{
  "id": 8521916,
  "name": "DARRELL G. HEMRIC, Employee, Plaintiff v. REED AND PRINCE MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Employer, and TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hemric v. Reed & Prince Manufacturing Co.",
  "decision_date": "1981-10-20",
  "docket_number": "No. 8110IC84",
  "first_page": "314",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Chief Judge MORRIS and Judge WELLS concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "DARRELL G. HEMRIC, Employee, Plaintiff v. REED AND PRINCE MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Employer, and TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "CLARK, Judge.\nIn an appeal from a decision by the Industrial Commission, the scope of review is limited to a determination of whether the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether the conclusions of law are supported by the findings. In order to be compensable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, an injury must result from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. G.S. 97-2(6); Barham v. Food World, 300 N.C. 329, 266 S.E. 2d 676, rehearing denied, 300 N.C. 562 (1980). Whether the injury arose out of and in the course of employment is a mixed question of fact and law, and where there is evidence to support the Commission\u2019s findings, this Court is bound by them. Barham v. Food World, supra; Hollar v. Furniture Co., 48 N.C. App. 489, 269 S.E. 2d 667 (1980).\nThis appeal presents only the question of whether plaintiff\u2019s injuries arose out of his employment with defendant-employer. The parties have stipulated that plaintiff\u2019s injuries resulted from an accident within the meaning of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, and his injuries clearly occurred in the course of his employment.\nIn Gallimore v. Marilyn\u2019s Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 233 S.E. 2d 529 (1977), the Supreme Court stated that the test of whether an injury \u201carises out of\u2019 the employment is:\n\u201cwhether the injury is a natural and probable consequence of the nature of the employment. A contributing proximate cause of the injury must be a risk to which the employee is exposed because of the nature of the employment. This risk must be such that it \u2018might have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as incidental to the service when he entered the employment. The test \u201cexcludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the workmen would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. . . .\u201d \u2019 Bartlett v. Duke University, 284 N.C. 230, 233, 200 S.E. 2d 193, 195 (1973). In other words, the \u2018 \u201ccausative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood. . . .\u201d \u2019 Harden v. Furniture Co., supra, [199 N.C. 733] at 735, 155 S.E. at 730.\u201d\nId. at 404, 233 S.E. 2d at 532-533.\nThe court in Gallimore relied on Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 188 S.E. 2d 350 (1972), where the facts are somewhat similar to the facts in the case sub judice. In Robbins the claimants were the survivors of two deceased employees of a grocery store. The estranged husband of one of the employees entered the store and shot his wife and a co-worker. The shootings had their origin in domestic problems. The husband was jealous, accused her of \u201crunning around\u201d with her co-worker, and had gone to the store and threatened to kill them. He also threatened to kill her employer if he continued to employ her. The Court reversed the Commission award to the survivors, holding that to be compensable the injury must be caused by a risk which is reasonably related to and created by the employment, and since the origin of the shootings was in the domestic problems of the husband and wife and not in the employment, the claimants could not recover.\nThe plaintiff makes the argument that Robbins is distinguishable on the facts in that in the case before us the violent nature of the Hicks-Williams relationship was a continuing one and that the deceased was given the responsibility of keeping a time record of Hicks\u2019 work, which required the claimant to be present in the office at the time of the shooting. But we find these factors present also in Robbins where there was a continuing threat of death and the duties of the co-workers required their presence at the store with the intimidated employee. Further, in Robbins the risk of death or bodily injury to co-workers was greater in that the threat of death by the outsider included other co-workers and was not limited, as in the case sub judice, to a threat against the one worker involved in the personal relationship with the outsider.\nThe Gallimore and Robbins cases are authority for the principle of law that an injury is not compensable when it is inflicted in an assault upon an employee by an outsider as the result of a personal relationship between them, and the attack was not created by and not reasonably related to the employment. The assault must have had such a connection with the employment that it can be logically found that the nature of the employment created the risk of the attack. See 8 Strong\u2019s N.C. Index 3d Master and Servant \u00a7 59 (1977), and 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 329 (1976).\nPlaintiff also argued that, had it not been for Smith\u2019s instructions to plaintiff that he keep a record of Hicks\u2019 hours, he would have been at the post office and not in the office at the time of the shooting. The shooting of plaintiff, and also the shootings of the employees in Robbins v. Nicholson, supra, occurred on the premises not because the victim was performing the duties of employment at the time of the assault, but merely because he was present on the premises. The serious injuries which plaintiff sustained were caused by the vicious and unreasoned criminal act of Williams, not by an accident arising out of plaintiff\u2019s employment.