{ "id": 8523629, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT JOSEPH LUCAS, JR.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Lucas", "decision_date": "1982-07-06", "docket_number": "No. 813SC1307", "first_page": "141", "last_page": "146", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "58 N.C. App. 141" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "103 S.E. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 N.C. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622192 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/248/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E. 2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568006 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 S.E. 2d 95", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 N.C. App. 732", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555355 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/20/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 U.S. 1073", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6501988, 6502182, 6501705, 6501901, 6502479, 6502064, 6501810, 6501653, 6502296, 6502395 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/423/1073-05", "/us/423/1073-07", "/us/423/1073-02", "/us/423/1073-04", "/us/423/1073-10", "/us/423/1073-06", "/us/423/1073-03", "/us/423/1073-01", "/us/423/1073-08", "/us/423/1073-09" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E. 2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "877" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 N.C. App. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551222 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/26/0259-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 525, "char_count": 10778, "ocr_confidence": 0.82, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2284104443170226e-07, "percentile": 0.6050715698096685 }, "sha256": "109c7bb047cf2843868b236133ee3374b331112f36e21cd882842f02334b60d5", "simhash": "1:bfeb55bc506003e1", "word_count": 1738 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:20:52.636886+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges VAUGHN and MARTIN (Harry C.) concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT JOSEPH LUCAS, JR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HILL, Judge.\nIn Pitt County case No. 80CRS607, defendant was charged with misdemeanor larceny, to which he pleaded guilty in superior court as a part of a plea bargain. He was given a two year suspended sentence and placed on probation for three years. In case No. 80CRS12196, defendant was charged with misdemeanor trespass, and in case No. 80CRS12197, defendant was charged with failure to stop at the scene of an accident. Again as a part of a plea bargain, defendant pleaded guilty to both charges in superior court. The cases were consolidated for judgment and defendant was given a two year suspended sentence and placed on probation for three years. In Wake County case No. 79CRS72590, transferred for supervision to Pitt County and known there as No. 81CRS7359, defendant was charged with misdemeanor credit card fraud. He was given a twelve month suspended sentence and placed on probation for three years.\nOn 11 February 1981, defendant\u2019s probation in case No. 80CRS607 was modified to include the condition of probation required in No. 80CRS12196 and No. 80CRS12197, that he \u201c[ejnter the program administered by Health Services of the Roanoke Valley, . . . Roanoke, [Virginia], initially at Hegira House and subsequently at Omni House, and that he satisfactorily attend and complete the requirements of said program.\u201d A probation violation report was filed on 13 March 1981 stating that \u201con March 3, 1981 Hegira House terminated the defendant from its program for his being unmotivated, uncommitted and extremely resistant to the treatment offered to him at Hegira House . . . .\u201d\nA hearing on the revocation of defendant\u2019s probation was convened on 18 May 1981 at which the State\u2019s evidence tends to show that defendant did not wish to be at Hegira House. Henry L. Altice, director of Hegira House, testified that the treatment at the house was based upon \u201cinsight therapy\u201d and group confrontation. Basically, Altice stated, \u201cIf you do something, you get something for it. If you don\u2019t, you get dealt with for it. But in terms of actual therapy, there are all types of therapy\u2014 energetics, reality, and encounter therapy. One to one counselling and family therapy.\u201d Altice further testified that defendant did not perform his assigned tasks at Hegira House and refused to give urine specimens used to monitor drug usage. In sum, Altice stated that defendant \u201cwas terminated because of the lack of commitment and involving himself into the process of the program and refusing to take care of himself and in giving urinalysis, and disobeying directions from the staff to work on his crew when he was expected to do that.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s evidence tends to show that the Hegira House method of treatment was inappropriate for defendant. Dr. James L. Mathis, a psychiatrist, testified that \u201c[a] confrontive-type environment as described by Mr. Altice would create in [defendant] a tremendous anxiety and create in him a tremendous desire to escape and get away from there.\u201d Defendant testified that he did not understand the treatment program at Hegira House and was rebuffed when he made inquiries about \u201cwhat was going on.\u201d Defendant described various \u201cconfrontation\u201d methods used at the house that involved yelling obscenities at him to induce crying, and deprivation of sleep, food, and contact with \u201cthe family.\u201d He stated that he had trouble giving the urine specimens because he had to give them in front of other people. Defendant also admitted that he refused to give urine specimens and that he disobeyed directions from the staff, but he apparently was told by a doctor to refrain from certain activities because of a back ailment caused by a previous automobile injury.\nThe judge found as a fact that defendant \u201cwilfully and without lawful excuse violated his special condition of probation ... by refusing to attend and complete the requirements of the program ... at Hegira House,\u201d and ordered that defendant\u2019s probation be revoked and the suspended sentences be immediately effectuated.\nOn 4 June 1981, defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief in superior court stating that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that \u201c[t]he acts charged in the criminal pleading did not constitute a violation of criminal law,\u201d and that the sentence was illegally imposed or otherwise invalid as a matter of law. The motion was \u201cdeemed .denied\u201d because defendant already had given notice of appeal from the orders revoking his probation and the superior court thereby had no jurisdiction.