{ "id": 8527193, "name": "FIBER INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CORONET INDUSTRIES, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Fiber Industries, Inc. v. Coronet Industries, Inc.", "decision_date": "1982-12-07", "docket_number": "No. 8218SC91", "first_page": "677", "last_page": "682", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "59 N.C. App. 677" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "256 S.E. 2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571493, 8571377, 8571411, 8571448, 8571353 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0455-05", "/nc/297/0455-02", "/nc/297/0455-03", "/nc/297/0455-04", "/nc/297/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 S.E. 2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 N.C. App. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550077 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/40/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E. 2d 352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566306, 8566375, 8566425, 8566457, 8566335 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0398-01", "/nc/302/0398-03", "/nc/302/0398-04", "/nc/302/0398-05", "/nc/302/0398-02" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E. 2d 509", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 N.C. App. 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2674072 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/50/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 S.E. 2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 700", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569715 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0700-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 S.E. 2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 N.C. 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575757 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/260/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 U.S. 235", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6162253 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/357/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E. 2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558922 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0674-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 U.S. 310", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6157001 ], "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/326/0310-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 577, "char_count": 11428, "ocr_confidence": 0.627, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.696984412264456e-08, "percentile": 0.529711577779245 }, "sha256": "82c5837708642e583ea503420c831e2b52004bdffdd4e115c1fe82028e27a52d", "simhash": "1:878d5da1424acc4e", "word_count": 1805 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:55:54.350150+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Webb and Becton concur." ], "parties": [ "FIBER INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CORONET INDUSTRIES, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nThe defendant argues that the plaintiff must establish the statutory grounds for personal jurisdiction under G.S. \u00a7 55445(a)(1) which reads in pertinent part:\nJurisdiction over foreign corporations not transacting business in this State. \u2014(a) Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this State, whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted business in this State and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of action arising as follows: (1) Out of any contract made in this State or to be performed in this State;\nThe defendant contends this statute applies because of the provision for \u201cSpecial Jurisdiction Statutes\u201d in G.S. \u00a7 1-75.4(2). Defendant goes on to argue that the jurisdictional standard of G.S. \u00a7 55445(a)(1) has not been established because the defendant has had insufficient contacts with North Carolina, the contract involved was not made or performed in North Carolina and there is no nexus between plaintiff\u2019s claim and the defendant\u2019s contacts with this state. The defendant also contends that the requirement of constitutional due process has not been met because it does not have the requisite \u201cminimum contacts\u201d with North Carolina \u201csuch that the maintenance of the suit does not offend \u2018traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u2019 \u201d (Citations omitted.) International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).\nA two-part test controls the proper determination of personal jurisdiction. First, a statutory basis must exist for finding personal jurisdiction. Second, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must meet the requirements of constitutional due process. Dillon v. Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 675, 231 S.E. 2d 629, 630 (1977).\nThe applicable statutory provision of the North Carolina long-arm statute grants a court of this state jurisdiction\n[i]n any action, whether the claim arises within or without this State, in which a claim is asserted against a party who when service of process is made upon such party: . . . [i]s engaged in substantial activity within this State, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise.\nG.S. \u00a7 1-75.4(1). The statute which defendant argues controls the instant situation, G.S. \u00a7 55-145, is an alternative ground for finding jurisdiction. As stated in G.S. \u00a7 55-146.1,\n[i]n addition to the provisions set out in this Chapter, foreign corporations may be served with process and subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State pursuant to applicable provisions of Chapter 1 and Chapter 1A of the General Statutes.\nTherefore, we find that G.S. \u00a7 l-75.4(l)(d) controls the jurisdictional issue in this case, and under that provision the necessary determination is whether the defendant was \u201cengaged in substantial activity within this State.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 l-75.4(l)(d) does not, by any of its terms, require a finding of a nexus between a plaintiffs claim and a defendant\u2019s contacts with the state, but applies to \u201cany action\u201d against a defendant \u201cengaged in substantial activity\u201d in North Carolina.\nIn our opinion, the facts of this case demonstrate \u201csubstantial activity\u201d by the defendant in North Carolina. Over the past several years the defendant has purchased millions of dollars worth of yarn from the plaintiff in North Carolina, solicited orders for carpet through its sales representative who maintains 50 accounts, sold millions of dollars worth of carpet to over 140 customers, purchased goods and services from more than 100 individuals or companies, provided promotional aids to its salesman, maintained a WATS line for its customers\u2019 use in placing orders at its Georgia office and given cooperative advertising funds to some of its North Carolina customers.\nWe further find that these facts fulfill the requisites of constitutional due process under the second prong of the two-part jurisdictional test. The minimum contacts standard of International Shoe was later refined by the United States Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958):\n[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.