{
  "id": 8525644,
  "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: WALTER W. CROUSE",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re Crouse",
  "decision_date": "1983-12-20",
  "docket_number": "No. 8321DC207",
  "first_page": "696",
  "last_page": "699",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "65 N.C. App. 696"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "283 S.E. 2d 553",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1981,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "54 N.C. App. 429",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8522994
      ],
      "year": 1981,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/54/0429-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "238 S.E. 2d 153",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1977,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "34 N.C. App. 320",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8548813
      ],
      "year": 1977,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/34/0320-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "248 S.E. 2d 448",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "38 N.C. App. 573",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8555146
      ],
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/38/0573-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "283 S.E. 2d 553",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1981,
      "opinion_index": 1
    },
    {
      "cite": "54 N.C. App. 429",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8522994
      ],
      "year": 1981,
      "opinion_index": 1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/54/0429-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "248 S.E. 2d 448",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 1
    },
    {
      "cite": "38 N.C. App. 573",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8555146
      ],
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/38/0573-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 402,
    "char_count": 7812,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.806,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 6.770845263994211e-08,
      "percentile": 0.4139897731489365
    },
    "sha256": "bb5f781fd5cb6eec85a59ae0527ab7d13494ddfd93c7aefbe96d2bbd0ca0e0c3",
    "simhash": "1:98e765c3db631068",
    "word_count": 1269
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:11:09.312138+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judge Phillips concurs.",
      "Judge EAGLES dissents."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "IN THE MATTER OF: WALTER W. CROUSE"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WEBB, Judge.\nIn his first assignment of error the respondent contends that the commitment order is void on its face because the court did not record facts to support the order as required by G.S. 122-58.7. He says this is so because the court recorded the facts by placing the letter \u201cx\u201d in the boxes on the commitment order form beside the facts and other findings it made. He says this violates the rule of In re Jacobs, 38 N.C. App. 573, 248 S.E. 2d 448 (1978). It is true that case states that \u201cMerely placing an \u2018X\u2019 in the boxes on the commitment order form does not comply with the statute.\u201d We believe this is dictum. This Court in that case did not state what findings the district court had made but said they were essentially identical to the findings made in In re Koyi, 34 N.C. App. 320, 238 S.E. 2d 153 (1977). This Court held in Koyi the recorded facts were not sufficient. Since the recorded facts were not sufficient to support an order of commitment, we do not believe the statement as to the insufficiency of placing an \u201cx\u201d on the commitment order form was necessary to the decision in Jacobs. We do not believe this case should be reversed because the court recorded the facts by placing \u201cx\u2019s\u201d by the recorded facts on the order of commitment form.\nThe respondent also contends that there was not sufficient evidence for the court to find he was dangerous to himself. His mother testified as to the matters she had alleged in the petition. One of the psychiatrists stated that a finding of imminent danger to respondent could be based on \u201cofficers report anger, destruction, running away . . . potentially dangerous 2nd to paranoia.\u201d The other psychiatrist stated \u201cthe patient is now on medication, which may explain part of his \u2018reasonableness\u2019 but seems so lacking in judgment and/or having such a need to deny his behavioral excesses after the fact that the next \u2018explosion\u2019 even further fueled by anger over being sent here . . . could well cause injury to others.\u201d The court could conclude from the reports of the psychiatrists that the respondent is paranoid, destructive, and potentially dangerous. We believe this supports the findings of the district court.\nThe respondent, relying on In re Crainshaw, 54 N.C. App. 429, 283 S.E. 2d 553 (1981), argues that the district court should be reversed because it did not make a \u201cspecific finding of probability of serious physical debilitation resulting from . . . lack of self-caring ability.\u201d It is true that Crainshaw contains language to the effect that such a finding is necessary but we believe this is dictum and not binding on this panel. Crainshaw held that the evidence did not support a finding of dangerousness to self or others, and we believe the holding of that case should be limited to this. G.S. 122-58.7(i) says that an inpatient commitment order may be supported by a finding \u201cthat the respondent is mentally ill . . . and dangerous to himself.\u201d We do not believe we should hold a finding in addition to this should be required to support a commitment order. Some of the language of Crainshaw would require it but we do not believe that language was necessary to a decision in the case and is not the holding of the case.\nThe respondent was committed for outpatient care. Since the court made findings which would support a commitment for inpatient care, we believe this supports an order for outpatient treatment.\nAffirmed.\nJudge Phillips concurs.\nJudge EAGLES dissents.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WEBB, Judge."
