{ "id": 8522352, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF WALTRAUD H. HOLT", "name_abbreviation": "In re Holt", "decision_date": "1981-10-20", "docket_number": "No. 8112DC290", "first_page": "352", "last_page": "355", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "54 N.C. App. 352" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "247 S.E. 2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553754 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347-348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.E. 2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 N.C. App. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554406 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/25/0442-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 380, "char_count": 7309, "ocr_confidence": 0.804, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.050872942463661e-07, "percentile": 0.5539587443128924 }, "sha256": "e324953480d96f7ab00fdd8f21f7f7041c654e3528603c9e4d6bda4726cfdd95", "simhash": "1:8f98f68a627f3e86", "word_count": 1150 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:12:28.716896+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HEDRICK and Hill concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF WALTRAUD H. HOLT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Judge.\nThe involuntary commitment statute, G.S. 122-58.7(i), required as a condition to a valid commitment order that the district court find, by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, two distinct facts: first, that respondent was mentally ill or inebriate, as those words are defined in G.S. 122-36; and second, that respondent was dangerous to herself or others. In re Carter, 25 N.C. App. 442, 213 S.E. 2d 409 (1975).\nThe court found, in its oral ruling and its written order, that respondent was mentally ill. The record contains competent evidence, medical and non-medical, to support this finding. It is thus conclusive on appeal, and the first of the two statutory requirements is satisfied. In re Underwood, 38 N.C. App. 344, 247 S.E. 2d 778 (1978).\nTo satisfy the second requirement there must be (1) findings to support a conclusion that respondent was dangerous to herself or others, and (2) competent evidence to support such findings. Id. With reference to whether respondent was dangerous to herself, the oral ruling contained a finding that she was \u201cpresently incapable of managing her own affairs, incapable of properly caring for herself as to medication or as to proper nourishment.\u201d The written order contained a finding that she was \u201cincapable of properly caring for her medical needs, diet, grooming and g\u00e9neral affairs.\u201d These findings, if supported by competent evidence, would support a conclusion that respondent was dangerous to herself.\nPetitioner concedes that the portion of the findings relating to respondent\u2019s incapacity properly to care for herself as to medication \u201cdoes not appear from the record to be based on the evidence.\u201d The evidence likewise in no way indicates respondent\u2019s incapacity to care for her grooming needs.\nAs to the remaining portion of these findings, which relates to respondent\u2019s incapacity to care for herself in terms of proper nourishment and diet, the psychiatrist who examined her four days before the hearing testified:\nBy incapable of managing her own affairs I mean that in the withdrawn state she would not feed herself properly and do those things for herself that would maintain proper health. I have no personal knowledge of her not feeding herself properly. I only know what she said. She said that she would not eat if she suspected the food was poisoned.\nWhile this witness testified that respondent \u201cha[d] a history of . . . severe withdrawn state,\u201d he did not testify that she was at that time,experiencing it. Because his testimony that respondent \u201cwould not feed herself properly and do those things for herself that would maintain proper health\u201d related only to when she was \u201cin the withdrawn state,\u201d absence of evidence that she was in that state at the time the ruling was made renders the evidence insufficient to support the findings that respondent was incapable of properly caring for herself \u201cas to proper nourishment\u201d and \u201cdiet.\u201d- The, evidence that respondent \u201cwould not eat if she suspected the food was poisoned\u201d merely indicates normal behavior expected of any reasonable person. It thus is also insufficient to support the findings.\n\u201cOur function on appeal is . . . to determine whether there was any competent evidence to support the factual findings made.\u201d Underwood, 38 N.C. App. at 347-348, 247 S.E. 2d at 781. Exercise of. this function here discloses no evidence to support the findings from which the court could have concluded that respondent was dangerous to herself.\nWith reference to whether respondent was dangerous to others, the findings were not sufficient to support such, a conclusion. The court found, in its oral ruling and its. written order, that \u201crespondent ha[d] made statements to her husband of a threatening nature.\u201d There was no finding, however, and no evidence to support any finding that might have been made, as to when these statements were made, the nature of the threats they contained, or the danger to petitioner reasonably inferable therefrom. This finding thus was insufficient to sustain a conclusion that respondent was dangerous to others. See Carter, 25 N.C. App. at 445, 213 S.E. 2d at 411. Moreover, we take judicial notice that if a mere finding that a wife made threatening statements to her husband suffices to support a conclusion that she is dangerous to others, few wives could withstand such a conclusion.\nThe evidence was not sufficient to support the findings from which the court could have concluded that respondent was dangerous to herself. The findings were not sufficient to support a conclusion that respondent was dangerous to others. The second of the two statutory requirements for involuntary commitment thus has not been met.\nAccordingly, the order appealed from is\nReversed.\nJudges HEDRICK and Hill concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Lemuel W. Hinton, for the petitioner, appellee.", "Staples Hughes, Assistant Public Defender, for the respondent, appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF WALTRAUD H. HOLT\nNo. 8112DC290\n(Filed 20 October 1981)\nInsane Persons \u00a7 1.2\u2014 findings required by involuntary commitment statute \u2014 insufficient evidence to Support commitment order\nG.S. 122-58.7(0 requires, as a condition to a valid commitment order, that the court find by convincing evidence that (1) respondent is mentally ill or inebriate, and (2) respondent is dangerous to herself or others. Petitioner failed to meet the second prong of the test where the findings concerning respondent\u2019s incapacity to care for herself were not supported by the evidence, and evidence concerning threatening statements to her husband, without evidence of their substance, was insufficient to support a conclusion she is dangerous to others.\nAPPEAL by respondent from Cherry, Judge. Order entered 5 January 1981 in District Court, CUMBERLAND County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 September 1981.\nThis is a proceeding pursuant to General Statute chapter 122, article 5A, for involuntary commitment of respondent to a mental health facility.\nRespondent\u2019s estranged husband filed a sworn petition alleging that respondent was mentally ill and dangerous to herself or others. The facts on which the petition was based were stated as follows:\n[Respondent has a history since 1975 of psychiatric] treatment; hospitalized at Cumberland Psychiatric] Hospital in Dec 1978; received outpatient care from Jan to Sep 79; and had refused since th\u00e1t time to accept further treatment. Believes that certain unidentified forces are plotting against her, and preventing her from doing things that she wants to do; further [,] that there is a conspiracy against her. Frequently threatens to (roast) inflict physical injury upon the petitioner. Periodically complains of imaginary odors; claims her 4 children are speaking with voices different] from their own. Rapidly changing moods from passive to hostile behavior. Frequently calls the military police at Ft Bragg for imagined occurrences.\nThe district court, after receiving evidence from petitioner and respondent, made oral findings upon which it orally ordered respondent committed, \u201cfor hospitalization and treatment over a period of ninety days unless . . . discharged as by law provided.\u201d A written order of commitment was subsequently signed and filed.\nFrom the order of commitment, respondent appeals.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Lemuel W. Hinton, for the petitioner, appellee.\nStaples Hughes, Assistant Public Defender, for the respondent, appellant." }, "file_name": "0352-01", "first_page_order": 380, "last_page_order": 383 }