{ "id": 8547938, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEROME PASCHAL", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Paschal", "decision_date": "1969-10-22", "docket_number": "No. 6912SC473", "first_page": "334", "last_page": "341", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "6 N.C. App. 334" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "168 S.E. 2d 62", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 N.C. App. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549677 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/5/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 S.E. 2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 N.C. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629614 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/230/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 S.E. 2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 N.C. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2219481 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/244/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 S.E. 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 N.C. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628600 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/195/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 S.E. 2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558619 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 S.E. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625504 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 S.E. 2d 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 N.C. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624963 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53, 54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/247/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 S.E. 2d 661", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569961 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 S.E. 2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564082 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E. 2d 49", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575372 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575701 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 S.E. 2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560537 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 790, "char_count": 16749, "ocr_confidence": 0.591, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.796484210511943e-08, "percentile": 0.4571816735261399 }, "sha256": "c8a68e5d15a7fb971f45c649630cfcfb9f64fd64f5980afe2847f7c9a74ef2ae", "simhash": "1:b6ed54a7c16e59f3", "word_count": 2819 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:07:50.917320+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Campbell and PaeKer, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEROME PASCHAL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GRAHAM, J.\nThe defendant does not contend that the State\u2019s evidence was insufficient to show that the crime of manslaughter was in fact committed. He argues, however, that the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove his identity as the driver of the automobile involved in the collision and that the court therefore erred in refusing to allow his motion for judgment of nonsuit made at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and renewed at the close of all the evidence.\nIt is fundamental in this State that upon motions for non-suit, the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is to have the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. State v. Lipscomb, 274 N.C. 436, 163 S.E. 2d 788; State v. Goines, 273 N.C. 509, 160 S.E. 2d 469; State v. Cook, 273 N.C. 377, 160 S.E. 2d 49; State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379, 156 S.E. 2d 679. If the motion challenges the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, the question for the court is whether a reasonable inference of defendant\u2019s guilt may be drawn from the circumstances. \u201cIf so, it is for the jury to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in combination, satisfy them beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is actually guilty.\u201d State v. Rowland, 263 N.C. 353, 358, 139 S.E. 2d 661, 665; State v. Cook, supra.\nTwo witnesses for the State positively identified the defendant as the person they found pinned beneath the steering wheel in1 a \u201cbucket seat\u201d moments after the collision. Officer McCoy was quite specific in his identification: \u201cI am absolutely certain that the man I pulled out from under the steering wheel was Paschal. I knew there was going to be a court case, and I wanted to take a good look at him. I was going to be sure I knew the driver.\u201d These same witnesses testified that Oakman, whom the defendant contended was driving, was wedged in the right front seat with the hood on the right side protruding through the windshield and into his heck. There was nothing in the evidence to suggest that the wreck here involved was the type where a car overturns or spins in such a way as to possibly rearrange its occupants. