{ "id": 8522994, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF PATRICIA A. CRAINSHAW", "name_abbreviation": "In re Crainshaw", "decision_date": "1981-11-03", "docket_number": "No. 8119DC416", "first_page": "429", "last_page": "433", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "54 N.C. App. 429" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "248 S.E. 2d 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555146 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 S.E. 2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 N.C. App. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549855 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/40/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122-58.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 S.E. 2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553754 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 S.E. 2d 537", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519271 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122-58", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 476, "char_count": 9744, "ocr_confidence": 0.802, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3608438240779086e-07, "percentile": 0.6359222101365756 }, "sha256": "f6400c05af8f6bc9c8356915ec205e7dea9277a8bf4b65596287a306b3634a0e", "simhash": "1:d165e52eda0fbbe5", "word_count": 1586 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:12:28.716896+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge Wells concurs.", "Judge WEBB dissents." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF PATRICIA A. CRAINSHAW" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN (Robert M.J, Judge.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122-58.7U) requires as a condition to a valid commitment order that the district court find two distinct facts by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence: first that the respondent is mentally ill or inebriate and second, that the respondent is dangerous to herself or others.\nIt is for the trier of fact to determine whether evidence offered in a particular case is clear, cogent, and convincing. Our function on appeal is simply to determine whether there was any competent evidence to support the factual findings made. In re Monroe, 49 N.C. App. 23, 270 S.E. 2d 537 (1980); In re Underwood, 38 N.C. App. 344, 247 S.E. 2d 778 (1978).\nThe respondent contends that there is no competent evidence to support a finding or conclusion of dangerousness to self, either in the facts recorded in the court\u2019s order or in the record. The phrase \u201cdangerous to himself\u201d when used in Article 5A is defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122-58.2(1) as follows:\na. \u201cDangerous to himself\u2019 shall mean that within the recent past:\nI. That he would be unable without care, supervision, and the continued assistance of others not otherwise available, to exercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his daily responsibilities and social relations, or to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety; and\nII. That there is a reasonable probability of serious physical debilitation to him within the near future unless adequate treatment is afforded pursuant to this Article. A showing of behavior that is grossly irrational or of actions which the person is unable to control or of behavior that is grossly inappropriate to the situation or other evidence of severely impaired insight and judgment shall create a prima facie inference that the person is unable to care for himself. . . .\nThe statutory language established a two prong test for dangerousness to self. The first prong addresses self-care ability regarding one\u2019s daily affairs. The second prong, which also must be satisfied for involuntary commitment to result, mandates a specific finding of a probability of serious physical debilitation resulting from the more general finding of lack of self-caring ability. We have held that pursuant to G.S. 122-58.7\u00dc) the facts supporting danger must be recorded by the trial court. In re Caver, 40 N.C. App. 264, 252 S.E. 2d 284 (1979); In re Jacobs, 38 N.C. App. 573, 248 S.E. 2d 448 (1978).\nWe must agree with respondent that neither the facts recorded by the trial court nor the record supports a conclusion or ultimate finding of dangerousness to self. Alternatively, even if indicative of some danger, the facts do not support the finding that \u201c[t]here is a reasonable probability of serious physical debilitation to the Respondent within the near future. . . .\u201d\nThe judgment in this case discloses that the trial judge relied solely upon the testimony of the respondent\u2019s husband and daughter in its finding that the respondent was dangerous to herself. The court found that the respondent had forgotten to turn off the stove on many occasions, resulting in the burning of numerous pots and pans and a formica top; that she was forgetful; that she frequently talked to the wall; and that she appeared to be out of touch with her real surroundings. These facts may be evidence of mental illness, or under the broad language of \u00a7 122-58.2(l)a.l.I., danger characterized by inability to \u201cexercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his daily responsibilities. . . .\u201d However, these facts do not meet the second prong of the test, a reasonable probability of serious physical debilitation to her in the near future. The State presented no evidence showing the present or future effect of this behavior on the respondent. Forgetfulness and talking to the wall alone do not amount to danger as contemplated in the controlling statute.\nWe do not consider the respondent\u2019s remaining assignment of error.\nFor the reasons stated, the decision of the district court is\nReversed.\nJudge Wells concurs.\nJudge WEBB dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN (Robert M.J, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Webb\ndissenting.