{ "id": 8527324, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DEBORAH WALKER HAGGARD", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Haggard", "decision_date": "1982-12-07", "docket_number": "No. 824SC458", "first_page": "727", "last_page": "730", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "59 N.C. App. 727" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "330 A. 2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 12027453 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/330/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 L.Ed. 2d 281", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 S.Ct. 402", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 924", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6427200, 6428259, 6427109, 6427687, 6427816, 6427463, 6427563, 6428013, 6427929, 6428122, 6427293 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0924-02", "/us/434/0924-11", "/us/434/0924-01", "/us/434/0924-06", "/us/434/0924-07", "/us/434/0924-04", "/us/434/0924-05", "/us/434/0924-09", "/us/434/0924-08", "/us/434/0924-10", "/us/434/0924-03" ] }, { "cite": "235 S.E. 2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572704 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 S.E. 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. 631", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8660811 ], "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/169/0631-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 380, "char_count": 5410, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20558843392027876 }, "sha256": "889e2f452121bb974903364fcf4205f7a46e9a9579acadc4d2d2288b2547eb8c", "simhash": "1:0c02f119880384fa", "word_count": 876 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:55:54.350150+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Vaughn and Wells concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DEBORAH WALKER HAGGARD" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Judge.\nDefendant was convicted of violating G.S. 14-204(5), which provides: \u201cIt shall be unlawful . . . [t]o procure, or to solicit, or to offer to procure or solicit for the purpose of prostitution or assignation.\u201d She concedes that the evidence established prostitution, but contends that it failed to establish solicitation for prostitution, and that the court thus erred in denying her motion to dismiss. We reject the contention.\nIn construing statutes, words should be given their ordinary meaning unless it appears, from the context or otherwise, that another and different sense was intended. Abernethy v. Commissioners, 169 N.C. 631, 635, 86 S.E. 577, 579 (1915). Nothing appears with regard to G.S. 14-204(5), from the context or otherwise, to indicate an intent to give the word \u201csolicit\u201d anything other than its ordinary meaning.\n\u201cSolicit\u201d is. a word of common usage and understanding. The gravamen of the common law offense of soliciting \u201clies in counseling, enticing or inducing another to commit a crime.\u201d State v. Furr, 292 N.C. 711, 720, 235 S.E. 2d 193, 199, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924, 98 S.Ct. 402, 54 L.Ed. 2d 281 (1977). Webster\u2019s New International Dictionary 2169 (3d ed. 1971) defines \u201csolicit\u201d, inter alia, as \u201cto entice . . .: lure on and esp. into evil. . . [; to] attempt to seduce . . . .\u201d Webster\u2019s New Collegiate Dictionary (7th ed. 1967) defines \u201csolicit\u201d, inter alia, as \u201cto entice or lure ... to do wrong ... to accost (a man) for immoral purposes.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1248-49 (5th ed. 1979) defines \u201csolicit\u201d, inter alia, as \u201c[t]o appeal for something; ... to ask for the purpose of receiving; ... to try to obtain; . . . [t]o awake or excite to action, or to invite.\u201d\nThe District of Columbia Court of Appeals has stated: \u201cTo establish the offense [of solicitation for prostitution] it is not necessary to prove any particular language or conduct. Ordinarily it is a question of fact whether the acts and words of the defendant, viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances, constitute the inviting or enticing prohibited by [statute]. [Citation omitted.]\u201d United States v. Smith, 330 A. 2d 759, 761 (D.C. App. 1975). The pertinent \u201csurrounding circumstances\u201d here were as follows:\nThe state\u2019s principal witness saw defendant at an establishment called \u201cMovie Mates.\u201d Defendant asked if he \u201cwould like to watch a movie with the lady.\u201d A sign advised, inter alia, of a $20.00 charge to watch a movie accompanied by a girl with \u201cno top on.\u201d\nThe witness told defendant he would \u201ctake the $20.00 for topless.\u201d He gave her $20.00, and they went into a back room.\nThere defendant told the witness \u201cto take [his] clothes off and get comfortable and lay down on the bed.\u201d The witness complied. Defendant then turned on a television set, \u201ctook off her top,\u201d and lay down beside him.\nAfter they had talked for a time while watching a movie of \u201ca lady and a man having oral sex,\u201d defendant told the witness that \u201cif [he] wanted anything else ... it would cost [him] more money.\u201d The witness asked what she meant; and defendant replied, \u201c[W]ell, you can just have anything.\u201d The witness referred to the TV screen where a woman was performing oral sex on a man, and he asked how much more that would cost him. Defendant replied that it would cost $40.00. The witness gave defendant $40.00; and after a brief departure from the room, defendant commenced performing oral sex on him.\nThis continued for several minutes, after which the witness asked defendant \u201chow much more it would cost [him] to get laid.\u201d Defendant indicated it would cost another $20.00. The witness had only $13.75 in his possession. Defendant settled for that, took $13.75 from the witness, and left the room briefly. When she returned, she and the witness \u201chad sex.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s statements to the witness as they lay side by side, with defendant partially clothed and the witness nude, that \u201cif [he] wanted anything else ... it would cost [him] more money,\u201d and that he could \u201cjust have anything,\u201d clearly constituted solicitation for prostitution when, as required, those words are given their ordinary meaning. Defendant\u2019s contention that the court erred in denying her motion to dismiss is thus without merit.\nDefendant further asserts prejudicial error in portions of the instructions to the jury. We have carefully examined the portions complained of, and we find no merit in the contention.\nNo error.\nJudges Vaughn and Wells concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Henry T. Rosser, for the State.", "Warrick, Johnson & Parsons, P.A., by W. Douglas Parsons, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DEBORAH WALKER HAGGARD\nNo. 824SC458\n(Filed 7 December 1982)\nProstitution \u00a7 2\u2014 solicitation lor prostitution \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nDefendant\u2019s statements to a witness as they lay side by side, with defendant partially clothed and the witness nude, that \u201cif [he] wanted anything else ... it would cost [him] more money\u201d and that he could \u201cjust have anything\u201d clearly constituted solicitation for prostitution when, as required, those words are given their ordinary meaning. G.S. 14-204(5).\nAppeal by defendant from Strickland, Judge. Judgment entered 6 January 1982 in Superior Court, Onslow County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 November 1982.\nDefendant appeals from a judgment of imprisonment entered upon her conviction of solicitation for prostitution.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Henry T. Rosser, for the State.\nWarrick, Johnson & Parsons, P.A., by W. Douglas Parsons, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0727-01", "first_page_order": 759, "last_page_order": 762 }