{ "id": 8525653, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROGER RIVARD and STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KEVIN POWER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Rivard", "decision_date": "1982-06-15", "docket_number": "No. 815SC1344", "first_page": "672", "last_page": "676", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "57 N.C. App. 672" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "101 S.Ct. 924", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 L.Ed. 2d 842", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "449 U.S. 1113", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11862430, 11862629, 11862726, 11862342, 11862781, 11862506, 11862219, 11862254, 11862545, 11862675, 11862836, 11862587, 11862397, 11862462 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/449/1113-05", "/us/449/1113-10", "/us/449/1113-12", "/us/449/1113-03", "/us/449/1113-13", "/us/449/1113-07", "/us/449/1113-01", "/us/449/1113-02", "/us/449/1113-08", "/us/449/1113-11", "/us/449/1113-14", "/us/449/1113-09", "/us/449/1113-04", "/us/449/1113-06" ] }, { "cite": "638 F. 2d 1171", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1357427 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/638/1171-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E. 2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564413 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 S.Ct. 3018", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 L.Ed. 2d 1117", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "447 U.S. 925", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6235587, 6235299, 6234339, 6234950, 6236808, 6233739, 6234065, 6235858, 6237141, 6233461, 6237463, 6236469, 6234655 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/447/0925-08", "/us/447/0925-07", "/us/447/0925-04", "/us/447/0925-06", "/us/447/0925-11", "/us/447/0925-02", "/us/447/0925-03", "/us/447/0925-09", "/us/447/0925-12", "/us/447/0925-01", "/us/447/0925-13", "/us/447/0925-10", "/us/447/0925-05" ] }, { "cite": "618 F. 2d 1067", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1380673 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1072, n. 2" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/618/1067-01" ] }, { "cite": "654 F. 2d 1057", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1257933 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1068" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/654/1057-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 U.S. 266", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11340163 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" }, { "page": "602" }, { "page": "2539" }, { "page": "273" }, { "page": "602-03" }, { "page": "2539" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/413/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 465", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1532189 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472-73" }, { "page": "9" }, { "page": "2430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 U.S. 606", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1727 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" }, { "page": "626" }, { "page": "1978" }, { "page": "621" }, { "page": "629-30" }, { "page": "1981" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/431/0606-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 542, "char_count": 9374, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.505882454708161e-08, "percentile": 0.5230513439200509 }, "sha256": "be1e0c3c8a213755a5b40ac320c7af704e0d4adf33ed95e9396d79b49ab8e321", "simhash": "1:db78a3320234576b", "word_count": 1539 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:38.946391+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Arnold and Wells concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROGER RIVARD and STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KEVIN POWER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nDefendants first assign error to the denial of their motions to quash the bills of indictment. G.S. \u00a7 15A-1444(e) in pertinent part provides:\nExcept as provided in subsection (al) of this section [such subsection dealing with a guilty-pleading defendant\u2019s right to appeal the prison term to which he is sentenced] and G.S. 15A-979 [dealing with a guilty-pl\u00e9ading defendant\u2019s right to appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress evidence], and except when a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest has been denied, the defendant is not entitled to appellate review as a matter of right when he had entered a plea of guilty or no contest to a criminal charge in the superior court, but he may petition the appellate division for review by writ of certiorari.\nSince defendants pleaded guilty to the bills of indictment, they are not entitled to appellate review as a matter of right of the denial of their motions to quash, and defendants have not petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the denial of their motions to quash. This assignment of error therefore presents no question for review.\nIn their next assignment of error, defendants argue, \u201cThe Trial Court Erred in Denying Appellants\u2019 Motions to Suppress Evidence Obtained Illegally by the Government.\u201d This assignment of error is reviewable pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 15A-979(b). Defendants contend that the warrantless searches of their plane and of the duffel bags found therein violated the Fourth Amendment in that such warrantless searches were conducted without the requisite existence of exigent circumstances, and of probable cause to believe the searches would uncover evidence of a crime.\n\u201c[Searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.\u201d United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616, 52 L.Ed. 2d 617, 626, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 1978 (1977). The single fact that the person or item in question has entered the United States from outside suffices to endow border searches with the reasonableness required by the Fourth Amendment; there is no additional requirement that there be a showing of probable cause or the prior procurement of a search warrant. Id. Further, this \u201c \u2018border search\u2019 exception is not based on the doctrine of \u2018exigent circumstances.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 621, 52 L.Ed. 2d at 629-30, 97 S.Ct. at 1981. Rather, \u201c[t]he authority of the United States to search the baggage of arriving international travelers is based on its inherent sovereign authority to protect its territorial integrity. By reason of that authority, it is entitled to require that whoever seeks entry must establish the right to enter and to bring into the country whatever he may carry.\u201d Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472-73, 61 L.Ed. 2d 1, 9, 99 S.Ct. 2425, 2430 (1979).