{
  "id": 8521757,
  "name": "FRANCIS D. BUIE v. DANIEL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, d/b/a Daniel CONSTRUCTION Co.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Buie v. Daniel International Corp.",
  "decision_date": "1982-03-16",
  "docket_number": "No. 8110SC494",
  "first_page": "445",
  "last_page": "448",
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      "category": "reporters:state",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:44:21.707745+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Martin (Harry C.) and Wells concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "FRANCIS D. BUIE v. DANIEL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, d/b/a Daniel CONSTRUCTION Co."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "ARNOLD, Judge.\nIn this case we are called upon first to decide whether punitive damages may be recovered in an action based on an employee\u2019s discharge for seeking workers\u2019 compensation benefits.\nPlaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss plaintiffs punitive damages claim, contending that N.C.G.S. 97-6.1 does not preclude an award of punitive damages. We disagree.\nAs plaintiff correctly points out, G.S. 97-6.1 was passed by the legislature in response to this Court\u2019s holding in Dockery v. Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E. 2d 272 (1978). The Dockery opinion stated that no private cause of action existed under North Carolina law for an employee\u2019s dismissal in retaliation for claiming workers\u2019 compensation benefits. The legislature expressly created such a right, with the passage of G.S. 97-6.1, in the next session of the General Assembly. However, the wording of the statute clearly limits recovery to damages \u201csuffered by the employee\u201d as a result of the employer\u2019s violation of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. G.S. 97-6.1(b).\nPunitive damages, by their very nature, are not damages \u201csuffered\u201d by anyone. Rather, they are damages awarded to punish a wrongdoer, over and above the amount required to compensate for the injury. Whether, as plaintiff argues, the purpose of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act would be better served by the threat of punitive damages for its violation is not for this Court to decide. We are bound by the wording of G.S. 97-6.1, and any amendment thereto is within the realm of the legislature.\nPlaintiffs second argument is that the trial court erred in dismissing his claim for treble damages for defendant\u2019s alleged unfair trade practices in violation of G.S. 75-1.1. In support of this argument, plaintiff correctly notes that the scope of the statute was expanded by amendment in 1977 to apply to unfair practices \u201cin or affecting commerce,\u201d whereas the earlier version of the statute had set forth a more limited prohibition of \u201cunfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.\u201d Plaintiff contends that the more expansive language of the current statute is broad enough to encompass \u201call forms of business activities, including employment practices.\u201d We conclude otherwise.\nThe 1977 statutory amendment to which plaintiff refers was passed in direct response to our Supreme Court\u2019s ruling in State ex rel. Edmisten v. J. C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 233 S.E. 2d 895 (1977). Overruling this Court, our Supreme Court, in Penney, held that G.S. 75-1.1 as then worded was so narrow in its application that financing practices pursuant to credit sales by a retail store were not included thereunder.\nThe Supreme Court\u2019s restrictive construction of the statute apparently had not been anticipated by the legislature. Indeed, the General Assembly acted immediately to amend the provision so as to bring its application into line with the declaration of legislative intent which had accompanied its passage:\nThe purpose of this section is to declare, and to provide civil legal means to maintain, ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in business, and the consuming public within this State, to the end that good faith and dealings between buyers and sellers at all levels of commerce be had in this State. (Emphasis supplied.) State ex rel. Edmisten v. J. C. Penney Co., supra, at 316, 233 S.E. 2d 899.\nUnlike buyer-seller relationships, we find that employer-employee relationships do not fall within the intended scope of G.S. 75-1.1, in spite of plaintiffs strained characterization of the latter as \u201csale of employment skills.\u201d Employment practices fall within the purview of other statutes adopted for that express purpose.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial court dismissing plaintiffs claims for punitive damages and treble damages is\nAffirmed.\nJudges Martin (Harry C.) and Wells concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "ARNOLD, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Sanford, Adams, McCullough & Beard, by Charles H. Montgomery, Catherine B. Arrowood and Renee J. Montgomery, for plaintiff appellant.",
      "Thompson, Mann and Hutson, by George J. Oliver and Susan L. Hartzoge, for defendant appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "FRANCIS D. BUIE v. DANIEL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, d/b/a Daniel CONSTRUCTION Co.\nNo. 8110SC494\n(Filed 16 March 1982)\n1. Damages \u00a7 11.2; Master and Servant 8 69 \u2014discharge for seeking workers\u2019 compensation benefits \u2014 no punitive damages\nNo punitive damages may be recovered in an action based on an employee\u2019s discharge for seeking workers\u2019 compensation benefits since the wording of G.S. 97-6.1(b) clearly limits recovery to damages \u201csuffered by the employee\u201d as a result of the employer\u2019s violation of the Act.\n2. Master and Servant \u00a7 69; Unfair Competition \u00a7 1\u2014 employee\u2019s discharge for seeking workers\u2019 compensation benefits \u2014 no treble damages\nIn an action based on an employee\u2019s discharge for seeking workers\u2019 compensation benefits, the trial court correctly dismissed the employee\u2019s claim for treble damages for defendant\u2019s alleged unfair trade practices in violation of G.S. 75-1.1 since employer-employee relationships do not fall within the intended scope of G.S. 75-1.1.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from Bailey, Judge. Judgment entered 19 March 1981 in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 January 1982.\nPlaintiff brought this action for damages resulting from his alleged harassment and dismissal by defendant employer following his work-related injury. Plaintiff contends that defendant\u2019s action was taken pursuant to a policy designed to discourage employees from exercising their right to workers\u2019 compensation benefits. The trial court granted defendants\u2019 N.C.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiffs claims for punitive and treble damages. Plaintiff appeals from this dismissal.\nSanford, Adams, McCullough & Beard, by Charles H. Montgomery, Catherine B. Arrowood and Renee J. Montgomery, for plaintiff appellant.\nThompson, Mann and Hutson, by George J. Oliver and Susan L. Hartzoge, for defendant appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0445-01",
  "first_page_order": 477,
  "last_page_order": 480
}