{ "id": 8519317, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDELL WILLIS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Willis", "decision_date": "1983-03-01", "docket_number": "No. 8210SC749", "first_page": "23", "last_page": "42", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "61 N.C. App. 23" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "254 S.E. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 739", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571143, 8571059, 8571028, 8570997, 8571095 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0739-05", "/nc/296/0739-03", "/nc/296/0739-02", "/nc/296/0739-01", "/nc/296/0739-04" ] }, { "cite": "249 S.E. 2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 N.C. App. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550024 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/39/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E. 2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571168 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 So. 2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9557444 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519-20" }, { "page": "518-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/395/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 S.E. 2d 535", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 N.C. App. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548892 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/40/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575125 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E. 2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557269 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E. 2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568468 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 S.E. 2d 422", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564774 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 S.E. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552518 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/46/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 S.Ct. 2048", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 L.Ed. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "451 U.S. 970", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6297860, 6298121, 6296317, 6297131, 6296589, 6295406, 6296017, 6296882, 6297366, 6295705, 6297629 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/451/0970-10", "/us/451/0970-11", "/us/451/0970-04", "/us/451/0970-07", "/us/451/0970-05", "/us/451/0970-01", "/us/451/0970-03", "/us/451/0970-06", "/us/451/0970-08", "/us/451/0970-02", "/us/451/0970-09" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E. 2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569816 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E. 2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 N.C. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526691 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/55/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 S.E. 2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "831" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 N.C. App. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521048 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/54/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E. 2d 918", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 N.C. App. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553597 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/36/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 F. 2d 346", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 169401 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/498/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 S.Ct. 120", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 L.Ed. 2d 105", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "677 F. 2d 394", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 557417 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/677/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 S.E. 2d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 N.C. App. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553602 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/30/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 S.E. 2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 N.C. App. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11302190 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/22/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E. 2d 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559216 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 698", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571127 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561796, 8561873, 8561842, 8561814, 8561782 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0375-02", "/nc/300/0375-05", "/nc/300/0375-04", "/nc/300/0375-03", "/nc/300/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 S.E. 2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.C. App. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547961 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/45/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 S.Ct. 1320", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 L.Ed. 2d 764", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "445 U.S. 931", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1777344, 1777730, 1777412, 1777605, 1777508, 1777800, 1777385, 1777487, 1777649, 1777618, 1777877, 1777689, 1777599 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/445/0931-08", "/us/445/0931-02", "/us/445/0931-12", "/us/445/0931-11", "/us/445/0931-07", "/us/445/0931-13", "/us/445/0931-09", "/us/445/0931-10", "/us/445/0931-05", "/us/445/0931-04", "/us/445/0931-01", "/us/445/0931-06", "/us/445/0931-03" ] }, { "cite": "604 F. 2d 1135", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 22545 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/604/1135-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 U.S. 