{
  "id": 8522524,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. OSCAR REGINALD HINNANT",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hinnant",
  "decision_date": "1983-11-15",
  "docket_number": "No. 827SC1174",
  "first_page": "130",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:11:09.312138+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Arnold and Eagles concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. OSCAR REGINALD HINNANT"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WELLS, Judge.\nDefendant challenges the trial court\u2019s application of the Fair Sentencing Act to the facts of his case. Specifically, he first contends that his sentence undermines the policy of the act because he received double the presumptive prison term on the basis of a single weak aggravating factor: prior convictions of (1) shoplifting and (2) breaking and entering and larceny.\nThis court and our supreme court have previously considered the public policy aspects of the Fair Sentencing Act raised by the defendant in this case. In State v. Davis, 58 N.C. App. 330, 293 S.E. 2d 658, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 745, 295 S.E. 2d 482 (1982), we made it clear that under the act, trial judges continue to have great discretion with respect to balancing factors found in aggravation against factors found in mitigation, and that their balancing process, if correctly carried out, will not be disturbed on appeal. In State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E. 2d 689 (1983), our supreme court approved those principles we laid down in Davis. We must, therefore, reject defendant\u2019s argument that we may review the trial court\u2019s sentence on the grounds that one \u201cweak\u201d factor in aggravation should not be allowed to support a sentence which is double that of the presumptive sentence.\nWhile rejecting defendant\u2019s argument, we are constrained, however, to recognize defendant\u2019s lament that this case significantly illustrates the fact that the evil of disparity in sentencing has not been eliminated by the act. There is no question that within the parameters of Davis and Ahearn, a single factor in aggravation, properly found, may support a sentence ranging from fifteen years (the presumptive sentence) to life imprisonment (the maximum sentence) for second degree murder, regardless of how many factors in mitigation are found.\nNeither can we find necessary fault with defendant\u2019s argument that if the fundamental goals of the act are to be obtained, deviation from presumptive sentences should be the exception, not the rule, and that this case may illustrate the fears of the Knox Commission that \u201cif trial judges . . . disregard legislatively prescribed guidelines for sentencing, then the system would quickly revert to the unjust results of the present discretionary system.\u201d Whatever the merits of such argument may be, we are nevertheless convinced that as the act is now written, the results reached by us in Davis \u2014 and blessed by our supreme court in Ahearn \u2014 are sound. The act did not eliminate the existing \u201cdiscretionary system\u201d; it only established certain guidelines for trial judges which, if correctly observed, still leaves an open door for disparity of sentences. When it comes to sentencing, the trial judges still sit in the driver\u2019s seat. While, when appropriate, we can apply the letter of the law, the spirit of the law reposes in the hands of the trial judges who must apply it. In sentencing review, we look not for errors in judgment, but only for errors of law.\nDefendant also argues that the trial court did commit an error of law by not finding two factors in mitigation: first, that defendant was coerced into shooting the victim, and second, that defendant was suffering from a mental condition (alcoholism and drunkenness) which, while insufficient to constitute a defense, did significantly reduce defendant\u2019s culpability.\nInitially, defendant argues that his evidence on both factors was \u201cuncontradicted\u201d and was therefore of a quality sufficient to require a finding in mitigation. We cannot agree. The defendant has the burden of establishing such factors by a preponderance of the evidence, G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a), and the trial court must weigh defendant\u2019s evidence regardless of whether it is uncontradicted. The test laid down by our supreme court in State v. Jones, supra, is as follows:\nWhen evidence in support of a particular mitigating or aggravating factor is uncontradicted, substantial and there is no reason to doubt its credibility, to permit the sentencing judge simply to ignore it would eviscerate the Fair Sentencing Act.\nWhile defendant\u2019s testimony that he was \u201ccoerced\u201d into shooting the victim may be uncontradicted, its credibility is certainly open to question because of the subjective nature of such evidence and because of the defendant\u2019s interest in mitigating his own sentence. The same may be said for defendant\u2019s testimony that he was intoxicated at the time. Defendant\u2019s statement to the arresting officers indicates that he was able to recall in very substantial detail the events leading up to and following the shooting. Such evidence tends to show that defendant was not in such a state of intoxication as would have deprived him of his reason or of his ability to understand the dangerous aspects of his conduct; thus the credibility of such evidence was open to question.