{
  "id": 8522942,
  "name": "HARRINGTON MANUFACTURING CO., INC. v. LOGAN TONTZ COMPANY and TRIAD METAL PRODUCTS COMPANY",
  "name_abbreviation": "Harrington Manufacturing Co. v. Logan Tontz Co.",
  "decision_date": "1981-09-01",
  "docket_number": "No. 806SC1140",
  "first_page": "625",
  "last_page": "627",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "53 N.C. App. 625"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "253 S.E. 2d 282",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1979,
      "opinion_index": -1
    },
    {
      "cite": "40 N.C. App. 496",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8551429
      ],
      "year": 1979,
      "opinion_index": -1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/40/0496-01"
      ]
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:33:41.579477+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Chief Judge MORRIS and Judge BECTON concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "HARRINGTON MANUFACTURING CO., INC. v. LOGAN TONTZ COMPANY and TRIAD METAL PRODUCTS COMPANY"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WEBB, Judge.\nWe note at the outset that the appellant has violated Rule 28(b)(3) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure in that in its brief it did not, immediately following each question, refer to the assignment of error and exception pertinent to the question identified by their numbers and pages in the printed record on appeal. Pursuant to Rule 2 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, we consider the appellant\u2019s assignments of error.\nThe appellant assigns error to the charge of the court as to damages. We believe this assignment of error has merit. The court correctly charged the jury under the previous decision of this Court as to what the plaintiff had to prove to show justifiable revocation under G.S. 25-2-608, and \u201ccover\u201d under G.S. 25-2-712. In charging on damages, the court instructed the jury it would have to answer the revocation issue and the \u201ccover\u201d issue favorably to the plaintiff in order to award damages to plaintiff. In this there was error. As we stated in Manufacturing Co. v. Logan Tontz, supra, at page 504:\n\u201cIf a jury did find such a revocation of acceptance, then, under G.S. 25-2-711(1) plaintiff would be entitled to recover the amount of the contract price it has paid for the goods involved. In addition to allowing the recovery of so much of the purchase price as has been paid, G.S. 25-2-711 provides additional remedies for the buyer upon a justifiable revocation of acceptance. Under G.S. 25-2-711(l)(a) the buyer is entitled to \u2018cover\u2019 by procuring substitute goods for those found to be nonconforming.\u201d\nAs our decision on the previous appeal points out, damages for \u201ccover\u201d are damages to which the plaintiff would be entitled in addition to so much of the price as had been paid if the jury should find the plaintiff has \u201ccovered\u201d after properly revoking its acceptance. G.S. 25-2-712(3) specifically provides that the failure of a buyer to effect \u201ccover\u201d does not bar him from any other remedy. When the jury found the plaintiff had justifiably revoked its acceptance, the plaintiff was entitled to damages in the amount it had paid for the goods involved although the jury found the plaintiff did not \u201ccover.\u201d For this reason we hold it was error to charge the jury they would have to find there had been a revocation and \u201ccover\u201d to award damages.\nThe plaintiff also assigns error to the exclusion of testimony which it contends showed loss of profit and damage to the goodwill of its business. We do not believe the evidence in this record, including that which was excluded, is sufficient to show a loss of profit or damage to goodwill. For that reason we do not consider these elements of damage in this case.\nWe do not discuss the plaintiffs other assignments of error, as the questions they pose may not arise at a new trial. For the reasons given in this opinion, we hold there must be a new trial on all issues.\nNew trial.\nChief Judge MORRIS and Judge BECTON concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WEBB, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Pritchett, Cooke and Burch, by Stephen R. Burch and W. W. Pritchett, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.",
      "Turner, Enochs, Foster, Sparrow and Burnley, by B. J. Pearce and James R. Turner, and, Allsbrook, Benton, Knott, Cran-ford and Whitaker, by Thomas I. Benton, for defendant appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "HARRINGTON MANUFACTURING CO., INC. v. LOGAN TONTZ COMPANY and TRIAD METAL PRODUCTS COMPANY\nNo. 806SC1140\n(Filed 1 September 1981)\nDamages \u00a7 17; Uniform Commercial Code \u00a7 24\u2014 revocation of acceptance of goods \u2014 cover \u2014 instruction on damages\nIn a breach of contract action in which plaintiff contended that it justifiably revoked its acceptance of latches ordered from defendant after it had paid part of the purchase price and that it properly \u201ccovered\u201d by procuring substitute latches for those ordered by defendant, the trial court erred in charging the jury that they would have to find that there had been a justifiable revocation and \u201ccover\u201d to award damages to plaintiff, since damages for \u201ccover\u201d are damages to which plaintiff would be entitled in addition to so much of the purchase price as it had paid if the jury should find that plaintiff \u201ccovered\u201d after properly revoking its acceptance. G.S. 25-2-712.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from Hobgood (Hamilton H.j, Judge. Judgment entered 2 June 1980 in Superior Court, NORTHAMPTON County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 May 1981.\nThis is an action for breach of contract which is now in this Court for the second time. See Manufacturing Co. v. Logan Tontz Co., 40 N.C. App. 496, 253 S.E. 2d 282 (1979) in which this Court remanded for a new trial on all issues. The defendant Logan Tontz Company was voluntarily dismissed prior to trial.\nThe plaintiff alleged, and its evidence tended to prove, that it had purchased from Triad Metal Products latches to be used in the construction of bulk tobacco curing barns and that these latches did not conform to the sample by which plaintiff had ordered. It offered further evidence that it paid a part of the purchase price, revoked its order, and replaced the latches at additional cost by making its own latches. The jury found that the plaintiff had justifiably revoked its acceptance of the latches, that the plaintiff did not properly \u201ccover\u201d, and awarded the plaintiff $1.00 in damages.\nPlaintiff appealed.\nPritchett, Cooke and Burch, by Stephen R. Burch and W. W. Pritchett, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.\nTurner, Enochs, Foster, Sparrow and Burnley, by B. J. Pearce and James R. Turner, and, Allsbrook, Benton, Knott, Cran-ford and Whitaker, by Thomas I. Benton, for defendant appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0625-01",
  "first_page_order": 653,
  "last_page_order": 655
}