      },
      {
        "text": "Judge Eagles\ndissenting.\nI dissent. Reversal of the order of the district court is required by our court\u2019s decision in In re Jacobs, 38 N.C. App. 573, 248 S.E. 2d 448 (1978), holding that \u201cmerely placing an \u2018X\u2019 in the boxes on the commitment order form does not comply with the statute,\u201d or alternatively, by our court\u2019s decision in In re Crainshaw, 54 N.C. App. 429, 283 S.E. 2d 553 (1981), mandating a \u201cspecific finding of probability of serious physical debilitation resulting from the more general finding of lack of self-caring ability\u201d\nThe majority inappropriately characterizes the requirements laid down in Jacobs and Crainshaw as mere dictum which may be disregarded at will by subsequent panels of this court. I respectfully disagree.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "Judge Eagles"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Barbara P. Riley, for the State.",
      "Sparrow and Bedsworth, by George A. Bedsworth, for respondent appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: WALTER W. CROUSE\nNo. 8321DC207\n(Filed 20 December 1983)\n1. Insane Persons 8 1.2\u2014 commitment order \u2014 placing \u201cX\u201d beside recorded facts on form\nAn order of involuntary commitment was not void because the court recorded the facts by placing the letter \u201cX\u201d by the recorded facts on the order of commitment form. G.S. 122-58.7.\n2. Insane Persons 8 1.2\u2014 involuntary commitment \u2014 dangerousness to self\nReports of psychiatrists indicating the respondent was paranoid, destructive, and potentially dangerous were sufficient to support the court\u2019s determination that respondent was dangerous to himself.\n3. Insane Persons 8 1.2\u2014 involuntary commitment \u2014 necessary findings\nAn involuntary commitment order need not be supported by a specific finding of probability of serious physical debilitation resulting from the lack of self-caring ability.\nJudge Eagles dissenting.\nAppeal by respondent from Harrill, Judge. Order entered 18 November 1982 in District Court, Forsyth County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 October 1983.\nThe respondent appeals from an order in an involuntary commitment proceeding.\nOn 8 November 1982, petitioner (respondent\u2019s mother) initiated a proceeding for involuntary commitment pursuant to G.S. 122-58.3. Petitioner alleged that the respondent \u201cis a mentally ill or inebriate person who is dangerous to himself or to others.\u201d The following facts were set forth as the basis for petitioner\u2019s opinion:\n\u201c[Respondent has] become deeply involved in religion. In the recent past was seclusive part of the time; hostile and raging at other times. Speech is pressured. Measures every coming event in days, hours, and minutes. This morning he screamed out, as he often does, and began to act so bizarrely that officers were called out. He was babbling incoherently, raging, hostile. Was trembling, fists were clenched, and he was ready to violently explode. Petitioner believes he is potentially violent and unable to exercise judgment required to provide for his needs of safety and self-protection.\u201d\nOn the basis of this petition, the Assistant Clerk of Superior Court directed that respondent be taken into custody and held for examination by a qualified physician. Respondent was examined by two physicians who gave their opinion that respondent was mentally ill and was imminently dangerous to himself or others.\nRespondent\u2019s case was heard in district court on 18 November 1982. Respondent was represented by counsel. The testimony of petitioner and the medical reports of the two physicians were introduced into evidence. The court found that respondent was mentally ill and dangerous to himself or to others. This finding was indicated by a mark in the appropriate space on the standard form denominated \u201cOrder in Involuntary Commitment Proceeding.\u201d In a similar fashion, the court indicated on the form that its finding was supported by the fact that respondent has recently \u201cacted in such a manner as to evidence that he would be unable without care, supervision and the continued assistance of others to: satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, safety and protection.\u201d As evidence supporting these facts, the court incorporated by reference the medical reports of the examining physicians.\nRespondent was committed for outpatient care at the For-syth/Stokes Mental Health Clinic for a period not to exceed ninety days. From the entry of the order of commitment, respondent appealed.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Barbara P. Riley, for the State.\nSparrow and Bedsworth, by George A. Bedsworth, for respondent appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0696-01",
  "first_page_order": 728,
  "last_page_order": 731
}