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that the front of the Chevrolet collided violently into the side of the Renault. From all the evidence presented a reasonable inference is that the bodies of the occupants were immediately affixed in the wreckage by the impact in substantially the same -position they occupied immediately before the collision. To hold otherwise would be to completely disregard the physical evidence.\nThe civil case of Parker v. Wilson, 247 N.C. 47, 100 S.E. 2d 258, involved a collision where the bodies of the occupants were wedged in the wreckage in a manner similar to those of the defendant and Oakman in this case. There Parker, J. (now C.J.), made the following observations at 247 N.C. 47, 53, 54, 100 S.E. 2d 258, 262, 263:\n\u201cWhen the automobile struck the tree at tremendous speed, and the front seat was brought forward almost as far as it could possibly go, and the back seat was pulled loose and thrown up against the windshield on top of the occupants of the front seat, it would seem that there was no opportunity for the occupants of the front seat to have changed the position in which they were sitting immediately prior to the crash. It would further seem that the crash hurled Donald Wilson\u2019s head partially out of the windshield on the right side and with his head in that position his body could not have changed from the position it was in immediately prior to the collision with the tree. It would seem that all the evidence tends to show that Bonnie Patrick was driving the automobile at the time of the fatal wreck.\u201d\nIt is true that the defendant\u2019s testimony created a conflict in the evidence. However, this was a matter for the jury to solve and the jury obviously accepted the version of the State. State v. Turberville, 239 N.C. 25, 79 S.E. 2d 359.\nThe defendant challenges the testimony of the police officers as to the speed of defendant\u2019s car along Hillsboro Street approximately one and one-half miles from the point of the collision, contending that this evidence was too remote in time and distance to have been relevant. This contention is without merit. The manner and speed in which the automobile was operated from the moment it left Vick\u2019s Drive-In until the instant of the collision describes a continuous unbroken attempt by the driver to avoid the pursuing officers irrespective of the consequences. To restrict evidence in such a case to the time immediately preceding the impact would be an unreasonable limitation. See State v. Bridgers, 267 N.C. 121, 147 S.E. 2d 555; State v. Leonard, 195 N.C. 242, 141 S.E. 736.\nThe defendant\u2019s third and fourth assignments of error relate to the court\u2019s charge to the jury. He contends that the jury was not adequately instructed regarding the credibility of witnesses. The record indicates His Honor clearly instructed the jury that it was the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and could believe all, a part, or none of what a witness said.\nThe defendant also contends that the court did not sufficiently define and instruct the jury on circumstantial evidence. This contention is not supported by the record. The court explained to the jury the nature of circumstantial evidence, how it was to be weighed, and that unless it was clear, convincing and conclusive and excluded all doubt that the defendant was the driver of the car at the time of the collision he should be acquitted. Furthermore, the court charged that standing alone circumstantial evidence would not justify an identification. The charge was favorable to the defendant. Absent a request, no further instructions were necessary. State v. Bridgers, supra; State v. Stevens, 244 N.C. 40, 92 S.E. 2d 409; State v. Flynn, 230 N.C. 293, 52 S.E. 2d 791; 3 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Criminal Law, \u00a7 113.\nThe defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error are deemed abandoned since no reference, argument or citation relating thereto is brought forward in the brief. Rule 28, Rules of Practice in the Court of Appeals; State v. Pulley, 5 N.C. App. 285, 168 S.E. 2d 62.\nIn the trial below, we find no error.\nNo error.\nCampbell and PaeKer, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GRAHAM, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Morgan, Attorney General, William W. Melvin, Assistant Attorney General, and T. Buie Costen, Staff Attorney, for the State.", "Barrington, Smith & Barrington by Carl A. Barrington, Jr. for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEROME PASCHAL\nNo. 6912SC473\n(Filed 22 October 1969)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 104\u2014 motion for nonsuit \u2014 consideration of evidence\nUpon motion for nonsuit, the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to have the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 106\u2014 motion for nonsuit \u2014 sufficiency of circumstantial evidence\nIf a motion for nonsuit challenges the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, the question for the court is whether a reasonable inference of defendant\u2019s guilt may be drawn from the circumstances.