{ "id": 8524834, "name": "HAYDEN B. RENWICK v. THE NEWS AND OBSERVER PUBLISHING COMPANY, d/b/a THE RALEIGH TIMES; HAYDEN B. RENWICK v. GREENSBORO NEWS COMPANY, d/b/a THE GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS AND RECORD", "name_abbreviation": "Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co.", "decision_date": "1983-07-05", "docket_number": "No. 8215SC432", "first_page": "200", "last_page": "244", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "63 N.C. App. 200" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "418 U.S. 264", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172714 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/418/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 U.S. 6", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6169038 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/398/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 U.S. 323", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173012 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/418/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 U.S. 907", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6193027, 6193476, 6191395, 6192228, 6192844, 6191570, 6192435, 6193235, 6192024, 6191772, 6192668 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/426/0907-09", "/us/426/0907-11", "/us/426/0907-01", "/us/426/0907-05", "/us/426/0907-08", "/us/426/0907-02", "/us/426/0907-06", "/us/426/0907-10", "/us/426/0907-04", "/us/426/0907-03", "/us/426/0907-07" ] }, { "cite": "441 U.S. 961", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1779972, 1779909, 1780358, 1779977, 1779883, 1780217, 1780210, 1780595, 1780180, 1779990, 1779897, 1779935 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/441/0961-02", "/us/441/0961-12", "/us/441/0961-09", "/us/441/0961-10", "/us/441/0961-06", "/us/441/0961-04", "/us/441/0961-01", "/us/441/0961-11", "/us/441/0961-05", "/us/441/0961-03", "/us/441/0961-08", "/us/441/0961-07" ] }, { "cite": "429 U.S. 1062", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6882, 7139, 7046, 6760, 5930, 6316, 5644, 7919, 5839, 5751, 6523, 7899 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/429/1062-04", "/us/429/1062-11", "/us/429/1062-09", "/us/429/1062-05", "/us/429/1062-03", "/us/429/1062-10", "/us/429/1062-08", "/us/429/1062-06", "/us/429/1062-12", "/us/429/1062-02", "/us/429/1062-07", "/us/429/1062-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 834", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6269058, 6268547, 6267367, 6266504, 6267921, 6268211, 6267092, 6267605, 6266782, 6268791, 6266238, 6269311 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0834-11", "/us/434/0834-09", "/us/434/0834-05", "/us/434/0834-02", "/us/434/0834-07", "/us/434/0834-08", "/us/434/0834-04", "/us/434/0834-06", "/us/434/0834-03", "/us/434/0834-10", "/us/434/0834-01", "/us/434/0834-12" ] }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 969", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6463712, 6463616, 6464514, 6464322, 6463971, 6464610, 6464105, 6463516, 6464691, 6464217, 6463834, 6464412 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0969-03", "/us/434/0969-02", "/us/434/0969-10", "/us/434/0969-08", "/us/434/0969-05", "/us/434/0969-11", "/us/434/0969-06", "/us/434/0969-01", "/us/434/0969-12", "/us/434/0969-07", "/us/434/0969-04", "/us/434/0969-09" ] }, { "cite": "81 S.E. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8594883 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Mich. L. Rev. 1621", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Mich. L. Rev.", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 L.Ed. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 S.Ct. 235", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "654 P. 2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10431533 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/654/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 F. Supp. 1383", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5590812 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Statement that plaintiff had \"homicidal tendencies\" could reasonably be taken in its literal rather than hyperbolic sense by a jury where such words appear in a passage focusing on lobbyists in America connected with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (\"IRA\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/513/1383-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 So. 2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9732445 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "889" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/355/0879-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 N.E. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "380 Mass. 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 478546 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/380/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "598 S.W. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9941497 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Editorial characterizing attorney's work in handling a fire district merger as a \"sleazy sleight-of-hand\" protected as expressing the author's feelings or \"opinions\" on the issue" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/598/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 L.Ed. 2d 788", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 S.Ct. 2152", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 935", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6254274, 6255847, 6255242, 6255564, 6254542, 6254929, 6253938, 6256085, 6253593, 6253242 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0935-04", "/us/446/0935-09", "/us/446/0935-07", "/us/446/0935-08", "/us/446/0935-05", "/us/446/0935-06", "/us/446/0935-03", "/us/446/0935-10", "/us/446/0935-02", "/us/446/0935-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 N.E. 2d 996", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "379 Mass. 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 5879166 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/379/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 U.S. 469", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11643989 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/420/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 U.S. 153", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1780104 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/441/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 F. Supp. 1285", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5606999 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/518/1285-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 F. 2d 122", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 253123 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/467/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 F. Supp. 1206", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 397637 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/461/1206-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Colum. L. Rev. 1205", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Colum. L. Rev.", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1207" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "510 F. Supp. 761", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3240763 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/510/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 714", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 N.C. App. 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553631 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/13/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 S.E. 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1891, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8650166 ], "year": 1891, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/109/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 S.E. 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1920, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 N.C. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8653316 ], "year": 1920, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/180/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 S.E. 2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8612350 ], "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/242/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 S.E. 2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567468 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E. 2d 910", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570336, 8570284, 8570444, 8570383, 8570419 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0294-02", "/nc/298/0294-01", "/nc/298/0294-05", "/nc/298/0294-03", "/nc/298/0294-04" ] }, { "cite": "255 S.E. 2d 784", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791" }, { "page": "791" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 N.C. App. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551330 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/41/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.Y.S. 2d 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "A cause of action for libel will lie for the statement that a singer's recording company, lawyer, and manager \"all screwed her at once\" when the falsity of the disclosed facts is properly alleged in the pleadings" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 A.D. 2d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 5565149 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "A cause of action for libel will lie for the statement that a singer's recording company, lawyer, and manager \"all screwed her at once\" when the falsity of the disclosed facts is properly alleged in the pleadings" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/75/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 L.Ed. 2d 832", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 S.Ct. 2228", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 A. 2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" }, { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Md. App. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md. App.", "case_ids": [ 2313756 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" }, { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/27/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Yale L. J. 642", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Yale L.J.", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "639 F. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Miss. L. J. 671", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Miss. L.J.", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 L.Ed. 2d 1066", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 S.Ct. 2406", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "586 P. 2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 Cal. Rptr. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Cal. 3d 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2282086 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-3d/22/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 L.Ed. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 S.Ct. 647", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 1002", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6485670, 6485576, 6485872, 6485490, 6485751 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/1002-03", "/us/434/1002-02", "/us/434/1002-05", "/us/434/1002-01", "/us/434/1002-04" ] }, { "cite": "556 F. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 956561 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/556/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 L.Ed. 2d 777", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 S.Ct. 785", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "539 F. 2d 882", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1040094 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895" }, { "page": "895" }, { "page": "896", "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/539/0882-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 L.Ed. 2d 95", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 S.Ct. 120", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "551 F. 2d 910", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 980322 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "913" }, { "page": "913", "parenthetical": "Opinions based on false facts are actionable only against a defendant who had knowledge of the falsity or probable falsity of the underlying facts" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/551/0910-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 U.S. 15", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12026621 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" }, { "page": "1785" }, { "page": "291" }, { "page": "25, 26" }, { "page": "1788" }, { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/403/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 L.Ed. 2d 456", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 S.Ct. 514", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 N.E. 2d 1299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1307" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "397 N.Y.S. 2d 943", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "951" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 N.Y. 2d 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.2d", "case_ids": [ 2331447 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny-2d/42/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 P. 2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" }, { "page": "429" }, { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Cal. Rptr. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "weight": 4, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644" }, { "page": "645" }, { "page": "646" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 Cal. 3d 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2292839 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-3d/17/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 U.S. 293", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6141173 ], "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/320/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 F. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1361752 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" }, { "page": "63" }, { "page": "62" }, { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/639/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 U.S. 75", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167317 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92", "parenthetical": "concurring opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/383/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 U.S. 64", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11728748 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/379/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 S.E. 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1926, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 N.C. 749", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631398 ], "year": 1926, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/191/0749-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 S.E. 2d 896", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575409 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 S.E. 2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 N.C. App. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551248 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/43/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 S.E. 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1927, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 N.C. 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8599785 ], "year": 1927, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/194/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E. 