{ "id": 8525984, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONNIE WAYNE HOWELL", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Howell", "decision_date": "1982-10-19", "docket_number": "No. 827SC107", "first_page": "184", "last_page": "190", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "59 N.C. App. 184" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "234 S.E. 2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571372 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 S.E. 2d 189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 N.C. App. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550801 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/27/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 S.E. 2d 364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8596105 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 S.E. 2d 423", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559866 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0041-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 594, "char_count": 13389, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2269389344706595e-07, "percentile": 0.7785000206575751 }, "sha256": "f7e0242d6b7335e7b7679ceb15e54eb5ee9e5d9e26d222fcadb6616d17b9bcf7", "simhash": "1:272e36a55b0aa2d4", "word_count": 2169 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:55:54.350150+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Vaughn and Hill concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONNIE WAYNE HOWELL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nThe defendant first contends by his Assignment of Error No. 3 that the trial judge erred when he failed to require the District Attorney to disclose whether the prosecuting witness, Willie Lee Smith, had been granted immunity or concessions by prosecutors in other counties in violation of G.S. \u00a7 15A-1054. Our review of the record finds no ruling on the defendant\u2019s motion requesting the trial judge to order such a disclosure by the district attorney. Therefore, there is no question properly before this court for review. However, assuming that the trial judge actually denied the defendant\u2019s motion, the defendant failed to show any violation of G.S. \u00a7 15A-1054(c) which provides:\nWhen a prosecutor enters into any arrangement authorized by this section, written notice fully disclosing the terms of the arrangement must be provided to defense counsel, or to the defendant if not represented by counsel, against whom such testimony is to be offered, a reasonable time prior to any proceeding in which the person with whom the arrangement is made is expected to testify. Upon motion of the defendant or his counsel on grounds of surprise or for other good cause or when the interest of justice require, the court must grant a recess.\nG.S. \u00a7 15A-1054(c) requires disclosure of a prosecutor\u2019s arrangement with a witness only when an arrangement has been reached. In this case, there is nothing in the record to show that any agreement had been made with the witness, Smith.\nThe trial record indicates that the District Attorney informed the court, in response to this motion, that no arrangement had been made with his office. Furthermore, under cross examination the witness, Smith, expressly denied that he was to receive preferential treatment for testifying. The defendant has made no showing of proof to the contrary, and he only speculates that concessions had been made because the witness had not been sentenced in one case and had received shorter sentences than his co-criminals in another case. Therefore, we find no violation of G.S. \u00a7 15A-1054(c).\nThe defendant next contends in Assignment of Error Nos. 4, 5 and 6, based on Exception Nos. 3-23 and 25-27, that the trial court erred in allowing witnesses to testify about matters tending to show that the defendant was involved in a continuing criminal enterprise of receiving stolen goods. The defendant argues such testimony was intended solely to impugn the defendant\u2019s character and that such evidence was irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial.\nThe standard test for relevancy and materiality is whether the evidence \u201chas any logical tendency, however slight, to prove a fact in issue.\u201d 1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence, \u00a7 77 (2d ed. 1982).\nIt is not required that evidence bear directly on the question in issue, and evidence is competent and relevant if it is one of the circumstances surrounding the parties, and necessary to be known, to properly understand their conduct or motives, or if it reasonably allows the jury to draw an inference as to a disputed fact. (Citations omitted.)\nState v. Arnold, 284 N.C. 41, 47-48, 199 S.E. 2d 423, 427 (1973). The basic fact in issue in this case was whether the defendant knew and had reason to believe that the firearms he possessed were stolen. The defendant\u2019s exceptions relate to three pieces of testimony. First, Willie Lee Smith testified that he had visited defendant\u2019s grocery store on several occasions, once to deliver a television set and another time to accompany a friend, who wanted to pawn his sister\u2019s watch. Second, an undercover agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms testified that the defendant had sold a gun to him. Third, defendant\u2019s wife testified as to how much personal and real property she and the defendant owned.