{ "id": 8520746, "name": "JACQUELINE U. SNEED v. CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Sneed v. Carolina Power & Light Co.", "decision_date": "1983-03-15", "docket_number": "No. 8210SC386", "first_page": "309", "last_page": "312", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "61 N.C. App. 309" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "266 S.E. 2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561077 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 U.S. 117", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3907939 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1929, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/280/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 U.S. 371", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6142010 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1924, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/265/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 S.E. 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 N.C. 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8612453 ], "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/212/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 A.L.R. 3d 900", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "428 F. 2d 385", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2239906 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386", "parenthetical": "construing Burns Annotated Indiana Statutes \u00a7 40-1206 \"his personal representative, parents, dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/428/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Idaho 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Idaho", "case_ids": [ 4446133 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137", "parenthetical": "construing Indiana Code \u00a7 72-203 \"his personal representatives, dependents or next of kin at common law or otherwise\"" }, { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "construing Indiana Code \u00a7 72-203 \"his personal representatives, dependents or next of kin at common law or otherwise\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/96/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 F. Supp. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5637241 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676", "parenthetical": "construing Georgia Code \u00a7 114-103 \"his personal representative, parents, dependents or next of kin at common law or otherwise. . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/368/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.W. 2d 35", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36", "parenthetical": "construing Williams Code, Sec. 6859 \"his personal representative, dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise. . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 Tenn. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tenn.", "case_ids": [ 8529857 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107", "parenthetical": "construing Williams Code, Sec. 6859 \"his personal representative, dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise. . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tenn/194/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 S.E. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559844 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0545-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 437, "char_count": 6699, "ocr_confidence": 0.801, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.070412624799286e-08, "percentile": 0.4667727732389031 }, "sha256": "0544d9932f516386110ef0a6ac407ed82d5722b8866abf69a4e86a89c65c3d68", "simhash": "1:c9bdb3b14c0936d4", "word_count": 1063 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:13:54.976609+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge Vaughn and Judge WHICHARD concur." ], "parties": [ "JACQUELINE U. SNEED v. CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nPlaintiff challenges the granting of defendant\u2019s Rule 12(b)(1), (6) and (7) motions to dismiss contending that the claim of a wife for loss of consortium, where her injured husband is entitled to compensation under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, is not barred by the provisions of G.S. 97-10.1. We disagree.\nJurisdiction lies in the trial court for \u201call actions for personal injuries due to negligence, except insofar as it has been deprived of such jurisdiction by statute.\u201d Bryant v. Doughterty, 267 N.C. 545, 549-50, 148 S.E. 2d 548, 552 (1966). Here the trial court has been deprived of jurisdiction by the clear language of G.S. 97-10.1:\nIf the employee and the employer are subject to and have complied with the provisions of this Article, then the rights and remedies herein granted to the employee, his dependents, next of kin, or personal representative shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his dependents, next of kin, or representative as against the employer at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death.\nAppellant contends that the statute\u2019s enumeration of \u201cthe employee, his dependents, next of kin, or personal representative\u201d does not include his wife and that her claim therefore survives. We do not agree. Numerous cases from other jurisdictions with similarly phrased statutes have held that a spouse\u2019s claim for loss of consortium is barred. Napier v. Martin, 194 Tenn. 105, 107, 250 S.W. 2d 35, 36 (1952) (construing Williams Code, Sec. 6859 \u201chis personal representative, dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise. . . .