{ "id": 8550883, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MEXON DIGGS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Diggs", "decision_date": "1969-12-17", "docket_number": "No. 697SC509", "first_page": "732", "last_page": "736", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "6 N.C. App. 732" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "171 S.E. 2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 N.C. App. 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550699 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/6/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 S.E. 2d 767", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560515 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 S.E. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560045 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 S.E. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558175 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 S.E. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 N.C. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573134 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/256/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 S.E. 2d 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574116 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0488-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 423, "char_count": 9682, "ocr_confidence": 0.57, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.565170110192638e-08, "percentile": 0.28643407395566306 }, "sha256": "67535e814b802219706e564ebffd0a315129159c575da8804b849886f7224dfa", "simhash": "1:07eb79f3d5b50550", "word_count": 1654 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:07:50.917320+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Campbell and Geaham, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MEXON DIGGS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, J.\nDefendant assigns as error the refusal of the court to grant his motion of nonsuit made at the conclusion of the State\u2019s evidence and renewed at the conclusion of all of the evidence. There is no merit in this assignment of error. It is elementary that upon a motion for nonsuit in a criminal case, all the evidence upon the whole record tending to sustain a conviction is to be considered in the light most favorable to the State and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. State v. Bruton, 264 N.C. 488, 142 S.E. 2d 169. When the evidence in the present case is so considered, it is sufficient to establish every essential element of the crime charged and to require submission of the case to the jury.\n\u201cThree elements are necessary to constitute the offense of forgery: (1) There must be a false making or alteration of some instrument in writing; (2) there must be a fraudulent intent; and (3) the instrument must be apparently capable of effecting a fraud.\u201d State v. Phillips, 256 N.C. 445, 124 S.E. 2d 146. Defendant admitted to the officers that he had written the check in question and that he did not have permission from the person whose name appeared as drawer of the check to sign his name. The person whose name appeared on the face of the check as payee and whose signature purportedly appeared on the back, testified that she had never signed the back of the check nor had she given defendant permission to sign her name thereon. This evidence was sufficient to establish the false making of the instrument. Defendant\u2019s admission to the officers that he had gotten another man to go to the store and cash the check for him was sufficient to establish his fraudulent intent. The check itself, which was introduced in evidence, was on its face such an instrument as was capable of effecting a fraud.\nThere is also no merit in defendant\u2019s contention that there was not in this case sufficient evidence aliunde his confession to carry the case to the jury. The check itself was introduced in evidence; endorsements appearing on the back thereof indicated it had been negotiated. There was independent evidence that the signature of the persons whose names appeared thereon as drawer and as payee were not genuine; the purported payee herself so testified. \u201cWhen the State offers evidence of the corpus delicti in addition to defendant\u2019s confession of guilt, defendant\u2019s motion to nonsuit is correctly denied.\u201d State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 141, 166 S.E. 2d 53. In the case before us there was sufficient extrinsic evidence corroborating defendant\u2019s confession to warrant submitting the case to the jury.\nDefendant contends he is entitled to a new trial because of failure of the trial judge to conduct a voir dire hearing and to make findings of fact as to the voluntariness of his confession. Apart from the fact that this contention is not based upon any appropriate assignment of error, the contention is without merit. At his trial defendant made no objection to the testimony of the two police officers concerning his extrajudicial admissions. A general objection, if timely made, would have been sufficient, State v. Vickers, 274 N.C. 311, 163 S.E. 2d 481, but unless objection is made at the proper time it is waived. State v. Edwards, 274 N.C. 431, 163 S.E. 2d 767. He cannot raise the objection for the first time on appeal. State v. Jones, 6 N.C. App. 712, 171 S.E. 2d 17. (Opinion by Brock, J., filed this date.) It should also be noted that in the present ease defendant admitted on cross-examination that the officers had advised him of his rights. He has never contended that any confession or admission allegedly made by him was involuntary; he simply denied that he made any.\nIn the trial we find\nNo error.\nCampbell and Geaham, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Robert Morgan and Staff Attorney T. Buie Costen, for the State.", "Narron & Holdford, by William H. Holdford and Henry C. Babb, Jr., for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MEXON DIGGS\nNo. 697SC509\n(Filed 17 December 1969)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 104\u2014 motion for nonsuit \u2014 consideration of evidence\nUpon motion for nonsuit in a criminal case, all the evidence upon the whole record tending to sustain a conviction is to be considered in the light most favorable to the State and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom.\n2. Forgery \u00a7 1\u2014 elements of the crime\nTo constitute the offense of forgery, (1) there must be a false making or alteration of some instrument in writing, (2) there must be a fraudulent intent, and (3) the instrument must be apparently capable of effecting a fraud.\n3. Forgery \u00a7 2\u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nIn this prosecution for forgery of a check, the State\u2019s evidence is held sufficient for the jury where it tends to show that defendant admitted to officers that he wrote the check in question and did not have permission from the person whose name appeared as drawer of the check to sign his name, that the person named thereon as payee whose signature purportedly appeared on the back of the check had neither signed the back of the check nor given defendant permission to sign her name thereon, that defendant had gotten another person to cash the check for him, and the check itself was introduced in evidence.\n4. Forgery \u00a7 2; Criminal Law \u00a7 106\u2014 sufficiency of evidence aliunde defendant\u2019s confession\nIn this prosecution for forgery, there was sufficient extrinsic evidence corroborating defendant\u2019s confession to warrant submission of the case to the jury, where the forged check was introduced in evidence, endorsements appearing on the back thereof indicated it had been negotiated, and there was independent evidence that the signatures of the persons whose names appeared thereon as drawer and as payee were not genuine.\n5. Criminal Daw \u00a7 106\u2014 corpus delicti \u2014 evidence aliunde confession\nWhen the State offers evidence of the corpus delicti in addition to defendant\u2019s confession of guilt, defendant\u2019s motion for nonsuit is correctly denied.\n6. Criminal Daw \u00a7 76\u2014 admission of confession \u2014 necessity for voir dire \u2014 failure to object\nIn this forgery prosecution, the trial court did not err in the admission of the testimony of two police officers concerning defendant\u2019s extrajudicial admission without conducting a voir dire hearing and making findings of fact as to the voluntariness of defendant\u2019s statements, where defendant made no objection at the trial to the officer\u2019s testimony.\n7. Criminal Daw \u00a7\u00a7 75, 162\u2014 confessions \u2014 necessity for objection\nA general objection, if timely made, is sufficient to challenge the admissibility of a confession, but objection is waived if not made at the proper time and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.\nON Certiorari from Fountain, J., December 1968 Criminal Session of Wilson Superior Court.\n\u25a0 Defendant, represented by court-appointed counsel, was tried on his plea of not guilty to a bill of indictment charging him with forging a check in the amount of $42.00, payable to one Emma Smith, and purporting to have been drawn by one Robert Smith. The State introduced the check in evidence and offered the testimony of the two police officers who had arrested defendant. These officers testified that after arresting the defendant and reading the warrant to him, they told defendant \u201che had the right to remain silent, that anything he said would be used against him in a court of law, that he had a right to have an attorney present with him before any question was asked, if he desired one, and that if he could not afford to hire a lawyer, one would be appointed to represent him.\u201d The officers testified that after they had given these warnings to the defendant, he did not request an attorney before he answered their questions. The officers testified that they had told the defendant that according to their information defendant had written the check, had gotten another man to go to the store and cash it for him, and - that Robert Smith had never given defendant permission to sign his name to the check. The officers testified that defendant had admitted to them that their information was right.\nThe State also offered the testimony of Emma Smith, who testified that Robert Smith was her son, that he was in the Army on the date the check was issued, that the signature \u201cRobert Smith\u201d on the check was not her son\u2019s handwriting, and that she had never signed the back of the check nor had she given defendant permission to sign her name on the back of the check.\nThe defendant took the stand and testified that he knew Robert Smith and Emma Smith, but that he had not signed the check or written any part of it and that the only time he had ever seen it was when it was shown to him by the officers. Defendant also testified that the officers had advised him of his rights and had told him they had information that he had written the check, but he denied that he had admitted to them that their information was right or that he had ever made any incriminating statement.\nThe jury returned a verdict of guilty, and judgment was imposed thereon sentencing defendant for a term of eighteen months. Defendant gave notice of appeal, but requested that his court-appointed counsel be relieved of further duties, stating to the court that he would privately employ counsel to effect his appeal. Defendant failed to raise necessary funds to retain private counsel in apt time to perfect his appeal. The superior court then appointed defendant\u2019s present counsel, who had not represented him at his trial, to represent him, and this Court thereafter granted defendant\u2019s petition for writ of certiorari to perfect a late appeal.\nAttorney General Robert Morgan and Staff Attorney T. Buie Costen, for the State.\nNarron & Holdford, by William H. Holdford and Henry C. Babb, Jr., for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0732-01", "first_page_order": 756, "last_page_order": 760 }