\nWe find that all the evidence challenged by these exceptions, except that of the wife regarding the property she and defendant owned, was not irrelevant or immaterial. Although the evidence did not relate directly to the crime for which the defendant was tried, it did have a logical tendency to prove the defendant\u2019s motive for the crime, the witnesses\u2019 familiarity with the defendant, the connection between defendant\u2019s witnesses and the State\u2019s witnesses and the defendant\u2019s reason to believe the guns he possessed had been stolen. Defendant, in Assignment of Error No. 6, specifically objects to the testimony of the ATF agent as irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent because it tends to show the defendant\u2019s involvement in an independent offense. However, the testimony is relevant and material insofar as it establishes the defendant\u2019s motive for possessing firearms and establishes a link between the witness and the defendant. As a general rule, evidence showing the defendant has committed another distinct or separate crime is inadmissible evidence, State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E. 2d 364 (1954), but here the testimony objected to did not amount to evidence of a separate, independent offense. The ATF agent simply testified that the defendant had sold him a shotgun. The trial judge struck from the record further testimony by the ATF agent that he had asked the defendant about keeping record of the sale. Thus, there was no evidence admitted that showed the defendant\u2019s involvement in a separate offense. The testimony was properly limited by the trial judge and admitted as relevant, material and competent evidence.\nWith respect to the testimony of the wife with respect to the property she and defendant owned, we agree with the defendant and find no relevance for this testimony; however, its admission was clearly not prejudicial error. The trial judge has considerable discretion with respect to cross examination and we find no abuse of discretion in his allowing the wife\u2019s testimony. Even so, its admission was clearly harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. These assignments of error have no merit.\nIn his Assignment of Error Nos. 7 and 8, defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his request to allow one of his counsel to withdraw and testify on his behalf. The parties stipulated that had defendant\u2019s counsel been allowed to testify he would have related a prior inconsistent statement of the State\u2019s witness. On cross examination, the State\u2019s witness testified as follows:\nQ. And do you remember telling him that the law told you after your arrest that the reason you were arrested is because Ronnie Howell gave the police a description of your vehicle, including the license plate number, and a description of what you looked like and where you would be?\nA. No sir.\nDefendant\u2019s counsel then requested that his co-counsel be permitted to withdraw and testify as to a prior conversation with the witness contradicting the above testimony on grounds that the testimony and prior inconsistent statement went to a material, not collateral, issue.\nWe hold the trial judge properly found the witness\u2019s statement was \u201ccollateral\u201d and had nothing to do with the material issues of the crime for which defendant was charged. On collateral matters, the cross examiner usually must accept the witness\u2019s answer as conclusive and may not contradict it with testimony from other witnesses. See, 1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence, \u00a7 48 (2d ed. 1982). However, we recognize there are exceptions to this general rule, one of which appears when the \u201ccollateral\u201d statement demonstrates bias or interest of the witness toward the cause or the parties. State v. Murray, 27 N.C. App. 130, 218 S.E. 2d 189 (1975). In the instant case, the attorney for the defendant specifically objected to the trial judge\u2019s ruling on grounds that the witness\u2019s statement raised a material issue. Insofar as the objection was to whether the statement was \u201ccollateral\u201d or material, the trial judge made a proper ruling. Assuming, however, that the proper specific objection, i.e. that the statement was within an exception to the rule on \u201ccollateral\u201d matters, had been made and overruled, we would find any error to be non-prejudicial and harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nFinally, through Assignment of Error Nos. 11 and 12, defendant argues the trial judge\u2019s instructions to the jury to disregard prejudicial testimony elicited during cross examination by the district attorney failed to cure the prejudicial impact of the testimony. We do not agree with the defendant and find the trial judge\u2019s curative instructions to disregard the testimony were sufficient. As the North Carolina Supreme Court stated in State v. Siler, 292 N.C. 543, 553, 234 S.E. 2d 733, 740 (1977):\nOrdinarily, where objectionable evidence is withdrawn and the jury instructed not to consider it no error is committed because under our system of trial by jury we assume that jurors are people of character and sufficient intelligence to fully understand and comply with the court\u2019s instructions and they are presumed to have done so.