{ "id": 8519816, "name": "A. J. ROSE and wife, DORA W. ROSE v. GUILFORD COUNTY, by and through the Guilford County Commissioners", "name_abbreviation": "Rose v. Guilford County ex rel. Guilford County Commissioners", "decision_date": "1982-12-21", "docket_number": "No. 8218SC116", "first_page": "170", "last_page": "174", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "60 N.C. App. 170" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 35", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572863 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E. 2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566715 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 S.E. 2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561932 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 S.E. 2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560800, 8560875, 8560843, 8560816, 8560825 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0202-01", "/nc/300/0202-05", "/nc/300/0202-04", "/nc/300/0202-02", "/nc/300/0202-03" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 N.C. App. 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553580 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/44/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 S.E. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563771 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 S.E. 2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550483 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/46/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 S.E. 2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566432, 8566530, 8566571, 8566461, 8566494 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0196-01", "/nc/304/0196-04", "/nc/304/0196-05", "/nc/304/0196-02", "/nc/304/0196-03" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E. 2d 918", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 N.C. App. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170651 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/52/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 S.E. 2d 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 N.C. App. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554653 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/21/0129-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 511, "char_count": 9079, "ocr_confidence": 0.8, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3381845587141865e-07, "percentile": 0.7918728080285762 }, "sha256": "ef05857bafed54df4ac9e26d6736a46f3d65afe1aeb7e87d4ea44faa60fefd80", "simhash": "1:a55dd44904a52c6c", "word_count": 1461 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:52:46.639047+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WELLS and Whichard concur." ], "parties": [ "A. J. ROSE and wife, DORA W. ROSE v. GUILFORD COUNTY, by and through the Guilford County Commissioners" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "VAUGHN, Judge.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 first argument is that the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs\u2019 affidavits, which were filed on the day of the summary judgment hearing, were inadmissible. We do not agree. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56(c) provides, in part: \u201cThe adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits.\u201d This rule was explained in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Chantos, 21 N.C. App. 129, 203 S.E. 2d 421 (1974):\nIt is clear that opposing affidavits are to be served prior to the day of the hearing. It follows that the clear intent of the legislature is that supporting affidavits should be filed and served sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit opposing affidavits to be filed prior to the day of the hearing.\nNationwide Insurance Company v. Chantos, 21 N.C. App. at 130, 203 S.E. 2d at 423. Accord, Rockingham Square Shopping Center, Inc. v. Integon Life Insurance Corp., 52 N.C. App. 633, 279 S.E. 2d 918, review denied, 304 N.C. 196, 285 S.E. 2d 101 (1981).\nPlaintiffs\u2019 second argument is that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant because there is a genuine issue of fact. We agree.\nSummary judgment should be rendered \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56(c). Since the trial judge only considered the pleadings in making his determination, the motion for summary judgment was, in effect, a motion for judgment on the pleadings under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(c). Burton v. Kenyon, 46 N.C. App. 309, 264 S.E. 2d 808 (1980). When a motion for judgment on the pleadings is made, \u201cft]he trial court is required to view the facts and permissible inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. All well pleaded factual allegations in the nonmoving party\u2019s pleadings are taken as true. . . .\u201d Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 137, 209 S.E. 2d 494, 499 (1974). See also Town of Bladenboro v. McKeithan, 44 N.C. App. 459, 261 S.E. 2d 260, appeal dismissed, 300 N.C. 202, 282 S.E. 2d 228 (1980). Pleadings comply with our present concept of notice pleading if the allegations in the complaint give defendant sufficient notice of the nature and basis of plaintiffs\u2019 claim to file an answer, and the face of the complaint shows no insurmountable bar to recovery. Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E. 2d 161 (1970). The allegations in plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, taken as true, tend to show that there was no substantial change in the rezoned property, and defendants acted in an unreasonable, discriminatory, illegal, arbitrary, and capricious manner. This clearly gave defendants sufficient notice of the nature and basis of plaintiffs\u2019 claim. Although the county commissioners have the power to rezone property when reasonably necessary for public health, safety, morals or welfare, this authority is limited in that it may not be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. This concept was explained in Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E. 2d 432 (1971). In Allred, the corporate defendant bought a 9.26 acre tract, which was zoned R-4. The corporate defendant\u2019s request that the property be rezoned from R-4 to Shopping Center was denied. Several years later the corporate defendant twice filed applications requesting the property be rezoned to R-10, and submitted plans for high rise luxury apartments. Eventually, the city council adopted the rezoning ordinance. Plaintiffs attacked the ordinance on the ground that it exceeded and conflicted with the authority conferred by the enabling legislation. The Court discussed the relevant zoning statutes, now in G.S. 160A-381 through G.S. 160A-392, and determined that one of the fundamental concepts of zoning is that \u201c[s]uch regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan. . . .