{ "id": 8525827, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY EDELL WILLIS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Willis", "decision_date": "1982-08-17", "docket_number": "No. 8110SC1289", "first_page": "617", "last_page": "624", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "58 N.C. App. 617" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "242 S.E. 2d 184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 N.C. App. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551167 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/35/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 U.S. 23", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8495 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/374/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 S.E. 2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 N.C. App. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547778 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/33/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 L.Ed. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 U.S. 10", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6156920 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" }, { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/333/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 U.S. 108", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6165107 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" }, { "page": "1513" }, { "page": "727" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/378/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 U.S. 643", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1785580 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/367/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 S.E. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568083 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 S.E. 2d 906", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "908" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567263 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 S.E. 2d 184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "35 N.C. App. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551167 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/35/0634-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 710, "char_count": 14963, "ocr_confidence": 0.806, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.907597123529909e-08, "percentile": 0.41983895586190545 }, "sha256": "f5a642b99b39cf168bb2e158b57d1d9641d75458d29528bfa024efa11b4eba45", "simhash": "1:b867747a5673b558", "word_count": 2470 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:20:52.636886+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge MARTIN concurs.", "Judge Becton dissents." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY EDELL WILLIS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MORRIS, Chief Judge.\nDefendant was indicted for trafficking in heroin, a violation of G.S. 90-95(h)(4)(a). After the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his premises, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the lesser included offense of simple possession of heroin. In his plea, defendant preserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, G.S. 15A-979. His appeal consists of two arguments supporting his contention that the motion to suppress should have been allowed. For the reasons stated below, we reject defendant\u2019s arguments and affirm the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his home.\nI\nOn 5 August 1980, Raleigh Police Detective Glover filed an application for a warrant to search a house at 526 S. Person Street. He swore to the following statement to establish probable cause for issuance of the warrant:\nOn 8/5/80 this investigator received information from a reliable informant who stated that Anthony Willis has a quantity of Heroin at 526 S. Person Street, Raleigh, North Carolina. This informant stated that he had seen a quantity of Heroin at 526 S. Person Street, also he saw Anthony Willis sale (sic) a spoon of Heroin to a Black Male within the past 72 hours. This informant has proven to be reliable on 2 different occasions in the past 2 years. This informant has made a con-troll (sic) buy of Heroin for Det. A. C. Munday and this Investigator. One person has been arrested for drug violation from this informants\u2019 information.\nHaving obtained the warrant, he and eight other officers proceeded to 526 S. Person Street. According to State\u2019s evidence at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, when the officers were approaching the address, they observed defendant\u2019s father and others standing in front of the house. Police Sergeant Peoples jumped from his automobile, ran to the house, and, as soon as he made entry to the house, shouted, \u201cPolice.\u201d Detective O\u2019Shields, who followed Sergeant Peoples into the house, testified that the main wooden door was completely open and the outer screen door was ajar. The officers found defendant and a woman in the second room of the house. After the people outside the house were brought in, Detective Glover read the search warrant, and a search was initiated. Fifty-eight grams of heroin were found.\nDefendant\u2019s cross-examination of State\u2019s witnesses, as well as affidavits and a transcript from his probable cause hearing, tended to show that the house at 526 S. Person was a shotgun house with three rooms; that, upon the officers\u2019 arrival at the house in unmarked cars, some officers went to the backdoor; that none of the officers had on police uniforms; that the officers heard no commotion before entering the house, and that Sergeant Peoples was in the living room of the dwelling when he shouted, \u201cPolice.\u201d\nThe trial court found, among other things, that defendant lived at the residence at 526 S. Person Street, and that he, therefore, had an expectation of privacy in the premises. The court also found that the search was conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant and that Sergeant Peoples announced, \u201cPolice\u201d at the same time as he was crossing the threshold and entering the premises. The court concluded that any violation of G.S. 15A-241 through G.S. 15A-259 was \u201cmerely technical in nature and effect\u201d and was not substantial enough to require exclusion pursuant to G.S. 15A-974.