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1935, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 N.C. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8596038 ], "year": 1935, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/208/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.E. 2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8603790 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 S.E. 2d 466", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 N.C. 755", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622561 ], "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/242/0755-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 S.E. 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59-60" }, { "page": "62-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 N.C. 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8620303 ], "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/212/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 S.E. 2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567991 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 U.S. 374", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11338065 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/385/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 U.S. 130", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167825 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/388/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 U.S. 254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 379234 ], "weight": 14, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" }, { "page": "721" }, { "page": "701" }, { "page": "732" }, { "page": "713" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/376/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E. 2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 760", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553505 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/46/0760-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E. 2d 593", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560941 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557369 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 S.E. 2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561932 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 S.E. 2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573981 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 U.S. 264", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172714 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/418/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 U.S. 6", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6169038 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" }, { "page": "1542" }, { "page": "15" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "1541" }, { "page": "14" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "1541" }, { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/398/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 U.S. 323", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173012 ], "weight": 18, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" }, { "page": "3009" }, { "page": "808" }, { "page": "3008" }, { "page": "807" }, { "page": "341" }, { "page": "3008" }, { "page": "806" }, { "page": "339-40" }, { "page": "3007" }, { "page": "805" }, { "page": "3007" }, { "page": "805" }, { "page": "326" }, { "page": "3000" }, { "page": "797-98" }, { "page": "339-340" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/418/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E. 2d 910", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570336, 8570284, 8570444, 8570383, 8570419 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0294-02", "/nc/298/0294-01", "/nc/298/0294-05", "/nc/298/0294-03", "/nc/298/0294-04" ] }, { "cite": "255 S.E. 2d 784", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "41 N.C. App. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551330 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/41/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 U.S. 254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 379234 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/376/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 U.S. 323", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173012 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/418/0323-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2848, "char_count": 104970, "ocr_confidence": 0.835, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.15896543819033e-08, "percentile": 0.4747842441779424 }, "sha256": "5cf3abf394b47bb82a28bae9bb4dbef616d0684e6073120c6828df4e4dba5dea", "simhash": "1:e079f43c4f5f1ed1", "word_count": 16911 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:55:10.514065+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge Phillips concurs.", "Judge WELLS dissents." ], "parties": [ "HAYDEN B. RENWICK v. THE NEWS AND OBSERVER PUBLISHING COMPANY, d/b/a THE RALEIGH TIMES HAYDEN B. RENWICK v. GREENSBORO NEWS COMPANY, d/b/a THE GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS AND RECORD" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHNSON, Judge.\nThe two cases in this libel and invasion of privacy action have been consolidated for purposes of appeal. The common questions presented for review are whether plaintiffs complaint (1) states a claim for relief for defamation and (2) states a claim for relief for invasion of privacy. Defendant Greensboro News raises an additional issue in its brief concerning a newspaper\u2019s liability for republication of the allegedly defamatory writings of another newspaper. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgment dismissing plaintiffs complaints.\nA copy of the editorial as it appeared in each defendant\u2019s newspaper is incorporated by reference into each complaint. The two complaints present substantially identical allegations and, where appropriate, they will be treated as a single complaint. The record on appeal contains no indication that pleadings responsive to the complaints were filed, and consists solely of the two complaints and two motions to dismiss, phrased exclusively in the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The judgment dismissing the complaint fails to state the grounds upon which dismissal was considered appropriate.\nA complaint is deemed sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) where no insurmountable bar to recovery appears on the face of the complaint and the complaint\u2019s allegations give adequate notice of the nature and extent of the claim. Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 260 S.E. 2d 611 (1979); Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E. 2d 161 (1970). A claim for relief should not suffer dismissal unless it affirmatively appears that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be presented in support of the claim. Presnell v. Pell, supra; Newton v. Insurance Co., 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E. 2d 297 (1976). The function of a motion to dismiss is to test the law of a claim, not the facts which support it. Snyder v. Freeman, 300 N.C. 204, 266 S.E. 2d 593 (1980). The allegations of the complaint are taken as true for the limited purpose of testing its sufficiency. Presnell v. Pell, supra. With these rules in mind, we must determine if the facts pleaded, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, involve substantive principles of law which entitle plaintiff to relief.\nThe plaintiff in this action was, at the time of the publications, and is presently, the Associate Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He had been an employee of the University of North Carolina (UNC) since 1969. Sometime prior to 1978, plaintiff Renwick was in charge of the University\u2019s minority admissions program at the Chapel Hill campus. The Raleigh Times editorial discusses and comments upon an issue of great public interest involving UNC\u2019s minority admissions policies, charges from Washington of racial discrimination against minority applicants, and plaintiffs role in the controversy surrounding the adequacy of the University\u2019s minority admissions efforts.\nAs a preliminary matter, we note that in order to recover for defamation it is plaintiffs burden to allege and prove that defendants made false and defamatory statements of or concerning plaintiff, which were published to a third person causing injury to plaintiffs reputation and, if the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, plaintiff must allege and prove actual malice on the part of defendants. See generally Hall v. Publishing Co., 46 N.C. App. 760, 266 S.E. 2d 397 (1980) and Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7\u00a7 558, 580A (1977). With regard to fault, the complaint alleges that the statements at issue were published negligently, with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth, and with actual malice. Plaintiff seeks both actual and punitive damages and the complaint further alleges that the statements were willful and wanton, published in bad faith, maliciously, and in total disregard of the truth. Similar allegations of reckless disregard for the truth, malice, and bad faith accompany the claim for invasion of privacy.\nPlaintiff neither contests nor expressly concedes that he is a \u201cpublic figure\u201d for purposes of the constitutional limitation on state libel actions established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed. 2d 686 (1964) and its progeny. Inasmuch as the pleading adequately alleges the standard of liability appropriate for a publisher of defamatory falsehood injurious to a public official or figure, we will treat the plaintiff as a public figure for purposes of this appellate review. We note only that Dean Renwick appears to fit under either of the two characterizations of a \u201cpublic figure\u201d stated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3009, 41 L.Ed. 2d 789, 808 (1974). See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1094 (1967) and Hall v. Publishing Co., supra.\nThe editorial appeared in The Raleigh Times on 22 April 1981 as follows:\nAnd He Calls It Bias?\nSome of the continuing deluge of charges from Washington against the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill \u2014 many obviously unfounded \u2014 are so ridiculous they only widen the gulf between reason and resentment as the State seeks to create better racial relations.\nThe latest barrage is based on allegations by Hayden Ren-wick, Associate Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at Chapel Hill, in a 1978 newspaper article. Renwick, formerly in charge of minority admissions, said that between 1975 and 1978 about 800 black students had been denied admission.\nYet Collin Rustin, the Minority Admissions Director since 1975, flatly denies the charge. Furthermore, the special admission concessions in effect for blacks also give the lie to charges of unfair discrimination against minorities.\nAccording to Rustin, every black student who meets the minimum standard combined score of 800 on the Scholastic Aptitude Test and has a 1.6 predicted grade point average is AUTOMATICALLY admitted. The exception would be if the applicant had not taken high school subjects required for admission.\nThat\u2019s discrimination? When the 800 required is only half the maximum possible score of 1,600? When the average SAT score for other competitive students admitted to last fall\u2019s freshman class at Carolina was between 1,070 and 1,080? When those competitive students admitted were in the top five percent of their high school graduating classes? When only 4,800 of 11,500 applicants clamoring to get in were admitted?\nIt has taken North Carolinians years to adjust to the necessity to grant some minority applicants, because of their disenfranchised background, special concessions in admissions. This gives them a chance to prove that their academic deficiencies are only temporary, not permanent.\nBut extremists who belittle and criticize these concessions\u2014 which indeed, seem here so excessive they do nothing for the student or the quality of education \u2014 should be publicly rebuffed.\nThe fact that, according to a 1979 faculty committee report, only 36 blacks have been denied access to UNC between 1975 and 1979 \u2014 compared to 6,700 competitive students turned away in one season \u2014 attests to UNO\u2019s yeoman efforts to make minorities welcome on campus. How long highly qualified whites denied admissions will tolerate this reverse discrimination without taking the University to court is undoubtedly affected by irresponsible charges such as this one.\nWith regard to defamation, plaintiffs first cause of action alleges inter alia-.\nThat in said Article (Exhibit A) plaintiff is reported as having said in a 1978 newspaper article \u201cthat between 1975 and 1978 about 800 black students had been denied admission.\u201d That said statement is false. That the entire Article (Exhibit A) gives the impression that the plaintiff is an extremist, a liar and is irresponsible in his profession. That said article has exposed plaintiff to public hatred, contempt and ridicule causing him embarrassment and humiliation.\nThat the publication of false and libelous statements set forth in Paragraph V herein, constitutes libel per se. In the alternative, such statements have a special meaning or innuendo in that they held the plaintiff out to the public to be an extremist, liar and irresponsible in his profession, and thereby constitute libel per se.\nThe second cause of action for invasion of privacy alleges:\nThat the publication of the foregoing statements set forth in Paragraph IV herein, placed the plaintiff in a false light before the public and constituted an invasion of plaintiffs privacy. That said statements were published with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth.\nThat by reason of the defendant placing the plaintiff in a false light and thereby invading his privacy, the plaintiff has been injured in his good name, and in his profession, and brought into public disgrace, contempt and infamy in his community . . .\nOn appeal, plaintiff contends that the complaint states a claim for libel per se under the theory that the words concerning plaintiff were in themselves libelous, or that the editorial read as a whole libelously imputes dishonesty and irresponsibility to the plaintiff. Further, that the editorial holds plaintiff out to public contempt and tends to impeach him in his profession. In an attempt to establish the defamatory nature of the editorial, plaintiff devotes the greater portion of his brief to an analysis of the law of libel as existed in North Carolina prior to the United States Supreme Court\u2019s imposition of significant constitutional limitation on libel and invasion of privacy actions in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, and Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 87 S.Ct. 534, 17 L.Ed. 2d 456 (1967).\nIn sharp contrast to plaintiffs approach to the issue, defendants rely almost exclusively on legal and constitutional principles generated by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny. As their primary argument, defendants point out that a plaintiff within the ambit of Sullivan has, at least as a practical matter, the burden of proving falsity, since he must in any event establish that defendants published with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. Further, that because statements of opinion cannot be proved false, they cannot be held libelous no matter how unreasonable or vituperous the opinion may be. Both defendants argue that the editorial represents nothing more than a forcefully expressed opinion on a public issue of considerable statewide importance; as such, its publishers are to be afforded absolute immunity from liability for injury to plaintiffs reputation under the constitutional privilege for expressions of opinion enunciated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra.\nDefendant Greensboro News presents an additional argument in support of the dismissal based upon the common law privilege of fair comment, which also recognized the key distinction between statements of fact and opinion in libel actions. The Greensboro News contends that the statements are not actionable because the underlying facts are set out in the editorial, that those facts are not materially false and could in no way constitute libel against the plaintiff. On this basis, it is argued that the editorial constitutes fair comment upon a matter of public concern and may not be made the subject of a claim for libel. Defendant Raleigh Times takes the position that the common law qualified privilege of fair comment has been wholly superceded by the Gertz rule of absolute protection.\nThe arguments presented by the defendants with respect to plaintiffs claims for invasion of privacy essentially mirror those made with respect to the libel claims regarding the necessity that plaintiff prove the statements made concerning him were substantially false. Thus, we are presented with a number of issues arising under the common law of libel and invasion of privacy, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press, and the interplay between them. We turn first to the questions of whether the editorial is capable of bearing the meaning urged by plaintiff, and whether that meaning is defamatory.\nI\nLibel Per Se\nIn general, the tort of defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name. Three classes of libel are recognized in North Carolina. They are: (1) publications obviously defamatory which are called per se; (2) publications susceptible of two interpretations, one of which is defamatory and the other not; and (3) publications not obviously defamatory but when considered with innuendo, colloquim, and explanatory circumstances become libelous, which are termed libels per quod. Arnold v. Sharpe, 296 N.C. 533. 251 S.E. 2d 452 (1979). We are not concerned here with libels of either the second or third class since the language published was clear and unambiguous and plaintiff has failed to plead extrinsic facts and circumstances which would render otherwise innocuous statements libelous.\nA most thorough definition of libel per se was stated by our Supreme Court in Flake v. News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 785-87, 195 S.E. 55, 59-60 (1938).\nA libel per se is a malicious publication expressed in writing, printing, pictures, caricatures, signs, or other devices which upon its face and without aid of extrinsic proof is injurious and defamatory . . .\nIn its most general and comprehensive sense it may be said that any publication that is injurious to the reputation of another is a libel . . .\nIn order to be libelous per se it is not essential that the words should involve an imputation of crime, or otherwise impute the violation of some law, or moral turpitude, or immoral conduct . . . But defamatory words to be libelous per se must be susceptible of but one meaning and of such nature that the court can presume as a matter of law that they tend to disgrace and degrade the party or hold him up to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or cause him to be shunned and avoided. The imputation must be one tending to affect a party in a society whose standard of opinion the court can recognize . . .\nThe general rule is that publications are to be taken in the sense which is most obvious and natural and according to the ideas that they are calculated to convey to those who see them. The principle of common sense requires that courts shall understand them as other people would. The question always is how would ordinary men naturally understand the publication. (Citations omitted.)\nThe Court in Flake then summarized the case law as follows:\nThe decisions in this jurisdiction, as well as others, clearly establish that a publication is libelous per se, or actionable per se, if, when considered alone without innuendo: (1) It charges that a person has committed an infamous crime; (2) it charges a person with having an infectious disease; (3) it tends to subject one to ridicule, contempt, or disgrace, or (4) it tends to impeach one in his trade or profession. (Citations omitted.)\nSee also Arnold v. Sharpe, supra; Badame v. Lampke, 242 N.C. 755, 89 S.E. 2d 466 (1955); Kindley v. Privette, 241 N.C. 140, 84 S.E. 2d 660 (1954).\nPlaintiff argues that the editorial implies that he is a liar, an extremist, ridiculous, irresponsible, and one who should be publicly rebuffed, that these are false factual charges, and that they tended to subject plaintiff to ridicule, public hatred, contempt or disgrace and tended to injure the plaintiff in his profession.\nAs a preliminary matter, we note that in determining the ac-tionability of a written imputation, the entire statement is to be considered. The writing should be interpreted from its four corners and the intent and meaning of an alleged defamatory statement must be gathered not only from words singled out as libelous, but from the context in which they appear. All the parts of the publication must be considered in order to ascertain the true meaning, and words are not to be given a meaning other than that which the context would show them to have. 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander, \u00a7 141, p. 643 (1970); Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 563, Comment d. The initial question for the court is whether the editorial is reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation, so as to warrant its submission to a jury to determine if in fact the defamatory connotation was conveyed. Restatement, supra, \u00a7 614. When read as a whole, we find the editorial capable of bearing a meaning that is defamatory in either of the senses urged by plaintiff.\nThe editorial as it appeared in The Raleigh Times bore the title, \u201cAnd He Calls It Bias?\u201d The opening paragraph comments upon the deleterious effect many of the \u201cobviously unfounded\u201d and \u201cridiculous\u201d charges from Washington against UNC has upon the citizens of the state. The second paragraph attributes the \u201clatest barrage\u201d of these charges to \u201callegations by Hayden Ren-wick, Associate Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at Chapel Hill, in a 1978 newspaper article.\u201d The sole reference to the content of that 1978 article is as follows: \u201cRenwick, formerly in charge of minority admissions, said that between 1975 and 1978 about 800 black students had been denied admission.\u201d Paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 8 are devoted to a refutation of Renwick\u2019s purported allegation concerning UNC\u2019s minority admissions practices. Paragraph 3 states that the Minority Admissions Director during the years in question \u201cflatly denies the charge.\u201d Paragraph 8 states as a fact that only 36 blacks have been denied access to UNC between 1975 and 1979, according to a 1979 faculty committee report. In paragraph 3 it is pointed out that in themselves, \u201cthe special admission concessions in effect for blacks also give the lie to charges of unfair discrimination against minorities.\u201d Paragraph 8 concludes by stating that \u201cirresponsible charges such as this one\u201d undoubtedly affect the length of time highly qualified whites denied admissions will tolerate the \u201creverse discrimination\u201d practiced by UNC. In paragraph 6 the editorial calls for the public rebuff of those \u201cextremists\u201d who belittle and criticize UNC\u2019s seemingly excessive special admissions concessions for blacks.\nInjury to reputation through defamation may be accomplished by both direct and indirect imputations and insinuations. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, \u00a7 111, p. 746 (4th Ed. 1971). It is not necessary that the charge be made in a direct, positive and open manner. A mere inference, implication, or insinuation is as actionable as a positive assertion if the meaning is plain. 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander, \u00a7 13, p. 528. We conclude that ordinary men would naturally understand the editorial to imply or insinuate that plaintiff\u2019s statistics regarding the number of blacks denied admission to UNC between 1975 and 1979 were either knowingly and intentionally false, or the result of gross incompetence in the conduct of plaintiffs profession. Either implication would appear to be dictated by the unexplained disparity between the 800 figure attributed to plaintiff, and the figure of 36 stated in \u201ca 1979 faculty committee report.\u201d In addition, plaintiffs purported charges are termed \u201cirresponsible,\u201d that is, made without consideration of possible consequences and held up to be a likely impetus or precipitating factor to future lawsuits against plaintiffs employer, UNC. These charges, if made in a positive and open manner, would be actionable.\nCommunications which have been held actionable per se include: accusations that plaintiff, a school cafeteria manager, brought \u201cliquor\u201d onto the school premises and distributed it to painters then employed in the school cafeteria. Presnell v. Pell, supra; the statement, \u201cDo you know Captain McCall of the Charlotte Police Department? Call him and he can tell you about all the shady deals Mr. Badame has pulled.\u201d Badame v. Lampke, supra; allegations that a minister who was a member of a church \u201chad been a disorderly member thereof in the sense that he was unwilling to cooperate in maintaining peace and the right spirit in church but caused trouble amounting to a continuous upheaval, and disrupted the peace and harmony of the church and therefore was excluded therefrom.\u201d Kindley v. Privette, supra; the statement by a butcher that his competitor had slaughtered a mad dog-bitten cow, Broadway v. Cope, 208 N.C. 85, 179 S.E. 452 (1935); a publication which said of an ordained minister that there was not in this generation \u201ca more ignorant man ... or one less charitable toward men who might honestly disagree with him.\u201d Pentuff v. Park, 194 N.C. 146, 138 S.E. 616 (1927); and statements in a letter from a CPA to the Internal Revenue Service which complained about plaintiff IRS agent\u2019s \u201charrassment [sic] of the client whose tax return was under review,\u201d her \u201cinability to grasp certain fundamental accounting practices,\u201d a level of \u201cexpertise below what one should expect of an Internal Revenue Agent,\u201d and plaintiffs general lack of professionalism as compared with other IRS agents. Angel v. Ward, 43 N.C. App. 288, 258 S.E. 2d 788 (1979).\nWords which have been held not to be actionable per se are: the plaintiff had \u201cinfavorable [sic] personal habits,\u201d Robinson v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 273 N.C. 391, 159 S.E. 2d 896 (1968); that the plaintiff, who was white, \u201chad negro blood in his veins,\u201d Deese v. Collins, 191 N.C. 749, 133 S.E. 92 (1926). From a reading of these cases, we believe the editorial, insofar as it imputes dishonesty and/or incompetence and irresponsibility to plaintiff, would tend to expose plaintiff to ridicule, public hatred or contempt and tend to deprecate plaintiff in his profession. If proven to be false, these imputations would constitute libel per se.\nHowever, we do not agree with plaintiff that the term \u201cextremist\u201d as used in this editorial would constitute libel per se. We acknowledge that in some circles the word may not be considered complementary. However, as used here, the term carried no pejorative connotation that could adversely affect plaintiff\u2019s professional character or subject him to public contempt and ridicule. In context, the epithet merely expressed the newspaper\u2019s view that plaintiff was indirectly advocating that UNC make even greater efforts in the area of minority admissions.\nWith the exception of the term \u201cextremist,\u201d we conclude that at common law, as it stood prior to the Sullivan case, the editorial as a whole is reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning so as to warrant its submission to a jury to determine if, in fact, the defamatory meaning was so understood. Restatement, supra, \u00a7 614. However, the matter does not end here.\nII\nConstitutional Privilege\nDefendants\u2019 principal contention supporting dismissal of the complaint is that the statements complained of are expressions of constitutionally privileged \u201cpure opinion.\u201d They argue that the editorial describes a set of circumstances and expresses the Times\u2019 opinion in light of the circumstances. Defendant Greensboro News presents the theory as follows:\nAn expression of opinion occurs when the maker of a comment states the facts on which his opinion is based and then expresses a comment on a subject. An assertion that cannot be proved false, such as an opinion, cannot be held libelous. It is only when the underlying material facts upon which an opinion is based are shown to be false that a statement of opinion may become actionable. When the facts upon which the opinion is based are fully set forth in the published communication, or are generally within the knowledge of the parties to the published communication, any expression of opinion is constitutionally protected and absolutely privileged.\nFrom this, defendants conclude that plaintiff s complaint discloses on its face an insurmountable bar to recovery because expressions of editorial opinion may not form the basis for a libel (or invasion of privacy) action consistent with constitutional guarantees of free speech and press. The argument is based largely upon \u00a7 566 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, and a number of state and federal court decisions interpreting the impact of Sullivan and Gertz upon the law of libel and the common law privilege of \u201cfair comment\u201d or \u201cprivileged criticism.\u201d See Restatement, Torts, \u00a7\u00a7 606, 607 (1938) and Restatement (Second) of Torts, \u00a7 580A.\nPlaintiff contends that the editorial consists of representations of fact which are capable of being proved false. In the alternative, plaintiff argues that should this Court conclude that the statements are opinion, the First Amendment provides no absolute protection for a newspaper \u201cto make false material statements of fact and then to draw defamatory conclusions therefrom,\u201d because such conduct would not advance society\u2019s interest in \u201cuninhibited, robust, and wide open debate on public issues.\u201d Thus, we must determine what the scope of the absolute constitutional privilege for opinion is, whether the defamatory communications at issue are statements of fact or opinion, and, if opinion, whether they come within the ambit of that constitutional privilege.\nWe approach these issues with the realization that since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, the principles governing libel actions have developed in recognition of the countervailing interests between the desire for a free and uninhibited press and the law of defamation. In Sullivan, the Court recognized that our nation has made a \u201cprofound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it will include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials,\u201d 376 U.S. at 270, 84 S.Ct. at 721, 11 L.Ed. 2d at 701, and created a qualified constitutional privilege toward that end. The federal rule established in Sullivan, prohibiting a public official from recovering damages for publications containing factual errors or defamatory content which relate to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d was extended to include even characteristics germane to fitness for office which may also affect the official\u2019s private character. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed. 2d 125 (1964). The Court later acknowledged that this constitutional bias toward unfettered speech will often come at the expense of compensation for harm to reputation, at least where a topic of public concern or interest is involved. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra at 342, 94 S.Ct. at 3008, 41 L.Ed. 2d at 807. However, in Gertz, the Court also reiterated its prior rejection of the view that publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and indefeasible constitutional immunity from liability for defamation in recognition of the fact that underlying the law of libel is the legitimate state interest in the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood. Id. at 341, 94 S.Ct. at 3008, 41 L.Ed. 2d at 806.\nWe would not lightly require the State to abandon this purpose, for, as Mr. Justice Stewart has reminded us, the individual\u2019s right to the protection of his own good name \u201creflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being \u2014 a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. The protection of private personality, like the protection of life, itself, is left primarily to the individual states under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean that the right is entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional system.\u201d Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (concurring opinion).\nAt stake then, are the competing values of the individual\u2019s interest in reputation and society\u2019s interest in freedom of expression. We next examine the accommodation between these values established in the New York Times-Gertz line of cases.\nA. False Ideas Under the First Amendment\nAs Judge Friendly noted in Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., 639 F. 2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980), the following passage from Justice Powell\u2019s opinion for the Court in Gertz \u201chas become the opening salvo in all arguments for protection from defamation actions on the ground of opinion, even though the case did not remotely concern the question.\u201d\nUnder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.\nGertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40, 94 S.Ct. at 3007, 41 L.Ed. 2d at 805. However, in the very next sentence Justice Powell stated that there is \u201cno constitutional value in false statements of fact,\u201d and continued,\nNeither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society\u2019s interest in \u201cuninhibited, robust, and wide-open\u201d debate on public issues . . . They belong to that category of utterances which \u201care no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.\u201d (Citations omitted.)\nAn illustration of the point regarding the type of opinion that could be corrected by discussion, and thus become entitled to constitutional protection, was taken from Thomas Jefferson\u2019s first Inaugural Address:\n\u201cIf there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.\u201d\nId. at 340 n. 8, 94 S.Ct. at 3007, 41 L.Ed. 2d at 805. In contrast to the foregoing example drawn from the realm of purely theoretical debate on the value of competing political systems, the alleged libels in Gertz, considered sufficiently \u201cfactual\u201d to warrant remanding the case for a new trial for defamation, included an \u201cimplication that petitioner had a criminal record\u201d and charges that he was a \u201cLeninist\u201d or \u201cCommunist-fronter.\u201d Id. at 326, 94 S.Ct. at 3000, 41 L.Ed. 2d at 797-98. The latter expressions took on the nature of factual allegations in the context of an article alleging that plaintiff had been the architect of a communist frameup leading to the conviction of a Chicago policeman.\nTwo other Supreme Court cases relied upon by defendants are also commonly cited for the creation of a constitutional exception, for statements of opinion, Greenbelt Pub. Ass\u2019n. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 26 L.Ed. 2d 6 (1970), and Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 41 L.Ed. 2d 745 (1974). In Greenbelt the defendant newspaper published a series of articles concerning the city\u2019s efforts to acquire land for a new school site. One of the articles opened by stating that \u201c[d]elay in construction of a new Greenbelt high school is the lever by which a local developer is pressuring the city to endorse his bid for higher density rezoning of two large tracts of land.\u201d A speaker\u2019s comment at a city council meeting that plaintiff was \u201cblackmailing\u201d the city in connection with these negotiations was reprinted and adopted by the newspaper. Plaintiff sued on the theory that the articles imputed to him the crime of blackmail. After noting that the articles were full, accurate, truthful reports of the plaintiff\u2019s negotiating proposals and what had been said at the public hearings before the city council, Justice Stewart wrote for the Court that no libel had been committed because no one who read the account would have considered that the plaintiff was being charged with the crime of blackmail. The word \u201cblackmail\u201d in this context \u201cwas no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered Bresler\u2019s negotiating position extremely unreasonable.\u201d 398 U.S. at 14, 90 S.Ct. at 1542, 26 L.Ed. 2d at 15. It is plainly implied that had an accusation of actual criminal wrongdoing been conveyed, it would have been held actionable.\nIn Letter Carriers v. Austin, supra, recovery was sought for a union newsletter\u2019s use of the epithet \u201cscab\u201d to describe the plaintiff, and its publication of a well-known Jack London definition of a \u201cscab\u201d as a, \u201ctraitor to his God, his country, his family and his class.\u201d The Court stated, \u201c[b]efore the test of reckless or knowing falsity can be met, there must be a false statement of fact. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 339-340.\u201d Id. at 284, 94 S.Ct. at 2781, 41 L.Ed. 2d at 761. \u201cScab\u201d was held to be a representation of fact (that plaintiffs had refused to join the union), but was not considered actionable because (1) it was both literally and factually true and (2) in its derogatory aspect, it was mere rhetoric, a means by which the union thought it could most effectively make its point. The phrase \u201ctraitor to his God, his country\u201d was protected because \u201ctraitor\u201d in this context could not be construed as a false representation of fact. \u201cSuch words were obviously used here in a loose, figurative sense to demonstrate the union\u2019s strong disagreement with the views of those workers who oppose unionization.\u201d 418 U.S. at 284, 94 S.Ct. at 2781, 41 L.Ed. 2d at 762. They were further examples of the \u201cloose language or undefined slogans that are part of the conventional give-and-take in our economic and political controversies \u2014 like \u2018unfair\u2019 or \u2018fascist\u2019\u2014 [not a falsification of] facts.\u201d Id., quoting from Cafeteria Employees Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943). Again, it was \u201cmerely rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of the contempt felt by union members to those who refuse to join.\u201d\nThe determination of whether statements complained of are representations of fact or expressions of opinion is a matter of law for the court to decide. Letter Carriers v. Austin, supra; Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 552 P. 2d 425 (1976); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y. 2d 369, 397 N.Y.S. 2d 943, 366 N.E. 2d 1299, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969, 98 S.Ct. 514, 54 L.Ed. 2d 456 (1977). Whether an alleged defamatory statement is fact or opinion may depend on the context of the publication. As one court stated, \u201cwhat constitutes a statement of fact in one context may be treated as opinion in another in light of the nature and context of the communication taken as a whole.\u201d Gregory, 17 Cal. 3rd at 601, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 644, 552 P. 2d at 428.\nDefendant News and Observer argues that editorials by definition express the opinions of the newspaper, so that the nature of the publication indicated that the sentiments expressed were opinion, and not fact. Defendant further contends that the sentiments expressed in the Times' editorial are \u201cmerely rhetorical hyperbole,\u201d used in the context of commentary on an issue of public concern and debate. For these reasons defendant argues the editorial falls within the ambit of first amendment protection for statements of opinion.\nWhile it is indisputable that editorials may, and usually do, express the opinions of the newspaper, the fact of publication in the editorial column alone is not determinative. The Times\u2019 editorial contains nearly as much purely factual information concerning the minority admissions program as it contains expressions of editorial opinion. Paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 8 primarily contain statistics and information about UNO\u2019s admissions practices. The editorial \u201cviewpoint\u201d is expressed primarily by indirection, through a comparison of facts and figures attributed to Hayden Renwick with contrary data obtained by the defendant. Many of the facts disclosed are handled in a loose manner. For example, the minimum standard combined score of black students on the Scholastic Aptitude Test is contrasted to the average SAT score \u201cfor other competitive students.\u201d That Hayden Renwick actually charged UNC with unfair discrimination against minorities in his 1978 article is never directly stated, but hinted at repeatedly. The \u201cridiculous\u201d allegations of discrimination from Washington are never identified specifically, and the basis for the editorial\u2019s conclusion that plaintiff\u2019s 1978 article was the cause of the latest barrage of these charges in 1981 is unstated. In addition, the source of many of the facts presented in the editorial is not disclosed. Interspersed with the factual data thus loosely presented are the statements and implications complained of. This quasi-reportorial style renders the ordinarily difficult process of distinguishing between representations of fact and expressions of opinion nearly impossible.\nThe Greenbelt-Letter Carriers-Gertz trilogy relied on by defendants to create the constitutional immunity for statements of \u201copinion\u201d offers little direct guidance on the fact/opinion controversy presented here because the defamatory meaning is largely implied and must be gleaned from a reading of the editorial as a whole. Letter Carriers and Greenbelt both involved specific words or phrases used in contexts which clearly indicated that the words were employed in their figurative, descriptive senses. On that basis, the plaintiffs\u2019 contentions that the words charged them falsely with having committed specific crimes \u2014 blackmail and treason \u2014were rejected. With the exception of allegations concerning the term \u201cextremist,\u201d rhetorical hyperbole, which by definition is \u201cartificially eloquent exaggeration for effect, not to be taken literally,\u201d does not form the basis of plaintiff\u2019s claim for defamatory falsehood. To argue that the sentiments expressed are mere hyperbole is to confuse what is expressed with the form of its expression.\nThus far, it would appear that the Supreme Court has extended absolute protection to the form \u2014 epithet, rhetorical hyperbole, metaphor \u2014 in which the speaker or writer chooses to express his judgment, characterization, or evaluation when the context (supporting facts stated) renders it absolutely clear that the derogatory characterization was used in its loose, figurative, or emotive sense and not as a factual assertion of specific misconduct or criminal conduct. This protection for \u201copinion\u201d in the context of libel actions is analogous to the First Amendment protection extended to the content of speech in other areas of legitimate state regulation of speech. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed. 2d 284 (1971) is an illustrative case in point. The Cohen court held, inter alia, that the words \u201cFuck the Draft\u201d printed on a jacket worn into a Los Angeles courthouse would not support a state conviction for obscene expression because obscene expression must be, in a significant way, erotic. Id. at 20, 91 S.Ct. at 1785, 29 L.Ed. 2d at 291. In rejecting this literal interpretation of the language, Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, noted:\nIt cannot plausibly be maintained that this vulgar allusion to the selective service system would conjure up such psychic stimulation in anyone likely to be confronted with Cohen\u2019s crudely defaced jacket.\nId. Later, Justice Harlan discussed the figurative, imaginative sense in which the words were employed, observing that in matters of taste and style, \u201cone man\u2019s vulgarity is another\u2019s lyric.\u201d\n[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.\n403 U.S. at 25, 26, 91 S.Ct. at 1788, 29 L.Ed. 2d at 294.\nIn other words, if the offending terminology has no substantive, literal bearing on the content of the expression, the speaker cannot be punished solely for his choice of language. In Greenbelt, supra, it is clear that had the defendant merely expressed the opinion that Bresler\u2019s negotiating position was \u201cextremely unreasonable,\u201d the cognitive content of that opinion would have been protected. The only arguably defamatory aspect was the form in which the speaker chose to express the idea. The Supreme Court merely held that protection would not be forfeited because the idea was expressed through a word subject to interpretation as charging criminal conduct. Much the same can be said of the holding in Letter Carriers v. Austin, supra. Neither Letter Carriers, Greenbelt, nor Gertz itself directly analyzed a publication defamatory in its cognitive, literal content, as opposed to the stylistic form of its expression under the \u201copinion\u201d exception.\nThe gravamen of plaintiff\u2019s complaint is that the editorial falsely attributes the statement that 800 blacks were denied admission to him, and proceeds to draw defamatory contrasts and conclusions concerning plaintiff from its own false statement of fact. By means of the structure of the editorial, the Times presented an unexplained disparity in the admissions figures purportedly released by Renwick in 1978, and those released in an anonymous \u201cfaculty committee\u201d report. The statement,\n[AJllegations by Hayden Renwick . . . that between 1975 and 1978 about 800 black students had been denied admission\nwas contrasted to,\n[t]he fact that, according to a 1979 faculty committee report, only 36 blacks have been denied access to UNC between 1975 and 1979.\nNo further information is provided regarding the respective sources or data bases for the two sets of black admissions figures. No direct statement is made that Renwick actually charged UNC with discrimination in his 1978 article, nor is any other background provided regarding his figures. However, Renwick\u2019s purported statement regarding admissions is repeatedly characterized as a \u201ccharge\u201d of \u201cbias\u201d or \u201cdiscrimination,\u201d and he is clearly classed among the \u201cextremists\u201d who belittle UNC\u2019s \u201cyeoman\u201d minority admissions efforts and who should be \u201cpublicly rebuffed.\u201d By thus hinting at a motive for the release of the 800 figure, the editorial makes it unlikely that the ordinary reader would not conclude that Renwick had dishonestly or recklessly released false figures about blacks denied admission because he was dissatisfied with the existing minority admissions policies and practices. In addition, other portions of the editorial refer obliquely to adverse consequences these \u201cirresponsible\u201d charges have had \u2014 bringing on an additional \u201cdeluge\u201d of charges from Washington \u2014 and undoubtedly will have \u2014prospective lawsuits against plaintiff\u2019s employer.