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11715586 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" }, { "page": "440-41" }, { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/414/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 300", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6174244 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302-03" }, { "page": "65-66" }, { "page": "1058" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 U.S. 410", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11317375 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" }, { "page": "589" }, { "page": "644" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/393/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 U.S. 143", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9137003 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" }, { "page": "617-18" }, { "page": "1924" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/407/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 U.S. 89", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11728831 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/379/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E. 2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565819 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0243-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1566, "char_count": 45402, "ocr_confidence": 0.799, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.693529872153582e-07, "percentile": 0.8277913113853356 }, "sha256": "fcd1c358f4e1bfa2d208d2e02e0357eb1f19115fef57e00bd8c4b75625c405a1", "simhash": "1:9176f67c24a608da", "word_count": 7618 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:13:54.976609+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge VAUGHN and Judge Wells concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDELL WILLIS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRASWELL, Judge.\nUnder his multi-faceted assignments of error defendant argues that there was no probable cause for his warrantless arrest or search of his person, that currency and papers seized from his person were improperly admitted into evidence, that certain jury instructions were improper, that his motions to dismiss and nonsuit should have been allowed, and that the controlled substances trafficking statute is unconstitutional.\nWe hold that probable cause existed for the warrantless arrest, search of the person incidental to arrest, seizure of money from the person, and seizure of four pieces of paper from the defendant\u2019s wallet.\nWhen a warrantless arrest is made upon the basis of probable cause, the arrest is constitutionally valid. The framework for a determination of the existence of probable cause in any case is conditioned upon \u201c \u2018whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within [the officers\u2019] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.\u2019 \u201d State v. Bright, 301 N.C. 243, 255, 271 S.E. 2d 368, 376 (1980), quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 13 L.Ed. 2d 142, 145, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225 (1964).\nIn our case Detective O\u2019Shields, a 10-year veteran of the Raleigh Police Department, received information from a confidential informant on 22 June 1981, the same date of the arrest, that the defendant, a subject known to both officer and informant, would be delivering packages of heroin to several people in the vicinity of South and South Saunders Streets at Shirley\u2019s Restaurant and Lounge. Past information from this informant had proven reliable and had led to convictions in approximately 25 cases, of which 6 or 7 of them had been in the previous 6 months. The detective had dealt with this informant many times.\nOn the basis of this intelligence, Detective O\u2019Shields, accompanied by Sgt. Peoples, drove in an unmarked car to the vicinity of South and South Saunders Streets at approximately 10:30 p.m. After circling the area twice, the officers met a Cadillac automobile on Florence Street. A subsequent chase of the Cadillac for a block to a block and a half led to the arrest of the defendant, who was a passenger in the Cadillac, at the rear parking lot of Shirley\u2019s Restaurant and Lounge.\nThe facts and circumstances of the encounter with the Cadillac, as more specifically related under the facts of this opinion; what was happening at the moment of the encounter; the fresh knowledge from the confidential informant; the proven past reliable knowledge through 25 convictions; the self-verifying details of the officers finding the defendant in the exact vicinity where the informant had said the defendant would be delivering packages of heroin; the defendant being one of the two occupants of the Cadillac; the throwing of a glassine package by the defendant from the car; the defendant yelling, \u201cGo, go, go. Get out of here. Get out of here\u201d; the way and manner of the automobile leaving its position on Florence Street; the way the defendant, during the chase, \u201cwas all down in front of the vehicle making all sorts of motions with his hands\u201d; the Cadillac being in motion at night without lights; the leaving and prompt return by Sgt. Peoples to the place where the package had been thrown from the Cadillac; the retrieval of the glassine package from the exact same area from which an object had been thrown by defendant and prompt return with the package to the parking lot of Shirley\u2019s Restaurant; the white powder appearance of the contents of the package \u2014 all of which, when taken en masse, were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that defendant had committed or was committing a criminal offense in violation of the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act. O\u2019Shields possessed a reasonable ground for belief that defendant was committing or had committed an offense, justifying the arrest of the defendant without a warrant. State v. Bright, supra. As said in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 32 L.Ed. 2d 612, 617-18, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924 (1972), \u201cOne simple rule will not cover every situation. Some tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant no police response or require further investigation before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized. But in some situations \u2014 for example, . . . when a credible informant warns of a specific impending crime \u2014 the subleties of the hearsay rule should not thwart an appropriate police response.\u201d O\u2019Shields was acting and \u201crelying on something more substantial than a casual rumor.\u201d Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89 S.Ct. 584, 589, 21 L.Ed. 2d 637, 644 (1969).\nOur case is similar to McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 18 L.Ed. 2d 62, 87 S.Ct. 1056 (1967). In affirming a possession of heroin conviction, the court in McCray noted the following eviden-tiary summary of the officers\u2019 testimony:\n\u201cOfficer Jackson stated that he and two fellow officers had had a conversation with an informant on the morning of January 16 in their unmarked police car. The officer said that the informant had told them that the petitioner, with whom Jackson was acquainted, \u2018was selling narcotics and had narcotics on his person and that he could be found in the vicinity of 47th and Calumet at this particular time.