{
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  "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: TIMOTHY G. HAGAN v. PEDEN STEEL COMPANY and EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hagan v. Peden Steel Co.",
  "decision_date": "1982-05-18",
  "docket_number": "No. 8110SC819",
  "first_page": "363",
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  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Chief Judge MORRIS and Judge VAUGHN concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "IN THE MATTER OF: TIMOTHY G. HAGAN v. PEDEN STEEL COMPANY and EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nIn any judicial proceeding appealing a decision of the Employment Security Commission, \u201cthe findings of the Commission, as to the facts, if there is evidence to support it, and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined to questions of law.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 96-15(i). Even when the findings are not supported by the evidence, however, \u201cwhere there is no exception taken to such findings, they are presumed to be supported by the evidence and are binding on appeal.\u201d Beaver v. Crawford Paint Co., 240 N.C. 328, 330, 82 S.E. 2d 113, 114 (1954). In the present case, the findings of fact were not challenged and, hence, are conclusive; the sole question on appeal therefore is whether the findings of fact support the Commission\u2019s conclusion that the claimant was disqualified for unemployment compensation.\nG.S. \u00a7 96-14(2) provides in pertinent part, \u201cAn individual shall be disqualified for benefits . . . if it is determined by the Commission that such individual is, at the time such claim is filed, unemployed because he was discharged for misconduct connected with his work.\u201d \u201cMisconduct,\u201d in the context of G.S. \u00a7 96-14(2), has been defined as \u201cconduct which shows a wanton or wilful disregard for the employer\u2019s interest, a deliberate violation of the employer\u2019s rules, or a wrongful intent.\u201d Intercraft Industries Corp. v. Morrison, 305 N.C. 373, 375, 289 S.E. 2d 357, 359 (1982). \u201cMisconduct\u201d may consist in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee. In re Collingsworth, 17 N.C. App. 340, 194 S.E. 2d 210. (1973). Although it has been stated that, \u201c[ojrdinarily a claimant is presumed to be entitled to benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Act, but this is a rebuttable presumption with the burden on the employer to show circumstances which disqualify the claimant,\u201d Intercraft Industries Corp. v. Morrison, supra at 376, 289 S.E. 2d at 359, it has also been stated, \u201cEach claimant is required to show to the satisfaction of the Commission that he is not disqualified for benefits under the terms of this section.\u201d In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306, 310, 13 S.E. 2d 544, 547 (1941); see also State ex rel Employment Security Commission v. Jarrell, 231 N.C. 381, 57 S.E. 2d 403 (1950).\nWhatever party bears the burden of nonpersuasion with respect to the issue of disqualification, the conclusive findings of fact in the present case are that the \u201c[claimant was discharged from this job for gross insolence toward his employer.\u201d The question of law presented by this appeal therefore resolves itself into the following: Is discharge for such insolence a \u201cdischarge[ ] for misconduct connected with [the employee\u2019s] work?\u201d Such insolence does represent a wilful disregard by the employee of the employer\u2019s interest in maintaining a cooperative and harmonious employment environment. Supervisor-personnel relations are apt to deteriorate if personnel unjustifiably call their supervisors \u201cGod-damned liar[s],\u201d and such offensive and insulting behavior by the employee is properly characterized as a deliberate violation of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee. Although an employee\u2019s insulting outburst towards a supervisor may in some provoking circumstance be understandable, the Commission in the present case negatived any mitigating factors with respect to claimant\u2019s behavior when it described his conduct as \u201cgross insolence.\u201d The Commission\u2019s findings of fact support its conclusion that the claimant was discharged for misconduct. See In re Chavis, 55 N.C. App. 635, 286 S.E. 2d 623 (1982). The judgment of the superior court is reversed and the cause is remanded to the superior court for the entry of an order reinstating the order of the Commission.\nReversed and remanded.\nChief Judge MORRIS and Judge VAUGHN concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HEDRICK, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "No counsel for plaintiff appellee.",
      "Poyner, Geraghty, Hartsfield & Townsend, by Cecil W. Harrison, Jr., for defendant appellant Peden Steel Company; and C. Coleman Billingsley, Jr. and V. Henry Gransee, Jr., for defendant appellant Employment Security Commission of North Carolina."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: TIMOTHY G. HAGAN v. PEDEN STEEL COMPANY and EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA\nNo. 8110SC819\n(Filed 18 May 1982)\nMaster and Servant \u00a7 108.1\u2014 unemployment compensation \u2014 insolence toward supervisor \u2014 discharge for misconduct\nAn employee\u2019s discharge for gross insolence toward his supervisor because he called the supervisor a \u201cGod-damned liar\u201d constituted a discharge \u201cfor misconduct in connection with his work\u201d within the meaning of G.S. 96-14(2), and the employee was thus disqualified for unemployment compensation.\nAPPEAL by defendants from Brewer, Judge. Judgment entered 3 June 1981 in Superior Court, WAKE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 31 March 1982.\nThis appeal arises from a claim for unemployment compensation filed with the Employment Security Commission (Commission) of North Carolina by Timothy Hagan (claimant), formerly employed by Peden Steel Company (employer).\nThe Commission made the following unchallenged findings of fact:\n1. Claimant last worked for Peden Steel on November 25, 1980. From November 30, 1980 until December 6, 1980, claimant has registered for work and continued to report to an employment office of the Commission and has made a claim for benefits in accordance with G.S. 9645(a).\n2. Claimant was discharged from this job for gross insolence toward his supervisor.\n3. On the last day of his employment his supervisor was discussing the claimant\u2019s performance record (progress report). Among other things, the supervisor made reference to such short comings on the part of the claimant relative to his job performance, i.e. among other things, too many visits to the toilet, staying in the toilet too long, hindering other people at their work.\n4. During the course of the interview, the claimant addressed himself to the supervisor in the following manner,\n\u201cYou are a liar \u2014 you are a God-damned liar.\u201d Thereupon the claimant broke off the conference and left the room where the progress report was being made. The claimant was subsequently discharged.\nFrom these findings, the Commission \u201cconcluded that the claimant\u2019s actions . . . which precipitated his discharge contains [sic] the elements of misconduct\u201d and that the \u201c[claimant must, therefore, be disqualified for benefits\u201d since he was \u201cdischarged from the job for misconduct connected with the work.\u201d Upon claimant\u2019s appeal to superior court, the court concluded that \u201c[t]he findings of fact do not support the conclusion that claimant was discharged for misconduct,\u201d and reversing the Commission, ruled that \u201c[claimant is not disqualified for unemployment benefits.\u201d Defendants appealed.\nNo counsel for plaintiff appellee.\nPoyner, Geraghty, Hartsfield & Townsend, by Cecil W. Harrison, Jr., for defendant appellant Peden Steel Company; and C. Coleman Billingsley, Jr. and V. Henry Gransee, Jr., for defendant appellant Employment Security Commission of North Carolina."
  },
  "file_name": "0363-01",
  "first_page_order": 393,
  "last_page_order": 396
}