\n3. Automobiles \u00a7\u00a7 66, 113\u2014 manslaughter \u2014 identity of driver \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nIn this prosecution for manslaughter resulting from a collision which occurred while defendant\u2019s car was being pursued by two police cars, the State\u2019s evidence of defendant\u2019s identity as the driver of the pursued automobile is held sufficient for submission of the case to the jury, where it tends to show that defendant\u2019s automobile collided violently into the side of another automobile, that defendant was found pinned beneath the steering wheel moments after the collision, and that the person who defendant contended was driving was found wedged in the right front seat with the hood on the right side protruding through the windshield into his neck, a reasonable inference from the evidence being that the bodies of the occupants of defendant\u2019s automobile were immediately affixed in the wreckage by the impact in substantially the same position they occupied immediately before the collision.\n4. Automobiles \u00a7\u00a7 66, 113\u2014 manslaughter \u2014 identity of di-iver\u2014 conflicting evidence \u2014 jury question\nIn this prosecution for manslaughter growing out of an automobile collision, conflict in evidence of the State and of the defendant as to who was driving defendant\u2019s automobile at the time of the collision presented a question for the jury.\n5. Automobiles \u00a7\u00a7 45, 112\u2014 manslaughter \u2014 speed of car 1% miles prior to accident \u2014 admissibility\nIn this manslaughter prosecution resulting from an automobile collision which occurred while defendant\u2019s automobile was being pursued by two police ears, the trial court properly admitted testimony by the pursuing police officers as to the speed of defendant\u2019s automobile approximately one and one-half miles from the point of the collision.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 117\u2014 instructions \u2014 credibility of witnesses\nIn this manslaughter prosecution, the trial court properly instructed the jury regarding the credibility of witnesses.\n7. Automobiles \u00a7 114; Criminal Law \u00a7 112\u2014 instructions \u2014 circumstantial evidence\nIn this manslaughter prosecution growing out of an automobile collision, the jury was sufficiently instructed on circumstantial evidence where the court explained the nature of circumstantial evidence, how it was to be weighed and that defendant should be acquitted unless the evidence was-clear, convincing and conclusive and excluded all doubt that defendant was the driver of the automobile at the time of the collision.\n8. Criminal Law \u00a7 166\u2014 abandonment of assignments of error\nAssignments of error are deemed abandoned where no reference, argument or citation relating thereto is brought forward in the brief. Rule of Practice in the Court of Appeals No. 28.\nAppeal by defendant from Bickett, J., 19 May 1969 Regular Criminal Session of Superior Court of CumbeRland County.\nThe defendant was charged in four separate bills of indictment with manslaughter. The cases were consolidated for trial and the defendant entered a plea of not guilty in each case.\nIt was stipulated at the trial that the death charged in each indictment resulted from personal injuries received and sustained as a result of a collision between the defendant\u2019s 1968 Chevrolet automobile and a 1967 Renault automobile at approximately 9:30 P.M., 5 November 1968, at or near the intersection of Kensington Circle and Ramsey Street in the City of Fayetteville.\nFayetteville police officer Ernest McCoy testified for the State that he saw the defendant\u2019s automobile exit from the parking lot of Vick\u2019s Drive-In minutes before the accident. The automobile turned north on Hillsboro Street at a high rate of speed, \u201cfish-tailing,\u201d squealing tires and making a loud roar. Officer McCoy turned on his blue light and siren and gave chase. The automobile continued down Hillsboro Street for approximately 2/10 of a mile, attaining, in the opinion of the officer, a speed of 60 miles per hour. It then turned right on Chance Street and proceeded approximately 4/10 of a mile to Ramsey Street where it turned left and proceeded north about a mile to the intersection of Ramsey Street and Kensington Circle where it collided with a 1967 Renault automobile which was in the process of turning left from Ramsey Street onto Kensington Circle and across the path of the defendant\u2019s automobile. In Officer McCoy\u2019s opinion, his police car was travelling in excess of 100 miles per hour on Ramsey Street. \u201cI was about, I guess, two hundred feet behind the Chevrolet when we came off of Chance Street \u2014 and he was leaving me. When we came to the crest of the hill, I slowed down a little bit because I knew there was a red light on the other side of the hill. . . . When I got to the top of the hill the impact had already taken place. The cars were still sliding down the side.