle might be engaged in or connected with criminal activity.\n2. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 34\u2014 warrantless search of vehicle \u2014 contraband in plain view\nDefendants\u2019 Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by a warrantless \u00a1search of their vehicle where an officer had probable cause to suspect that defendants might be engaged in criminal activity; the officer was merely investigating defendants\u2019 activity in an area of seasonal residences when he shined his light into their vehicle and inadvertently saw what he, an experienced law enforcement officer, perceived to be a marijuana cigarette; and contraband was thus in plain view subject to lawful seizure; furthermore, given the cigarette in plain view, the gray plastic film container on the ground next to one defendant\u2019s foot, and the defendants\u2019 response of \u201cyes\u201d when asked if anything was in the vehicle, the trial court\u2019s findings clearly established a probability that other contraband was contained in the vehicle, therefore justifying the warrantless search of the vehicle in which the balance of the contraband was discovered and seized.\nAPPEAL by defendants from Cornelius, Judge. Judgments entered 20 February 1980 In Superior Court, Dare County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 January 1981.\nDefendants were charged in proper bills of indictment with felonious possession of marijuana. On 19 February 1980, defendant Tillett and defendant Smith each filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained at the time of their arrest. After a hearing, the trial judge made findings which, except as quoted, are summarized as follows: On 13 November 1979, at approximately 9:40 p.m., Patrolman Wagoner of the Kill Devil Hills Police Department was patrolling alone when he entered Nags Head Woods, a \u201cheavily wooded\u201d area containing summer cottages, with only one such cottage occupied at that time of the year. This particular area was also inhabited by deer, and reports of \u201cfirelighting\u201d deer in the area had been filed on previous occasions. It was raining and the roadway into Nags Head Woods was a \u201cone-way dirt road, two cars having difficulty passing\u2014\u2019\u2019Upon entering this area, Wagoner met a black Camaro automobile containing two males. Wagoner did not observe an inspection sticker on the vehicle. Wagoner continued on for \u201cfive or six miles, his intention was to allow the vehicle to go to the occupied dwelling should he choose to do so____\u201d Wagoner then turned around and \u201cmet the same vehicle coming out of Nags Head Woods...\u201d and Wagoner \u201cstopped in front of the vehicle with his lights on. . . .\u201d Wagoner\napproached the vehicle, asked the driver of the vehicle what he was doing and at that time he shined his flashlight into the vehicle and the driver informed him they were just riding; that upon shining his flashlight into the vehicle, he observed a white piece of paper folded up like a cigarette with a bulge in the center partially smoked on the console of the vehicle....\nBased on his training and experience, Wagoner formed an opinion that \u201cit was marijuana,\u201d and he then told the driver he was going to have to search the car. No request for permission to search was made. Wagoner reached in and pulled out a sawed-off cue stick, and he noticed defendant Tillett \u201cmake a move through the rear glass of the vehicle.\u201d Wagoner \u201cheard a noise three or four seconds later as he walked to the rear of the vehicle and saw a gray plastic film container on the ground near Mr. Tillett\u2019s foot\u2014\u201d Wagoner picked up the container, unscrewed the cap, and found rice and some plastic cellophane. Upon unwrapping the plastic, Wagoner found \u201ca small purple pill\u201d and then Wagoner conducted a search of both defendants. Wagoner \u201casked if anything was in the vehicle and the response was \u2018yes\u2019...\u201d and Wagoner then found two \u201croaches\u201d in the ashtray, a nine-inch fishing knife beside the seat, a twenty-five pound grocery bag containing \u201cthree plastic bags of green vegetable material\u201d on the floorboard behind the driver\u2019s seat, a glass vial and another film container. Defendants were placed under arrest, and the next day Wagoner observed that the black Camaro did have a Virginia inspection sticker located in the center of the front windshield.\nBased on these findings, the trial judge concluded that Wagoner had \u201creasonable suspicions based upon definite facts that the defendants were engaged in or had engaged in criminal conduct;\u201d that Wagoner had \u201clegal justification\u201d to be where he was; that \u201cthe rolled cigarette appeared in plain view and based upon past experience and training... there was a reasonable suspicion that there was a connection between the items and criminal behavior;\u201d that the discovery of the items was \u201cinadvertent;\u201d and that Wagoner \u201cdid not know the location beforehand and had not intended to seize them.\u201d Based upon the findings and conclusions, the trial judge denied defendants\u2019 motions to suppress, and thereafter both defendants pleaded guilty. From a judgment imposing a prison sentence, which was suspended, of \u201cnot less than two years nor more than three years\u201d for defendant Smith, and a judgment imposing a prison sentence of \u201cnot more than two years\u201d for defendant Tillett, defendants appealed pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 15A-979(b).\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General William F. Briley, for the State.\nKellogg, White & Evans, by Thomas N. Barefoot, for the defendants appellants." }, "file_name": "0520-01", "first_page_order": 546, "last_page_order": 552 }