{
  "id": 8526781,
  "name": "PEGGY S. RICHARDSON v. THE CAROLINA BANK, Personal Representative of the Estate of John P. Richardson",
  "name_abbreviation": "Richardson v. Carolina Bank",
  "decision_date": "1982-11-16",
  "docket_number": "No. 8120SC1341",
  "first_page": "494",
  "last_page": "497",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "59 N.C. App. 494"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "266 S.E. 2d 746",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1980,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "749"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "47 N.C. App. 84",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8548188
      ],
      "year": 1980,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/47/0084-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "140 S.E. 2d 708",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 4,
      "year": 1965,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "711"
        },
        {
          "page": "712"
        },
        {
          "page": "713"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "264 N.C. 20",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8570243
      ],
      "year": 1965,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/264/0020-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 366,
    "char_count": 6488,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.774,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.2683689771277135e-07,
      "percentile": 0.6141143750079637
    },
    "sha256": "0fee9871ed019af5fe143badf3fb4d82d2f55c8043a5afbf1f7c462cc22774d1",
    "simhash": "1:35fdc029946f0467",
    "word_count": 1077
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:55:54.350150+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Arnold and Whichard concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "PEGGY S. RICHARDSON v. THE CAROLINA BANK, Personal Representative of the Estate of John P. Richardson"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MARTIN (Robert M.), Judge.\nThis appeal presents two questions, the most important question being whether the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. We hold that the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s Rule 12(b)(6) motion, since plaintiff\u2019s complaint sets forth a cause of action for unjust enrichment.\nThe facts in this case are similar to those in Fulp v. Fulp, 264 N.C. 20, 140 S.E. 2d 708 (1965). In that case the husband and wife placed improvements on land titled in the husband\u2019s name only. The husband agreed that he would add the wife\u2019s name to the deed if she would contribute one-half of the cost of the improvements. The wife paid one-half the costs of the improvements and then asked that the property be titled in both their names, but the husband refused to change the deed. The parties separated in 1959 at which time the wife brought an action to impose a resulting or constructive trust, or in the alternative, to recover her contributions to the cost of the improvements.\nJustice Sharp (later Chief Justice), speaking for the Court, found the theories of resulting trusts and constructive trusts inapplicable to that fact situation, since the wife\u2019s funds had not been used by the husband to acquire title to realty. Id. at 22, 140 S.E. 2d at 711. Instead, the court found the wife\u2019s evidence sufficient to establish an equitable lien. In describing this remedy it stated \u201cAn equitable lien, or encumbrance, is not an estate in land, nor is it a right which, in itself, may be the basis of a posses-sory action. It is simply a charge upon the property, which charge subjects the property to the payment of the debt of the creditor in whose favor the charge exists.\u201d Id. at 24, 140 S.E. 2d at 712.\nThe court further stated that the remedy \u201cresults only where there are factors invoking equity, here the confidential relationship.\u201d Id. at 25, 140 S.E. 2d at 713. While, in the present case, the plaintiff and Richardson were not husband and wife at the time plaintiff contributed to the cost of improvements placed on Richardson\u2019s land, we feel that their relationship was so similar to the confidential relationship found in Fulp that we are compelled to invoke the equitable lien doctrine.\nIn another similar case where husband and wife had divorced, the husband sought to recover the value of improvements he had made to the wife\u2019s property during the marriage. Parslow v. Parslow, 47 N.C. App. 84, 266 S.E. 2d 746 (1980). The facts did not disclose any express or implied communication on the part of the wife indicating she was willing to add her husband\u2019s name to the record of title. The Court of Appeals held that where the plaintiff possessed a good faith belief that plaintiff owned or would own an interest in the value of the improvements made by plaintiff on defendant\u2019s property and the improvements inured to defendant\u2019s benefit, plaintiff had a claim sufficient to support an equitable lien under the unjust enrichment doctrine. \u201cNo contract, oral or written, enforceable or not, is necessary to support a recovery based upon unjust enrichment.\u201d Id. at 88-89, 266 S.E. 2d at 749.\nWe hold that plaintiff\u2019s action should not have been dismissed, as the complaint contained enough information to set out a cause of action for unjust enrichment. Plaintiff should be allowed to prove, as in Parslow, that she possessed a good faith belief that she owned or would own an interest in the value of the improvements made by plaintiff to defendant\u2019s property.\nSince we hold that the theory of constructive trusts is not applicable to these facts, we find no prejudicial error in the trial court\u2019s denial of plaintiff\u2019s motion to amend her complaint to include a prayer for imposition of a constructive trust.\nWith respect to the plaintiff\u2019s appeal from the judgment dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we hold that the judgment of the trial court was in error. The judgment is therefore\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges Arnold and Whichard concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MARTIN (Robert M.), Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Pollock, Fullenwider, Cunningham & Patterson, by Bruce T. Cunningham, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.",
      "Van Camp, Gill & Grumpier, by James R. Van Camp, for defendant-appe lie e."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "PEGGY S. RICHARDSON v. THE CAROLINA BANK, Personal Representative of the Estate of John P. Richardson\nNo. 8120SC1341\n(Filed 16 November 1982)\nQuasi Contracts and Restitution \u00a7 5\u2014 unjust enrichment \u2014 sufficient evidence to support equitable lien on former husband\u2019s property\nThe trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss since plaintiffs complaint set forth a cause of action for unjust enrichment where the evidence tended to show that plaintiff and decedent had been married, divorced, later resumed living together but did not marry, and bought a tract of land, in which title was in deceased\u2019s name only, but to which plaintiff contributed $20,606.15 of her own funds.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from Lane, Judge. Judgment entered 24 August 1981 in Superior Court, Moore County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 September 1982.\nPlaintiff and John P. Richardson were married on 24 February 1962 and later divorced. After the divorce plaintiff and Richardson resumed living together, but did not remarry. They moved to Moore County, North Carolina, in October 1972 and Richardson bought a tract of land on which plaintiff and Richardson began building a home in 1979. Title to the property was in Richardson\u2019s name only. Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she contributed $20,606.15 of her own funds to the cost of improvements to Richardson\u2019s land. When Richardson died, the Moore County property was included among Richardson\u2019s estate, and defendant, the personal representative of Richardson\u2019s estate, refused to reimburse plaintiff for her contribution to improvements on Richardson\u2019s property. Plaintiff brought this action for reimbursement of those funds under the theory of unjust enrichment.\nThe complaint was filed on 21 October 1980 and on 11 August 1980 plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint to include a prayer for imposition of a constructive trust. On 6 October 1981 the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint because of failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court also denied plaintiff\u2019s motion to amend the complaint.\nPollock, Fullenwider, Cunningham & Patterson, by Bruce T. Cunningham, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.\nVan Camp, Gill & Grumpier, by James R. Van Camp, for defendant-appe lie e."
  },
  "file_name": "0494-01",
  "first_page_order": 526,
  "last_page_order": 529
}