{ "id": 2643689, "name": "BLUE JEANS CORPORATION v. PINKERTON, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Blue Jeans Corp. v. Pinkerton, Inc.", "decision_date": "1981-03-03", "docket_number": "No. 8013DC690", "first_page": "137", "last_page": "140", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "51 N.C. App. 137" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "192 S.E. 2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564121 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E. 2d 184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 N.C. App. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547952 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/41/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 S.E. 2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572602 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 S.E. 2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562163 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 N.C. App. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554539 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/42/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 S.E. 2d 419", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567655 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 S.E. 2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 N.C. App. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551677 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/47/0655-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 430, "char_count": 7798, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2924678943100599e-07, "percentile": 0.6201911771690164 }, "sha256": "1c9150f908a32b556bcb556e46358cae25eb6a051915d46098fa1d2eed05070d", "simhash": "1:26d15a7b948c3c9c", "word_count": 1224 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:24:29.581265+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Arnold and Hill concur." ], "parties": [ "BLUE JEANS CORPORATION v. PINKERTON, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WELLS, Judge.\nOn motion for summary judgment, the burden on the moving party is to establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact remaining to be determined. Gregory v. Perdue, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 655, 656, 267 S.E. 2d 584, 586 (1980). If the movant carries this burden by showing that an essential element of the opposing party\u2019s claim is non-existent, then the burden shifts to the non-moving party to either show that a genuine issue of material fact does exist or provide an excuse for not so doing. Moore v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 296 N.C. 467, 469-70, 251 S.E. 2d 419, 421-22 (1979).\nDefendant\u2019s evidence properly before the court established the existence of the written contract between the parties in the form of a letter confirming plaintiffs order for services, signed by both parties, and specifying the service authorized, the hours of service, and the charges and rates. In clear and unambiguous language, the contract stated the conditions to which defendant\u2019s guards would be alert and respond: fire, theft, trespass and vandalism. Clear and express language of a contract controls its meaning, and neither party may contend for an interpretation at variance with its language on the ground that the writing did not fully express his intent. Olive v. Williams, 42 N.C. App. 380, 383, 257 S.E. 2d 90, 93 (1979). See also Taylor v. Gibbs, 268 N.C. 363, 365, 150 S.E. 2d 506, 507 (1966); 3 Corbin on Contracts \u00a7 573, at 357 (1960). Considered alone, the contract shows that an essential element of plaintiffs claim is non-existent, i.e., defendant had no contractual duty to be alert to and report on weather conditions or roof leaks. Having carried its burden, defendant forced plaintiff to produce a forecast of its evidence. See Moore v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., supra.\nIn its affidavit in response to defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs vice president stated that in precontractual oral negotiations, defendant\u2019s agents represented that defendant\u2019s service would provide a complete asset protection respecting all emergencies and acts of God including weather. Plaintiff also submitted a copy of a letter from defendant to plaintiff detailing the services defendant offered. Plaintiffs forecast of evidence fails to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff has not controverted the validity of the written contract. Even if the parties did in fact discuss duties in addition to those named in the contract, such prior or contemporaneous negotiations are presumed to be merged in the written contract, Fox v. Southern Appliances, 264 N.C. 267, 270, 141 S.E. 2d 522, 525 (1965), and are therefore without effect. Realty, Inc. v. Coffey, 41 N.C. App. 112, 115, 254 S.E. 2d 184, 186 (1979).