{ "id": 8522927, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM RAY RIDDLE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Riddle", "decision_date": "1984-01-17", "docket_number": "No. 8329SC460", "first_page": "60", "last_page": "66", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "66 N.C. App. 60" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "202 S.E. 2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 670", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564781 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0670-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 S.E. 2d 742", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562627 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 S.E. 2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562902 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 S.E. 2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565379 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E. 2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559773 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E. 2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572384 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 S.E. 2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570646 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 84-14", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 705, "char_count": 14033, "ocr_confidence": 0.822, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.581842569932351e-07, "percentile": 0.8172962979694955 }, "sha256": "991a05f0dafa6194db466ae44dbf3e15b7eb067cc3bba58494d817df20522c09", "simhash": "1:3ffb1072d21103b6", "word_count": 2351 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:19.573584+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge VAUGHN concurs.", "Judge BECTON dissents." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM RAY RIDDLE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HILL, Judge.\nFor his first assignment of error, defendant contends his statutory and constitutional rights were violated because he was not arraigned in open court. Arraignment is mandatory unless waived in writing prior to the day for which arraignment is calendared in the manner provided by statute. G.S. 15A-945. An arraignment is a proceeding whereby a defendant is brought before a judge having jurisdiction to try the offense, so that the defendant may be formally apprised of the charges pending against him and directed to plead to them. G.S. 15A-941. Should the defendant fail to plead after the prosecutor has read the charges or otherwise fairly summarized them, the court must record the fact, and defendant must be tried as if he had entered a plea of not guilty. \u201cWhere there is no doubt that a defendant is fully aware of the charge against him, or is in no way prejudiced by the omission of formal arraignment, it is not reversible error for the trial court to fail to conduct a formal arraignment proceeding.\u201d State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 73, 265 S.E. 2d 164, 166 (1980).\nHere the record is silent as to any arraignment. However, the judge in his charge to the jury said, \u201cThe defendant, by his plea of not guilty, has denied his guilt . . . .\u201d The defendant was in court, his lawyer participated in the trial, and defendant called witnesses who testified in the defense of the defendant. Defendant in no way was prejudiced by the lack of formal arraignment and cannot now claim reversible error. State v. McCotter, 288 N.C. 227, 217 S.E. 2d 525 (1975). This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant claims the trial court erred in admitting his custodial statements because he was not warned of his Miranda rights and was seized without probable cause. Over defendant\u2019s objections Officer Cline was permitted to testify to the jury that defendant had stated his height to be six feet, his weight 150 pounds, and that he had stated he was unemployed. Defendant contends the questions and answers were relevant to the identity of the defendant as being the intruder seen by Mr. Hollifield, and to defendant\u2019s possible motive for having taken Mr. Hollifield\u2019s billfold. We disagree.\nA voir dire was heard to consider the admissibility of the challenged statement. Defendant on voir dire testified that he had not understood he was free to leave at the time he was being questioned at the sheriffs department by armed officers who were identified to him as detectives. The defendant, in fact, understood that he was coming to the courthouse, in addition to being directed by the officer to go there, to turn himself in on a probation violation. Officer Cline admitted defendant told him when he came to the sheriffs department \u201cthat he knew that there was a warrant or was going to be a warrant issued on him for a probation violation.\u201d\nAt the conclusion of the voir dire, the trial court found as fact that the defendant was not under arrest, that he was not threatened, coerced, or intimidated in any manner, that no promises or threats were made, that defendant was free to leave at any time, and that it was not necessary or required that the Miranda warnings be given him as \u201cMiranda warnings and waiver of counsel are required when, and only when, the defendant is being subjected to custodial interrogation.\u201d State v. Sykes, 285 N.C. 202, 205, 203 S.E. 2d 849, 851 (1974). Defendant was not in custody at the time he answered the questions. Such personal data was nothing more than a general investigation of the offense. Defendant voluntarily came to the sheriffs office. He was free to leave. Therefore, the court concluded defendant\u2019s statement as to date of birth, sex, race, age, height, weight, color of eyes, color of hair and nickname to be properly admissible.