\u201d); Massey v. Thiokol Chemical Corp., 368 F. Supp. 668, 676 (S.D. Ga. 1973) (construing Georgia Code \u00a7 114-103 \u201chis personal representative, parents, dependents or next of kin at common law or otherwise. . . .\u201d); Coddington v. City of Lewiston, 96 Idaho 135, 137, 525 P. 2d 330, 332 (1974) (construing Indiana Code \u00a7 72-203 \u201chis personal representatives, dependents or next of kin at common law or otherwise\u201d); England v. Dana Corp., 428 F. 2d 385, 386 (7th Cir. 1970) (construing Burns Annotated Indiana Statutes \u00a7 40-1206 \u201chis personal representative, parents, dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise\u201d). See also Annotated 36 A.L.R. 3d 900, 929 \u00a7 7 (1971).\nThe statute is clear and unambiguous and requires the result that plaintiff cannot maintain an action for loss of consortium resulting from injuries to plaintiffs spouse when those injuries are compensable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nWe reject appellant\u2019s contention that the provisions of Chapter 97 are violative of the Constitution of North Carolina, Article I, Section 18, as a taking of property without due process of law. The constitutionality of Chapter 97 has been upheld by our Supreme Court and similar acts have been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. Lee v. American Enka Corporation, 212 N.C. 455, 193 S.E. 809 (1937); R. E. Sheehan Co. v. Shuler, 265 U.S. 371, 44 S.Ct. 548, 68 L.Ed. 1061 (1924).\nFurthermore, it is clear that the General Assembly may abolish common law remedies and create statutory remedies in their place to attain permissible legislative objectives. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 50 S.Ct. 57, 74 L.Ed. 221 (1929).\nIn response to the Rule 12(b)(7) motion to dismiss, appellant argues that compulsory joinder of the plaintiffs claim with her husband\u2019s claim before the Industrial Commission is not mandated by Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hospital, 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E. 2d 818 (1980). Nicholson dealt with the problem of potential double recovery for the same injuries by victim and spouse and required mandatory joinder of claims for loss of consortium with pending claims of the injured spouse through whom loss of consortium is claimed. Although joinder of this action with the pending Workers\u2019 Compensation Act claim of the plaintiffs spouse would be impossible as the statute is now written, dismissal pursuant to Nicholson is appropriate.\nTo hold as plaintiff contends would effectively circumvent the purpose of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act to assure injured employees compensation without proof of negligence, while limiting employers\u2019 total liability for the injury suffered by the employee. We hold that a claim for consortium by the spouse of an employee injured on the job, where the employee\u2019s injury is compensable under Chapter 97, cannot be maintained.\nFor the reasons stated, we hold that the trial court\u2019s order dismissing the complaint is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge Vaughn and Judge WHICHARD concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Perry, Kittrell, Blackburn & Blackburn, by George T. Blackburn, II, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Fred D. Poisson for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JACQUELINE U. SNEED v. CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY\nNo. 8210SC386\n(Filed 15 March 1983)\nHusband and Wife \u00a7 9; Master and Servant \u00a7 87\u2014 injuries compensable under Workers\u2019 Compensation Act \u2014 loss of consortium action by spouse prohibited\nWhen an employee\u2019s injuries are compensable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, the employee\u2019s spouse is prohibited from maintaining an action for loss of consortium resulting from such injuries by the statute which excludes \u201call other rights and remedies of the employee, his dependents, next of kin or representative as against the employer at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death,\u201d G.S. 97-10.1. Furthermore, the statute does not constitute a taking of property without due process in violation of Art. I, \u00a7 18 of the North Carolina Constitution.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from Bailey, Judge. Judgment entered 1 March 1982. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 February 1983.\nPlaintiff\u2019s husband, Richard Sneed, who was an employee of defendant, was injured on the job when a load of coal with which he was working became dislodged, crushing and pinning him and causing him serious disabling injuries. While Richard Sneed had a Workers\u2019 Compensation Act claim pending before the North Carolina Industrial Commission, plaintiff sought damages, through a civil action in superior court, for loss of consortium caused by defendant\u2019s alleged negligence which resulted in personal injury to plaintiff\u2019s husband.\nPlaintiff requested actual and punitive damages from defendant for loss of consortium caused by injuries to her husband which included periods of depression and sexual impotence. Defendant answered admitting the on-the-job injury to plaintiff\u2019s husband but denying negligence on its part and denying that the complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), (6) and (7) and for summary judgment. From the court\u2019s order dismissing the action, plaintiff appeals.\nPerry, Kittrell, Blackburn & Blackburn, by George T. Blackburn, II, for plaintiff-appellant.\nFred D. Poisson for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0309-01", "first_page_order": 341, "last_page_order": 344 }