{ "id": 8521399, "name": "INTERCRAFT INDUSTRIES CORP. v. KAREN M. MORRISON and EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA", "name_abbreviation": "Intercraft Industries Corp. v. Morrison", "decision_date": "1981-10-06", "docket_number": "No. 8110SC68", "first_page": "225", "last_page": "229", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "54 N.C. App. 225" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "383 A. 2d 533", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 1736921, 1736916 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535", "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/476/0617-01", "/pa/476/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 Pa. 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 1736921 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620", "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/476/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 N.W. 636", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 Wis. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis.", "case_ids": [ 8680580 ], "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis/237/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 S.E. 2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212-213" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 N.C. App. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555463 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343-344" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/17/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" }, { "page": "4" }, { "page": "3" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 N.C. App. 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554919 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722" }, { "page": "723" }, { "page": "722" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/44/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 S.E. 2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2646082 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 S.E. 2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 N.C. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559687 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/259/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 S.E. 2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575710 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0598-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 508, "char_count": 10399, "ocr_confidence": 0.787, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.527646540942415e-08, "percentile": 0.34792182864715276 }, "sha256": "966981332300c249d53757155875cc7a0998a1d7d54b8c2cfc16abb44e225579", "simhash": "1:e573208e24274f76", "word_count": 1652 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:12:28.716896+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge HILL concurs.", "Judge Hedrick dissents." ], "parties": [ "INTERCRAFT INDUSTRIES CORP. v. KAREN M. MORRISON and EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Judge.\nThe issue is whether the commission properly concluded that claimant\u2019s absence from work due to inability, to secure child care, while unexcused and in violation of employer\u2019s policy, nevertheless did not constitute such \u201cmisconduct connected with [her] work,\u201d G.S. 96-14(2), as to disqualify her for unemployment compensation benefits. We hold that it did.\nClaimant commenced work with employer on 4 September 1979. Employer\u2019s policy permitted a maximum of six days absence in a twelve month period. The seventh absence resulted in \u201coral warning\u201d; the eighth, in \u201cwritten warning\u201d; the ninth, in \u201cfinal written warning\u201d; and the tenth, in \u201ctermination.\u201d\nOn 22 January 1980, pursuant to this policy, employer notified claimant in writing that if she incurred one further charged absence in the next thirty days, she would subject herself \u201cto further discipline and/or discharge.\u201d On 15 February 1980 employer notified claimant in writing that on 7 February 1980 she \u201chad another charged absence,\u201d and that if she incurred still another within thirty days her employment would be terminated. On 16 February 1980, a Saturday, claimant was absent from work. Her \u201cabsentee report,\u201d filed with employer\u2019s Employee Relations Office, stated under the heading \u201cExplanation,\u201d \u201cNo Babysitter.\u201d She testified at the commission\u2019s hearing on her claim that her husband was a truck driver and that she \u201ccouldn\u2019t work on Saturday because [she] didn\u2019t have a babysitter.\u201d When asked if \u201c[i]t was just a matter where [she] simply couldn\u2019t find child care,\u201d she responded, \u201cYes, I just couldn\u2019t.\u201d Evidence for the employer tended to establish that Saturday work was mandatory overtime if the employer posted notice by the preceding Thursday that Saturday was to be a work day. Claimant\u2019s evidence indicated that she did not see the posted notice on this occasion, but that her supervisor did discuss it with her.\nThe commission made the following pertinent findings of fact:\n2. Claimant was discharged from this job for being absent on February 16, 1980, a scheduled day of overtime work. She was absent because she had no child care that day. The absence was not excused.\n3. The claimant had been warned, and was aware, that ten (10) unexcused absences within a twelve-month period would result in her discharge. The absence on February 16, 1980, was her tenth unexcused absence.\nThese findings are supported by competent evidence and thus are conclusive on appeal. G.S. 96-4(m); G.S. 96-15(i); In re Thomas, 281 N.C. 598, 189 S.E. 2d 245 (1972); In re Abernathy, 259 N.C. 190, 130 S.E. 2d 292 (1963); Yelverton v. Furniture Industries, 51 N.C. App. 215, 275 S.E. 2d 553 (1981); In re Cantrell, 44 N.C. App. 718, 263 S.E. 2d 1 (1980). The question, then, as noted above, is whether these findings support the commission\u2019s conclusion that claimant was not disqualified from unemployment compensation benefits by \u201cmisconduct connected with [her] work.\u201d G.S. 96-14(2).\nThis court has approved the following definition of \u201cmisconduct\u201d as it relates to unemployment compensation statutes:\n\u201c* * * [T]he term \u2018misconduct\u2019 [in connection with one\u2019s work] is limited to conduct evincing such wilful or wanton disregard of an employer\u2019s interest as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer\u2019s interests or of the employee\u2019s duties and obligations to his employer. * * *\u201d\nIn re Collingsworth, 17 N.C. App. 340, 343-344, 194 S.E. 2d 210, 212-213 (1973), quoting Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636 (1941) (emphasis supplied). This court has also found the following rule persuasive:\n[W]e must evaluate both the reasonableness of the employer\u2019s request in light of all the circumstances, and the employee\u2019s reasons for noncompliance. The employee's behavior cannot fall within \u201cwilfull misconduct\u201d if it was justifiable or reasonable under the circumstances, since it cannot then be considered to be in wilfull disregard of conduct the employer \u201chas the right to expect.