\nThe appeals from the orders revoking defendant\u2019s probation and from the order denying his motion for appropriate relief were consolidated for our disposition on 2 September 1981.\nDefendant first argues that the judge had no jurisdiction or authority to revoke his probation and effectuate his suspended sentences because the warrant in case No. 80CRS12197 is fatally defective. The warrant states, in part, as follows:\n[Defendant named above did unlawfully, willfully, . . . fail to stop at the scene of an accident and collision occurring on N.C. 33 . . . Highway ... in which the vehicle driven by the defendant was involved.\nG.S. 20466(b), under which defendant was charged in this warrant, states, in part, as follows:\nThe driver of any vehicle involved in an accident or collision resulting in damage to property and in which there is not involved injury or death of any person shall immediately stop his vehicle at the scene of the accident or collision and shall give his name, address, driver\u2019s license number and the registration number of his vehicle to the driver or occupants of any other vehicle involved in the accident or collision or to any person whose property is damaged in the accident or collision . . ..\n(Emphasis added.) Thus, defendant contends that the warrant quoted above is fatally defective because it did not charge the essential elements of the crime; to wit, defendant\u2019s failure to give his name, address, driver\u2019s license number, and registration number of his vehicle.\n\u201cThe driver violates the statute if he does not immediately stop at the scene.\u201d State v. Norris, 26 N.C. App. 259, 262, 215 S.E. 2d 875, 877 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976). In Norris, this Court held that the warrant\u2019s allegations that Norris \u201c \u2018did fail to . . . give his name, address, operator\u2019s lie. number and registration number of his vehicle . . .\u2019 would become relevant only if there was some evidence that he immediately stopped at the scene.\u201d Id.\nWe distinguish the present case from State v. Wiley, 20 N.C. App. 732, 203 S.E. 2d 95 (1974), which is cited by defendant. In Wiley, the warrant read, in part, as follows:\n[Defendant . . . did unlawfully and willfully operate a motor vehicle on a public street or public highway: By leaving the scene of a collision (property damage only) in violation of and contrary to the form of the statute . . ..\nId. at 732, 203 S.E. 2d at 95 (emphasis added). The evidence was uncontroverted that the driver of the truck fled the scene of the accident. This Court arrested judgment because the warrant did not charge Wiley with operating the motor vehicle which was involved in the accident, and it did not charge that Wiley failed to give his name, address, and driver\u2019s license number before leaving the scene of the accident. Id. Having stopped, Wiley could have given the information required by G.S. 20466(b); therefore, that warrant was fatally defective. In the present case, however, defendant was charged with failing to stop at the scene of an accident. Not having stopped, defendant could not have given the information required by the statute.\nUnder the principles stated in Norris, we find that the warrant in case No. 80CRS12197 is sufficient to charge the offense. Defendant\u2019s remaining arguments on this point, dependent upon the above disposition, are likewise without merit.\nDefendant\u2019s final arguments challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judge\u2019s findings of fact, conclusions, and orders revoking defendant\u2019s probation. As noted above, the judge found as a fact that \u201cdefendant has wilfully and without lawful excuse violated his special condition of probation ... by refusing to attend and complete the requirements of the program ... at Hegira House . . ..\u201d\nIt is well settled that in a probation revocation hearing, \u201c[a]ll that is required ... is that the evidence be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge in the exercise of his sound discretion that the defendant has willfully violated a valid condition of probation or that the defendant has violated without lawful excuse a valid condition upon which the sentence was suspended.\u201d State v. Hewitt, 270 N.C. 348, 353, 154 S.E. 2d 476, 480 (1967), and cases cited therein. Of course, the judge\u2019s findings of fact in such a hearing should be definite and not conclusory. State v. Robinson, 248 N.C. 282, 103 S.E. 2d 376 (1958).\nWe conclude that the evidence recounted above is sufficient to support the judge\u2019s finding of fact that defendant \u201cwilfully and without lawful excuse\u201d violated the condition of his probation \u201cby refusing to attend and complete\u201d the Hegira House program. Further, the findings of fact are sufficiently definite to support the order revoking defendant\u2019s probation. The judge need not make extensive findings of fact, but they must be sufficient to satisfy the requirements quoted above in light of the evidence presented. This the judge accomplished in the present case.\nFor these reasons, the orders are\nAffirmed.\nJudges VAUGHN and MARTIN (Harry C.) concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HILL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Special Deputy Attorney General Ann Reed, for the State.", "Jeffrey L. Miller and Tharrington, Smith & Hargrove, by Wade M. Smith, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT JOSEPH LUCAS, JR.\nNo. 813SC1307\n(Filed 6 July 1982)\n1. Automobiles and Other Vehicles \u00a7 131\u2014 failure to stop at accident scene \u2014sufficiency of warrant\nA warrant charging that defendant unlawfully failed to stop at the scene of an accident in which the vehicle driven by defendant was involved was sufficient to charge a crime under G.S. 20-166(b) without additional allegations that defendant failed to give his name, address, driver\u2019s license number, and the registration number of his vehicle.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 143.6\u2014 violation of probation condition \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe evidence in a probation revocation hearing was sufficient to support the trial judge\u2019s finding that defendant \u201cwillfully and without lawful excuse\u201d violated a condition of his probation by refusing to attend and complete a treatment program.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Small, Judge and from Brown, Judge. Orders entered 18 May 1981 and 14 July 1981 in Superior Court, PITT County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 May 1982.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Special Deputy Attorney General Ann Reed, for the State.\nJeffrey L. Miller and Tharrington, Smith & Hargrove, by Wade M. Smith, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0141-01", "first_page_order": 173, "last_page_order": 178 }