\nWhere the employee is injured in the course of employment by an outsider because of hate, jealousy, or revenge based on a personal relationship, the fact that the employer has knowledge of prior threats of death or bodily harm does not result in the injury\u2019s arising out of the employment. To allow compensation under such circumstances would have the practical effect of placing on the employer the duty of yielding to such threats of violence and terminating the employment of any worker so threatened. This would saddle the employer with a grossly unfair burden and the employee, in many cases, with an unjust job termination.\nWe find that the evidence was sufficient to support the Industrial Commission\u2019s findings of fact and that these findings support the Commission\u2019s denial of plaintiffs claim for Workers\u2019 Compensation benefits since plaintiffs injury did not arise out of his employment.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge MORRIS and Judge WELLS concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "CLARK, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Schoch, Schoch and Schoch by Arch Schoch, Jr. and Aaron N. Clinard for plaintiff appellant.",
      "Hutchins & Tyndall by Richard Tyndall and Richard D. Ramsey for defendant appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "DARRELL G. HEMRIC, Employee, Plaintiff v. REED AND PRINCE MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Employer, and TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. 8110IC84\n(Filed 20 October 1981)\nMaster and Servant \u00a7 59\u2014 workers\u2019 compensation \u2014 injuries from shooting by coworker\u2019s boyfriend \u2014accident not arising out of employment\nInjuries received by plaintiff at his place of employment when the boyfriend of a co-worker shot both plaintiff and the co-worker did not arise out of his employment where the assault resulted from the personal relationship between the co-worker and her boyfriend and was not created by or reasonably related to the employment, notwithstanding plaintiff was present in the office in which the shooting occurred because he had been instructed to keep a record of the co-worker\u2019s hours.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Opinion and Award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission entered 25 September 1980. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 September 1981.\nIn this proceeding plaintiff sought compensation for injuries he received at his place of employment when he was shot by the boyfriend of a co-worker. The parties stipulated that the provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act controlled the action, that an employer-employee relationship existed between the plaintiff and defendant-employer, that defendant insurance company was the carrier, and that plaintiff\u2019s average weekly wage was $192.31. Plaintiff appealed from the denial of benefits by the North Carolina Industrial Commission.\nDefendant Reed and Prince Manufacturing Company is a Massachusetts-based corporation with a regional warehouse-office facility located in High Point, North Carolina. Mr. R. J. Smith was regional manager for defendant-employer and in charge of the operations in High Point. Plaintiff was employed as an inside sales and purchasing agent by defendant-employer. The High Point office had four other employees in addition to plaintiff, one of whom was Doris M. Hicks, an office secretary.\nHicks had a boyfriend named Jimmy Lee Williams. During the two years of her employment, Hicks talked freely with her coworkers about the volatile and sometimes violent nature of her relationship with Williams. On one occasion Williams assaulted Hicks while on the business premises. When Hicks tried to end her relationship with Williams, he began to threaten her and made harassing telephone calls to her during business hours at least five or six times a day. Hicks was afraid of Williams and carried a pistol in her pocketbook for protection. Several days before the shooting, Williams placed an obscene message about Hicks on the front door of the business. This incident was reported to the High Point Police and investigated by them. Several employees feared for their personal safety from Williams after this occurred.\nAfter repeated complaints by other workers in the office that Hicks was not adequately performing her job because of her involvement with Williams, Smith decided to fire her. Another reason for this decision to terminate Hicks\u2019 employment was Smith\u2019s growing concern that Williams \u201cwas like a time-bomb\u201d and might do some harm. Smith asked plaintiff to keep a record of Hicks\u2019 working hours so that he could use her tardiness as justification for firing her.\nOn the morning of 16 May 1978, plaintiff arrived at work at 8:05 a.m. It was his custom to go to the office and then go to the post office to pick up the mail for defendant-employer. However, since he was keeping a record of Hicks\u2019 working hours, plaintiff remained at his desk until Hicks\u2019 arrival at 8:25 a.m. Upon Hicks\u2019 arrival, Williams appeared from a place where he had been hiding and fired three rifle shots at Hicks, killing her. Before fleeing, he fired four shots at plaintiff, seriously injuring him. Williams was later convicted of murder and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill.\nIn a hearing before the Deputy Commissioner of the North Carolina Industrial Commission, on 12 April 1979, plaintiffs claim for benefits under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act was allowed. The Deputy Commissioner found that defendant-employer\u2019s retention of Hicks as an employee increased the risk that other employees would be assaulted, and that plaintiff\u2019s injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment.\nUpon appeal by defendant, the Full Industrial Commission set aside the award of benefits to plaintiff. It found that the assault on plaintiff was unrelated to his employment and did not arise out of the employment, and therefore denied plaintiff\u2019s claim. One Commissioner filed a dissenting opinion.\nPlaintiff appealed the decision of the Full Commission to this Court.\nSchoch, Schoch and Schoch by Arch Schoch, Jr. and Aaron N. Clinard for plaintiff appellant.\nHutchins & Tyndall by Richard Tyndall and Richard D. Ramsey for defendant appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0314-01",
  "first_page_order": 342,
  "last_page_order": 347
}
