{ "id": 8520341, "name": "GEORGE REYNOLDS EVANS, SR. v. WILLIAM CHIPPS; CARNEY JAMES; DARRYL BRUESTLE and the CITY OF WILMINGTON", "name_abbreviation": "Evans v. Chipps", "decision_date": "1982-03-02", "docket_number": "No. 815SC605", "first_page": "232", "last_page": "237", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "56 N.C. App. 232" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 704", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570569, 8570621, 8570694, 8570655 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0180-01", "/nc/280/0180-02", "/nc/280/0180-04", "/nc/280/0180-03" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 N.C. App. 673", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552262 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/12/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 N.C. App. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554820 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/11/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 S.E. 2d 873", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "884" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560788 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 S.Ct. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 L.Ed. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "444 U.S. 842", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11330562, 11331077, 11331177, 11330314, 11330634, 11330411, 11330484, 11330714, 11330811, 11331006 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/0842-04", "/us/444/0842-09", "/us/444/0842-10", "/us/444/0842-01", "/us/444/0842-05", "/us/444/0842-02", "/us/444/0842-03", "/us/444/0842-06", "/us/444/0842-07", "/us/444/0842-08" ] }, { "cite": "567 F. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 906244 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/567/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 F. 2d 47", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10588877 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/529/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1985", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 S.E. 2d 919", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 806", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574340, 8574361, 8574382, 8574319, 8574393 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0806-02", "/nc/298/0806-03", "/nc/298/0806-04", "/nc/298/0806-01", "/nc/298/0806-05" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 N.C. App. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550997 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/43/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 525, "char_count": 11537, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5167889270572125e-07, "percentile": 0.6685692872441598 }, "sha256": "24914bb4ba79241cbeeead0ead56a445e5dc5e8bb0fd6e3b43c043c0c91f2ee8", "simhash": "1:80ca5fe2922eb64c", "word_count": 1918 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:44:21.707745+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HILL and BECTON concur." ], "parties": [ "GEORGE REYNOLDS EVANS, SR. v. WILLIAM CHIPPS; CARNEY JAMES; DARRYL BRUESTLE and the CITY OF WILMINGTON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\n\u201c[I]n determining the applicable statute of limitations, the focus should be upon the nature of the right which has been injured. . . .\u201d Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 229, 241, 259 S.E. 2d 1, 9, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 806, 261 S.E. 2d 919 (1979). In the present case, plaintiff\u2019s complaint, when considered in a light most favorable to him, alleges injuries to rights which arguably would produce the following causes of action: an action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for deprivation of civil rights under color of state law; an action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1985(3) for conspiracy to deprive another of his civil rights; false imprisonment; malicious prosecution; and trespass. For the actions brought under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1983, 85(3), the applicable limitations period is determined by reference to state law, Cox v. Stanton, 529 F. 2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975); that limitations period is three years, which is the time limitation prescribed by G.S. \u00a7 1-52(2) for actions founded on \u201ca liability created by statute, either state or federal.\u201d See Bireline v. Seagondollar, 567 F. 2d 260 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842, 62 L.Ed. 2d 54, 100 S.Ct. 83 (1979). Plaintiff\u2019s other causes of action, assuming they were adequately alleged, are subject to the following limitations periods: for false imprisonment, one year, G.S. \u00a7 1-54(3); for trespass by a public officer under color of his office, three years, G.S. \u00a7 1-52(13); and for malicious prosecution, three years, G.S. \u00a7 1-52(5).\n\u201cOrdinarily, the period of the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiffs right to maintain an action for the wrong alleged accrues. The cause of action accrues when the wrong is complete, even though the injured party did not then know the wrong had been committed.