\u2019 Jackson said that he and his fellow officers drove to that vicinity in the police car and that when they spotted the petitioner, the informant pointed him out and then departed on foot. Jackson stated that the officers observed the petitioner walking with a woman, then separating from her and meeting briefly with a man, then proceeding alone, and finally, after seeing the police car, \u2018hurriedly walkpng] between two buildings.\u2019 \u2018At this point,\u2019 Jackson testified, \u2018my partner and myself got out of the car and informed him we had information he had narcotics on his person, placed him in the police vehicle at this point.\u2019 Jackson stated that the officers then searched the petitioner and found the heroin in a cigarette package.\nJackson testified that he had been acquainted with the informant for approximately a year, that during this period the informant had supplied him with information about narcotics activities \u2018fifteen, sixteen times at least,\u2019 that the information had proved to be accurate and had resulted in numerous arrests and convictions.\u201d\nId. at 302-03, 18 L.Ed. 2d at 65-66, 87 S.Ct. at 1058.\nWe also hold that the intensity of the search of the person of the defendant was lawful and that the money and papers were properly seized and received into evidence. Judge D. B. Herring, Jr., the trial judge who heard the pretrial motion to suppress, based upon facts found, and which we also find to be fully supported in the record, concluded that the search here did not take place until after a lawful arrest, and that \u201conce arrested a search, incident to the arrest, of the defendant\u2019s person . . . was lawful and proper.\u201d It was during the search that the money was found in bundles in various parts of his clothing and the four papers were found in his wallet. As held by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 38 L.Ed. 2d 427, 440-41, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477 (1973),\n\u201cA police officer\u2019s determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the search. The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a \u2018reasonable\u2019 search under that Amendment.\u201d\nThe issue of the lawful seizure of a wallet, and other items, from a defendant in a drug case was discussed in United States v. House, 604 F. 2d 1135, 1142 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931, 63 L.Ed. 2d 764, 100 S.Ct. 1320 (1980):\n\u201cThe government argues that the jacket, wallet, keys, and car ownership papers were seized to show constructive possession by appellant of drugs or money. Over $3,000 was found in the wallet; drugs were found in the jacket, a locked overnight bag in the bedroom closet, and the car. The government argues that these items constituted \u2018mere evidence\u2019 that would aid in a particular apprehension or conviction. [Citation omitted.] We find the government\u2019s position to be well taken. Moreover, the car keys and wallet were seized incident to appellant\u2019s lawful arrest.\u201d\nThe defendant makes a specific six-prong attack on the admission into evidence of the currency taken from his person and the automobile, and to the admission into evidence of the four pieces of paper taken from defendant\u2019s wallet, contending prejudicial error, as follows:\n\u201c(1) O\u2019Shields\u2019s belief as to the meaning of the papers was an impermissible assertion of an opinion by a nonexpert witness with no firsthand knowledge of the facts about which he was testifying.\n(2) The documents, and the interpretations that O\u2019Shields ascribed to them, were attributed to the Defendant in the absence of any evidence to show that they were written by the Defendant.\n(3) The documents and the meaning given them by O\u2019Shields were admitted for the purpose of proving the truth of the meaning that O\u2019Shields had given them and thus are hearsay.\n(4) The purpose for the introduction of this evidence was to create the impression in the minds of the jurors that the Defendant had engaged in a variety of heroin transactions for which he had not been charged and was not on trial. The admission of the evidence for that purpose constituted an attack upon the Defendant\u2019s character during the State\u2019s case in chief and without the Defendant having first put his character in issue.\n(5) The money, documents, and the testimony about the documents were offered to conjure up the implication that the Defendant was engaged in the sale of heroin, which is irrelevant to the offense of possession of heroin, for which the Defendant was on trial, and was calculated to create substantial prejudice against the Defendant in the minds of the jurors.\n(6) The documents and currency were seized from the Defendant without probable cause in violation of the United States Constitution and Chapter 15A of the North Carolina General Statutes and were, therefore, inadmissible at the Defendant\u2019s trial. For each of these reasons the Court erred. For any of them the Defendant is entitled to a new trial.\u201d\nWe merge our discussion of these arguments by first considering whether O\u2019Shields was an expert or a lay witness as to his testimony about the papers. The uncontradicted evidence shows that Detective O\u2019Shields had been a Raleigh police officer for 10 years. He had experience as a patrolman with the Selective Enforcement Unit and for a year and a half with the Drugs and Vice Unit. His present duties were working with narcotics and vice cases. On voir dire O\u2019Shields stated that he was trained by attending several drug identification schools and search warrant classes, by working drug campaigns with the investigative division, by working on the east and south sides of Raleigh and by his previous experience on the Selective Enforcement Unit. He had been involved in the investigation of heroin trafficking in the City of Raleigh for approximately six years. Thus, it appears from the record that through his study, experience and personal knowledge of the area, O\u2019Shields had \u2018\u2018acquired such skill that he was better qualified than the jury to form an opinion on the particular subject of his testimony.\u201d Maloney v. Hospital Systems, 45 N.C. App. 172, 177, 262 S.E. 2d 680, 683, disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 375 (1980), citing State v. Johnson, 280 N.C. 281, 286, 185 S.E. 2d 698, 701 (1972). The mere fact that O\u2019Shields was never tendered as an expert witness nor held by the court to be an expert witness, does not in fact prevent him, otherwise qualified in the record, from giving his opinion. It is the substance of the background evidence of qualifications in the record and not any magic words spoken by the judge that determine if the witness may give opinion testimony. In State v. Mitchell, 283 N.C. 462, 196 S.E. 2d 736 (1973), there was no formal ruling that a fingerprint identification witness was an expert, but the record showed that he was better qualified than the jury to form an opinion on the subject. See State v. Covington, 22 N.C. App. 250, 206 S.E. 2d 361 (1974); and 1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 133, fn. 6, p. 515 (1982). In Covington, supra, at 253, 206 S.E. 2d at 363, it was held proper to allow a Durham Vice Squad officer with years of vice squad experience to describe \u201cuse of narcotics paraphernalia and cutting of heroin.