\u201d In other words, if there was \u201cgood cause\u201d for the employee\u2019s action, it cannot be charged as wilfull misconduct.\nCantrell, 44 N.C. App. at 722, 263 S.E. 2d at 3, quoting McLean v. Board of Review, 476 Pa. 617, 620, 383 A. 2d 533, 535 (1978) (emphasis supplied). Thus, while \u201c[a] claimant\u2019s deliberate and unjustifiable refusal to report to work . . . constitutes misconduct sufficient to disqualify claimant from receiving benefits,\u201d Cantrell, 44 N.C. App. at 723, 263 S.E. 2d at 4, benefits are properly awarded if there was good cause for the claimant\u2019s action, rendering the conduct justifiable or reasonable under the circumstances.\nThe commission found here that claimant\u2019s absence was due to her inability to obtain child care for the day of mandatory overtime. The finding supports a conclusion that \u201cgood cause\u201d existed for the absence, which rendered it justifiable and reasonable under, the circumstances. The finding, therefore, supports the conclusion that the absence which occasioned claimant\u2019s dismissal did not amount to wilful misconduct connected with her work, under the test articulated in Cantrell. 44 N.C. App. at 722, 263 S.E. 2d at 3. Although the commission found that the employer did not excuse claimant\u2019s absence and that claimant knew her tenth unexcused absence could result in her discharge, these findings did not dictate, a conclusion that the discharge was for misconduct. An absence which an employer refuses to excuse does not necessarily constitute misconduct as that term has been defined by this court for purposes of determining disqualification for unemployment compensation benefits.\nIt is immaterial that the commission made no finding as to what, if anything, claimant did to obtain child care or as to whether she advised her employer that she had a problem in that respect. The employer, as the party attempting to deny unemployment compensation benefits, has the burden of establishing that a claimant\u2019s discharge resulted from misconduct. The employer here did not produce evidence regarding claimant\u2019s efforts to obtain child care or to advise the employer of her problem. Nor did it cross examine claimant in this respect. Under these circumstances, the commission correctly concluded that the employer had not met its burden of showing that claimant\u2019s discharge resulted from misconduct; and claimant\u2019s unchallenged testimony that she \"simply couldn\u2019t find child care\u201d was sufficient to support the finding which underlies the commission\u2019s conclusion that claimant was not discharged for misconduct connected with her work.\nAffirmed.\nJudge HILL concurs.\nJudge Hedrick dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Hedrick\ndissenting.\nThe Commission based its conclusion that claimant was not disqualified to receive unemployment benefits upon its finding that \u201c[s]he was absent because she had no child care that day.\u201d The Commission concedes that the employer\u2019s work rules relating to the termination of the claimant\u2019s employment for ten unexcused absences is reasonable, and the Commission found as a fact that the claimant was advised on Thursday that she was expected to work \u201cmandatory overtime\u201d on Saturday; and the Commission further found that her absence on Saturday was unexcused. The Commission made no finding whatsoever as to what, if anything, the claimant did to obtain \"child care\u201d or that she advised or notified her employer that she had any problem. In my opinion, the absence of such findings is most material. The employer had carried its burden when it proved to the satisfaction of the Commission that the claimant had violated a reasonable rule of the employer with respect to unexcused absences. If the Commission, as it did, was going to substitute its rule or excuse for that of the employer, the least the Commission could have done was to support such a conclusion by findings of fact as to what, if anything, the claimant did to justify her conduct in not coming to work. The Commission accepted the claimant\u2019s excuse and thereby substituted its decision for that of the employer as to whether the absence was \u201cunexcused.\u201d In my opinion the decision of the Commission, and the opinion of the majority, effectively guts the reasonable work rules of the employer. The ruling of the Commission, and the decision of the majority affirming that ruling, announces that any employee can violate the reasonable work rules of his or her employer by simply stating after the fact that he or she was unable to obtain \u201cchild care.\u201d Under the circumstances of this case, all an employee has to do is simply announce that he or she was unable to get a babysitter for the day he or she was supposed to work. While the decision rendered today by the majority is a victory for one female claimant, it will cause employers to think twice before employing women with little children who might need child care. I vote to reverse.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge Hedrick" } ], "attorneys": [ "Pope, McMillan, Gourley and Kutteh, by William H. McMillan, for plaintiff appellant.", "T. S. Whitaker, Attorney for Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, by V. Henry Gransee, Jr., Staff Attorney, for defendant appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "INTERCRAFT INDUSTRIES CORP. v. KAREN M. MORRISON and EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA\nNo. 8110SC68\n(Filed 6 October 1981)\nMaster and Servant \u00a7 108.1\u2014 unemployment compensation \u2014 absence caused by failure to find child care \u2014 not willful misconduct\nDefendant was not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits where she was discharged after a series of ten absences, the tenth of which was caused by her inability to find child care for Saturday work which was mandatory overtime. The employer had the burden of establishing claimant\u2019s discharge resulted from misconduct, and the employer failed to meet its burden.\nJudge Hedrick dissenting.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from Lee, Judge. Judgment entered 12 September 1980 in Superior Court, WAKE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 September 1981.\nPlaintiff (employer) appeals from a judgment affirming a decision by defendant Employment Security Commission (commission) that defendant Karen M. Morrison (claimant) is not disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits.\nPope, McMillan, Gourley and Kutteh, by William H. McMillan, for plaintiff appellant.\nT. S. Whitaker, Attorney for Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, by V. Henry Gransee, Jr., Staff Attorney, for defendant appellees." }, "file_name": "0225-01", "first_page_order": 253, "last_page_order": 257 }