{
  "id": 8524170,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PERRY BROWN THOMPSON",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Thompson",
  "decision_date": "1983-06-07",
  "docket_number": "No. 8213SC1140",
  "first_page": "585",
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1983,
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      "cite": "307 N.C. 584",
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      "year": 1982,
      "pin_cites": [
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      "cite": "59 N.C. App. 157",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
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      "year": 1982,
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    {
      "cite": "229 S.E. 2d 810",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1976,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "31 N.C. App. 248",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "year": 1976,
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    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-120",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "year": 1981,
      "opinion_index": 0
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:38:59.213578+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Wells and EAGLES concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PERRY BROWN THOMPSON"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BECTON, Judge.\nDefendant\u2019s sole assignment of error relates to his sentencing hearing. He argues that the trial court erred when it found that the offense of felonious uttering was committed for pecuniary gain and, thereby, improperly found that the factors in aggravation outweighed the factors in mitigation of defendant\u2019s sentence. We agree.\nThe issue raised by defendant\u2019s argument is whether pecuniary gain is inherent in the offense of felonious uttering. That offense comprises three essential elements: (1) the offer of a forged check or other instrument to another; (2) with knowledge that the instrument is false; and (3) with the intent to defraud or injure another. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-120 (1981). See also, State v. Hill, 31 N.C. App. 248, 229 S.E. 2d 810 (1976).\nFirst, as we said in State v. Morris, 59 N.C. App. 157, 296 S.E. 2d 309 (1982), \u201cif the pecuniary gain at issue in a case is inherent in the offense, then that \u2018pecuniary gain\u2019 should not be considered an aggravating factor.\u201d Id., at 161-62, 296 S.E. 2d at 313.\nAdditionally, the General Assembly recently amended the Fair Sentencing Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(1)(c) (1981), to more clearly define pecuniary gain. Effective 1 October 1983, that factor will read: \u201cThe defendant was hired or paid to commit the offense.\u201d That amendment, in our view, clearly evinces the Legislature\u2019s intent to avoid the enhancement of a defendant\u2019s sentence simply because money or other valuable items were involved in the crime charged. Bound as we are fairly to interpret legislative enactments, and charged both to divine and carry out the intent of the Legislature, we are compelled to hold that the trial court erred in considering pecuniary gain as a factor in aggravation of defendant\u2019s sentence.\nWe note that it is difficult to imagine an uttering case in which a defendant utters or passes a fraudulent instrument for gain other than pecuniary; indeed, except for the aggrandizement of one\u2019s financial resources, uttering a defective instrument is pointless. We therefore determine that, unless a defendant is hired or paid for the commission of the offense, any other pecuniary gain is inherent in the offense of uttering a fraudulent instrument.\nBecause one of the findings in aggravation of defendant\u2019s sentence was improperly entered, and a sentence in excess of the presumptive imposed, this case is remanded for a new sentencing hearing. State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E. 2d 689 (1983).\nRemanded for resentencing.\nJudges Wells and EAGLES concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BECTON, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas H. Davis, Jr., for the State.",
      "Jerry A. Jolly, for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PERRY BROWN THOMPSON\nNo. 8213SC1140\n(Filed 7 June 1983)\nCriminal Law g 138\u2014 felonious uttering \u2014 pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance\nIn imposing a sentence for the felonious uttering of a forged check, the trial court erred in considering as an aggravating circumstance that the offense was committed for pecuniary gain since pecuniary gain was inherent in the offense of uttering where defendant was not hired or paid for committing the offense.\nAppeal by defendant from Preston, Judge. Judgment entered 3 March 1982 in Superior Court, COLUMBUS County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 April 1983.\nDefendant was indicted by a Columbus County Grand Jury, for allegedly committing two felonies: forgery and uttering. The indictment charged that defendant, on 2 July 1981, forged the name of Tom Ludlum on a check payable to Paul Baldwin, drawn in the amount of $150.00, and uttered it to Todd\u2019s Furniture Store. It was established at trial that defendant presented the check to a Todd\u2019s employee as payment for a lamp costing $51.88, and received $98.12 in change. The lamp was to have been picked up later, but was never claimed. Todd\u2019s sold the lamp to another customer.\nThe jury acquitted defendant of forgery but found him guilty of felonious uttering. From a judgment imposing an active sentence of five (5) years, defendant appeals.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas H. Davis, Jr., for the State.\nJerry A. Jolly, for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0585-01",
  "first_page_order": 617,
  "last_page_order": 618
}