\u201d Also see, State v. Clark, 30 N.C. App. 253, 226 S.E. 2d 398 (1976). \u201cThe absence of a record finding of qualification is not ground for challenging the ruling implicitly made in allowing him to testify. At least if the record indicates that such a finding could have been made, it will be assumed the judge found him qualified, . . .\u201d Brandis, supra, at p. 517.\nThere was a voir dire as to O\u2019Shields\u2019 actual interpretation of the names, figures, and telephone numbers appearing on the four pieces of paper taken from defendant\u2019s wallet. The trial judge properly concluded that during the voir dire itself, O\u2019Shields had gone too far in giving his opinions. However, we hold that Judge Battle properly ruled that where the officers were personally familiar with the name on the piece of paper, the officer could identify the person and explain his knowledge of same. Since the papers were taken directly from defendant\u2019s wallet and the defendant\u2019s own name appeared as addressee on one of the pieces of paper, a receipt for the rental of post-hole diggers, it was not required that the State prove who wrote the papers or made any of the markings on them or any other type of authentication. The fact that the papers were found in his wallet indicates that the defendant considered the papers important to himself.\nCoupled with his complaint of O\u2019Shields\u2019 opinion evidence is an allegation of improper comment by the district attorney in his closing jury argument. We agree with the State that since the defense counsel\u2019s argument is not brought forward in the record, the defendant ought not to be allowed to object to the argument of the State because the argument might well have been in response to comments made by the defendant\u2019s counsel. See G.S. 15A-1241(b). We have nevertheless examined the challenged comment and find it to be without merit. The district attorney here had argued that based on the testimony of O\u2019Shields and Peoples,\n\u201c[T]hat what we have here is Edell Willis\u2019 records of his heroin sales. We have got the names of the people who you now know, according to the evidence testified by Detective O\u2019Shields, are known and convicted heroin users, with each one of them having next to them certain numbers, nine hundred, five hundred, seven hundred fifty, nine hundred, three hundred, five hundred fifty, etc. What is that? Doesn\u2019t the evidence show, ladies and gentlemen, that Edell Willis had just made sales of certain amounts of heroin for certain prices that he now had with him. Did he sell a package of heroin for five hundred dollars to Miss D., to Young J.J. two packages, one nine hundred dollar package and a five hundred dollar package? What does this say? What does the money say? Isn\u2019t that exactly what was going on? Or is that just one of those coincidental things that point to innocence that Mr. Hall was talking about.\u201d\nThe defendant\u2019s objection to this argument has already been answered in United States v. Washington, 677 F. 2d 394, 396 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 74 L.Ed. 2d 105, 103 S.Ct. 120 (1982), as follows:\n\u201cThe defendants also complain about the prosecutor\u2019s statement to the jury that matching names and figures in the address books and slips of paper found on the two defendants give \u2018an idea of how drug dealers do business, the names of customers and the amounts of money.\u2019 The defendants argue that, since no expert witness had testified on the business practices of drug dealers, this comment went beyond the evidence in the case. We disagree. The prosecutor was merely suggesting a plausible inference to be drawn from the evidence. Such suggestions are proper. See United States v. Welebir, 498 F. 2d 346, 351-52 (4th Cir. 1974).\u201d\nThe defendant argues further that O\u2019Shields\u2019 testimony that he was \u201cmaking an assumption\u201d as to the identification of names, nicknames, and figures violates the hearsay rule, was an attack upon the defendant\u2019s character, and tended to show that the defendant was engaged in other offenses which were not relevant to the crime charged. We do not agree.\nThe defendant was indicted under G.S. 90-95(h)(4). The opinion by O\u2019Shields was relevant and admissible as evidence concerning defendant\u2019s guilty knowledge of what he possessed. The trafficking in drugs statute is aimed at an offender who is facilitating a large scale flow of drugs, and the General Assembly aimed to deal with such an offender. Our Court held in State v. Richardson, 36 N.C. App. 373, 375, 243 S.E. 2d 918, 919 (1978), that \u201cIn drug cases, evidence of other drug violations is relevant and admissible if it tends to show plan or scheme, disposition to deal in illicit drugs, knowledge of the presence and character of the drug, or presence at and possession of the premises where the drugs are found.\u201d Defense counsel could have, but did not, request the trial judge to instruct the jury as to the limited purpose for which this evidence was received. Id. Richardson was cited with approval by our Court in State v. Haynes, 54 N.C. App. 186, 282 S.E. 2d 830 (1981), a case where the officer was permitted in a drug case \u201cto identify certain papers which had been removed from defendant\u2019s billfold at the time of arrest and to testify as to their contents.\u201d Id. at 186, 282 S.E. 2d at 831. Here, the four pieces of paper and the bundles of money were relevant and tended to show a plan or scheme to traffic in drugs and a disposition of the defendant to deal in illicit drugs; that defendant had knowledge of the presence of heroin in the package abandoned and thrown by him from the automobile; and that it was defendant\u2019s intent to possess heroin and traffic in same.\nBy his third question the defendant contends that the trial judge erred in its failure to charge the jury on the lesser-included charge of simple possession of a controlled substance, or any other lesser offense. This contention is without merit.