\nII\nDefendant\u2019s first argument is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during the search because the warrant authorizing the search was based upon an affidavit that was insufficient to establish probable cause for issuance of the warrant. This argument is, of course, grounded in the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961).\nIn Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed. 2d 723 (1964), the Supreme Court dealt with constitutional requirements for obtaining a state search warrant. It emphasized that the protection guaranteed by the 4th Amendment consists in requiring that inferences drawn to support the issuance of a search warrant be drawn by a \u201cneutral and detached\u201d magistrate, not by police officers \u201cengaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.\u201d Id. at 111, 84 S.Ct. at 1513, 12 L.Ed. 2d at 727, quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436, 440 (1948). The application for the warrant must allege facts by which the magistrate can determine whether there is probable cause to support the warrant. Mere conclusions of the officer applying for the warrant or of the informant are not sufficient.\nNorth Carolina has statutorily set forth requirements for the contents of the application for a search warrant, the pertinent ones of which are:\n(2) A statement that there is probable cause to believe that items subject to seizure under G.S. 15A-242 may be found in or upon a designated or described place, vehicle, or person; and\n(3) Allegations of fact supporting the statement. The statements must be supported by one or more affidavits particularly setting forth the facts and circumstances establishing probable cause to believe that the items are in the places or in the possession of the individuals to be searched;\nG.S. 15A-244\u00cd2) and (3).\nBased on this statute and on Aguilar v. Texas, supra, defendant contends that the application in the present case fails to establish that contraband was, at the time of the application, in the place to be searched, fails to link defendant\u2019s sale of heroin to the residence at 526 S. Person Street, and fails to provide any connection between defendant and the premises. We concede that the affidavit of Detective Glover was not artfully drawn. We do not, however, believe that applications for search warrants, written by police officers often in haste, must be drawn with syntactical precision which would try even our more learned grammarians.\nA reasonable reading of the application for the search warrant in the case sub judice leads this Court to conclude that it did contain sufficient facts to allow issuance of the search warrant. The application contains a statement of probable cause; the information upon which the application was based was received on the very day the application was made; the informant had stated that he had seen a quantity of heroin at 526 S. Person Street, the place to be searched; and the defendant had been seen selling heroin within the past 72 hours. There is a further statement supporting the reliability of the informant. This case is clearly distinguishable from State v. Armstrong, 33 N.C. App. 52, 234 S.E. 2d 197 (1977), which defendant cites in support of his argument. Unlike the affidavit before this Court now, Armstrong dealt with an affidavit which utterly failed to connect contraband to the premises for which the warrant was obtained.\nIll\nDefendant further argues that the motion to suppress evidence should have been allowed because, in announcing their identity and purpose and in entering defendant\u2019s premises, the police officers failed to comply with statutory requisites. G.S. 15A-249 requires a police officer executing a search warrant to give appropriate notice of his identity and purpose before entering the premises. G.S. 15A-251 allows an officer to enter premises by force when necessary to execute the warrant if:\n(1) The officer has previously announced his identity and purpose as required by G.S. 15A-249 and reasonably believes either that admittance is being denied or unreasonably delayed or that the premises or vehicle is unoccupied; or\n(2) The officer has probable cause to believe that the giving of notice would endanger the life or safety of any person.\nG.S. 15A-25K1) and (2).\nIn the instant case, the facts show that the police officer, at best, announced his identity as he entered the front door to the house. He did not state his purpose for being there. It is clear from the findings of fact made in the order denying defendant\u2019s motion that the officer had no probable cause to believe that the giving of notice would endanger the life or safety of any person. Hence, in our view, the officers violated the statutory requirements for execution of the search warrant.\nThe question now becomes whether the failures of the police officers to follow statutory procedures in entering and searching defendant\u2019s premises require the exclusion of evidence seized during the search. G.S. 15A-974 requires suppression of evidence \u201cif it is obtained as a result of a substantial violation\u201d of the Criminal Procedure Act. Determination of whether a violation is substantial is made upon consideration of all the circumstances, including:\na. The importance of the particular interest violated;\nb. The extent of the deviation from lawful conduct;\nc. The extent to which the violation was willful;\nd. The extent to which exclusion will tend to deter future violations of this Chapter.\nG.S. 15A-974\u00cd2) a.-d.\nWhile we are mindful of the extreme importance of the right of the individual to be secure against unlawful searches of his home, we are also aware that, in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed. 2d 726 (1963), the Supreme Court refused to find unconstitutional the officers\u2019 entry, without warrant, notice, or permission, where there was evidence that such entry was effected to prevent destruction of contraband. While this holding was based upon California law governing forcible entries, we find it significant in measuring, in our case, the importance of the particular interest violated.