{
  "id": 8522863,
  "name": "NADINE BEACH MOORE, As Administratrix of the Estate of Gwyn Beach, Plaintiff/Appellant v. PIEDMONT PROCESSING COMPANY and LUMBERMEN'S MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants/Appellees",
  "name_abbreviation": "Moore v. Piedmont Processing Co.",
  "decision_date": "1982-04-06",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Clark and Arnold concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "NADINE BEACH MOORE, As Administratrix of the Estate of Gwyn Beach, Plaintiff/Appellant v. PIEDMONT PROCESSING COMPANY and LUMBERMEN\u2019S MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants/Appellees"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WHICHARD, Judge.\nThe Industrial Commission concluded that plaintiffs decedent \u201cdid not suffer from disability as a result of an occupational disease within the meaning of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\u201d We find that the findings of fact, which are supported by competent evidence, adequately support this conclusion; and we therefore affirm the denial of benefits.\nThe chief medical witness testified as follows: Decedent worked 48 years in cotton mills, smoked about one pack of cigarettes a day for forty years, and was totally disabled when he applied for benefits. The primary causes of decedent\u2019s disability were bronchitis and emphysema. (In his 1979 examination report the witness had listed his \u201cfirst two impressions\u201d as \u201c1. pulmonary emphysema\u201d and \u201c2. chronic bronchitis.\u201d) Bronchitis is more commonly found among cotton mill workers than among members of the general public, but is not \u201cpeculiar to\u201d cotton mill workers. It is impossible to distinguish the relative contributions of bronchitis and emphysema to decedent\u2019s disability. Exposure to cotton dust \u201cprobably\u201d contributed to his disability, but cannot be said to have \u201ccaused\u201d it. Smoking played a \u201clarge role\u201d in his disability and \u201ccould or might\u201d have caused either the bronchitis or the emphysema or both. The relative contributions of cotton dust and smoking to the bronchitis cannot be distinguished. Decedent had no classic history of \u201cMonday morning\u201d symptoms.\nTo obtain benefits plaintiff must show that (1) decedent suffered from an \u201coccupational disease,\u201d that is, one \u201cdue to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular . . . occupation . . ., but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside of the employment,\u201d G.S. 97-53(13); and (2) this occupational disease resulted in disability to work. Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 304 N.C. 1, 12, 282 S.E. 2d 458, 466-67 (1981).\nPlaintiff assigns error to the following findings and conclusion of the commission:\nFindings Of Fact\n6. . . . [The doctor\u2019s] primary diagnosis or impression was pulmonary emphysema ....\n7. . . . There were no symptoms referable to the work environment ....\n8. Deceased was not disabled as a result of an occupational disease within the meaning of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act ....\n9. The primary cause of deceased becoming disabled was the disease emphysema, which is not characteristic of or peculiar to the textile industry. The primary cause of deceased\u2019s emphysema was the almost \u201c40 pack years\u201d of cigarette smoking.\n\u2021 * * 9fC * * *\nConclusions Of Law\n1. Deceased . . . did not suffer from disability as a result of an occupational disease within the meaning of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nThe findings of fact made by the Commission are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence in the record. Walston v. Burlington Industries, \u2014 N.C. \u2014, \u2014, 285 S.E. 2d 822, 827 (1982) (as corrected by N.C. Supreme Court order No. 116A81, filed 8 March 1982); Morrison v. Burlington, Inc., 304 N.C. 1, 6, 282 S.E. 2d 458, 463 (1981). The conclusions of the commission will not be disturbed if justified by the findings of fact. Inscoe v. Industries, Inc., 292 N.C. 210, 216, 232 S.E. 2d 449, 452 (1977); Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, \u2014 S.E. 2d \u2014 (filed 16 March 1982).\nWe hold that the Commission\u2019s findings are adequately supported by the medical testimony, and that the findings support the conclusion and award denying benefits.\nThe Commission made no findings regarding bronchitis. Plaintiff argues that under Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E. 2d 101 (1981), \u201cthis case [must] be remanded to the Industrial Commission for further findings as to the role of other diseases in causing decedent\u2019s disability, particularly with respect to the disease of chronic bronchitis.\u201d A remand was necessitated in Hansel because our Supreme Court was \u201cunable to say that the findings justify the Commission\u2019s conclusion as to causation and its award\u201d since \u201cthe medical evidence in the record [was] not sufficiently definite ... to permit effective appellate review.