\u201d Wilson v. Crab Orchard Development Co., 276 N.C. 198, 214, 171 S.E. 2d 873, 884 (1970). Bireline v. Seagondollar, supra, however, states that the federal rule fixes the time of accrual of a right of action under the federal civil rights statutes, and that such time of accrual is the point in time when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. Assuming arguendo that all of plaintiff\u2019s claims arose on the very late date of 8 August 1977, the date on which he was sentenced to prison and a date on which he would necessarily have to have known of the injuries forming the basis of his action, all of plaintiff\u2019s possible causes of action would still be barred by the statute of limitations, since his complaint was not filed until 27 October 1980.\nPlaintiff argues, however, that the facts that he was in prison and that he needed time to prepare his suit prevented the statute of limitations from running against his action. This argument is without merit. G.S. \u00a7 1-17, which enumerates the disabilities which delay the running of a limitations period, does not include imprisonment; in fact, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws Ch. 252, effective 1 January 1976, is entitled \u201cAn Act to Amend G.S. 1-17 so as to Eliminate Imprisonment as a Disability Under the Statute of Limitations. . . .\u201d Plaintiffs imprisonment therefore did not prevent the running of the statute of limitations. Similarly, plaintiff cannot avoid the statute of limitations bar by the mere fact that he needed more time to investigate and prepare his case. See Wheeless v. St Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 11 N.C. App. 348, 181 S.E. 2d 144 (1971).\nPlaintiff also undertakes to make the argument that his filing of a complaint in United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina on 15 September 1978 and G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41 prevent a statute of limitations bar to his action. Of the alleged factual grounds for recovery contained in plaintiff\u2019s complaint in the present action, only two were contained in plaintiffs federal complaint. Those two pertained to defendants\u2019 alleged improper detention of plaintiff without his having been identified by the victim and their alleged deprivation of his right to counsel. With respect to the other claims not mentioned in the federal complaint, but raised in the present case, the federal complaint is wholly irrelevant. With respect to the two claims which were raised in the federal complaint, plaintiff would have us construe G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41 to save plaintiff from a statute of limitations bar. G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41(a) provides a plaintiff an additional year to file a new action after a timely action on that same claim is voluntarily dismissed. G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41(b) likewise provides that a new action may be filed within a year of an involuntary dismissal on a timely first action, if the court so specifies and if the court specifies that the dismissal of the first action was without prejudice. In the present case, there is nothing in the record to show that the two claims which first appeared in plaintiffs federal complaint were subject to either a voluntary or involuntary dismissal; in fact, plaintiffs claim for deprivation of counsel is still pending in federal court; plaintiffs federal court claim of improper detention was subject to a summary judgment in favor of defendants on 23 January 1979, and the court did not specify that plaintiff would have any additional time to file a new action thereon; finally, plaintiffs complaint in the present action was filed more than one year after the federal district court entered summary judgment against plaintiff. Plaintiffs \u201cRule 41\u201d argument is without merit. In addition, it should be noted that a civil action is commenced, in such a manner as to avoid a statute of limitations bar, if, within the period of limitations prescribed, a plaintiff files \u201ca complaint with the court,\u201d G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 3 [Emphasis added.]; plaintiff\u2019s filing of a complaint in federal district court was unavailing to prevent a statute of limitations bar in this action.\nWhen the record discloses that a plaintiff\u2019s claims against the defendant are barred by the statute of limitations, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and summary judgment is appropriate. Jarrell v. Samsonite Corp., 12 N.C. App. 673, 184 S.E. 2d 376 (1971), cert. denied, 280 N.C. 180, 185 S.E. 2d 704 (1972). Summary judgment in the present case was proper.\nAffirmed.\nJudges HILL and BECTON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HEDRICK, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Plaintiff appellant George Reynolds Evans, pro se.", "Nelson, Smith & Hall, by James L. Nelson; and City Attorney R. Michael Jones, for defendants appellees.", "Legal Services of the Lower Cape Fear, by James B. Gillespie, Jr., amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GEORGE REYNOLDS EVANS, SR. v. WILLIAM CHIPPS; CARNEY JAMES; DARRYL BRUESTLE and the CITY OF WILMINGTON\nNo. 815SC605\n(Filed 2 March 1982)\n1. Constitutional Law \u00a7 17; Limitation of Actions \u00a7 4.1\u2014 actions for violations of civil rights \u2014 statute of limitations\nThe three-year time limitation prescribed by G.S. 1-52(2) for actions founded on \u201ca liability created by statute, either state or federal\u201d applies to actions under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1983 and 1985(3) to recover damages for deprivation of civil rights under color of State law and for conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights.\n2. False Imprisonment \u00a7 2; Malicious Prosecution \u00a7 7; Trespass \u00a7 3\u2014 statute of limitations for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and trespass\nThe one-year limitation of G.S. 1-54(3) applies to an action for false imprisonment; the three-year limitation of G.S. 1-52(5) applies to an action for malicious prosecution; and the three-year limitation period of G.S. 1-52(13) applies to an action for trespass by a public officer under color of his office.\n3. Constitutional Law \u00a7 17; False Imprisonment \u00a7 2; Malicious Prosecution \u00a7 7; Trespass \u00a7 3\u2014 actions barred by statute of limitations\nPlaintiff\u2019s actions to recover damages for alleged violation of his civil rights under color of state law, conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and trespass were barred by the statute of limitations, the longest of which was three years, where all of plaintiff\u2019s claims arose by 8 August 1977, the date on which he was sentenced to prison and on which he necessarily would have known of the injuries forming the bases of his actions, and plaintiff\u2019s complaint was not filed until 27 October 1980.\n4. Limitation of Actions \u00a7 11\u2014 plaintiff in prison \u2014 time to prepare suit \u2014 statute of limitations not tolled\nThe fact that defendant was in prison and needed time to prepare his complaint did not prevent the statute of limitations from running against his suit to recover damages for alleged violations of his civil rights under color of state law, conspiracy to violate his civil rights, false imprisonment, trespass by a public officer under color of his office, and malicious prosecution.\n5. Limitation of Actions \u00a7 12.2; Rules of Civil Procedure \u00a7 41 \u2014 filing of complaint in federal court \u2014statute of limitations not barred in state court\nG.S. 1A-1, Rule 41(a) did not prohibit claims in state court which had previously been filed in a federal district court from being barred by the statute of limitations where there was nothing in the record to show that the federal court claims were subject to either a voluntary or involuntary dismissal; in entering summary judgment against plaintiff on one claim, the federal court did not specify that plaintiff would have any additional time to file a new action thereon; and plaintiff\u2019s complaint in the state court was filed more than a year after the federal district court entered summary judgment against plaintiff. Furthermore, plaintiff\u2019s filing of a complaint in federal district court would not prevent the statute of limitations from barring his action in the state court. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 3.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from Rouse, Judge. Order entered 20 January 1981 in Superior Court, New HANOVER County. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 9 February 1982.\nThis plaintiff was convicted by a jury of armed robbery and larceny, and judgments were entered against him on 8 August 1977 sentencing him to concurrent prison terms of thirty and two years.\nOn 27 October 1980, plaintiff instituted this civil action against William Chipps and Carney James, who are officers of the Wilmington Police Department; Darryl Bruestle, who is Chief of Police in Wilmington; and the City of Wilmington. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleges that defendants violated his civil rights and committed misconduct against him in that defendants Chipps and James arrested plaintiff on 22 April 1977 (for the offenses for which he was convicted) and denied his request for counsel, in that he was held on a criminal charge without having been identified by the victim on the night of arrest, in that perjured testimony and illegal evidence was used against him, in that there was a conspiracy to procure perjured testimony against him, in that a search of plaintiff\u2019s residence was conducted for the sole purpose of harassing plaintiffs family, and in that defendants Chipps and James changed police records and tried to destroy evidence exculpating plaintiff of the criminal charges then pending against him and failed to turn over other such exculpatory evidence.\nDefendants filed an answer denying the plaintiff\u2019s material allegations, pleading the statute of limitations as a bar to the action, and moving for summary judgment. On 20 January 1981, the court entered an order granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment, \u201con the basis of the Statute of Limitations barring the Plaintiff\u2019s action.\u201d Plaintiff appealed.\nPlaintiff appellant George Reynolds Evans, pro se.\nNelson, Smith & Hall, by James L. Nelson; and City Attorney R. Michael Jones, for defendants appellees.\nLegal Services of the Lower Cape Fear, by James B. Gillespie, Jr., amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0232-01", "first_page_order": 264, "last_page_order": 269 }