{ "id": 12170570, "name": "GRAHAM HUMPHRIES, Employee v. CONE MILLS CORPORATION, Employer, and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Carrier", "name_abbreviation": "Humphries v. Cone Mills Corp.", "decision_date": "1981-06-16", "docket_number": "No. 8010IC1208", "first_page": "612", "last_page": "617", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "52 N.C. App. 612" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "161 S.E. 2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8576097 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E. 2d 189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198" }, { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571831 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 S.E. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. App. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 S.E. 2d 516", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521054 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E. 2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561147 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0329-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 529, "char_count": 9459, "ocr_confidence": 0.844, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5232346301313376e-07, "percentile": 0.811773968289271 }, "sha256": "4115ee1b63adf0776030babe1b0ac6f8b589e735253bb38c302fed7111261d5b", "simhash": "1:cb43d3fa7b9f262b", "word_count": 1512 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T23:00:28.379499+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge Martin (Robert M.) and Judge Whichard concur." ], "parties": [ "GRAHAM HUMPHRIES, Employee v. CONE MILLS CORPORATION, Employer, and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Carrier" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BECTON, Judge.\nThe scope of appellate review of an award made by the Commission is limited by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act to \u201cerrors of law under the same terms and conditions as govern appeals from the superior court to the Court of Appeals in ordinary civil actions.\u201d G.S. 97-86. The Commission\u2019s award is \u201cconclusive and binding [on this court] as to all questions of fact.\u201d Id. Our review for errors of law requires a \u201ctwo fold determination of whether the Commission\u2019s findings are supported by any competent evidence and whether its subsequent legal conclusions are justified by those findings. See Barham v. Food World, Inc., 300 N.C. 329, 266 S.E. 2d 676 (1980); Walston v. Burlington Industries, 49 N.C. App. 301, 271 S.E. 2d 516 (1980).\u201d Buck v. Procter & Gamble, 278 N.C. App. 268, 52 S.E. 2d 88 (1981).\nDefendants argue that Humphries\u2019 evidence (1) fails to establish that his disease was caused by the conditions of his employment, and (2) fails to establish that he is permanently disabled by the disease. Humphries\u2019 claim was brought under the provision of G.S. 97-53(13) which deems an occupational disease to be:\nAny disease . . . which is proven to be due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside of the employment. (Emphasis added.)\nThis statute in no way requires that the conditions of employment be the exclusive cause of the disease in order to be compen-sable. In Booker v. Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E. 2d 189 (1979), Chief Justice Sharp interpreted the language of G.S. 97-53(13) to mean that \u201c[a] disease is \u2018characteristic\u2019 of a profession when there is a recognizable link between the nature of the job and an increased risk of contracting the disease in question.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 297 N.C. at 472, 256 S.E. 2d at 198. Moreover, Booker holds that the disease need not be one which \u201coriginates exclusively from the particular kind of employment in which the employee is engaged, but rather . . . employment must result in a hazard which distinguishes it in character from the general run of occupations. . . .\u201d Id. at 473, 256 S.E. 2d at 199.\nDefendants argue that the evidence presented only shows, at best, that plaintiffs condition was aggravated by the conditions of his employment, not caused by them. Our reading of the record is otherwise. Dr. Sieker, Humphries\u2019 treating physician and an expert in the field of respiratory disease, testified: \u201cIt is my opinion that the cotton dust exposure contributed to his bron-chopulmonary disease.\u201d On cross examination after discussing the contributory effects of cigarette smoking, Dr. Sieker pointed out that \u201cit\u2019s possible to say that both [smoking and cotton dust exposure] were contributing factors\u201d in causing the disease, but once Humphries stopped smoking in 1969, \u201che was still exposed to cotton dust, he had progression of symptoms so the cotton dust of itself must have been a factor in causing trouble.\u201d\nDr. Herbert A. Saltzman, an expert in the field of occupational disease, testified that based on his examination of Hum-phries, \u201cit is more likely than not that [Humphries\u2019] condition is due to byssinosis [a respiratory disease common to textile mill workers].\u201d The testimony of Drs. Sieker and Saltzman is competent evidence which supports the Commission\u2019s finding that the nature and condition of Humphries\u2019 employment caused him to contract, or at least increased the risk of his contracting, an obstructive respiratory disease.