{ "id": 8523747, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SAMMY RAY RIDDLE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Riddle", "decision_date": "1982-04-06", "docket_number": "No. 8128SC1039", "first_page": "701", "last_page": "706", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "56 N.C. App. 701" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "443 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182418 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" }, { "page": "576-77" }, { "page": "2791-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E. 2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "825" }, { "page": "824" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 N.C. App. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523425 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/54/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 S.E. 2d 3", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8607201 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 S.E. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5-6" }, { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568004 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E. 2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565031 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0113-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 512, "char_count": 10217, "ocr_confidence": 0.797, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0446031217563963e-07, "percentile": 0.7530191914663751 }, "sha256": "0c3a2c92710d929de018de4b92889f85f426ec5a2d946f73f998d5f32ddd7eaf", "simhash": "1:a0cdc11094608b2e", "word_count": 1742 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:44:21.707745+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN (Robert M.) and MARTIN (Harry C.) concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SAMMY RAY RIDDLE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Judge.\nThe principal issue is whether the court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. We find no error.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following:\nDonna Wood, while a passenger in a car driven by her husband, Ronald Wood, suddenly saw car lights in the middle of the road and saw her husband turn the steering wheel toward the right shoulder. There was a collision, and the Wood car went into an adjacent field. Ronald Wood died from injuries sustained in the collision.\nDonna Wood saw defendant get out of the other car involved in the collision and walk toward her. He told her that his friend owned and was driving the car, and that his friend had jumped out and run through the woods when the collision occurred. She smelled a strong odor of alcohol about him at that time.\nLloyd Messer observed the accident. As he went by the scene he saw a man \u201cstanding at the right-hand door on the passenger\u2019s side\u201d of the car which collided with the Woods car. The man was shutting or opening the door. Messer exited from his vehicle and attempted to assist Mr. Woods. While he was so engaged, defendant approached; and Messer could smell alcohol. Defendant told Messer the car belonged to and had been driven by his friend, and his friend had \u201crun out on him and run through the woods.\u201d Messer went to the woods, but could find nothing.\nWhen the investigating patrolman arrived, defendant told him the car belonged to his girl friend. He also told him one Gerald Ray had been driving. He \u201cindicated that Mr. Ray had supposedly left out the driver\u2019s door.\u201d The patrolman attempted to open that door and was unable to do so because of the damage it had sustained in the collision. The patrolman smelled a strong odor of alcohol about defendant, and observed that defendant was \u201cvery hesitant and swaying.\u201d In his opinion defendant\u2019s faculties were appreciably impaired by some type of alcoholic beverage. Defendant told the patrolman he had consumed four or five drinks of liquor. He told him he had not been driving the car. The only description defendant could give of the alleged driver related to the clothes he wore. The patrolman placed the name Gerald Ray in the PIN machine and found no one in the record by that name.\nAnother patrolman administered a breathalyzer test to defendant which produced a reading of .14 percent blood alcohol. Defendant also told this patrolman he was not driving the car.\nSheriff\u2019s deputies checked the area and could find no evidence \u201cregarding somebody running through the woods.\u201d When the wrecker driver requested the keys to the car which collided with the Woods car, defendant \u201creached in his pocket and got the keys out.\u201d\nDefendant testified on his own behalf as follows:\nHe had worked with Gerald Ray seven years previously, but had not seen him in a long time prior to encountering him at a bar the night the collision occurred. Defendant had consumed four or five drinks. He did not know how many Ray had consumed.\nDefendant and Ray went to the home of defendant to get the keys to defendant\u2019s girl friend\u2019s car. Defendant had pled guilty to driving under the influence three times in the previous ten year period. His license had been in suspension because of a DUI conviction. Consequently, Ray had driven.\nDefendant last saw Ray when the car stopped following the accident. While defendant was at the Woods car, he heard something going through the woods. He looked toward his girl friend\u2019s car, did not see Ray coming from there toward the Woods car, and assumed that Ray had run.\nDefendant admitted that he had produced the keys to the car when the wrecker came. He stated that he had pulled them out of the car when he went to look for the registration at the request of the investigating patrolman.\nIn ruling on the motion to dismiss, the foregoing evidence had to be considered in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable intendment and every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. If there was substantial evidence \u2014direct, circumstantial, or both \u2014to support a finding that the offense charged had been committed and that defendant committed it, a case was made for the jury, and the motion was properly denied. State v. McKinney, 288 N.C. 113, 117, 215 S.E. 2d 578, 581-82 (1975).