\nThus, a defamatory imputation of personal dishonesty and irresponsibility on the part of an employee in a position of authority at a public university is not expressly stated, but is nonetheless strongly implied. These charges, whether express or implied, go far beyond the mere expression of editorial disagreement with those who charge the University with racial discrimination as defendant News and Observer contends. The editorial\u2019s contents give no indication that these charges were meant, or would be interpreted, in any but their literal sense. As literal assertions, the implied charges as well as those stated explicitly in the editorial, more nearly resemble the statements found sufficiently factual in Gertz to support a libel action, than they do the obviously personal evaluations expressed through slogans insufficiently specific, or hyperbole insufficiently literal, to be proved false in Greenbelt and Letter Carriers.\nB. Actionable Opinions vs. Generally Derogatory Remarks\nBoth defendants argue that statements similar to those in The Raleigh Times editorial have been held constitutionally protected by courts in other jurisdictions. We have carefully reviewed the cases cited in both sets of briefs and principally relied upon to create the broad immunity for statements of \u201copinion\u201d urged by defendants. As a preliminary matter we note that in no case concerning the protection of statements as mere opinion has a serious question as to the accuracy and truth of the disclosed facts been raised. Our analysis of the cases reveals as essential judicial consensus on the scope of the absolute protection afforded expressions of opinion under the First Amendment which effectively excludes accusations of personal dishonesty, misconduct or criminal conduct.\nIn Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., supra, the plaintiff, a state court judge, charged the defendants with libel in writing and publishing a book charging the judge with being corrupt and incompetent and advocating his removal from office. The New York Court of Appeals ruled that the charge of incompetence was an expression of opinion regarding the Judge\u2019s performance in office, and the advocacy of his removal was an expression of the opinion that the Judge was unfit for his office. Both opinions were entitled to protection, even if falsely and insincerely held, because the writer set forth the basis for his beliefs, thus allowing the reader to draw his own conclusion as to whether the writer\u2019s views should be supported or challenged. In short, it was subject to public debate. However, the charges that plaintiff was \u201cprobably corrupt\u201d and that his sentences of certain defendants were \u201csuspiciously lenient,\u201d were held actionable.\nThese words were not used merely in a \u201cloose, figurative sense\u201d to demonstrate Newfield\u2019s strong disagreement with some of plaintiff\u2019s dispositions . . . The ordinary and average reader would likely understand the use of these words, in the context of the entire article, as meaning that plaintiff had committed illegal and unethical actions. Accusations of criminal activity, even in the form of opinion, are not constitutionally protected . . . While inquiry into motivation is within the scope of absolute privilege, outright charges of illegal conduct, if false, are protected solely by the actual malice test. (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.)\n42 N.Y. 2d at 381-82, 397 N.Y.S. 2d at 951, 366 N.E. 2d at 1307.\nThe analysis in Rinaldi, is based in part upon Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra. Gregory concerned a defamation action arising from a labor dispute. At issue were statements in a company bulletin to the effect that plaintiff union officers were apparently willing to sacrifice the interests of the members of their union to further their own political aspirations and personal ambitions. The Supreme Court of California noted that the language of both statements was \u201ccautiously phrased in terms of apparency,\u201d and \u201c[m]ore importantly, the charges are of the kind typically generated in the \u2018economic give-and-take\u2019 of a spirited labor dispute in which the judgment, loyalties and subjective motives of rivals are reciprocally attacked and defended, frequently with considerable heat.\u201d 17 Cal. 3d at 603, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 645, 552 P. 2d at 429. The court rejected the plaintiffs\u2019 contentions that although statements of opinion regarding their abilities and judgment constitute protected First Amendment speech, attacks on their motivations are not so shielded. However, the court stated, in dictum, that there is a critical distinction between opinions which attribute improper motives to a public official and accusations, in whatever form, that an individual has committed a crime or is personally dishonest. \u201cNo First Amendment protection, of course, enfolds the latter charges.\u201d Id. at 604, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 646, 552 P. 2d at 430.\nIn Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F. 2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834, 98 S.Ct. 120, 54 L.Ed. 2d 95 (1977), the statements at issue were unfavorable remarks about the writer A. E. Hotchner (friend of Ernest Hemingway and author of the memoir, Papa Hemingway). The author-defendant described Hotchner as a \u201ctoady\u201d and a \u201chypocrite\u201d who was \u201cnever open and above board.\u201d In the context of discussing the need for the plaintiff to prove that the defamatory falsehoods were made with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth, the court stated that these characterizations, if viewed in isolation cannot constitute actionable libel. \u201cA writer cannot be sued for simply expressing his opinion of another person, however unreasonable the opinion or vituperous the expressing of it may be.\u201d 551 F. 2d at 913. The court also noted that the statements about Hotchner contained no claims that he had engaged in any unusual or outlandish conduct. Id. It is apparent that the characterizations \u201ctoady\u201d and \u201chypocrite\u201d fall easily into the category of mere epithet or hyperbole, too loosely definable to carry specific factual content themselves. Therefore, although vituperous, they could not be actionable.\nIn Rinaldi Gregory, and Hotchner statements which the reader would clearly understand to be general evaluations of fitness, loyalty, judgment, subjective motives, and even character, both from the context of the issue discussed and nature of the statement made, have received absolute protection, while more specific charges of particular acts of misconduct or dishonesty have not.\nThe Second Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., supra. The Cianci court reviewed a number of state and federal cases in which the \u201cpure opinion\u201d defense was raised, including an earlier opinion of that court in Buckley v. Littell, 539 F. 2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062, 97 S.Ct. 785, 50 L.Ed. 2d 777 (1977). One of the statements at issue in Buckley, contained in the book, Wild Tongues (a \u201ctimely study of political extremism\u201d), appears as follows:\nLike Westbrook Pegler, who lied day after day in his column about Quentin Reynolds and goaded him into a lawsuit, Buckley could be taken to court by any one of several people who had enough money to hire competent legal counsel and nothing else to do.\n539 F. 2d at 895. The Buckley court held this to be an assertion of the fact that Buckley had lied about and implicitly libeled several people who, if they wanted to and could afford it, would take him to court for his lies. The statement was contrasted to the two other alleged libels; that Buckley was a \u201cfellow traveler of the fascists,\u201d or the \u201cright wing\u201d and a deliberate purveyor of material picked up from \u201copenly fascist journals.\u201d The former statement could not be considered as factual because of the \u201ctremendous imprecision of the meaning and usage of the terms,\u201d and the latter were held to be merely \u201cloosely definable, variously interpretable statements of opinion . . . made inextricably in the context of political, social or philosophical debate.\u201d Id. at 895.\nWith regard to the statement comparing Buckley to Pegler, the Cianci court interpreted the decision as follows:\nThis was considered to be a defamatory assertion of fact namely, that Buckley had made false and libelous statements. After repeating the contrast drawn in Gertz between expressions of \u201cpure opinion\u201d and \u201cfalse statements of fact,\u201d the court held the statement was actionable because \u201cthe clear meaning to be inferred was that he considered Buckley to be a libeler like Pegler.\u201d Id. at 896 (emphasis supplied). Since surely this was a statement of Littell\u2019s opinion, our decision must mean that when an \u201copinion\u201d is something more than a generally derogatory remark hut is laden with factual content, such as charging the commission of serious crimes, the First Amendment confers no absolute immunity, as distinguished from the qualified protection accorded by Sullivan in the case of public figures. And the court did not rest its decision at all on the basis that Littell implied he had reasons for believing Buckley to have been a libeller and defamer other than those disclosed in his articles. (Emphasis added.)\n639 F. 2d at 63.\nCianci itself involved a libel action brought by an incumbent mayor against a magazine which printed an article stating that the mayor had once been accused of rape, had arranged to have the charges dropped, and had made a payment to the accuser. The defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss the complaint under F. R. Civ. P. 12(b) and/or 56 was granted by the district court on the grounds that the article did not directly charge Cianci with the alleged criminal behavior, but principally because to the extent the article implied that Cianci was guilty of rape or improper payoffs, such implications were constitutionally protected as expressions of opinion.\nThe appellate court reversed the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the defendants were not immunized by the constitutional exception for statements of opinion, by the common law privilege of fair comment, or by the constitutional privilege of neutral reportage. The court drew the following conclusion from its review of the relevant cases, 639 F. 2d at 64:\nThe principle of the Greenbelt-Letter Carriers-Gertz trilogy, of our own Buckley decision, and of the New York Court of Appeals decision in Rinaldi is (1) that a pejorative statement of opinion concerning a public figure generally is constitutionally protected, quite apart from Sullivan, no matter how vigorously expressed; (2) that this principle applies even when the statement includes a term which could refer to criminal conduct if the term could not reasonably be so understood in context; but (3) that the principle does not cover a charge which could reasonably be understood as imputing specific criminal or other wrongful acts.\nApplying the fact/opinion distinction set forth in Gertz, the court held \u201ca statement that Cianci raped Redick at gunpoint twelve years ago and then paid her in an effort to obstruct justice falls within the [Gertz] Court\u2019s explication of false statements of fact rather than its illustrations of false ideas where public debate is the best solvent.\u201d 639 F. 2d at 62.\nThe defendant\u2019s organization of the facts detailing the decision not to prosecute Cianci and the $3,000 payment to the \u201cvictim\u201d was itself held susceptible of the foregoing defamatory connotation because the article, so organized, strongly implied that the payment was prior to and was the primary reason for the decision not to prosecute, although it did not state this directly. In fact, the two events had occurred independently of one another. The court concluded that even if the article were to be read as only expressing the \u201copinion\u201d that Cianci had committed the crimes of rape and obstruction of justice, it is not absolutely protected as distinguished from the protection afforded by Sullivan.\nThe charges of rape and obstruction of justice were not employed in a \u201cloose, figurative sense\u201d or as \u201crhetorical hyperbole.\u201d A jury could find that the effect of the article was not simply to convey the idea that Cianci was a bad man unworthy of the confidence of the voters of Providence but rather to produce a specific image of depraved conduct \u2014 committing rape with the aid of trickery, drugs and threats of death or serious injury, and the scuttling of a well-founded criminal charge by buying off the victim. Such serious charges have not yet become \u201cundefined slogans that are part of the conventional give-and-take in our economic and political controversies.\u201d (Citations omitted.) To call such charges merely an expression of \u201copinion\u201d would be indulge in Humpty-Dumpty\u2019s use of language. We see not the slightest indication that the Supreme Court or this court ever intended anything of this sort and much to demonstrate the contrary.\nId. at 64.\nWe are persuaded by the logic and reasoning of the Cianci opinion, as well as our analysis of the relevant Supreme Court decisions, that the protection thus far extended to expressions of \u201cmere opinion\u201d under the First Amendment has by no means been interpreted as broadly and comprehensively by other courts as defendants argue. It is clear that many purported statements of \u201copinion\u201d concerning the personal honesty, integrity, and conduct of individuals have been held sufficiently capable of being proven false to support libel actions for injury to reputation.\nDefendants place great reliance upon statements in Edwards v. National Audubon Society, 556 F. 2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002, 98 S.Ct. 647, 54 L.Ed. 2d 498 (1977), protecting use of the epithet \u201cliar\u201d as an expression of opinion concerning the plaintiffs\u2019 intellectual honesty. Defendant News and Observer contends that The Raleigh Times \u2019 editorial does not even contain the epithet \u201cliar,\u201d and, to the extent that it expresses an opinion on honesty, the editorial merely questions the intellectual, not moral, honesty of \u201ccertain categories of persons.\u201d\nTwo publications were at issue in Edwards. The first, a New York Times article reporting on serious charges levelled by an official of the Audubon Society against public figures during the midst of a heated and often acrimonious debate over continued use of the insecticide DDT. The second publication was a letter sent to the Times by another Audubon official, clarifying the charges. The Times article contained portions of a forward to the Society publication American Birds reporting the Society\u2019s Christmas Bird Count totals. The forward stated that certain paid \u201cscientist-spokesmen\u201d who were citing the bird count totals as proving that birdlife was thriving despite the use of DDT were being \u201cpaid to lie.\u201d Although the persons under attack were not named in the forward, the Times reporter obtained the names from the Society and printed them in the article. The letter of response to the Times, which was not published, stated, 556 F. 2d at 119:\nNor do we like to call people liars, but those who have most consistently misused our data [including the appellees] certainly have had time to learn from our patient explanations of their misinterpretations of our data over the several years of the DDT controversy.