\u201d G.S. 160-174 [repealed by session laws 1971, c. 698, s. 2, effective 1 January 1972, current statute is G.S. 160A-383]. The Court held the ordinance invalid and unenforceable because they found that the city council did not determine that the 9.26 acre tract and the surrounding circumstances justified rezoning the tract to R-10. Instead, the city council based its actions on its approval of the applicant\u2019s plans to build high rise luxury apartments. The Court held that disregarding the fundamental concepts of zoning may be arbitrary and capricious. \u201cRezoning must be effected by the exercise of legislative power rather than by special arrangements with the owner of a particular tract or parcel of land.\u201d Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. at 545, 178 S.E. 2d at 441. See also Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E. 2d 35 (1972).\nIn this case, plaintiffs\u2019 allegations indicate that the surrounding circumstances and location of the property has not changed, and the rezoning was arbitrary and capricious. Since the pleadings give defendants sufficient notice of the nature and basis of plaintiffs\u2019 claim to enable them to answer, and there is no insurmountable bar to recovery on the face of the complaint, the judgment on the pleadings should be reversed.\nReversed.\nJudges WELLS and Whichard concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "VAUGHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "R. Horace Swiggett, Jr., and Herman Winfree, for plaintiff appellants.", "Deputy County Attorney Margaret A. Dudley, for defendant appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "A. J. ROSE and wife, DORA W. ROSE v. GUILFORD COUNTY, by and through the Guilford County Commissioners\nNo. 8218SC116\n(Filed 21 December 1982)\n1. Rules of Civil Procedure \u00a7 56.3\u2014 affidavits filed on day of summary judgment hearing \u2014inadmissible\nPursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56(c) the trial court properly ruled that plaintiffs\u2019 affidavits, which were filed on the day of the summary judgment hearing, were inadmissible.\n2. Municipal Corporations \u00a7 30.3\u2014 zoning change \u2014summary judgment for defendants improper\nThe trial court erred in entering summary judgment for defendant county concerning a zoning change involving plaintiffs\u2019 property where the allegations in plaintiffs\u2019 complaint tended to show that there was no substantial change in the rezoned property, and that defendant acted in an unreasonable, discriminatory, illegal, arbitrary, and capricious manner by preventing them from having mobile homes on their property.\nAPPEAL by plaintiffs from Wood, Judge. Judgment entered 1 December 1981 in Superior Court, Guilford County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 November 1982.\nIn November 1979, the Guilford County Commissioners rezoned plaintiffs\u2019 property from A-l to R-20S. Plaintiffs brought this action to have the rezoning set aside. Plaintiffs\u2019 verified complaint alleged they owned their tract of land, consisting of thirty-seven acres, for nineteen years. Prior to 1979, their land was zoned A-l which permitted mobile homes. Plaintiffs already had two mobile homes on their property, and they wanted to install two more. Their complaint also alleged:\nV. That some of the adjoining property owners became dissatisfied when they received the information that some additional mobile homes would be located on the Plaintiffs\u2019 land and that as a result thereof, some of the adjoining property owners filed a petition with Guilford County requesting that approximately 100 acres of land, which included the Plaintiffs\u2019 land, be rezoned from A-l Agriculture to R-20S and that the sole motive of the adjoining property owners was not to rezone their land for the purpose of building houses, but solely to rezone the property for the purpose of changing zoning from A-l Agriculture to R-20S, so as to prevent the plaintiffs from erecting additional mobile homes on their property as they proposed to do so.\nVI. That the Guilford County Commissioners on November 19, 1979, did change the zoning of the Plaintiffs\u2019 property, together with others consisting of approximately 100 acres, more or less, from A-l Agriculture to R-20S, and as a result of said rezoning, the plaintiffs have been greatly damaged and that they are no longer able to use their land as they contemplated and that the said rezoning was done solely for the purpose of defeating the Plaintiffs\u2019 right to install mobile homes on their property as they were allowed to do under the A-l Agriculture zoning as it previously existed.\nVIII. That the actions of the Guilford County Commissioners in rezoning the Plaintiffs\u2019 property from A-l Agriculture to R-20S is unreasonable, discriminatory, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, and constitutes a taking of plaintiffs\u2019 property without due process of law.\nIX. That no evidence whatsoever was presented at the meeting of the County Commissioners at the time the rezoning was passed, to the effect that there had been any substantial change in the condition of the character and nature of said lands. . . .\nDefendants filed an answer which admitted it changed the zoning of plaintiffs\u2019 property, and denied the other material allegations in the complaint.\nDefendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment was granted based solely on the pleadings.\nR. Horace Swiggett, Jr., and Herman Winfree, for plaintiff appellants.\nDeputy County Attorney Margaret A. Dudley, for defendant appellees." }, "file_name": "0170-01", "first_page_order": 202, "last_page_order": 206 }