\nOnly when there is evidence of a lesser-included offense is the judge required to charge on a lesser offense. All of the evidence, if believed \u2014 and credibility is a jury function \u2014 shows the total weight of the mixture of white powder to be 13.2 grams and that the mixture contained approximately 30% of pure heroin. The amount was well over the lower limit of 4 grams so as to fall within the trafficking statute. The fact that the mixture was analyzed to be 30% pure heroin instead of 100% pure heroin is not controlling. So long as the quantity of the mixture in which the percentage of heroin is present is of a weight of 4 grams or more, but less than 14 grams, this aspect of the controlled substances law has been satisfied. State v. Tyndall, 55 N.C. App. 57, 284 S.E. 2d 575 (1981). There was no evidence presented from which a trial judge could legitimately fashion a charge for a lesser offense. State v. Summitt, 301 N.C. 591, 273 S.E. 2d 425, cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970, 68 L.Ed. 2d 349, 101 S.Ct. 2048 (1981); State v. Coats, 46 N.C. App. 615, 275 S.E. 2d 486, affirmed, 301 N.C. 216, 270 S.E. 2d 422 (1980).\nThe judge\u2019s charge on circumstantial evidence is the fourth question presented for review. Although the judge did instruct the jury on circumstantial evidence, defendant contends that the instruction was not full and complete and did not comply with the one requested by defendant.\nThe defendant had requested that the judge use N.C.P.I. Crim. 104.05 (no eyewitness testimony or direct evidence) and that the judge instruct on the two kinds of circumstantial evidence, links in a chain and strands of a rope, so as to put the jury \u201cin a position to recognize either kind if it existed.\u201d Defendant also requested a more detailed and thorough explanation of \u201chypothesis\u201d of guilt or innocence. The actual instruction given is as follows:\n\u201cCircumstantial evidence is evidence of facts from which other facts may logically and reasonably be deduced. Circumstantial evidence is recognized and accepted proof in a court of law. However, before you may rely upon circumstantial evidence to find the defendant guilty in this case you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the State either alone or together with any direct evidence points unerringly to the defendant\u2019s guilt and excludes every other reasonable hypothesis.\u201d\nSince there was direct evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt through O\u2019Shields\u2019 testimony of seeing the defendant physically throw from his hand the package later identified as containing heroin, the trial judge was correct in refusing to charge on \u201cno eyewitness testimony or direct evidence.\u201d The actual charge quoted above is complete in itself and supported by the evidence in the case. The trial judge is not required to use the same language requested by counsel, even though the language used could have included more details. State v. Sledge, 297 N.C. 227, 254 S.E. 2d 579 (1979); State v. Monk, 291 N.C. 37, 229 S.E. 2d 163 (1976). As noted by our Supreme Court in Sledge, reiterating what it had earlier stressed in State v. Lowther, 265 N.C. 315, 318, 144 S.E. 2d 64, 67 (1965), \u201c[n]o set form of words is required which the court must use to convey to the jury the rule relating to the degree of proof required for conviction on circumstantial evidence in a criminal case.\u201d State v. Sledge, supra, at 234, 254 S.E. 2d at 584. We conclude, as did the court in Sledge, that there is no reasonable cause to believe that the jury was misled or misinformed by the charge as given.\nAnother assignment of error is the denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and at the close of all the evidence, and denial of nonsuit. He contends that the evidence presented was insufficient to convict defendant as a matter of law.\nAfter giving full consideration to all of the evidence, including the testimony of the one witness for the defendant, we find this assignment to be without merit. There was substantial evidence of all of the elements of the offense. State v. Smith, 40 N.C. App. 72, 252 S.E. 2d 535 (1979).\nIn his fifth assignment of error defendant attacks the constitutionality of G.S. 90-95(h)(4)a., (5) and (6) which provide:\n\u201c(4) Any person who sells, manufactures, delivers, transports, or possesses four grams or more of opium or opiate, or any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of opium or opiate . . . including heroin, or any mixture containing any such substance, shall be guilty of a felony which felony shall be known as \u2018trafficking in opium or heroin\u2019 and if the quantity of such substance or mixture involved:\na. Is four grams or more, but less than 14 grams, such person shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for not less than six years nor more than 15 years in the State\u2019s prison and shall be fined not less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000);\n* * * *\n(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except as provided in G.S. 90-95(h)(6), any person who has been convicted of a violation of this subsection shall serve the applicable minimum prison term provided by this subsection before either unconditional release or parole.\n(6) A person sentenced under this subsection is not eligible for early release or early parole if the person is sentenced as a committed youthful offender and the sentencing judge may not suspend the sentence or place the person sentenced on probation. However, the sentencing judge may reduce the fine, or impose a prison term less than the applicable minimum prison term provided by this subsection, or suspend the prison term imposed and place a person on probation when such person has, to the best of his knowledge, provided substantial assistance in the identification, arrest, or conviction of any accomplices, accessories, co-conspirators, or principals if the sentencing judge enters in the record a finding that the person to be sentenced has rendered such substantial assistance.\u201d\nDefendant argues that subsection (6) coerces a defendant to abandon his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination by denying him sentencing leniency unless he cooperates with the authorities. In State v. Benitez, 395 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1981), the Florida Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a statute similar to ours and held that:\n\u201cNothing in the statute suggests that \u2018substantial assistance\u2019 must incriminate the defendant of crimes other than those for which he has already been convicted (and for which no fifth amendment privilege is obviously necessary). We acknowledge the risk of prosecution in other jurisdictions. Nonetheless, a defendant need not invoke [N.C. subsection (6)], as nothing in the statute is compulsive. [Citation omitted.] Putting a defendant to a difficult choice is not necessarily forbidden by the fifth amendment. [Citation omitted] .... No constitutional deprivation results if a defendant elects to reap the benefits of [subsection 6].