\nIn this case, the prejudicial effect of the witness\u2019s remarks was removed by the judge\u2019s instructions; accordingly, we find the defendant had a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges Vaughn and Hill concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HEDRICK, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Lemuel W. Hinton, for the State, appellee.", "Moore, Diedrick, Whitaker and Carlisle, by L. G. Diedrick and Joe M. Hester, Jr., for the defendant, appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONNIE WAYNE HOWELL\nNo. 827SC107\n(Filed 19 October 1982)\n1. Constitutional Law \u00a7 30; Criminal Law \u00a7 89.8\u2014 whether witness granted immunity-disclosure not required\nThe trial court did not err in the denial of defendant\u2019s motion that the district attorney be required pursuant to G.S. 15A-1054(c) to disclose whether a prosecuting witness had been granted immunity or concessions by prosecutors in other counties where the district attorney informed the court that no arrangement had been made with his office, the prosecuting witness denied that he was to receive preferential treatment for testifying, and there was nothing in the record to show that an agreement had been made with the witness.\n2. Receiving Stolen Goods \u00a7 4\u2014 felonious possession of stolen property \u2014 relevancy of evidence\nIn a prosecution for felonious possession of stolen firearms, testimony by a witness that he had visited defendant\u2019s store to deliver a television set and to accompany a friend who wanted to pawn his sister\u2019s watch, and testimony by an undercover agent that defendant had sold a gun to him was relevant to prove defendant\u2019s motive for the crime, to establish a link between the witnesses and the defendant, and to show defendant\u2019s reason to believe that the firearms he possessed had been stolen.\n3. Receiving Stolen Goods \u00a7 4\u2014 property owned by defendant and his wife \u2014 irrelevancy \u2014 harmless error\nIn a prosecution for felonious possession of stolen firearms, testimony by defendant\u2019s wife as to how much personal and real property she and defendant owned was irrelevant, but its admission was not prejudicial error.\n4. Attorneys at Law \u00a7 4; Criminal Law \u00a7 88.3\u2014 refusal to permit attorney to withdraw and testify\nThe trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s request to allow one of his attorneys to withdraw and testify as to a prior inconsistent statement of a State\u2019s witness in order to contradict testimony by the witness on cross-examination where defendant\u2019s request was based on the contention that the statement concerned a material issue and the trial court properly found that the witness\u2019s prior statement was \u201ccollateral\u201d and had nothing to do with the material issues of the crime with which defendant was charged. Even if defendant\u2019s objection had been based on the contention that the statement came within an exception to the rule concerning the acceptance of a witness\u2019s answer on cross-examination about collateral matters, any error in the court\u2019s ruling was harmless.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 96\u2014 withdrawal of evidence \u2014 curative instructions\nAny prejudicial effect of a witness\u2019s remarks during cross-examination by the district attorney was removed by the trial judge\u2019s instructions to the jury to disregard the remarks.\nAppeal by defendant from Reid, Judge. Judgment entered 7 October 1981 in Superior Court, NASH County. Heard in Court of Appeals 14 September 1982.\nThe defendant was charged in a proper bill of indictment with felonious possession of stolen goods, to wit: four firearms with a total value of $850. Upon defendant\u2019s plea of not guilty, the State offered evidence tending to show the following: On 13 March 1981, law enforcement officers from the Rocky Mount Police Department, Nash County Sheriffs Office and the United States Department of the Treasury searched the defendant\u2019s residence in Nash County. The officers seized twenty-seven firearms of various descriptions. A subsequent investigation revealed that four of the firearms had been stolen. The State offered further evidence tending to show that the defendant took possession of the firearms knowing and having reasonable grounds to believe the guns to have been feloniously stolen. The defendant offered evidence tending to show he' did not know or have reasonable grounds to believe that the guns in his possession had been stolen.\nThe jury found the defendant guilty of felonious possession of three of the firearms. The trial judge imposed a prison sentence of one to three years. Defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Lemuel W. Hinton, for the State, appellee.\nMoore, Diedrick, Whitaker and Carlisle, by L. G. Diedrick and Joe M. Hester, Jr., for the defendant, appellant." }, "file_name": "0184-01", "first_page_order": 216, "last_page_order": 222 }