\nOur own Supreme Court recognized these principles in Farmer v. Ferris, 260 N.C. 619, 625, 133 S.E. 2d 492, 497 (1963):\nIt seems, according to the most recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, that the question cannot be answered by applying a mechanical formula or rule of thumb, but by ascertaining what is fair and reasonable and just in the circumstances. In the application of this flexible test, a relevant inquiry is whether defendant engaged in some act or conduct by which it may be said to have invoked the benefits and protections , of the law of the forum.\nSee also, Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz, 285 N.C. 700, 208 S.E. 2d 676 (1974).\nApplying these statutory and constitutional standards, this court recently held the sufficient contacts requirements for due process were met where the defendant, a Saudia Arabian corporation, whose agents solicited job applications through newspaper advertisements, came to North Carolina to interview and hire employees and mailed letters offering employment to twenty-eight North Carolina residents at their homes. Mabry v. Fuller-Shuwayer Co., 50 N.C. App. 245, 273 S.E. 2d 509 (1981) appeal dismissed, 302 N.C. 398, 279 S.E. 2d 352 (1981). Also, in Parris v. Disposal, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 282, 253 S.E. 2d 29 (1979) appeal dismissed, 297 N.C. 455, 256 S.E. 2d 808 (1979), one of the facts noted by this court in finding sufficient minimal contacts was the defendant\u2019s listing in North Carolina telephone directories a toll free number to call in Hartford, Connecticut in the event of an accident.\nSimilarly, in this case, although the defendant does not have any North Carolina telephone listings it does maintain a WATS line for use by its North Carolina customers in placing orders. More than that, however, the defendant has benefited from millions of dollars worth of sales over the past five years to numerous customers and has purchased millions of dollars worth of materials used in making its carpet from North Carolina industries. Despite having no offices, mailing address, or phone number, or owning or leasing real property in North Carolina, its contacts with this state can hardly be called de minimus. Therefore, we hold the defendant had sufficient contacts with this state to give our courts personal jurisdiction over it. Under these facts, by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the trial judge did not violate any of the requirements of due process, fair play or substantial justice.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Webb and Becton concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HEDRICK, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, by James T. Williams, Jr. and Kathrine A. McLendon for plaintiff, appellee.", "Smith Moore Smith Schell & Hunter, by Alan W. Duncan for defendant, appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FIBER INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CORONET INDUSTRIES, INC.\nNo. 8218SC91\n(Filed 7 December 1982)\nConstitutional Law \u00a7 24.6; Process \u00a7 14.3\u2014 personal jurisdiction over foreign corporation-substantial activity in tbis State \u2014 minimum contacts with this State\nDefendant foreign corporation was \u201cengaged in substantial activity within this State\u201d so as to give the courts of this State personal jurisdiction over it pursuant to G.S. l-75.4(l)(d) in an action to recover for goods sold to defendant, and defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with this State so that the exercise of jurisdiction over it did not violate due process, where defendant has sold carpet to more than 140 customers in North Carolina during the past five years with total sales of more than $1 million in each of the five years; over the past five years defendant has purchased goods and services from more than 100 persons and companies in North Carolina; defendant has a resident sales representative in North Carolina who has about 60 accounts in this State; the sales representative receives promotional aids from defendant which are provided to North Carolina customers without charge; defendant keeps a WATS telephone number in Georgia for use by its customers in placing orders; defendant has provided cooperative advertising funds to its North Carolina customers; and defendant has bank accounts in North Carolina.\nAppeal by defendant from Seay, Judge. Order entered 17 November 1981 in Superior Court, Guilford County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 November 1982.\nThis is a civil action instituted by plaintiff to collect $268,316.64 from defendant for nylon yarn which the plaintiff delivered to the defendant in 1980. Defendant counterclaimed for $236,420 alleging that plaintiff wrongfully discontinued the manufacture of certain carpet yarn utilized by the defendant in making carpet products. In its answer and counterclaim, the defendant also denied that it had sufficient contacts with North Carolina to allow jurisdiction over it by the North Carolina Courts and moved for dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction.\nThe affidavits, answers to interrogatories and exhibits reveal the following facts. The plaintiff is a Delaware corporation which manufactures and sells nylon staple and maintains its principal place of business in Charlotte, North Carolina. The defendant is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Dalton, Georgia. Since 1975 defendant has purchased from plaintiff over $20 million worth of nylon staple. During the past five years defendant has sold carpet to more than 140 customers in North Carolina with total sales of more than $1,000,000 in each of the five years. Also, over the past five years, defendant has purchased goods and services from more than 100 persons and companies in North Carolina. Defendant has a resident sales representative in North Carolina who has about 50 accounts in North Carolina. The North Carolina sales representative receives promotional aids from the defendant which are provided to North Carolina customers without charge. Defendant\u2019s salesman solicits orders but exercises no control over corporate functions, nor does he supply any services to customers such as product installation, maintenance or technical assistance. Rather, the defendant company controls its sales representative in handling customer complaints and establishing customer credit. Defendant keeps a WATS telephone number in Georgia for use by its customers in placing orders, but it has never had a North Carolina telephone number, mailing address or office. Along with price lists and other promotional material, the defendant has provided cooperative advertising funds to its North Carolina customers. Finally, the defendant has bank accounts in North Carolina with Wachovia Bank and Trust Company.\nThe subject of this action is a contract for the sale of nylon staple by plaintiff to the defendant. Plaintiff offered to sell nylon staple, and defendant agreed to buy the product. The defendant sent an order from its Dalton, Georgia office, and plaintiff then sent an acknowledgment form from its Charlotte, North Carolina office. When the defendant refused to pay for its last order plaintiff brought this action. Upon the trial judge\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, defendant appealed.\nBrooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, by James T. Williams, Jr. and Kathrine A. McLendon for plaintiff, appellee.\nSmith Moore Smith Schell & Hunter, by Alan W. Duncan for defendant, appellant." }, "file_name": "0677-01", "first_page_order": 709, "last_page_order": 714 }