\u201d Hansel, 304 N.C. at 50-51, 283 S.E. 2d at 105. The chief medical witness\u2019 testimony here was \u201csufficiently definite\u201d to support the Commission\u2019s conclusion that decedent \u201cdid not suffer from disability as a result of an occupational disease.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nAlthough there was evidence to support a finding that cotton mill workers were subject to \u201cincreased risk\u201d of contracting bronchitis, see Booker v. Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 472, 256 S.E. 2d 189, 198 (1979), there was no compelling evidence that any higher incidence of bronchitis among cotton mill workers was \"due to . . . conditions . . . characteristic of and peculiar to\u201d that occupation, G.S. 97-53(13) (emphasis added). The chief medical witness testified only that bronchitis \u201ccould or might be caused in some instances by conditions characteristic of work in the cotton textile industries.\u201d The Commission was not bound to find from this evidence alone that bronchitis was an occupational disease.\nFurther, the Commission was not bound to find from the evidence that plaintiffs bronchitis was caused by exposure to cotton dust. The chief medical witness testified that he was \u201cunable to state with any degree of medical certainty the degree that either cigarette smoking or cotton dust exposure could or might have played in [decedent\u2019s] bronchitis.\u201d Thus, even if bronchitis were an occupational disease, plaintiff could properly be denied benefits because she had not proven that bronchitis due to cotton dust exposure caused decedent any calculable degree of disability.\nWhen a claimant becomes incapacitated for work and part of that incapacity is caused, accelerated or aggravated by an occupational disease and the remainder of that incapacity for work is not caused, accelerated or aggravated by an occupational disease, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act of North Carolina requires compensation only for that portion of the disability caused, accelerated or aggravated by the occupational disease.\nMorrison, supra, 304 N.C. at 18, 282 S.E. 2d at 470. Plaintiff had \u201cthe burden of proof \u2018to show not only . . . disability, but also its degree.\u2019 \u201d Id., 304 N.C. at 13, 282 S.E. 2d at 467.\nWe note that this is not a situation where \u201ca pre-existing, nondisabling, non-job-related condition is aggravated or accelerated ... by an occupational disease so that . . . the employer must compensate the employee for the entire resulting disability even though it would not have disabled a normal person to that extent.\u201d Id., 304 N.C. at 18, 282 S.E. 2d at 470. There is no evidence that decedent entered into cotton mill employment with a distinct condition that could have been aggravated by cotton dust exposure.\nBecause plaintiff failed to carry her burden of proving that decedent\u2019s disability resulted from a disease caused by conditions characteristic of his occupation, we affirm the findings, conclusions and award of the Industrial Commission denying benefits. See Walston v. Burlington Industries, supra-, Rutledge v. Tultex Corporation, supra.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Clark and Arnold concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WHICHARD, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gillespie & Lesesne, by Louis L. Lesesne, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.",
      "Hedrick, Feerick, Eatman, Gardner & Kincheloe, by Edward L. Eatman, Jr., for defendant appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "NADINE BEACH MOORE, As Administratrix of the Estate of Gwyn Beach, Plaintiff/Appellant v. PIEDMONT PROCESSING COMPANY and LUMBERMEN\u2019S MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants/Appellees\nNo. 8110IC572\n(Filed 6 April 1982)\nMaster and Servant \u00a7 68\u2014 workers\u2019 compensation \u2014 occupational disease \u2014denial of compensation proper\nThe Industrial Commission\u2019s findings that decedent was not disabled as a result of an occupational disease were supported by the evidence and the findings supported the conclusion and award denying benefits. Further, the Commission was not bound to find from the evidence that plaintiffs bronchitis was caused by exposure to cotton dust and, even if bronchitis were an occupational disease, plaintiff had not proven that bronchitis due to cotton dust exposure caused decedent any calculable degree of disability.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Opinion and Award entered 19 February 1981. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 February 1982.\nPlaintiff sought Workers\u2019 Compensation benefits for the pulmonary disability of her decedent allegedly caused by exposure to cotton dust. Commissioner Shuford entered an opinion and award denying the claim, and the full Industrial Commission affirmed. Plaintiff appealed.\nGillespie & Lesesne, by Louis L. Lesesne, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.\nHedrick, Feerick, Eatman, Gardner & Kincheloe, by Edward L. Eatman, Jr., for defendant appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0594-01",
  "first_page_order": 626,
  "last_page_order": 630
}