\nThe trial judge made findings of fact and rendered his conclusions thereon. If supported by competent evidence, the findings of fact are conclusive and binding on the appellate courts. State v. Thompson, 287 N.C. 303, 214 S.E. 2d 742 (1975). The record reveals sufficient evidence and testimony in support of the findings of fact. They in turn support the conclusions. We find no error in the ruling by the trial judge on this point.\nDefendant contends that the prosecutor\u2019s statements made in his closing argument constituted prejudicial error. In the present case the defendant had presented to the jury evidence tending to show alibi. The prosecutor made statements suggesting that more evidence tending to show alibi would have been produced had certain witnesses testified. While it is improper for a lawyer in his argument to assert his opinion that a witness is lying, \u201che can argue to the jury that they should not believe a witness. . . .\u201d State v. Noell, 284 N.C. 670, 696, 202 S.E. 2d 750, 767 (1974). In essence, the prosecutor\u2019s comments constituted an argument to the jury that they should not believe defendant\u2019s evidence of alibi, and therefore, the remarks represented a reasonable comment on the evidence.\nWe have examined defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error and find them without merit.\nNo error.\nChief Judge VAUGHN concurs.\nJudge BECTON dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "HILL, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge BECTON\ndissenting.\nAlthough N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 84-14 (1981) permits counsel to argue the \u201cwhole case as well of law as of fact ... to the jury,\u201d counsel may not inject into the trial his beliefs and personal opinions which are not supported by the evidence. State v. Britt, 288 N.C. 699, 220 S.E. 2d 283 (1975); see also State v. Locklear, 294 N.C. 210, 241 S.E. 2d 65 (1978). Believing that the argument made by the prosecuting attorney in this case transcends the bounds of propriety and fairness, I dissent.\nIn his closing argument, the assistant district attorney told the jury that he had not called a Mrs. Teague to testify during the State\u2019s case in chief because \u201cI knew that if I put Mrs. Teague on, this line of six witnesses [the defendant\u2019s witnesses] . . . would explain that away too.\u201d Although the trial court sustained defendant\u2019s objection to that argument and instructed the jury not to consider it, the assistant district attorney later made the same argument to the jury, using slightly different words:\nMembers of the jury, you will recall that this morning I put on testimony relating to the headband and defendant\u2019s witnesses took the stand and they said, \u2018Oh, yes, Barry Hensley had on a headband.\u2019 In light of that, I waited to put the other witness on and I submit to you that if I had put Mrs. Teague on this morning, in all likelihood, the evidence would be, \u2018Oh, yes, Barry Hensley was driving that car that night.\u2019\nMr. GOLDSMITH: Objection.\nThe COURT: Overruled.\nOr somebody would say, \u2018Oh, yes, I took the car about quarter til four in the morning just exactly like that lady said I took the car and went down this road and on down here several miles to visit some friend of mine.\u2019 I submit to you, members of the jury, that that would have been covered also.\nTo put the prosecutor\u2019s argument in context, it should be noted that Barry Hensley, according to the investigating officer, was initially the \u201cmain suspect.\u201d The facts which suggest that Barry Hensley was the main suspect are adequately detailed by the majority, ante pp. 1, 2. That some of defendant\u2019s alibi witnesses also testified that Barry Hensley was wearing a red headband on the night in question does not make the prosecutor\u2019s argument proper. After all, the investigating officer was well aware of the fact that Barry Hensley had been seen wearing a headband.\nIt was quite proper for the State, once defendant had presented evidence that he was at home at the time of the crime, to put on rebuttal evidence by Mrs. Teague that she saw a car leave the defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s house at approximately 3:30 a.m. and drive to some point in the general neighborhood, where she heard the car motor cut off and start up again approximately half an hour later and that the car returned to defendant\u2019s residence. It was improper, however, for the assistant district attorney to suggest that he decided not to call Mrs. Teague in the State\u2019s case in chief because the defendant\u2019s witnesses would have, in effect, lied. To permit the prosecutor to explain his trial strategy to the jury by suggesting that the order of his witnesses was dictated by his personal belief that otherwise \u201cin all likelihood\u201d the defendant\u2019s witnesses would have conformed their stories to fit what they had heard, is improper. In State v. Locklear, the defendant\u2019s conviction was reversed for improper remarks by the district attorney concerning the credibility of the defendant. Moreover, Disciplinary Rule 7-106(c)(4) of the North Carolina Code of Professional Responsibility (1974) forbids a lawyer from asserting his personal opinion \u201cas to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility of a witness, ... or as to the guilt or innocence of an accused. . . Indeed, our Supreme Court in State v. Locklear, quoting from the Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and Defense Function \u00a7 5.8(b), at 126 (Approved Draft 1971), stated: \u201cIt is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant.\u201d 294 N.C. 210, 216, 241 S.E. 2d 65, 69.\nI believe the prosecutor\u2019s argument was improper and prejudicial. I, therefore, vote for a new trial.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge BECTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten by Assistant Attorney General Guy A. Hamlin for the State.", "Goldsmith and Goldsmith, by C. Frank Goldsmith, Jr. for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM RAY RIDDLE\nNo. 8329SC460\n(Filed 17 January 1984)\n1. Criminal Law 8 22\u2014 no record of arraignment \u2014 no prejudicial error\nAlthough the record was silent as to whether or not defendant had a formal arraignment, the judge in his charge to the jury said, \u201cThe defendant, by his plea of not guilty, has denied his guilt,\u201d the defendant was in court, his attorney participated in the trial, and defendant called witnesses who testified in the defense of the defendant, and defendant was in no way prejudiced by the lack of formal arraignment and could not now claim reversible error. G.S. 15A-941; G.S. 15A-945.\n2. Criminal Law 8 77.1\u2014 defendant\u2019s statement as to age, height, and weight\u2014 admissible\nThere was sufficient evidence and testimony in support of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and subsequent conclusion that defendant was not under arrest, that he was not threatened, coerced or intimidated in any manner, and no promises or threats were made, that defendant was free to leave at any time, and that it was not necessary or required that Miranda warnings be given him when he stated his date of birth, sex, race, age, height, weight, color of eyes, color of hair and nickname.\n3. Criminal Law g 102.7\u2014 closing argument \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s comments not prejudicial error\nA prosecutor\u2019s comments in his closing argument which, in essence, constituted an argument to the jury that they should not believe defendant\u2019s evidence of alibi represented a reasonable comment on the evidence and was not prejudicial error.\nJudge Becton dissenting.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Thornburg, Judge. Judgment entered 3 December 1982 in Superior Court of MCDOWELL County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 December 1983.\nDefendant was convicted of second degree burglary and received an active sentence. He appeals.\nThe facts pertinent to this appeal can be summarized as follows: During the early morning hours of 21 July 1982, Howard Lee Hollifield awoke to find an intruder crawling on his hands and knees in his bedroom. Hollifield turned on the light, the intruder jumped up, and Hollifield got a \u201cpretty good look at him.\u201d\nAfter the intruder left, Hollifield noticed his wallet was missing from his trousers. He called the sheriffs department and described the intruder as being six feet tall, weighing 130 to 140 pounds, of slender build, thin faced, with dark brown hair of medium length. The intruder was wearing Levis, possibly tennis shoes, and a red headband, but not a shirt.\nA bloodhound traced the intruder toward the residence of Barry Hensley, but lost the scent at the paved road. Hensley was known to wear a headband, was of similar build as defendant, and had been seen in the area previously. The investigating officer noted initially the main suspect was Barry Hensley.\nOn the evening of the break-in, both Hensley and the defendant, Hollifield\u2019s neighbor, were at the residence of Morris Rad-ford, next door to Hollifield, shooting pool and drinking beer. There was evidence that defendant left the Radford residence between 2:00 and 2:30 a.m., saying he was going home to bed, and that Hensley left at 4:00 a.m. However, a witness for the State testified she saw a car leave defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s house at approximately 3:30 a.m. The car went to a point in the general neighborhood where the motor was cut off and started up again approximately half an hour later. The car then returned to the Riddle residence.\nTwo photographic line-ups were conducted. Hollifield failed to identify defendant in the first group of pictures; but did identify him from a later photographic line-up, at which time defendant\u2019s photograph had been added.\nOn 6 August 1982 officers of the McDowell County Sheriffs Department were \u201con the lookout\u201d for defendant throughout the county and saw the defendant riding with a Miss Nesbitt in Marion. The officer pulled the Nesbitt car over and advised the defendant that \u201cwe needed to talk to him.\u201d The officers followed defendant to the courthouse where Officer Cline interviewed him, asking questions concerning defendant\u2019s height, weight and employment. Thereafter, Officer Cline advised defendant of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and defendant declined to make any statement.\nHollifield identified the defendant sitting in the courtroom as the intruder. Defendant did not take the witness stand in his defense, but offered evidence through other witnesses tending to show alibi.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten by Assistant Attorney General Guy A. Hamlin for the State.\nGoldsmith and Goldsmith, by C. Frank Goldsmith, Jr. for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0060-01", "first_page_order": 92, "last_page_order": 98 }