\u201d Except for a period of \u201cpossibly one second\u201d when he slowed at the crest of the hill immediately before the collision, Officer McCoy kept the Chevrolet automobile within his vision. During this time the automobile proceeded without stopping through three stop signs. It swerved and almost hit a truck at the intersection of Hillsboro and Chance Street. At no time did the automobile stop or appreciably slow down in response to the blue light and siren of the police car.\nDaniel H. DeVane testified that on the night of the collision he was on duty as a police officer for the City of Fayetteville. He went to Vick\u2019s Drive-In in response to a call and as he arrived there he saw the defendant\u2019s Chevrolet automobile leave at a high rate of speed. DeVane radioed to Officer McCoy to \u201cstop the blue Chevelle\u201d and he then joined in the pursuit immediately behind Officer McCoy\u2019s police car. His further testimony corroborated that of Officer McCoy.\nBoth of the police officers arrived immediately at the scene of the collision. The vehicles involved were completely demolished. The pavement was torn up at the intersection. The Renault had come to rest 115 feet past the intersection and the Chevrolet had come to rest 246 feet from the intersection. Mr. and Mrs. Furman Lee Ennis, who had been riding in the Renault, were outside the car and appeared to be dead. Their bodies were badly mangled. The four occupants of the Chevrolet were still inside the car. Officers McCoy and Devane positively identified the defendant as the person whom they found in the left front seat. The steering wheel was pushed up and bent down in his lap, holding him in the car. He was dressed in army fatigues. The person on the right front seat, later identified as Wallace Oakman, was wearing civilian clothes. The hood on the right side had come through the windshield and was still down in Oakman\u2019s throat. The right front seat was pushing him onto the dash. The Chevrolet automobile had bucket seats with a console and gear shift lever separating the two front seats.\nThe State also offered the testimony of Jimmy Ray Cook who testified that he witnessed the collision from a service station lot 250 or 300 feet away. He observed the Chevrolet automobile travel-ling north on Ramsey Street for approximately three-quarters of a mile with the two police cars in pursuit 150 or 200 feet behind it. In his opinion the Chevrolet was travelling in excess of 100 miles an hour as it collided with the Renault. He further testified that the traffic light at the intersection of Ramsey Street and Hillsboro Street (about 60 to 75 feet south of the intersection where the collision occurred) was red facing south on Ramsey Street when the defendant\u2019s car went through it. On cross-examination Cook admitted that he had signed a written statement two days after the accident which contained statements in apparent conflict with his testimony. He insisted, however, that his testimony was the more accurate account of his recollection about the collision.\nIt was stipulated that the speed limit along most of the route followed by the defendant\u2019s automobile was 35 miles per hour. It was 45 miles per hour at the point of the collision.\nThe defendant testified in his own behalf that on 5 November 1968 he was a member of the Army stationed at Fort Bragg. Just after he got off duty that day he, Wallace Oakman, William H. Coleman and Larry Browder drove in the defendant\u2019s car to the home of defendant\u2019s cousin in Fayetteville where they dranlc some wine. About 8:30 P.M. they proceeded to Vick's Drive-In. On the way the defendant was given a traffic citation for exceeding a safe speed. At Vick\u2019s Drive-In the party consumed a six-pack of beer. Two of the passengers in defendant\u2019s car started some \u201ccommotion\u201d and they all left as someone went inside to call the police. The defendant was driving and Wallace Oakman was riding in the right front seat. As they were traveling on Murchison Boulevard toward Fort Bragg Oakman complained about the defendant\u2019s driving and reminded him that he had received a traffic citation earlier that evening. The defendant thereupon surrendered the steering wheel to Oakman and moved to the right front seat. The defendant stated \u201c[a]fter I gave him the steering wheel, I noticed he was going north and I immediately fell asleep. I will say I passed out.\u201d The defendant denied ever getting in the driver\u2019s seat again or remembering anything further until he awoke some time later in an ambulance.\nLarry Browder, the only person in addition to the defendant to survive the collision, was in the courtroom at the trial but did not testify.\nThe jury returned a verdict of guilty as to the charges contained in all four bills of indictment, and from judgment on the verdict imposing active prison sentences the defendant- appealed assigning error.\nRobert Morgan, Attorney General, William W. Melvin, Assistant Attorney General, and T. Buie Costen, Staff Attorney, for the State.\nBarrington, Smith & Barrington by Carl A. Barrington, Jr. for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0334-01", "first_page_order": 358, "last_page_order": 365 }