\u201d\nId. at 519-20.\nWe agree with the reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court and reject defendant\u2019s argument on this issue. We also find without merit defendant\u2019s contention that the phrase \u201csubstantial assistance\u201d is unconstitutionally vague in defining a convicted defendant who is eligible for leniency in sentencing. We again agree with the analysis of this issue in Benitez-.\n\u201cBeing a description of a post-conviction form of plea bargaining rather than a definition of the crime itself, the phrase \u2018substantial assistance\u2019 can tolerate subjectivity to an extent which normally would be impermissible for penal statutes. [Citation omitted.] The contested phrase, in any event, is susceptible of common understanding in the context of the whole statute. [Citation omitted.] There is no due process infirmity.\u201d\nId. at 518-19.\nWe adopt the language in the Benitez decision and hold that defendant\u2019s attack on the constitutionality of subsection (6) cannot be sustained.\nWe likewise reject defendant\u2019s argument that the mandatory minimum sentence and fine provision of subsection (4) violates his equal protection rights and the separation of powers clause of the N.C. Constitution because it \u201cplaces impermissible legislative restraints on the judiciary and, in effect, also places sentencing powers in the hands of the prosecutor, who is a member of the executive branch.\u201d It is well-established that the legislature has' exclusive power to prescribe the punishment for crimes. Jernigan v. State, 279 N.C. 556, 184 S.E. 2d 259 (1971); State v. Vert, 39 N.C. App. 26, 249 S.E. 2d 476 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 739, 254 S.E. 2d 181 (1979). The function of the court in the punishment of crimes is to determine whether an accused is guilty or innocent and, if guilty, to pronounce the penalty prescribed by the legislature. Jernigan v. State, supra.\nDefendant next contends that section (4)(a) is a violation of his equal protection rights because it penalizes possession of a particular amount of any mixture containing heroin without regard to the percentage of heroin in the mixture. The holding in State v. Tyndall, supra, is dispositive on this issue. In Tyndall this Court discussed the rational relationship between proscribing amounts of a mixture without reference to the percentage of drugs and the legitimate State interest in protecting the public welfare. The harsh penalties prescribed in the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act, G.S. 90-86 et seq., represent an attempt by the legislature to deter large scale distribution of drugs and thereby to decrease the number of people potentially harmed by drug use. Id.\nWe cannot agree with defendant\u2019s construction of these statutes and hold that G.S. 90-95(h)(4)a., (5) and (6) are not violative of the United States or North Carolina Constitutions. We therefore overrule defendant\u2019s fifth assignment of error.\nWe conclude after a thorough examination of all of the evidence and assignments of error that the defendant received a trial without prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nChief Judge VAUGHN and Judge Wells concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRASWELL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten by Assistant Attorney General Joan H. Byers for the State.", "Loflin & Loflin by Thomas F. Loflin, III; Of Counsel, Eagles, Hafer & Hall by Kyle S. Hall for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDELL WILLIS\nNo. 8210SC749\n(Filed 1 March 1983)\n1. Arrest and Bail \u00a7 3.4\u2014 legality of arrest for narcotics offenses\nAn officer had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was committing or had committed a narcotics offense and, therefore, lawfully arrested defendant without a warrant, where the officer received information from a confidential informant that defendant, a subject known to both the officer and the informant, would be delivering packages of heroin to several people at a certain location; past information from this informant had proven reliable and had led to convictions in approximately 25 cases; the officer and another officer drove to the area in an unmarked police car at about 10:30 p.m.; the officer saw a Cadillac rolling forward at a slow speed without its headlights on; as the police car passed the Cadillac, the officer recognized defendant as being the person who was sitting in the passenger seat; when the police car drove up behind the Cadillac, the officer saw defendant throw a white package from the Cadillac; when the officer jumped from his police car, defendant yelled, \u201cGet out of here,\u201d and the Cadillac sped off; the Cadillac was stopped several blocks away; the second officer retrieved the package which had been thrown out of the Cadillac by defendant; large sums of money were found in the Cadillac and on defendant\u2019s person; and the second officer told the arresting officer that the recovered package contained a white powder substance.\n2. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 8\u2014 search incident to arrest \u2014 lawfulness of intensity\nThe intensity of a search of defendant\u2019s person as an incident to his lawful arrest for a narcotics offense, during which bundles of money were found in various parts of his clothing and four papers were found in his wallet, was reasonable and lawful, and the money and papers were lawfully seized and received into evidence.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 51\u2014 opinion testimony \u2014 failure to tender witness as expert\nThe fact that an officer was never tendered as an expert witness nor held by the court to be an expert witness did not prevent him from giving opinion testimony where it appeared from the record that he had acquired such skill that he was better qualified than the jury to form an opinion on the particular subject of his testimony.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 80\u2014 names on pieces of paper \u2014 identification by officer\nIn a prosecution for felonious possession of heroin, the trial court properly ruled that an officer who was familiar with persons listed on pieces of paper found in defendant\u2019s wallet could identify each such person listed and explain his knowledge of that person. Furthermore, since the papers were taken directly from defendant\u2019s wallet and the defendant\u2019s own name appeared as addressee on one of the pieces of paper, the State was not required to prove who wrote the papers or made any of the markings thereon or any other type of authentication.