{ "id": 8520912, "name": "JAMES J. RORIE, Guardian ad Litem for CHICO RORIE, Minor Son, RACHEL L. RORIE, Deceased, Employee Plaintiff v. HOLLY FARMS POULTRY COMPANY, Employer; LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Rorie v. Holly Farms Poultry Co.", "decision_date": "1982-03-16", "docket_number": "No. 8110IC398", "first_page": "331", "last_page": "337", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "56 N.C. App. 331" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "128 S.E. 2d 598", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560408 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 So. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9904213 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/92/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-12", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis ours" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 S.E. 2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567907 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 S.E. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551315 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/30/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 671, "char_count": 13063, "ocr_confidence": 0.813, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.527646540942415e-08, "percentile": 0.3479212494628065 }, "sha256": "abe24bd564984a4d983b87498b58b79229b2a50eb222e5f44ecc9f8b6a0b7a97", "simhash": "1:3319944ffe8314d8", "word_count": 2139 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:44:21.707745+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge Wells concurs.", "Judge Arnold dissents." ], "parties": [ "JAMES J. RORIE, Guardian ad Litem for CHICO RORIE, Minor Son, RACHEL L. RORIE, Deceased, Employee Plaintiff v. HOLLY FARMS POULTRY COMPANY, Employer; LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN (Harry C.), Judge.\nThis is a case of first impression, necessitating a construction of N.C.G.S. 97-12(3), which reads: \u201cNo compensation shall be payable if the injury or death to the employee was proximately caused by: ... (3) His willful intention to injure or kill himself or another.\u201d We are asked on this appeal to consider whether Rachel Rorie\u2019s actions prior to her death constituted evidence of a willful intention to injure Beverly Thompson, and if so, whether this intent proximately caused her death. We will deal with each issue separately.\nWillful Intent To Injure Another\nAs this Court has not had occasion to interpret the words \u201cwillful intent to injure another,\u201d we find it instructive to examine the case law from other jurisdictions which have interpreted similar provisions. The parties would apparently adopt, without disagreement, the interpretation afforded by these cases as set forth in 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 11.15(d) (1978).\n\u201cThe words \u2018wilful intent to injure\u2019 obviously contemplate behavior of greater deliberateness, gravity and culpability than the sort of thing that has sometimes qualified as aggression.\u201d Id. at 3-184. Courts in other jurisdictions have considered two factors in reaching a decision that \u201cthe willful intent to injure another\u201d defense will preclude recovery. The first is the premeditative character of the assault. The second is the seriousness of the claimant\u2019s initial assault; that is, whether there was a reasonable expectation of bringing about real injury. Mere verbal abuse would not give rise to the defense of intent to injure. \u201cProfanity, scuffling, shoving, rough handling or other physical force not designed to inflict real injury do not satisfy this stern designation.\u201d Id. at 3-188.\nThe evidence in the record would support a finding that Rachel did not act impulsively. She deliberately pursued Beverly into the parking lot after announcing sometime earlier that they would settle their differences \u201conce and for all.\u201d However, the Commission failed to make a finding that Rachel Rorie\u2019s actions constituted an initial assault of a grave and aggravated nature. \u201c[T]here must be \u2018an easily perceptible danger of substantial bodily harm or death and a great chance that such harm will result.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 3-190 (emphasis ours). The Commission was able to find only that \u201cRachel got right up into Beverly\u2019s face and pinned her against the car. Beverly pushed Rachel from her. A knife was produced at this point by one of the combatants. The knife ended in Beverly\u2019s hands. It was used by her to stab Rachel to death.\u201d Therefore, absent a showing that Rachel either produced a knife, struck the first blow, or in some other way clearly manifested an intent to inflict serious injury upon Beverly, the defense should not be available. We hold that a finding of premeditation coupled with an initial assault intending serious injury is necessary to support a conclusion that a claimant\u2019s recovery is barred by her willful intent to injure another. This the Commission failed to do.