\nThe Edwards court first analyzed the statements concerning the plaintiffs in the letter. The court held that the reference to the scientists and professors as \u201cliars\u201d was protected as an expression of opinion, reasoning that,\nThe epithet \u201cliar\u201d in this context, standing by itself, merely expressed the opinion that anyone who persisted in misusing the Audubon statistics after being forewarned could not be intellectually honest. Since the basis of this opinion was fully set forth, the communication of Clement\u2019s views cannot be libelous, however mistaken they might be. (Emphasis added.)\n556 F. 2d at 121. However, the Audubon Society\u2019s principal charges, as reported in The New York Times, \u201cwent far beyond a mere accusation of scientific bad faith\u201d and actually charged the plaintiffs with being \u201cpaid to lie.\u201d This was held to be an implication of corruption, requiring a factual basis, which no party to the case was contending existed. Id. at 121 n. 5.\nThe court\u2019s reasoning makes it clear that \u201cliar\u201d was used as a rhetorical accusation of scientific bad faith concerning an issue over which opinions may differ \u2014 scientifically valid uses of data. That the epithet was merely a stylistic device to express strong disagreement over the plaintiff\u2019s use of the data was made clear by the supporting facts stated. Thus, the undertone of personal or moral dishonesty was entirely lacking.\nWe find no similar ameliorating circumstances present in The Raleigh Times\u2019 editorial to accompany the imputation of dishonesty arising out of the unexplained disparity between the 800 figure attributed to Hayden Renwick and the 36 figure attributed to the faculty committee. While the' editorial clearly does not go so far as to impute corruption to plaintiff, it does go beyond an accusation of mere intellectual dishonesty. Plaintiff is not being charged with what would be the arguable misuse of admissions data, but with the release of absolutely false and misleading data. Had the editorial only expressed disagreement with certain named persons who charged the University with racial discrimination and inadequate affirmative action efforts by charging those persons, in turn, with intellectual dishonesty, such editorial opinions would clearly be protected under the First Amendment. However, a jury could find that the effect of the editorial was not simply to convey the idea that Renwick had taken a demonstrably unreasonable position in the discrimination controversy surrounding UNC, but rather to produce a specific image of dishonest and irresponsible conduct which could only have a divisive effect on the public as well as potentially adverse consequences for the University itself.\nThese allegations, if stated expressly, would appear sufficiently factual to support a claim for defamation able to withstand the defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss the complaint. The California Supreme Court has held that where an article is ambiguous, and cannot as a matter of law be characterized as either stating a fact or an opinion, it is for the jury to determine whether an ordinary reader would have understood the article as a factual assertion charging specific acts of misconduct, or whether the statements were generally understood as an opinion respecting an official\u2019s public conduct in regard to a public matter. Good Government Group v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 672, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258, 586 P. 2d 572 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961, 99 S.Ct. 2406, 60 L.Ed. 2d 1066 (1979). A fortiori a claim based upon an ambiguous editorial would be sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Notwithstanding any possible ambiguity with respect to the fact/opinion distinction in this case, our examination of the constitutional and legal principles developed in the line of cases beginning with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, leads to the conclusion that even if the editorial were to be read as only expressing the \u201copinion\u201d that Renwick dishonestly and irresponsibly charged the University with denying admission to 800 black students when, as a \u201cfact,\u201d only 36 blacks had been denied access, it is not absolutely protected under Gertz. Rather, the editorial is protected, if at all, only by the qualified protection afforded by Sullivan for comment based upon erroneous facts where proof is lacking that the defendant actually knew of the falsity or acted in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the assertions. The question of whether plaintiff may ultimately recover under the heavy burden imposed by that standard is as yet wholly premature.\nC. Restatement (Second) of Torts, \u00a7 566\nDefendants also argue, in effect, that any implied opinion conveyed by the editorial is protected because the facts which, at least in their view, supported this opinion are set forth in it. Section 566 of the Restatement, governing expressions of opinion, states:\nA defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.\nAs acknowledged by the reporter, and demonstrated by the illustrations in the Comments, this statement of the law was arrived at by combining the common law privilege of fair comment with the limited constitutional protection of opinions and ideas developed in the Gertz, Greenbelt, and Letter Carriers cases. See Wade, The Communicative Torts and the First Amendment, 48 Miss. L. J. 671, 694-95 (1977).\nIn Cianci v. News Times Pub. Co., supra, the Second Circuit took the position that neither the pre-Restatement Supreme Court decisions nor the post-Restatement decisions in Buckley v. Littell, supra, Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, supra and the dictum in Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra, taken together would protect an \u201copinion\u201d that conveys a false representation of defamatory fact, such as a direct accusation of criminal misconduct (or personal dishonesty), even where there is no implication that the writer is relying on facts not disclosed. 639 F. 2d 64-5. While disclosure of the supporting facts will often serve as an indication of whether a particular word constituted a direct charge of a crime or a looser protected opinion, such disclosure alone will not serve to insulate a direct accusation of criminal misconduct. Id. at 65. We note also that the Restatement reporter has acknowledged that the position embodied in \u00a7 566, that mere opinion expressed upon disclosed or assumed facts is not actionable, may not be accurate as there has been no clear, firm holding by the Supreme Court to that effect. Wade, supra at 705-06.\nWherever the outer limits of First Amendment protection for \u201copinion\u201d may ultimately lie, it is clear that under the current state of the law, the statements in the Times\u2019 editorial are not eligible for absolute protection for the reasons stated in Part II, A and B of this opinion. Nor do we find the fact that defendants have disclosed the underlying facts (there being no allusion to other undisclosed defamatory facts which would support the alleged \u201copinions\u201d), standing alone, to otherwise insulate the editorial for two reasons: (1) the key underlying fact regarding plaintiff\u2019s allegation, which forms the subject of the editorial, is alleged to be false in the complaint and (2) the structure of the editorial is such that the disclosed facts do not function to indicate that a particular word constitutes a loose, protected opinion rather than a direct charge; rather, it is the detailing of the facts themselves that could be read as charging plaintiff with dishonesty.\nIn Greenbelt, supra, the Supreme Court carefully noted it was undisputed that the articles published by the defendants were accurate and truthful reports of what had been said at the public hearings before the city council, so that it \u201ccannot even be claimed that the petitioners were guilty of any \u2018departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers\u2019 (Citations omitted), much less a knowing use of falsehood or reckless disregard of whether the statements made were true or false.\u201d 398 U.S. at 12, 90 S.Ct. at 1541, 26 L.Ed. 2d at 14. Further, that Bresler\u2019s proposal was accurately and fully described in each article, along with the accurate statement that some people at the meetings had referred to the proposal as blackmail. But, the Court specifically stated that had the reports \u201cbeen truncated or distorted in such a way as to extract the word \u2018blackmail\u2019 from the context in which it was used at the public meetings, this would be a different case.\u201d Id. at 13, 90 S.Ct. at 1541, 26 L.Ed. 2d at 15. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleges the falsity of the sole material fact concerning his 1978 statement. From the comparison of that central fact to other data flow the imputations plaintiff claims defamed him. It is not evident from the complaint or the appended editorial in what manner the defendants have falsely represented plaintiff\u2019s statement. However, for purposes of reviewing the dismissal of the complaint, it must be taken as true that the newspaper has truncated or distorted plaintiff\u2019s statement so as to render the account of it false.\nAt common law, statements of opinion about matters of public concern were qualifiedly privileged when based upon a true or privileged statement of fact under the doctrine of \u201cfair comment\u201d or \u201cprivileged criticism.\u201d 1 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, \u00a7 5.28, p. 456 (1956); Restatement of Torts, \u00a7\u00a7 606, 607 (1938). The requirement of truly stated or privileged facts is explained in Harper and James, supra at 458, as follows:\nIf the actual facts are accurately stated, an opinion based thereon will be understood as such and taken for what it is worth. In such a case the writer may, by expressing his opinion, \u201clibel himself rather than the subject of his remarks.\u201d But if the facts are misstated, the subject of his remarks is at the writer\u2019s mercy, and a defamatory opinion, unless properly labeled, may have the effect of a statement of fact. (Emphasis added.)\nRestatement \u00a7 566 appears to incorporate the fair comment requirement of true or privileged disclosed facts in Comment c, at p. 175:\nIf the defendant bases his expression of a derogatory opinion of the plaintiff on his own statement of facts that are not defamatory, he is not subject to liability for the expression of opinion . . . The same result is reached if the statement of facts is defamatory but the facts are true (see \u00a7 581B), or if the defendant is not shown to be guilty of the requisite fault regarding the truth or defamatory character of the statement of facts (See \u00a7\u00a7 580A and 580B), or if the statement of facts is found to be privileged. (See \u00a7\u00a7 593-612.) (Emphasis added.)\nRestatement \u00a7 580A, referred to above, covers defamation of public officials or public figures and essentially restates the rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra. It is commonly acknowledged that the effect of Sullivan was to extend application of the privilege of fair comment to misstatements of fact as well as opinion about the conduct of public officials and figures, unless the plaintiff can prove that the statement was made with knowledge it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. See e.g. Restatement \u00a7 580A, Comment a, p. 215 and Reporter\u2019s Notes, p. 458-59; Hanson, 1 Libel and Related Torts, \u00a7\u00a7 140, 141 (1969); Note, The Scope of First Amendment Protection of Good-Faith Defamatory Error, 75 Yale L. J. 642, 644-45 (1966).\nThus, where the Sullivan standard of fault is applicable, and the issue of opinion upon disclosed facts has been raised, the plaintiff would have the burden of proving that the defendant based his expression of a derogatory opinion of the plaintiff on his own statement of false facts, with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether the facts were false or not. This is essentially the conclusion reached in Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514, 343 A. 2d 251 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907, 96 S.Ct. 2228, 48 L.Ed. 2d 832 (1976) in a decision written prior to the redrafting of Restatement \u00a7 566.\nIn Kapiloff the plaintiff high school principal sought recovery for alleged libels contained in a newspaper article rating the performance of county high school principals upon source materials set forth in the article. Plaintiff received one of the two \u201cunsuited\u201d ratings based upon the defendant\u2019s profile of the educational atmosphere at his school and the effect which the philosophies of the individual principal had on that atmosphere. The plaintiff alleged and offered proof as to the falsity of some of the facts stated by defendants. The court expressly rejected the defendants\u2019 argument that the Supreme Court either in Gertz specifically or in Sullivan or its progeny, has created an absolute privilege for all expressions of opinion on public matters and therefore eliminated the defense of \u201cfair comment,\u201d noting that there is language in Sullivan to the contrary. 27 Md. App. at 529, 343 A. 2d at 261.\nThe Maryland court concluded that both expressions of opinion and statements of fact concerning public officials and public figures can be actionable. Acknowledging the necessary relationship between an opinion and the facts it purports to comment on or interpret, the court concluded that the possible constitutional immunity for commentary must be determined on the basis of the veracity of the underlying facts.\nWhere the statements, however, are actual expressions of opinion, based upon stated or readily known facts, their objective truth or falsity depends on the veracity of these underlying facts. Therefore, any determinations with regard to falsity or the presence of actual malice must look to the stated or known facts which form the basis for the opinion.\n27 Md. App. at 533, 343 A. 2d at 264. See also Rand v. New York Times, 75 A.D. 2d 417, 430 N.Y.S. 2d 271 (1980) (A cause of action for libel will lie for the statement that a singer\u2019s recording company, lawyer, and manager \u201call screwed her at once\u201d when the falsity of the disclosed facts is properly alleged in the pleadings) and Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, supra, 551 F. 2d at 913 (Opinions based on false facts are actionable only against a defendant who had knowledge of the falsity or probable falsity of the underlying facts).\nDefendants both cite the decision of this Court in Brown v. Boney, 41 N.C. App. 636, 255 S.E. 2d 784, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 294, 259 S.E. 2d 910 (1979), as having established a constitutional bar to recovery against a media defendant for statements of opinion made in editorials upon disclosed facts. We do not read the decision quite so broadly. In Brown the plaintiff had been involved in an automobile accident, was charged with driving under the influence, and pled guilty to the offense. As a result, his driver\u2019s license was revoked. Defendant newspaper editor routinely published the list of license revocations. Plaintiff sought to prevent publication of his name by first attempting to prevent the otherwise routine release of his name from the Department of Motor Vehicles in Raleigh to defendant, and next by pleading personally with defendant not to publish his name. As a result of these and other efforts, defendant published a series of editorial articles accurately chronicling the accident, charges, revocation and plaintiff\u2019s efforts to prevent publication of his name in the newspaper revocation list. A few of the editorials compared plaintiffs efforts to have his name withheld from public scrutiny with \u201cPresident Nixon\u2019s efforts to cover up Watergate.\u201d Plaintiff sued for libel and invasion of privacy, presumably on the basis of the metaphorical comparison between his efforts and the Watergate cover-up.