\nDefendants also claim that Humphries fails to establish that he is permanently disabled. Defendants concede that Dr. Sieker is competent to offer an opinion concerning Humphries\u2019 degree of disability from certain physical activities. The defendants claim, however, that Dr. Sieker, over objection, was improperly permitted to give his opinion on the ultimate issue in the case \u2014whether Humphries was unable to work at all \u2014and that an improper foundation was laid for the hypothetical opinion question asked of Dr. Sieker. Regardless of the merits of defendants\u2019 objection to this question, no objection was made at trial when Dr. Sieker testified that:\nSubsequent to March, 1976, I had occasion to send further correspondence with regard to his disability. That was on 15 February 1978. The letter dated 15 February 1978 says that I confirm a conversation with the insurance company, Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company, of that date, February 15, 1978, and it indicates that I consider Mr. Hum-phries permanently disabled because of his severe lung disease. The last physician statement was dated August 8, 1977, again stating that he was permanently disabled.\nIt is well established that if an objection is not made when a question is asked and the answer given, the right to have that evidence excluded on appeal is waived. Johnson v. Lamb, 273 N.C. 701, 161 S.E. 2d 131 (1968). Moreover, Dr. Saltzman testified: \u201cI think that [Humphries] was significantly disabled at the time of my assessment [on 19 September 1977].\u201d And, Humphries testified that just prior to retirement, he could not walk from one end of the weave room to the other without having to rest; that he had to rest when climbing as few as five steps in his trailer; and that he could only sleep an hour and a half at a time because of his congestion. Given the expert testimony in the record and Hum-phries\u2019 own testimony about his physical condition, the Industrial Commission had before it competent evidence to support its finding that Humphries was permanently disabled.\nThe evidence presented, then, supports the Commission\u2019s findings that Humphries\u2019 disease was caused by the conditions of his employment and that this occupational disease was sufficiently severe to permanently disable him. These findings, taken as true, are competent to support the Commission in concluding as a matter of law that Humphries\u2019 disease is compensable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act and that he is entitled to compensation for permanent and total disability. Based upon this determination, the Opinion and Award of the Industrial Commission are\nAffirmed.\nJudge Martin (Robert M.) and Judge Whichard concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BECTON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Maupin, Taylor & Ellis, by Richard M. Lewis, and David V. Brooks, for defendant appellants.", "Hassell & Hudson, by Charles R. Hassell, Jr., for plaintiff ap-pellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GRAHAM HUMPHRIES, Employee v. CONE MILLS CORPORATION, Employer, and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Carrier\nNo. 8010IC1208\n(Filed 16 June 1981)\nMaster and Servant \u00a7 68\u2014 workers\u2019 compensation \u2014occupational disease \u2014permanent disability\nMedical evidence presented by plaintiff was sufficient to establish that his chronic obstructive respiratory disease was caused by the conditions of his employment in the weave room of a textile plant, and medical testimony and plaintiffs own testimony sufficiently established that he is permanently disabled by the disease.\nAppeal by defendants from North Carolina Industrial Commission. Opinion and Award filed 26 June 1980. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 April 1981.\nOn 13 March 1978, plaintiff, Graham Humphries, filed a complaint with the North Carolina Industrial Commission (Commission) alleging that he had contracted an occupational respiratory disease caused by exposure to cotton dust while working for the defendant, Cone Mills Corporation (Cone Mills). Humphries is presently fifty-seven years old and began working in textile mills at the age of sixteen. He worked in the weave room of various mills from that time until his retirement from Cone Mills on 15 January 1976.\nHumphries began working for Cone Mills at its Eno Plant in Hillsborough, North Carolina on 21 August 1969 as a loom fixer in the weave room. In 1971, he was promoted to Head Loom Fixer and worked in that position until 1973 when he was promoted to Supervisor of the weave room. Humphries remained in this supervisory position until his retirement in 1976.\nHumphries smoked approximately three-fourths of a pack of cigarettes per day for thirty years before he quit smoking in 1969. In 1972, Humphries came under the care of Dr. Herbert 0. Sieker of Duke Medical Center for treatment of respiratory problems that included shortness of breath, a tightness in his chest, and wheezing. Although under a regular course of treatment from Dr. Sieker, Humphries\u2019 respiratory problems worsened until he could no longer walk from one side of the weave room to the other without resting. Finally, in January 1976, Humphries stopped working because of his breathing problems, and he has not worked since that time.\nThe Commission upheld, and adopted as its own, an Opinion and Award by Deputy Commissioner Christine Denson in which she found that Humphries was \u201cpermanently and totally disabled as a result of [a] chronic obstructive respiratory disease.\u201d Hum-phries was awarded the maximum amount allowable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act of $146.00 per week for the remainder of his life. In its opinion, the Commission held that:\nPlaintiffs chronic obstructive respiratory disease was due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to his particular occupation and is not an ordinary disease of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside of the employment.\nDefendants are before us appealing from this adverse decision by the Commission.\nMaupin, Taylor & Ellis, by Richard M. Lewis, and David V. Brooks, for defendant appellants.\nHassell & Hudson, by Charles R. Hassell, Jr., for plaintiff ap-pellee." }, "file_name": "0612-01", "first_page_order": 640, "last_page_order": 645 }