\nFurthermore, we cannot find that the police officers\u2019 deviation from lawful conduct was extensive or willful. Upon reaching the premises, the officers observed three persons, including defendant\u2019s father, near an automobile. Although the officers heard no warning given by these persons, the officers feared that persons inside the house might destroy the contraband for which they were to search. They raced to the house where they found the main front door open and the screen door ajar. Sergeant Peoples yelled, \u201cPolice\u201d as he was moving through the open door. In our minds, exclusion of evidence seized under these circumstances will do little, if anything, to deter future violations of G.S. 15A-249 and G.S. 15A-251.\nThe scenario in the instant case was considerably different from that in State v. Brown, 35 N.C. App. 634, 242 S.E. 2d 184 (1978), cited by defendant. In that case police officers staged a mock car chase to lure defendant from his home and attempted, by deceitful means, to gain access to that home. This Court properly held that the motion to suppress in Brown should have been allowed.\nIn deciding that the violation of G.S. 15A-249 and G.S. 15A-251 was not substantial, we do not intend to obviate the clear mandate of those statutes. In the instant case, we simply do not find violation of the statutes governing warrant execution to be substantial enough to require suppression of evidence seized during the search.\nThe order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress is\nAffirmed.\nJudge MARTIN concurs.\nJudge Becton dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "MORRIS, Chief Judge." }, { "text": "Judge BECTON\ndissenting.\nThe majority correctly concludes that \u201cthe officers violated the statutory requirements for execution of the search warrant,\u201d ante, p. 7, but then holds that \u201cthe violation of G.S. 15A-249 and G.S. 15A-251 was not substantial,\u201d ante, p. 9. From that holding, I dissent.\nThe police clearly failed to give appropriate notice of their identity and purpose before entering the premises in question. And, as stated by the majority, \u201cthe officer had no probable cause to believe the giving of notice would endanger the life or safety of any person.\u201d Ante, p. 7. The officers\u2019 fear \u201cthat persons inside the house might destroy the contraband,\u201d ante, p. 8, is not sufficient, standing alone, to justify a forced entry. As stated by this Court in State v. Brown, 35 N.C. App. 634, 636, 242 S.E. 2d 184, 186 (1978), we do not \u201cread the statute so broadly as to justify its violation when the destruction of contraband is probable.\u201d\nConsidering (1) the facts of this case; (2) the fundamental right of an individual to be secure against unlawful searches of his home; and (3) the incidents of assaults on officers who fail to give appropriate notice of their identity and purpose before entering premises, I believe the evidence seized during the search should have been suppressed. I vote to reverse the conviction.\n. See State v. McCombs, 297 N.C. 151, 253 S.E. 2d 906 (1979) in which a City of Durham Narcotics Officer was killed after entering defendant\u2019s apartment to search for marijuana. Defendant testified that he \u201cnever heard anyone identify himself as a policeman until after he had fired the shot.\u201d Id. at 153, 253 S.E. 2d at 908. See also State v. Miller, 282 N.C. 633, 194 S.E. 2d 353 (1973).", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge BECTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Deputy Attorney General William W. Melvin and Associate Attorneys Jane P. Gray and Emily R. Copeland, for the State.", "Van Camp, Gill & Grumpier, by William B. Grumpier, and Loflin & Loflin, by Thomas F. Loflin III and Robert S. Mahler, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY EDELL WILLIS\nNo. 8110SC1289\n(Filed 17 August 1982)\n1. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 23\u2014 validity of warrant \u2014 sufficient to establish probable cause\nIn a prosecution for trafficking in heroin, a warrant authorizing a search was based upon an affidavit that was sufficient to establish probable cause for the issuance of the warrant where the application contained a statement of probable cause; the information upon which the application was based was received on the very day the application was made; the informant had stated that he had seen a quantity of heroin at 526 South Person Street, the place to be searched; and the defendant had been seen selling heroin within the past 72 hours. G.S. 15A-244(2) and (3).\n2. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 41\u2014 execution of search warrant \u2014 inappropriate notice by police officers \u2014 failures not requiring exclusion of evidence\nIn a prosecution for trafficking in heroin, officers violated the statutory requirements for execution of a search warrant, G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-249 and 15A-251G) and (2), when, at best, an officer announced his identity as he entered the front door to the house to be searched, and he did not state his purpose for being there. The violation was not substantial enough to require suppression under G.S. 15A-974, however, since (1) there was evidence that the entry was effected to prevent destruction of contraband, and (2) the police officers\u2019 deviation from lawful conduct was not extensive or willful.\nJudge Becton dissenting.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Godwin, Judge. Judgment entered 3 July 1981, in Superior Court, WAKE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 May 1982.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Deputy Attorney General William W. Melvin and Associate Attorneys Jane P. Gray and Emily R. Copeland, for the State.\nVan Camp, Gill & Grumpier, by William B. Grumpier, and Loflin & Loflin, by Thomas F. Loflin III and Robert S. Mahler, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0617-01", "first_page_order": 649, "last_page_order": 656 }