\nThis Court affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiffs own evidence tended to show the truth rather than the falsity of the underlying factual statements. In reference to the parallel drawn between plaintiffs admitted actions to prevent publication of his name and the Watergate coverup this Court stated only that,\nThe statements on which plaintiff primarily relies in this case are within the realm of fair editorial comment which has been accorded a significant measure of protection under the First Amendment.\n41 N.C. App. at 648, 255 S.E. 2d at 791. Following a reference to Gertz, a caveat appeared.\nThis does not mean, however, that newspapers or other media defendants can escape liability where the evidence discloses the publication of false factual statements under the guise of editorializing.\nId. The case under discussion is clearly distinguishable because the underlying fact is alleged to be false. In addition, as we discussed in Part II, A and B, supra, the statements at issue do not come within the measure of absolute constitutional protection for false ideas thus far established.\nDefendants\u2019 entire argument depends upon acceptance of the premise that \u201copinions\u201d are incapable of being proven false. However, the editorial opinions at issue, to the extent they are characterizable as such, are readily analyzable for objective truth or falsity according to the formula established in Kapiloff v. Dunn, supra, by application of the New York Times actual malice test to the underlying facts disclosed therein. As pointed out in Harper and James, supra, when the facts are misstated, a derogatory opinion, unless properly labeled, may have the effect of a statement of fact because the subject of the remarks is wholly at the writer\u2019s mercy. This is particularly true in plaintiff\u2019s case because any implied editorial opinion is inextricably intertwined with the supporting facts. A similar situation was presented in Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., supra. There the organization of the facts detailed in the article was itself held to be reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation, 639 F. 2d at 60, and the court held the common law privilege of fair comment to be inapplicable because the opinion was conveyed as part and parcel of the factual disclosures. \u201cIn such a case it is meaningless to say that the opinion is protected, when the facts are not.\u201d Id. at 67.\nIn short, we hold that mere disclosure of the facts upon which the opinions are based will not insulate the newspapers from liability where the facts are alleged to be false, and the detailing of the facts itself gives rise to the defamatory imputations complained of. We agree with plaintiff\u2019s contention that the First Amendment provides no absolute protection for a newspaper to make false material statements of fact and then draw defamatory conclusions from them. Nothing in the Supreme Court decisions discussed above leads to the conclusion that such conduct would serve any \u201csocial value as a step to the truth\u201d so as to outweigh the plaintiffs interest in the preservation of his own good name and reputation. We conclude that defendants\u2019 editorial is to be protected, if at all, under the Sullivan standard for good faith defamatory error. To hold otherwise on the facts of this case would be to sanction a media license to libel public figures far beyond that reasonably alluded to by the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra.\nIll\nFair Comment\nWe will briefly address defendant Greensboro News\u2019 argument that the editorial opinions are protected under the privilege of fair comment, inasmuch as we are of the opinion that the privilege retains considerable vitality quite apart from the limited constitutional immunity for \u201cpure opinion\u201d established in Gertz.\nOur courts have long recognized the privilege of fair comment upon matters of public interest, including the activities of public officials or figures. See e.g. Ponder v. Cobb, 257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E. 2d 67 (1962); Yancy v. Gillespie, 242 N.C. 227, 87 S.E. 2d 210 (1955); Alexander v. Vann, 180 N.C. 187, 104 S.E. 360 (1920); Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N.C. 270, 13 S.E. 775 (1891); Angel v. Ward, supra; Brown v. Boney, supra. However, the privilege is a matter of the defense to an action for defamation. Alexander v. Vann, supra-, Restatement of Torts \u00a7\u00a7 606, 607. Dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the statements are privileged comment is seldom appropriate because the privilege is only a qualified one, defeasible upon a showing that the comments were written with actual malice. Ponder v. Cobb, supra; Alexander v. Vann, supra; Ramsey v. Cheek, supra. In Yancey v. Gillespie, supra, our Supreme Court recognized the qualified privilege as a constitutional one.\nOne of the functions of a newspaper is to give information about public affairs and how public officials are carrying on the public business. So long as that qualified privilege is not abused, an action for libel cannot be maintained. Article I, Sec. 20, of the Constitution of North Carolina provides: \u201cFreedom OF the Press. The Freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and therefore ought never to be restrained, but every individual shall be held responsible for the abuse of the same.\u201d\n242 N.C. at 229, 87 S.E.' 2d at 212.\nThe Raleigh Times\u2019 editorial comments upon, inter alia, the veracity and effect of a particular statement published by a public figure concerning an issue of great public concern. Clearly the occasion of its publication would be a privileged one. However, where the complaint contains allegations of actual malice in both the common law and constitutional senses, as does plaintiffs, dismissal my not be premised on the basis of this qualified privilege as defendant contends.\nWe do not reach the issue of whether the editorial is in fact entitled to protection under the doctrine of fair comment because, as yet, no responsive pleadings have been filed raising that defense. We hold only that the qualified privilege of fair comment poses no insurmountable bar to plaintiffs recovery in view of the allegations of the complaint.\nIV\nFalse Light Invasion of Privacy\nOur courts have long recognized a claim for relief for false light invasion of privacy. Flake v. News Co., supra at 791-93, 195 S.E. at 62-64; Brown v. Boney, supra; Barr v. Telephone Co., 13 N.C. App. 388, 185 S.E. 2d 714 (1972). The claim recognized is consistent with Restatement \u00a7 652E, entitled \u201cPublicity Placing a Person in False Light,\u201d which provides:\nOne who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.\nFor liability to attach under Section 652E it is essential that the matter publicized be untrue, although it is not necessary for the matter to be defamatory. \u00a7 652E, Comment b. It is sufficient if the matter published attributes to the plaintiff characteristics, conduct, or beliefs that are false so that he is portrayed before the public in a false position. Id.; Brown v. Boney, supra, at 648, 255 S.E. 2d at 791. An action for defamation and a claim for false light invasion of privacy, however, are closely allied and the same considerations apply to each. Cibenko v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.J. 1981); Hill, Defamation and Privacy under the First Amendment, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1205, 1207 (1976). It is for the Court to determine whether the communication in question is capable of bearing a particular meaning which is highly offensive to a reasonable person. Cibenko, supra at 766.\nPlaintiff ascribes the same meaning to the publication in connection with his false light claim as he does in connection with his defamation claim. For the reasons set forth in connection with the defamation claim, then, this Court finds that the editorial is reasonably capable of conveying the offensive meaning or the innuendo ascribed by plaintiff as the basis for his invasion of privacy claim. And, for the same reasons that the editorial opinions may predicate a libel action because they are (1) not absolutely protected as \u201cpure opinion\u201d under the First Amendment, (2) are based upon an allegedly false statement of fact and (3) are inextricably intertwined with the allegedly false factual disclosure, thus capable of giving them the effect of false statements of fact upon the reader, they may also predicate a false light invasion of privacy action. Actual malice and damages have been adequately pleaded and the complaint discloses no absolute bar to recovery for plaintiff\u2019s second cause of action.\nV\nRepublication of Defamation\nDefendant Greensboro News contends that plaintiff\u2019s claim against it should be dismissed because the \u201cconstitutional guaranty of freedom of expression prevents a finding of liability for a newspaper\u2019s republication of a syndicated column, absent evidence that the newspaper had good reason to doubt the accuracy of the column.\u201d Defendant argues further that absent allegations that the Greensboro News Company had knowledge of material inaccuracies in The Raleigh Times editorial, it cannot be held responsible for reprinting the editorial.\nWe note first that the complaint against the Greensboro News Company in essence alleges:\n1. That the Greensboro News Company reprinted and published the false and defamatory statements concerning the plaintiff which had been originally written and published in The Raleigh Times.\n2. Thereby endorsing and extending the circulation of the defamatory statements.\n3. That defendant published said statements with knowledge of their falsity, or with reckless disregard for the truth, and with actual malice.\nThese pleadings sufficiently allege republication with knowledge of material inaccuracies or in reckless disregard of whether such statements were inaccurate to withstand defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the complaint.\nA federal court has recently referred to the \u201cblack-letter rule that one who republishes a libel is subject to liability just as if he had published it originally, even though he attributes the libelous statement to the original publisher, and even though he expressly disavows the truth of the statement.\u201d Hoover v. Peerless Publications, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Accord Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., supra, 639 F. 2d at 60-61. The rule is stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, \u00a7 578 as \u201cone who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it.\u201d All of the cases cited and relied upon by defendant in its brief essentially established a defense to liability for republication on the basis of justified reliance upon the research, writing, or reporting of an author or newspaper of proven professional ability and repute, absent evidence indicating knowledge of inaccuracies. See e.g. Mistrot v. True Detective Publishing Corp., 467 F. 2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972); Dresbach v. Doubleday & Company, 518 F. Supp. 1285 (D. D.C. 1981) and McManus v. Doubleday & Company, supra. However, the mere fact that such a defense may be available to defendant does not serve to defeat a claim which is adequately pleaded and to which no insurmountable bar to recovery appears from the face of the complaint.\nVI\nConclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons we hold that plaintiff\u2019s complaint states a claim for relief for defamation and invasion of privacy against both media defendants. The very organization of the editorial, as well as certain direct statements therein, are reasonably capable of conveying a defamatory meaning. The editorial statements are not absolutely protected under the First Amendment as \u201cfalse ideas\u201d or \u201cmere opinion\u201d because the defamatory imputations are sufficiently factual to be understood as literal charges of personal dishonesty and irresponsibility. The mere fact that defendants have disclosed the underlying facts upon which the opinions are based is insufficient, standing alone, to insulate the otherwise unprotected expressions of opinion \u2014 to the extent that the opinions are reasonably distinguishable from the facts in the editorial. Furthermore, the alleged falsity of the underlying facts concerning plaintiff, which we must take as false for purposes of testing the sufficiency of the complaint, effectively nullifies the claim of privilege for the opinions based upon disclosed facts as raising an absolute bar to recovery. In such a case the effect on the reader may be tantamount to that of a false statement of fact. It then properly becomes a question for the jury whether the editorial was so understood.\nIn due regard to the constitutional bias toward a robust, free, and uninhibited press we stress the narrow character of our ruling, namely that the defendants are not absolutely immunized by a constitutional exception for statements of opinion. Beyond that we have discussed the other privileges raised in support of the complaint\u2019s dismissal only to demonstrate that these privileges likewise offer no absolute protection, as distinguished from the qualified or conditional protection afforded by the New York Times case, for the express and implied statements complained of. We therefore conclude that defendant newspapers simply have not demonstrated that an insurmountable bar to recovery for .plaintiff\u2019s claims is disclosed on the face of the complaint either under the United States Constitution, the North Carolina Constitution or the common law of defamation, and that the complaint gives defendants sufficient notice of the nature and basis of plaintiff\u2019s claim to enable them to answer and to prepare for trial. We emphasize that our ruling in no way relieves the plaintiff from the substantial burden imposed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra. We hold only that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff\u2019s compalint for failing to state a claim.\nReversed.\nJudge Phillips concurs.\nJudge WELLS dissents.\n. It was brought to this Court\u2019s attention both during oral argument and by the briefs submitted by the defendants, that Dean Renwick\u2019s deposition was taken in the case and filed with the trial court, together with motions for summary judgment, prior to the hearing on the Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Further, that matters addressed in the deposition which were material and germane to the allegations of the complaint and to the defense were brought to the attention of the court during the hearing. The Renwick deposition is not part of the record on appeal and this Court has not been provided a transcript of the hearing. Thus, we are not in a position to know if matters outside the pleading were, in fact, presented to and not excluded by the court. When this does occur, Rule 12(b) provides that the motion to dismiss shall then be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56. Information contained in the Renwick deposition is not properly before this Court, despite the efforts of both defendants to present it in their briefs, and, therefore, we will consider neither that information nor those arguments of the defendants which are based upon the deposition information.\n. \u201cFor the most part those who attain this [public figure] status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment.\u201d\n. We have italicized those portions of the editorial which plaintiff principally claims contain false and defamatory statements concerning him.\n. The quotation marks were inexplicably missing from the complaint against The News and Observer, while included in the complaint against The Greensboro News. We choose to include them here as they render the awkward phrasing of the allegation somewhat clearer.\n. See, e.g. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 60 L.Ed. 2d 115 (1979); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed. 2d 328 (1975).\n. See Entries for \u201crhetorical\u201d and \u201chyperbole,\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged Ed. 1968).\n. In their briefs defendants cite, without placing principal reliance on, a number of cases to show that opinions far harsher than the Times\u2019 have been protected under the Gertz rule. We have examined these and other cases that our research had disclosed, and find nothing in the rulings inconsistent with our analysis of the scope of the Gertz decision\u2019s protection for expressions of \u201copinion.\u201d For example, in National Ass'n. of Gov\u2019t. Employees v. Central Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass. 220, 396 N.E. 2d 996 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935, 100 S.Ct. 2152, 64 L.Ed. 2d 788 (1980), a charge of \u201ccommunism\u201d was held to be mere pejorative rhetoric, a word too vague to be the subject of a defamation action. The court reasoned that the word was not meant to charge the plaintiff with complicity in the atrocities of Solzhenitsyn\u2019s Gulag Archipelago or other horrors distinctive of a totalitarian regime. In the context of its use, \u201ccommunism\u201d would most likely be taken to be rhetoric, abusive of the plaintiff for what it had done in attempting to squelch criticism. See also Anton v. St. Louis Suburban Newspapers, 598 S.W. 2d 493 (Mo. App. 1980) (Editorial characterizing attorney\u2019s work in handling a fire district merger as a \u201csleazy sleight-of-hand\u201d protected as expressing the author\u2019s feelings or \u201copinions\u201d on the issue). Protection is also extended to aesthetic and culinary criticism under a similar rationale. In Myers v. Boston Magazine, 380 Mass. 336, 403 N.E. 2d 376 (1980) a statement that plaintiff is \u201cthe only newscaster in town who is enrolled in a course for remedial speaking\u201d appeared in humorous \u201cBest and Worst\u201d format. The court held that the amusing format, as well as the ironic use of \u201cis\u201d rather than \u201cought,\u201d made it clear that the device used was no less figurative than a vague epithet or a soaring metaphor, was in the tradition of aesthetic criticism of performers, and was to be protected as mere opinion or ridicule. In Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879 (La. 1977) a restaurant reviewer\u2019s characterizations of some of the dishes served at the Maison de Mashburn were held to be evaluations of a purely subjective nature, mere expressions of opinion. \u201c[W]hen the author speaks of \u2018trout a la green plague\u2019 and \u2018yellow death on duck\u2019 it is obvious that an ordinarily reasonable person would not infer that these entrees were actually carriers of communicable diseases.\" Id. at 889. Compare McManus v. Doubleday, 513 F. Supp. 1383 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Statement that plaintiff had \u201chomicidal tendencies\u201d could reasonably be taken in its literal rather than hyperbolic sense by a jury where such words appear in a passage focusing on lobbyists in America connected with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (\u201cIRA\u201d), which was replete with reference to violence and gunrunning). The case on which defendants place principal reliance will be discussed infra.\n. Another decision of note is Miskovsky v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 654 P. 2d 587 (Okla. Sup. Ct. cert. denied, --- U.S. \u2014--, 103 S.Ct. 235, 74 L.Ed. 2d 186 (1982). During a political campaign the plaintiff, one of several candidates, raised allegations that another candidate, then Governor of Oklahoma, was a homosexual. In a series of editorials and political cartoons the defendant newspaper characterized plaintiff as the campaign \u201chatchet-man.\u201d The court held \u201chatchet-man\u201d protected as mere epithet, a judgmental and opinionative statement, incapable of constituting a falsehood. Other statements to the effect that the plaintiff \u201chad sunk to a new low in Oklahoma political rhetoric \u2014and for him that takes some doing,\u201d were also held protected opinion. Although the United States Supreme Court denied the petitioner\u2019s request for review in Miskovsky, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, dissented from the denial on the grounds that the Court did not intend to wipe out the rich and complex history of the common law\u2019s attempts to deal with the problem of defamatory \u201copinion\u201d with the two sentences of dicta quoted from Gertz regarding \u201cfalse ideas.\u201d \u2014-- U.S. at --\u2014, 103 S.Ct. at 236, 74 L.Ed. 2d at 186.\n. This point was specifically recognized by Judge Friendly writing for a different panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., supra, 639 F. 2d at 63.\n. The genesis of new \u00a7 566 is discussed in detail in Christie, Defamatory Opinions and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1621 (1977). Professor Christie takes the position that new \u00a7 566, in its final form, is logically consistent with the Restatement\u2019s own approach to d\u00e9famation, that the communication must be factually false as well as defamatory, see \u00a7 588, and with the logic of Gertz, that there is no such thing as a \u201cfalse idea\u201d or \u201copinion.\u201d Under old \u00a7 566, a derogatory expression of opinion, although based on disclosed or assumed facts, could be actionable. New \u00a7 566 is to the contrary. The section, together with the commentary, encompasses and renders unnecessary old \u00a7 567 regarding expressions of opinion on undisclosed facts. In addition, old \u00a7\u00a7 606-607 regarding \u201cfair comment\u201d or \u201cprivileged criticism\u201d were considered obviated by the new absolute protection for statements of \u201cpure opinion.\u201d\n. The Supreme Court stated, 376 U.S. at 292 n. 30, 84 S.Ct. at 732, 11 L.Ed. 2d at 713, \u201cSince the Fourteenth Amendment requires recognition of the conditional privilege for honest misstatements of fact, it follows that a defense of fair comment must be afforded for honest expression of opinion based upon privileged, as well as true, statements of fact. Both defenses are of course defeasible if the public official proves actual malice, as was not done here.\u201d (Emphasis added.) See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra at 152 n. 18, 87 S.Ct. at 1990, 18 L.Ed. 2d at 1109.\n. The provision of the 1868 North Carolina Constitution quoted in Yancey is now embodied in Article 1, \u00a7 14 Freedom of Speech and Press. (Adopted 1970.)\n. The contrary is true of a complaint which discloses on its face both defamation and facts giving rise to an occasion of absolute privilege. Such a complaint may properly be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Scott v. Veneer Co., 240 N.C. 73, 81 S.E. 2d 146 (1954).", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHNSON, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Wells\ndissenting.\nWhen viewed from its four corners, the publication complained of constitutes an expression of opinion regarding activities and comments of a public figure that, in my opinion, is entitled to protection under the Article I, Sec. 14 of the Constitution of North Carolina and the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. I believe this case to be a fair example of where the public\u2019s interest in uninhibited, robust, and open comment is paramount to an individual\u2019s interest in protecting his reputation or privacy. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed. 2d 686 (1964); compare Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed. 2d 789 (1974); and Brown v. Boney, 41 N.C. App. 636, 255 S.E. 2d 784, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 294, 259 S.E. 2d 910 (1979).\nFor these reasons, I must respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge Wells" } ], "attorneys": [ "Kennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy and Kennedy, by Annie Brown Kennedy, Harvey L. Kennedy and Harold L. Kennedy, III, for plaintiff appellant.", "Sanford, Adams, McCullough & Beard, by H. Hugh Stevens and Nancy Bentson Essex, for defendant appellee, The News and Observer Publishing Company.", "Smith, Moore, Smith, Schell & Hunter, by Richard W. Ellis and Alan W. Duncan, for defendant appellee, Greensboro News Company." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HAYDEN B. RENWICK v. THE NEWS AND OBSERVER PUBLISHING COMPANY, d/b/a THE RALEIGH TIMES HAYDEN B. RENWICK v. GREENSBORO NEWS COMPANY, d/b/a THE GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS AND RECORD\nNo. 8215SC432\n(Filed 5 July 1983)\n1. Libel and Slander \u00a7 14.1\u2014 newspaper editorials \u2014 potentially defamatory \u2014 dismissal improper\nWhere ordinary men could naturally understand an editorial printed in defendants\u2019 newspapers to imply or insinuate that plaintiffs statistics regarding the number of blacks denied admission to UNC between 1975 and 1979 were either knowingly and intentionally false, or the result of gross incompetence in the conduct of plaintiffs profession, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs action since the editorial as a whole is reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning so as to warrant its submission to a jury to determine if, in fact, the defamatory meaning was so understood.\n2. Libel and Slander \u00a7 5.2\u2014 defamatory statements as actionable \u2014 literal assertions\nWhere an editorial made it unlikely that the ordinary reader would not conclude that plaintiff had dishonestly or recklessly released false figures about blacks denied admission to UNC because he was dissatisfied with the existing minority admissions policies and practices, and where other portions of the editorial referred obliquely to adverse consequences the \u201cirresponsible\u201d charges had had, a defamatory imputation of personal dishonesty and irresponsibility on the part of an employee in a position of authority at a public university, while not expressly stated, was nonetheless strongly implied. The charges, whether express or implied, went far beyond the mere expression of editorial disagreement with those who charged the university with racial discrimination as defendant contended. The editorial\u2019s contents gave no indication that the charges were meant, or would be interpreted, in any but their literal sense. As literal assertions, the implied charges, as well as those stated explicitly in the editorial, more nearly resembled the statements found sufficiently factual in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) to support a libel action, than they did the obviously personal evaluations expressed through slogans insufficiently specific to be proved false in Greenbelt Pub. Ass\u2019n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) and Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974).\n3. Libel and Slander \u00a7 5.2\u2014 defamation claim sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss\nNotwithstanding any possible ambiguity with respect to whether an editorial stated facts or stated opinions, the Court\u2019s examination of the constitutional and legal principles developed in the line of cases beginning with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan leads to the conclusion that even if the editorial were to read as only expressing the \u201copinion\u201d that plaintiff dishonestly and irresponsibly charged the University with denying admission to 800 black students when, as a \u201cfact,\u201d only 36 blacks had been denied access, it is not absolutely protected under Gertz. Rather, the editorial is protected, if at all, only by the qualified protection afforded by Sullivan for a comment based upon erroneous facts where proof is lacking that the defendants actually knew of the falsity or acted in reckless disregard to the truth or falsity of the assertions. A fortiori a claim based upon an ambiguous editorial would be sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.\n4. Libel and Slander \u00a7 5.2\u2014 defamation action \u2014 underlying facts to support \u201copinion\u201d stated in editorial \u2014 not insulating defendants from b'abib'ty\nThe fact that defendants disclosed the underlying facts supporting their opinion in an editorial, standing alone, did not insulate the editorial under First Amendment protections for the following reasons: (1) the key underlying fact regarding plaintiffs allegation, which formed the subject of the editorial, is alleged to be false in the complaint, and (2) the structure of the editorial is such that the disclosed facts do not function to indicate that a particular word constitutes a loose, protected opinion rather than a direct charge; rather, it is the detailing of the facts themselves that could be read as charging plaintiff with dishonesty.\n5. Libel and Slander g 14.3\u2014 privilege of fair comment\nThe privilege of fair comment is a matter of defense to an action for defamation. Dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the statements are privileged comment is seldom appropriate because the privilege is only a qualified one, defeasible upon a showing that the comments were written with actual malice.\n6. Privacy \u00a7 1\u2014 false light invasion of privacy \u2014 sufficiency of complaint\nFor the same reasons that editorial opinions may predicate a libel action because they are (1) not absolutely protected as \u201cpure opinion\u201d under the First Amendment, (2) are based upon an allegedly false statement of fact and (3) are inextricably intertwined with the allegedly false factual disclosure, thus capable of giving them the effect of false statements of fact upon the reader, they may also predicate a false light invasion of privacy action.\n7. Libel and Slander \u00a76\u2014 republication of defamation\nPleadings in a defamation action sufficiently alleged republication with knowledge of material inaccuracies or in reckless disregard of whether such statements were inaccurate to withstand defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss the complaint.\nJudge Wells dissenting.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from Martin, Judge. Judgments entered 3 March 1982 in Superior Court, ORANGE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 March 1983.\nPlaintiff, Hayden B. Renwick, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, filed duplicate actions alleging libel and invasion of privacy against media defendants, The News and Observer Publishing Company and Greensboro News Company. The twin suits are founded upon an editorial originally published in The Raleigh Times on 22 April 1981, entitled, \u201cAnd He Calls It Bias?\u201d, and reprinted by the Greensboro News Company on 26 April 1981 in the Greensboro Daily News and Record in a commentary section, \u201cAround the State,\u201d under the title, \u201cDiscrimination?\u201d The Raleigh Times editorial reported and commented upon the public controversy surrounding the University of North Carolina\u2019s minority admissions efforts and the plaintiffs role in this controversy. Plaintiffs request for a retraction on the grounds that the editorial defamed him was denied by both newspapers. The defendants in both actions filed motions to dismiss the complaints, and a consolidated hearing was held. From judgments entered dismissing the actions pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, plaintiff appeals.\nKennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy and Kennedy, by Annie Brown Kennedy, Harvey L. Kennedy and Harold L. Kennedy, III, for plaintiff appellant.\nSanford, Adams, McCullough & Beard, by H. Hugh Stevens and Nancy Bentson Essex, for defendant appellee, The News and Observer Publishing Company.\nSmith, Moore, Smith, Schell & Hunter, by Richard W. Ellis and Alan W. Duncan, for defendant appellee, Greensboro News Company." }, "file_name": "0200-01", "first_page_order": 232, "last_page_order": 276 }