\nBorder searches \u201cmay in certain circumstances take place not only at the border itself, but at its functional equivalents as well.\u201d Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272, 37 L.Ed. 2d 596, 602, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2539 (1973). \u201cFor . . . example, a search of the passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after a nonstop flight from Mexico City would clearly be the functional equivalent of a border search.\u201d Id. at 273, 37 L.Ed. 2d at 602-03, 93 S.Ct. at 2539. (Emphasis added.)\nAlthough \u201cborder searches may be conducted regardless of whether customs officials have a reasonable or articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot,\u201d United States v. Sheikh, 654 F. 2d 1057, 1068 (5th Cir. 1981), \u201cthere cannot be [a] . . . border search without some degree of probability that the vessel has crossed a border, i.e. the officials must possess some articulable facts tending to show that the vessel has recently crossed an international border.\u201d United States v. Laughman, 618 F. 2d 1067, 1072, n. 2 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925, 65 L.Ed. 2d 1117, 100 S.Ct. 3018 (1980). Were the law otherwise, customs officials could search persons and property without any grounds for believing the border had been crossed, and such otherwise arbitrary intrusions would be retroactively legitimated by the subsequent discovery that the persons and property searched had recently come from outside the United States.\nIn the present case, the uncontroverted evidence presented at voir dire tended to show that defendants\u2019 airplane, and the contents thereof, were under the constant surveillance of customs officials from the time before it entered United States airspace until the time it landed in Wilmington; the evidence tended to show that the defendants\u2019 airplane was continuously tracked on radar even though the airplane manned by customs officials lost sight of defendants for a few minutes. Although the trial court did not make findings of fact to show the bases of its ruling, the necessary findings may be implied from the admission of the challenged evidence, since there was no material conflict of evidence on voir dire. State v. Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 268 S.E. 2d 452 (1980). Hence, the court\u2019s ruling implicitly contains findings that the airplane and contents searched were the same airplane and contents known to have come from outside the United States, and that the transnational character of the airplane and its contents was known to the customs officials who conducted the challenged search. These findings support the conclusion that the evidence was obtained pursuant to a valid border search, and, hence, the denial of the motion to suppress was proper. See United States v. Moore, 638 F. 2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113, 66 L.Ed. 2d 842, 101 S.Ct. 924 (1981). This assignment of error has no merit.\nThe order appealed from is\nAffirmed.\nJudges Arnold and Wells concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HEDRICK, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Daniel F. McLawhom, for the State.", "Crossley & Johnson, by Robert W. Johnson; and Richard S. Emerson, Jr., for defendant appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROGER RIVARD and STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KEVIN POWER\nNo. 815SC1344\n(Filed 15 June 1982)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 146.5\u2014 plea of guilty \u2014no right to appeal denial of motions to quash bills of indictment\nUnder G.S. \u00a7 15A-1444(e), defendants were not entitled to appellate review as a matter of right of the denial of their motions to quash where they pleaded guilty to the bills of indictment.\n2. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 3\u2014 border search of airplane\nThe trial court did not err in denying defendants\u2019 motion to suppress evidence of cocaine obtained by the government where the evidence tended to show that defendants\u2019 airplane, and the contents thereof, were under the constant surveillance of customs officials from the time before it entered the United States airspace until the time it landed in Wilmington, North Carolina which brought the search within the \u201cborder search\u201d exception.\nAppeal by defendants from Tillery, Judge. Judgments entered 15 September 1981 in Superior Court, NEW HANOVER County. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 27 May 1982.\nDefendants were charged in separate bills of indictment with felonious trafficking in controlled substances by transporting and possessing more than 400 grams of cocaine, in violation of G.S. \u00a7 90-95. Defendants moved to quash the indictments, and such motion was denied on 14 September 1981. Defendants also moved \u201cto suppress all evidence seized on or about the 7th day of June, 1981, as the result of a search of defendants and defendants\u2019 effects at the New Hanover County Airport.\u201d On voir dire, uncon-troverted evidence was offered tending to show the following: At about 9:00 p.m. on 6 June 1981, a Customs Air Officer for the United States Customs Service spotted an aircraft on the radar he was operating; the radar indicated that the aircraft was in flight in an area beyond United States territorial waters, but that the aircraft, while in flight, eventually entered the United States on either late 6 June or early 7 June 1981; the flight of the aircraft was continuously tracked by radar, and the airplane itself was intercepted and followed, except for a five minute interval during which it was not visible, by a United States Customs Service airplane; the airplane being tracked landed at New Hanover County Airport in Wilmington, North Carolina, and from it emerged the defendants; upon the landing of the aircraft, U.S. Customs Officers who had tracked defendants\u2019 plane and were aware of its having initially been spotted en route from outside the United States, searched the defendants\u2019 airplane and removed therefrom numerous nylon duffel bags; the officers then unzipped one of the nylon duffel bags, which weighed forty or fifty pounds, and found therein another padlocked nylon bag, which they slit open with a knife and found therein plastic packages containing cocaine. The trial court, at the conclusion of voir dire, denied defendants\u2019 motions to suppress \u201cthe evidence seized from the airplane.\u201d\nDefendants thereupon changed their pleas to guilty as charged, and reserved their rights to appeal the denials of their motions to quash and to suppress. From judgments imposing on each defendant a prison term of no more than nor less than sixteen years, defendants appealed.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Daniel F. McLawhom, for the State.\nCrossley & Johnson, by Robert W. Johnson; and Richard S. Emerson, Jr., for defendant appellants." }, "file_name": "0672-01", "first_page_order": 702, "last_page_order": 706 }