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 102.6\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s jury argument \u2014 plausible inference from the evidence\nIn a prosecution for felonious possession of heroin, the prosecutor\u2019s jury argument that, according to the testimony of two officers, persons whose names were written on papers found in defendant\u2019s wallet were known heroin users and dealers and that numbers beside the names of some of the persons represented a record of defendant\u2019s heroin sales merely suggested a plausible inference to be drawn from the evidence and was not improper.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 34.7, 34.8\u2014 evidence of other crimes \u2014 admissibility to show common plan or scheme, knowledge and intent\nIn a prosecution for trafficking in heroin, bundles of money found in various parts of defendant\u2019s clothing and papers found in defendant\u2019s wallet which contained the names of known heroin users with numbers beside some of the names were relevant as tending to show a plan or scheme and a disposition by defendant to deal in heroin, to show that defendant had knowledge of the presence of heroin in a package which he threw from an automobile, and to show that defendant intended to possess and traffic in heroin.\n7. Narcotics \u00a7 4.7\u2014 trafficking in heroin by possession \u2014 failure to instruct on lesser offenses\nIn this prosecution for trafficking in heroin by possessing between four and fourteen grams thereof, the trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of simple possession of heroin where all of the evidence tended to show that the total weight of the mixture of white powder possessed by defendant was 13.2 grams and that the mixture contained approximately 30% of pure heroin.\n8. Criminal Law \u00a7 112.4\u2014 instructions on circumstantial evidence\nIn a prosecution for felonious possession of heroin, the trial court properly refused to instruct on \u201cno eyewitness testimony or direct evidence\u201d where there was direct evidence of the offense through an officer\u2019s testimony that he saw defendant throw a package containing heroin from a car. Furthermore, the instruction given by the trial court on circumstantial evidence was sufficient although it was not in the language requested by defense counsel.\n9.Narcotics \u00a7 4\u2014 trafficking in heroin by possession \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe State\u2019s evidence was sufficient for the jury to find defendant guilty of trafficking in heroin by possessing between four and fourteen grams thereof.\n10. Narcotics \u00a7 5\u2014 trafficking in heroin \u2014 cooperation with authorities \u2014 statute permitting more lenient sentence \u2014 constitutionality\nThe subsection of the heroin trafficking statute which permits the trial judge to impose a more lenient sentence on a defendant who provides substantial assistance in the identification, arrest or conviction of any accomplices, accessories, co-conspirators or principals, G.S. 90-95(h)(6), is not unconstitutional on the theory that it coerces a defendant to abandon his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination by denying him sentencing leniency unless he cooperates with the authorities. Nor is the statute unconstitutionally vague in its use of the phrase \u201csubstantial assistance.\u201d\n11. Narcotics \u00a7 5\u2014 trafficking in heroin \u2014 mandatory minimum sentence \u2014constitutionality\nThe mandatory minimum sentence and fine provision of a subsection of the heroin trafficking statute, G.S. 90-95(h)(5), does not violate a defendant\u2019s equal protection rights and the separation of powers clause of the North Carolina Constitution on the theory that it places impermissible legislative restraints on the judiciary and, in effect, places sentencing power in the hands of the prosecutor.\n12. Narcotics \u00a7 5\u2014 heroin trafficking statute \u2014no violation of equal protection\nThe statute defining the offense of trafficking in heroin, G.S. 90-95(h)(4)a., does not violate a defendant\u2019s equal protection rights because it penalizes possession of a particular amount of any mixture containing heroin without regard to the percentage of heroin in the mixture.\nAppeal by defendant from Battle, Judge. Judgment entered 24 February 1982 in Superior Court, WAKE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 January 1983.\nThe jury convicted the defendant of feloniously possessing 4 to 14 grams of the controlled substance heroin in violation of G.S. 90-95(h)(4). Pretrial, the judge conducted a full evidentiary hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress items seized without a search warrant following an asserted arrest of his person. Defendant contends that the search was without probable cause. The suppression motion was denied and the items were subsequently admitted into evidence.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that on 22 June 1981, Raleigh police detective O\u2019Shields received information from a confidential informant that defendant, a subject known to both detective and informant, would be delivering packages of heroin to several people near Shirley\u2019s Restaurant and Lounge. Acting on this information, Officers O\u2019Shields and Peoples of the Drugs and Vice Division drove to the area in an unmarked police car at about 10:30 p.m. on 22 June 1981. The officers saw a dark blue Cadillac in the middle of Florence Street, without headlights, rolling forward at a slow speed. As the police car passed the Cadillac, shining its headlights into the car, O\u2019Shields recognized defendant, who was sitting in the passenger seat. The officers went around the block and drove up behind the Cadillac, which now was parked against the curb.\nO\u2019Shields saw defendant turn around and look out the back window of the Cadillac when the two vehicles were approximately three car lengths apart. As the Cadillac\u2019s passenger side door came open, two large interior lights at the back rear illuminated the interior. O\u2019Shields could then clearly see defendant looking out the back window, and the officers were about a car length behind. The officers stopped. Before O\u2019Shields could open his door, \u201cEdell Willis stuck his right arm out of the vehicle, up under the vehicle, and threw a white package up under the car.\u201d O\u2019Shields jumped out of the police car, and before O\u2019Shields could go in front of his own vehicle, the defendant slammed the Cadillac door and yelled, \u201cGo, go, go. Get out of here. Get out of here.\u201d The Cadillac sped off.