\nProximate Cause\nThe second question presented by this appeal is whether Rachel Rorie\u2019s death was proximately caused by her willful intent to injure Beverly Thompson. Plaintiff would have us adopt the reasoning in Inscoe v. Industries, Inc., 30 N.C. App. 1, 226 S.E. 2d 201 (1976), aff\u2019d on other grounds, 292 N.C. 210, 232 S.E. 2d 449 (1977). In Inscoe this Court held that under former N.C.G.S. 97-12 a claimant\u2019s intoxication would preclude recovery only if it was the sole proximate cause of the injury. Under this statute the General Assembly had provided that \u201c[n]o compensation shall be payable if the injury or death was occasioned by the intoxication of the employee or by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-12 (1972) (emphasis ours). The present language of the statute was the result of a 1975 amendment to the Act and was therefore written without the benefit of the Inscoe decision. Thus we find no support for defendants\u2019 contention that the legislative decision to change the \u201coccasioned by\u201d language to \u201cproximately caused by\u201d was an effort to frustrate the holding in Inscoe.\nWe approve of both the reasoning and the conclusion in Ins-coe, and hold that under N.C.G.S. 97-12(3) the party seeking an exemption under the statute must prove that the claimant\u2019s willful intent to injure was the sole proximate cause of the injury or death in question. This holding is in accord with the purposes of the compensation statute. As stated in Inscoe:\nWe are of the opinion that a critical reading of our Workmen\u2019s Compensation law and a careful review of case law interpreting similarly worded statutes from other states support our conclusion that benefits under the Act should be foreclosed only when the evidence shows that the claimant\u2019s intoxication was the sole cause of the accident and not simply a factor from which the causal acts ultimately arose.\n. . . \u201c . the various compensation acts were intended to eliminate the fault of the workman as a basis for denying recovery.\u2019 \u201d... Workmen\u2019s Compensation is a law designed to eliminate certain common law barriers to recovery and the \u201c \u2018. . . various Compensation Acts of the Union should be liberally construed to the end that the benefits thereof shall not be denied upon technical, narrow and strict interpretation.\u2019 \u201d\n30 N.C. App. at 8, 226 S.E. 2d at 205 (citations omitted). Moreover, this decision is supported by the fact that where retaliatory force is excessive or where the original aggressor has withdrawn, the defense is not available. See Landry v. Gilger Drilling Company, 92 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 1957).\nThe Industrial Commission did not find as a fact or conclude as a matter of law that Rachel Rorie\u2019s willful intent to injure Beverly Thompson was the sole proximate cause of her death. Rachel died as the result of multiple stab wounds inflicted upon her, force clearly excessive under the facts of this case. It is not sufficient that the claimant\u2019s actions are such as to merely contribute to her injury or death as to do so \u201cwould virtually read \u2018fault\u2019 as negligence back into the statute in its broadest and most devastating sense.\u201d Inscoe, supra, at 9, 226 S.E. 2d at 206.\nOur opinion today interpreting N.C.G.S. 97-12(3) is consistent with the fundamental policy and purposes of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, among which are to remove the concept of fault as the basis of liability and to prevent the dependency of the claimant and his family. Hartley v. Prison Department, 258 N.C. 287, 128 S.E. 2d 598 (1962). Thus any provision in the Act precluding recovery should be strictly construed and its application carefully guarded. In the application of N.C.G.S. 97-12(3), there is a strong presumption that the injury or death was not caused by the claimant\u2019s willful intent to injure another, the burden being on the defendants to prove otherwise. This burden is not met by merely offering evidence that the claimant precipitated an argument, used \u201cfighting words,\u201d or otherwise \u201cgoaded\u201d a fellow worker into striking the first blow.\nUpon applying the foregoing to the facts of this case, we hold that defendants have failed to prove that Rachel\u2019s death comes within the meaning of N.C.G.S. 97-12(3). The decision of the Commission is vacated and the cause remanded to the Commission for the entry of a decision consistent with this opinion.\nVacated and remanded.\nJudge Wells concurs.\nJudge Arnold dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN (Harry C.), Judge." }, { "text": "Judge ARNOLD\ndissenting.\nI dissent. G.S. 97-12(3) in my view does not require a finding that there be premeditation and an initial assault. It simply requires a finding to support the wording of the statute that there be a \u201c. . . willful intention to injure . . . another.\u201d In this case there was more than mere evidence that the claimant precipitated an argument by \u201cfighting words\u201d or otherwise \u201cgoading\u201d a fellow worker. Rachel threatened Beverly several times, saying that she was \u201cgoing to get Beverly,\u201d that \u201cthat was the last time\u201d Beverly would let a box fall on her, and that \u201conce and for all\u201d she was going to \u201csettle\u201d with Beverly. Rachel then pursued Beverly to Beverly\u2019s car, and evidence supports the Commission\u2019s finding that she then \u201cpinned\u201d Beverly against the car.