\nFor the reasons stated, the sentence imposed by the trial court is\nAffirmed.\nJudges Arnold and Eagles concur.\n. The Commission on Correctional Programs, informally known as the Knox Commission, was created by a legislative act in 1974. The Commission\u2019s sentencing study, \u201cFinal Report of the Legislative Commission on Correctional Programs,\u201d was presented to the North Carolina General Assembly in February, 1977. Copies of the report are available at the North Carolina Legislative Library, Legislative Building, Jones Street, Raleigh, N.C.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WELLS, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Wilson Hayman, for the State.",
      "Evans and Rountree, by Don Evans, for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. OSCAR REGINALD HINNANT\nNo. 827SC1174\n(Filed 15 November 1983)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 138\u2014 public policy aspects o! Fair Sentencing Act \u2014 great discretion in trial judge\nTrial judges continue to have great discretion with respect to balancing factors found in aggravation against factors found in mitigation, and their balancing process, if correctly carried out, will not be disturbed on appeal. Therefore, defendant\u2019s argument that an appellate court may review the trial court\u2019s sentence on the grounds that one \u201cweak\u201d factor in aggravation should not be allowed to support a sentence which is double that of the presumptive sentence is rejected.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 13S\u2014 factors in mitigation \u2014 properly not submitted\nThe trial judge did not err in failing to find as mitigating factors that defendant was coerced into shooting the victim and that defendant was suffering from a mental condition (intoxication) which significantly reduced defendant\u2019s culpablity since defendant\u2019s testimony that he was \u201ccoerced\u201d into shooting the victim, while uncontradicted, was open to question because of the subjective nature of such evidence and because the evidence tended to show that defendant was not in such a state of intoxication as would have deprived him of his reason or of his ability to understand the dangerous aspects of his conduct.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Brown, Judge. Judgment entered 21 June 1982 in NASH County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 August 1983.\nDefendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder, having confessed to shooting Ernest Lee Blanks. In his statement, defendant admitted pulling the trigger of a shotgun which another person pointed at the head of the victim. Defendant claimed he was drunk at the time, that he could not see the victim, and that the other person coaxed him into pulling the trigger. He helped dispose of the body after the killing.\nAt the sentencing hearing, the trial court found as the sole factor in aggravation that defendant had prior convictions for crimes punishable by more than sixty days\u2019 confinement. The trial court found in mitigation that defendant voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing at an early stage of the criminal process, and that he was willing to testify against a co-defendant. The trial court decided the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced defendant to thirty years in prison. The presumptive sentence for second degree murder is fifteen years. G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(f)(l). Defendant appealed his sentence pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 15A-1444(al).\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Wilson Hayman, for the State.\nEvans and Rountree, by Don Evans, for defendant.\n. Evidence that a defendant \u201ctestified truthfully\u201d against a co-defendant is one statutory factor which a trial judge must consider in passing sentence under the Fair Sentencing Act, G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(2)(h). However, evidence that a defendant was merely \u201cwilling\u201d to testify against a co-defendant does not meet the statutory requirement. State v. Jones, 309 N.C. 214, 306 S.E. 2d 451 (1983). Nevertheless, a trial judge may properly consider nonstatutory mitigating factors in setting a sentence, so long as those factors are logically related to the purposes of sentencing. G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4. The crucial difference is that a trial judge must consider the presence or absence of the statutory mitigating and aggravating factors; whereas a trial judge may, but is not required to consider nonstatutory mitigating factors. State v. Jones, supra. In the case at bar, the record merely shows that the trial judge considered as a mitigating factor that defendant was willing to testify against a co-defendant. It is not clear whether the trial court believed this evidence met the statutory requirements of G.S. \u00a7 15A-l340.4(a)(2)(h), or indicated a nonstatutory mitigating factor. In either case, of course, no prejudice to defendant can have resulted from the judge\u2019s finding."
  },
  "file_name": "0130-01",
  "first_page_order": 162,
  "last_page_order": 166
}