\nDefendant does not dispute that the evidence sufficiently establishes that the offense charged was committed. He contends, however, that it does not suffice to establish that he committed it.\nWhile the evidence that defendant was the driver of the car which struck that of the decedent was entirely circumstantial, \u201cthe identity of the driver of an automobile at the time of a collision may be established by circumstantial evidence, either alone or in combination with direct evidence.\u201d Helms v. Rea, 282 N.C. 610, 616, 194 S.E. 2d 1, 5-6 (1973). \u201c[Circumstantial evidence is not only a recognized and accepted instrumentality in the ascertainment of truth, but is essential, and, when properly understood and applied, highly satisfactory in matters of the gravest moment.\u201d Helms at 616-617, 194 S.E. 2d at 6, quoting from State v. Alston, 233 N.C. 341, 344, 64 S.E. 2d 3, 5 (1951).\nViewing the circumstantial evidence here in the light required by the governing principles stated above, we find it sufficient for the jury to pass on in view of the following:\nDefendant was observed immediately following the collision exiting from the car which collided with decedent\u2019s car. No one other than defendant was observed in, at, or near that car at any time. Lloyd Messer and the Sheriff\u2019s deputies checked the woods area nearby and could find no evidence to support defendant\u2019s story that his friend who was driving ran through the woods. Defendant reached in his pocket and produced the keys to the car when the wrecker driver requested them.\nFurther, there were discrepancies within defendant\u2019s statements and between defendant\u2019s statements and the physical evidence. Defendant told Ms. Woods and Mr. Messer that his friend who had been driving owned the car, but he told the investigating patrolman the car belonged to his girl friend. He told the investigating patrolman the driver had exited from the driver\u2019s side, but the patrolman found the door on that side impossible to open because of the damage it had sustained in the collision. He indicated that he had known the driver for a long time, yet he was unable to describe anything about him except his clothes. Finally, there was no other evidence tending to show that the alleged driver even existed; and there was evidence tending to show that he did not. These discrepancies, together with the evidence set forth above tending to connect defendant and no one else to the death vehicle, were sufficient to render defendant\u2019s credibility an issue for the jury.\nDefendant relies on State v. Ray, 54 N.C. App. 473, 283 S.E. 2d 823 (1981). In Ray the evidence failed to establish that the car occupied by defendant \u201chad been operated recently.\u201d Ray at 475, 283 S.E. 2d at 825. The Court there stated that the car occupied by Ray \u201capparently\u201d hit the other cars. Ray at 473, 283 S.E. 2d at 824. The evidence here was clearly sufficient to permit a finding that the car from which defendant exited was in operation at the time of the collision and that it did collide with the car occupied by the decedent. The cases thus are distinguishable.\nDefendant also relies on Jackson v, Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 61 L.Ed. 2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). Jackson establishes that federal habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions will be allowed \u201cif it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d 443 U.S. at 324, 61 L.Ed. 2d at 576-77, 99 S.Ct. at 2791-92. We find the evidence here sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\nDefendant also contends the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of his breathalyzer test. Evidence offered on voir dire supports the court\u2019s findings of fact, which in turn sustain the conclusions leading to denial of the motion. The denial thus was not error.\nNo error.\nJudges MARTIN (Robert M.) and MARTIN (Harry C.) concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney G. Criston Windham, for the State.", "Swain & Stevenson, by Kenneth T. Davies, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SAMMY RAY RIDDLE\nNo. 8128SC1039\n(Filed 6 April 1982)\nAutomobiles \u00a7 113.1\u2014 involuntary manslaughter \u2014 defendant as driver of car \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nIn a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter arising out of an automobile accident, the State\u2019s evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that defendant was the driver of the car which struck that of decedent where it tended to show that defendant was observed immediately following the collision exiting from the car which collided with decedent\u2019s car; no one other than defendant was observed in, at, or near that car at any time; no evidence could be found to support defendant\u2019s story that his friend was driving the car and ran through the nearby woods after the collision; defendant reached in his pocket and produced the keys to the car when the wrecker driver requested them; defendant told an accident victim and another person at the collision scene that his friend who had been driving owned the car, but he told the investigating patrolman that the car belonged to his girlfriend; defendant told the investigating patrolman that the driver had exited the car from the driver\u2019s side, but the patrolman found the door on that side impossible to open because of the damage it had sustained in the collision; defendant indicated that he had known the driver for a long time, but he was unable to describe anything about him except his clothes; and there was evidence tending to show that the alleged driver did not in fact exist.\nAppeal by defendant from Ferrell, Judge. Judgment entered 3 June 1981 in Superior Court, BUNCOMBE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 March 1982.\nDefendant appeals from a judgment of imprisonment entered upon a conviction of involuntary manslaughter.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney G. Criston Windham, for the State.\nSwain & Stevenson, by Kenneth T. Davies, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0701-01", "first_page_order": 733, "last_page_order": 738 }