\nMoreover, in rewriting G.S. 97-12 the General Assembly provided that a claimant could not recover for an injury or death \u201cproximately caused by,\u201d among other things, a willful intent to injure. I do not agree that the Inscoe decision requires us to amend the statute by reading in it a requirement that the claimant\u2019s intent to injure must be the \u201csole proximate cause.\u201d", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge ARNOLD" } ], "attorneys": [ "F. D. Poisson, Jr. and Larry E. Harrington for plaintiff appellant.", "Hedrick, Feerick, Eatman, Gardner and Kincheloe, by Philip R. Hedrick and Hatcher B. Kincheloe, for defendant appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JAMES J. RORIE, Guardian ad Litem for CHICO RORIE, Minor Son, RACHEL L. RORIE, Deceased, Employee Plaintiff v. HOLLY FARMS POULTRY COMPANY, Employer; LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier Defendants\nNo. 8110IC398\n(Filed 16 March 1982)\n1. Master and Servant \u00a7 57\u2014 workers\u2019 compensation \u2014 interpretation of \u201cwillful intent to injure another\u201d\nIn workers\u2019 compensation proceedings, a finding of premeditation coupled with an initial assault intending serious injury is necessary to support a conclusion that a plaintiffs recovery is barred by her willful intent to injure another. Therefore, where decedent and another employee worked together in a poultry processing plant, a dispute arose, decedent deliberately pursued the other employee into a parking lot after announcing sometime earlier that they would settle their differences \u201conce and for all,\u201d and where a struggle ensued and a knife was produced which was used to stab decedent to death, the Commission\u2019s failure to make a finding that decedent\u2019s action constituted an initial assault of a grave and aggravated nature precluded a conclusion that plaintiffs recovery was barred. G.S. 97-12(3).\n2. Master and Servant \u00a7 56\u2014 workers\u2019 compensation \u2014 fight between employees \u2014 proximate cause\nIn a workers\u2019 compensation proceeding in which decedent died as a result of multiple stab wounds inflicted upon her after she engaged in a fight with another employee, it was not sufficient for the Industrial Commission to find that decedent\u2019s actions were such as to have merely contributed to her injury and death. Rather, the Industrial Commission should have reached a conclusion as to whether decedent\u2019s willful intent to injure another employee was the sole proximate cause of her death. Under G.S. 97-12(3) the party seeking an exemption under the statute must prove that the claimant\u2019s willful intent to injure was the sole proximate cause of the injury or death in question.\nJudge Arnold dissenting.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from the opinion and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission filed 29 August 1980. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 November 1981.\nThis appeal arises out of a stabbing death which took place in the parking lot of defendant employer\u2019s poultry processing plant. The deceased, Rachel L. Rorie, worked in the employer\u2019s labeling department, as did Beverly Thompson. There was evidence that personal animosity existed between Rachel and Beverly based to some extent on Rachel\u2019s belief that Beverly was intentionally causing boxes travelling down a conveyor belt to \u201cjump the chute\u201d and hit Rachel. There was testimony that on the evening of 19 April 1979, Rachel had been hit by one of the boxes and the two women exchanged angry words. At the end of the shift shortly after midnight, Rachel preceded Beverly out of the work area, stopped in front of her, and challenged that they were going \u201cto settle this once and for all.\u201d Rachel approached Beverly again outside on the steps of the building and the two continued to exchange angry words as they walked to the parking lot. One of Rachel\u2019s friends urged her to avoid a confrontation. When Beverly reached her car she opened the door, threw her purse and wrap inside, closed the door, then turned and faced Rachel. A pushing match ensued. A knife \u201cwas produced.\u201d It \u201cended up\u201d in Beverly\u2019s hand and she stabbed Rachel at least ten times, causing her death.\nBeverly testified that Rachel \u201ccame down at me with a knife. I reached for it and, you know, we was real close on each other.\u201d Other witnesses testified that Beverly was holding a knife behind her back while the two women were arguing on the steps of the building and that Beverly pushed Rachel first.\nThis action was brought before the Industrial Commission asking that compensation be awarded in the form of death benefits. The deputy commissioner concluded as a matter of law that although the accidental death arose out of and in the course of the employment, \u201cno compensation shall be payable, however, because the death was proximately caused by wilful intention of decedent to injure another.\u201d In a two-to-one vote, the full Commission upheld the opinion of the deputy commissioner.\nF. D. Poisson, Jr. and Larry E. Harrington for plaintiff appellant.\nHedrick, Feerick, Eatman, Gardner and Kincheloe, by Philip R. Hedrick and Hatcher B. Kincheloe, for defendant appellees." }, "file_name": "0331-01", "first_page_order": 363, "last_page_order": 369 }