\nDefendant\u2019s evidence also established the lack of any genuine issue of material fact with regard to plaintiffs negligence claim. To recover damages for injury resulting from actionable negligence of defendant, plaintiff must show the existence of some legal duty owed to plaintiff by defendant, as well as defendant\u2019s breach of that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury. McNair v. Boyette, 282 N.C. 230, 236, 192 S.E. 2d 457, 461 (1972). Because defendant\u2019s uncontroverted evidence proved that the contract created no duty of defendant to be alert and respond to weather conditions and roof leaks, plaintiff has failed to show an essential element of its negligence claim, i.e., the existence of the duty. Moore v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., supra.\nConsiderning all the evidence before the trial court on defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment, we conclude that defendant established his right to judgment as a matter of law and that summary judgment for defendant was properly granted.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Arnold and Hill concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WELLS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lee & Lee, by J.B. Lee, for plaintiff appellant.", "Marshall, Williams, Gorham & Brawley, by Lonnie B. Williams, for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BLUE JEANS CORPORATION v. PINKERTON, INC.\nNo. 8013DC690\n(Filed 3 March 1981)\nContracts \u00a7 27.2; Negligence \u00a7 2- security service - failure to report leaky roof - no breach of contract or negligence\nIn an action to recover damages from leaks in the roof of plaintiffs building due to unusual weather while defendant\u2019s guards provided security service for the building, summary judgment was properly entered for defendant where defendant\u2019s evidence on motion for summary judgment established the existence of a written contract between the parties which required defendant\u2019s guards to be alert and respond only to fire, theft, trespass and vandalism, plaintiffs evidence showed only prior or contemporaneous negotiations which were merged into the written contract, and the evidence thus showed no contractual or other legal duty by defendant\u2019s guards to be alert and respond to weather conditions and roof leaks.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Wood, Judge. Judgment entered 4 April 1980 in District Court, Columbus County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 February 1981.\nPlaintiff, a North Carolina corporation engaged in the manufacture of garments, brought this action seeking to recover from defendant, a corporation engaged in the security field, damages sustained by plaintiff, based on breach of contract and negligence.\nPlaintiff alleged in its complaint the existence of a contract between the parties wherein defendant promised to provide to plaintiff an asset protection service. This service included furnishing security guards who would routinely inspect the manufacturing and storage buildings at plaintiffs plant in White-ville. Such inspections were to be performed at least once every hour and defendant\u2019s guards were to notify plaintiff of any hazard whatsoever threatening plaintiffs assets.\nPlaintiff further alleged that at some time during the weekend of 12 November to 15 November 1976 while defendant\u2019s security guards were on duty, one of plaintiffs warehouses sprang tremendous leaks in its roof due to unusual weather, and that fabrics stored in the warehouse suffered water damage in the amount of $7,300 as a result. By failing to observe and/or to report to plaintiff the hazardous condition of the warehouse roof, the security guards were negligent and such negligence caused the damage to plaintiffs property. Plaintiff also alleged that the guards\u2019 failure to inspect the warehouse and/or to report the leaks constituted contract breaches that caused the property damage.\nIn its answer, defendant relied inter alia on the contract between the parties. The service authorized by the contract was as follows: \u201cGuard will be alert and respond to and report on conditions of fire, theft, trespass and vandalism.\u201d Defendant alleged that under the contract there was no duty to seek out leaks in the plaintiffs building.\nDefendant moved for summary judgment. In ruling on defendant\u2019s motion, the trial judge considered the following: the affidavits of the two security guards assigned to plaintiffs plant on 12-15 November, stating that they were instructed to be on the lookout for fire, theft, trespass and vandalism, and not weather conditions or leaks; the affidavit of defendant\u2019s district manager, including a copy of the agreement between the parties; the affidavit of plaintiffs vice president, stating that the pre-contractual negotiations between the parties included representations by defendant that it would provide security with regard to fire as well as other acts of God including weather; a letter from defendant to plaintiff detailing the security services defendant offered; and the security service reports prepared by defendant\u2019s two guards with regard to their shift at plaintiffs plant on 12-15 November.\nThe trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment and plaintiff has appealed.\nLee & Lee, by J.B. Lee, for plaintiff appellant.\nMarshall, Williams, Gorham & Brawley, by Lonnie B. Williams, for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0137-01", "first_page_order": 165, "last_page_order": 168 }