\nThe package, or object thrown from the Cadillac, was pinpointed by O\u2019Shields as lying four feet away from a pecan tree in front of a house on Florence Street with no other objects around. The package was bundled or rolled up and approximately three or four inches long in a manila, white, glassine bag and had white powder in it.\nThe officers followed the Cadillac for several blocks and then stopped it, removing the two men from the car. Peoples immediately returned to the location on Florence Street to pick up the package that had been thrown out by defendant.\nIn the search of the Cadillac, O\u2019Shields recovered two large sums of money. In a money bag on the floor at the driver\u2019s feet was a total of $1,077.00. O\u2019Shields was still searching the Cadillac when Sgt. Peoples returned. Sgt. Peoples told Detective O\u2019Shields that he had recovered a package of white powder substance and \u201che picked it up where they threw it out.\u201d Peoples secured the white powder in the trunk.\nO\u2019Shields placed defendant and Monroe, the driver of the Cadillac, under arrest for possession of heroin. Defendant was searched and a total of $7,064.10 was found in various places on him.\nOn 18 November 1981, a hearing was held on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence. The judge denied the motion, concluding that there was probable cause, that once arrested there was a search of defendant\u2019s person incident to the arrest, and that the glassine bag was abandoned in the street and not the subject of the law of search and seizure.\nOn 23 February 1982 when the case came on for trial before Judge Battle, another hearing on the motion to suppress evidence was held and again the motion was denied. This hearing centered around four pieces of paper which were taken from the defendant\u2019s wallet the night of the arrest. The pieces of paper contained names of individuals with either telephone numbers or numerals noted beside them.\nDuring the jury trial a voir dire hearing was held out of the presence of the jury regarding the search of the defendant\u2019s person and the relevancy of the four pieces of paper. Both Detective O\u2019Shields and Sgt. Peoples testified. The voir dire evidence showed that O\u2019Shields had been involved in the investigation of heroin trafficking in the City of Raleigh for approximately six years, and that based on that experience and his knowledge of heroin trafficking, heroin dealers, and heroin addicts, the amounts next to the names on the four pieces of paper from the wallet of the defendant were amounts of heroin that dealers had passed to the defendant. O\u2019Shields made \u201ca connection with the names there with the heroin trafficking in Raleigh.\u201d He had arrested four of those people, and four of them were in prison for heroin trafficking. He said he knew Miss D (also known to him as Dee Jones, Linda Shaw Jones, and Linda Evans), J. J. Young, Bobby Ray Cox, Peach Smith, Drake, Sam Man (who was known to him as Sammy Perry) and Johnny (who was known to him to be Johnny Blalock) and related each to words or entries or notes on the pieces of paper. O\u2019Shields testified on cross-examination that he looked at the papers then \u201cin front of him and pretty much based on the information that I have gathered over the years as a narcotics officer, place an interpretation on these items as to who they are and what it means.\u201d He did not know who wrote the entries or when they were written. His interpretation of names came \u201cfrom informants and with (him) talking with these people themselves telling me their names, their street names.\u201d As to the telephone numbers listed on the papers, he knew personally the numbers of Dee Jones and Sammy Perry.\nSgt. Peoples testified on voir dire as to his own understanding of the meaning of the names and numbers on the papers. He based his answers on about two years of investigation of heroin trafficking in Raleigh and an examination of the papers themselves. He explained the names he knew and that he had checked telephone numbers with Southern Bell as listed on the papers. He said: \u201cI am making an assumption about these names and the people to whom they refer to. With regard to the figures that are written on these papers, it is based on experience in talking with addicts.\u201d\nAt the conclusion of voir dire, Judge Battle ruled that he would permit the officers, where they were personally familiar with the name on the piece of paper, to identify the person and explain their knowledge.\nWhen again before the jury, O\u2019Shields testified as to the money found and amounts, and as to the four pieces of paper. The money and papers were received into evidence over objection.\nUpon further questioning by the State, O\u2019Shields told the jury that he recognized certain names on the four pieces of paper. Those he identified were Miss D, J. J., Johnnie, B. Ray, Peach, Drake and S. Man. An example of one of his answers illustrates the nature of his testimony: \u201cI recognize that name as a street dealer called Miss D or D. Jones. They call her just D. I know her as Linda Shaw Jones. I have arrested her and searched her twice and she is now in prison for selling heroin.\u201d O\u2019Shields further testified that he knew the home phone number of Miss D on one of the papers, and that he had talked with her at this number on numerous occasions.\nSgt. Peoples, in testifying before the jury, related that before he first left the Florence Street location and pursued the Cadillac, \u201cI saw the white package on the ground.\u201d In returning to the scene to retrieve the package, he found it out in the street approximately four feet away from the curb with nothing else around it, and in the near vicinity of a tree and of 705 Florence Street. The elapsed time was approximately 3 to 5 minutes between first seeing the package and retrieving it.\nDefendant presented the testimony of one witness, Janet Graves. She testified that she lived at 707 Florence Street and was on her front porch at the time the Cadillac was first parked at the curb and when the police car first appeared. On direct, she said that \u201cno door to the Cadillac came open. Nor did any door to the police car come open at that time. No one got out of the police car. . . . No one threw anything out of the Cadillac.\u201d On cross-examination she testified, \u201cI watched the policeman and I watched the Cadillac and I was trying to figure out what was going on but I didn\u2019t see the door open to the Cadillac but I guess I couldn\u2019t really say that it didn\u2019t open.\u201d She did not see anybody throw anything on the street.\nAttorney General Edmisten by Assistant Attorney General Joan H. Byers for the State.\nLoflin & Loflin by Thomas F. Loflin, III; Of Counsel, Eagles, Hafer & Hall by Kyle S. Hall for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0023-01", "first_page_order": 55, "last_page_order": 74 }