\nI dissent from the majority. Dr. Knoelke testified that he had diagnosed the respondent as having a manic depressive illness, manic phase. Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (1971) defines a manic depressive as exhibiting features similar to manic depressive psychosis which it defines as \u201ca major mental disorder manifested either by mania or by psychotic depression or by alternating mania and depression.\u201d I can only conclude from this that the respondent was suffering from a serious mental disease.\nThe majority holds that neither the facts recorded nor the record supports a conclusion of dangerousness to self. I believe the facts recorded which are supported by the evidence as to the respondent\u2019s major mental disorder, her behavior in not turning off the stove which resulted in burning the utensils and formica top, her talking to the walls, her being extremely forgetful, and her appearance of being out of touch with her real surroundings support a conclusion that the respondent was not able \u201cto exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of [her] daily responsibilities and social relations.\u201d I also believe the facts recorded support a conclusion that the respondent\u2019s behavior was \u201cgrossly inappropriate to the situation.\u201d This creates a prima facie inference that the respondent was not able to care for herself which satisfies the requirement that there was a probability of serious physical debilitation to the respondent if she had not been treated.\nI would hold that there was sufficient evidence from which the district court could find facts supporting a conclusion that the respondent was mentally ill and dangerous to herself and the district court should not be reversed for so finding.\nI vote to affirm.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge Webb" } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten by Associate Attorney Max A. Garner for the State.", "Special Counsel for the Mentally III Howard C. McGlohon for the respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF PATRICIA A. CRAINSHAW\nNo. 8119DC416\n(Filed 3 November 1981)\nInsane Person \u00a7 1.2\u2014 involuntary commitment \u2014 dangerous to self \u2014 dangerous to others \u2014insufficiency of evidence\nThe evidence was insufficient to support a valid commitment order under G.S. \u00a7 122-58.7(i) as the evidence supporting the trial court\u2019s conclusion was that respondent had forgotten to turn off the stove on many occasions, resulting in burning of numerous pots and pans and a formica top; that she was forgetful; that she frequently talked to the wall; and that she appeared to be out of touch with her real surroundings. These facts do not support conclusion or ultimate finding of dangerousness to self as defined by G.S. \u00a7 122-58.2(l)a.\nJudge Webb dissenting.\nAPPEAL by respondent from Tate, Judge. Order entered 5 March 1981 in District Court, BURKE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 October 1981.\nOn 24 February 1978 Mitchell Crainshaw initiated proceedings for the involuntary commitment of his wife, Patricia Crainshaw, pursuant to Ch. 122, Article 5A, of the North Carolina General Statutes. He alleged respondent was a mentally ill person who was dangerous to herself or others. On the basis of this petition, a deputy clerk of court ordered that respondent be taken into custody in order that she might be examined by a qualified physician.\nRespondent was then examined by Dr. James A. Buckingham in Concord, North Carolina. Dr. Buckingham determined that respondent was mentally ill and dangerous to herself or others.\nRespondent was next transferred to Broughton Hospital, where she was examined by Dr. Michael Knoelke, who also found respondent to be mentally ill and potentially dangerous to herself or others.\nThe matter was heard at Broughton Hospital, Burke County, on 5 March 1981, respondent being present and represented by counsel. At the hearing Dr. Knoelke testified that he had diagnosed the respondent as having a manic depressive illness, manic phase. He testified that the husband and daughter of the respondent had testified that the respondent had often forgotten to turn off the stove resulting in the burning of numerous pots and pans and a formica top. Also they testified that the respondent is extremely forgetful, frequently talks to the wall and appears out of touch with her real surroundings.\nRespondent testified in her own behalf and denied the allegations. In her opinion she was able to care for herself. She had done her own housework and cooking prior to her admission to the hospital. She testified that she was quite capable of meeting her needs for her basic necessities, at the present time and prior to her admission to the hospital.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the court made the following findings of fact:\nRespondent is diagnosed as having Manic Depressive Illness, Manic Phase. The testimony of her husband and daughter shows that she has forgotten to turn off the stove on many occasions, with the result that numerous pots and pans have been burned, and even the formica top. She is extremely forgetful, frequently talks to wall, and appears to be out of touch with her real surroundings. The court concludes that this unawareness amounts to severely impaired insight and judgment, raising a strong inference that she is unable to care for herself.\nFrom the foregoing findings, the court concluded as a matter of law that respondent was mentally ill and dangerous to herself and ordered that the respondent be committed to Broughton Hospital for a period not to exceed 30 days and that the respondent be committed to the Out-Patient Clinic of Cabarrus County for 60 days. From this ruling, the respondent appealed.\nAttorney General Edmisten by Associate Attorney Max A. Garner for the State.\nSpecial Counsel for the Mentally III Howard C. McGlohon for the respondent." }, "file_name": "0429-01", "first_page_order": 457, "last_page_order": 461 }