{ "id": 8523173, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PEGGY ANN HAIGHT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Haight", "decision_date": "1984-01-17", "docket_number": "No. 8312SC354", "first_page": "104", "last_page": "109", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "66 N.C. App. 104" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "303 S.E. 2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 736", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4710863 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0736-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E. 2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E. 2d 356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566881, 8566947, 8566987, 8566843, 8566911 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0401-02", "/nc/302/0401-04", "/nc/302/0401-05", "/nc/302/0401-01", "/nc/302/0401-03" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E. 2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 N.C. App. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2673595 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/50/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 S.E. 2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568225, 8568386, 8568195, 8568275, 8568159 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0419-03", "/nc/286/0419-05", "/nc/286/0419-02", "/nc/286/0419-04", "/nc/286/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 S.E. 2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 N.C. App. 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549776 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/24/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E. 2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560498 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 S.E. 2d 89", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 N.C. App. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520671 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/56/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E. 2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560587 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66-67, fn. 1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 L.Ed. 2d 126", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 S.Ct. 195", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "444 U.S. 890", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11378056, 11377949, 11377893, 11378007 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/0890-04", "/us/444/0890-02", "/us/444/0890-01", "/us/444/0890-03" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182418 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E. 730", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1930, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 N.C. 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8603127 ], "year": 1930, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/199/0429-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 697, "char_count": 13891, "ocr_confidence": 0.82, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.454307742971023e-08, "percentile": 0.39806143138074845 }, "sha256": "7e4acf4b4850ec2d94e4a742c1ca878828209007c2d31cca32c2258d590aa580", "simhash": "1:839bfedf228c4cb9", "word_count": 2383 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:19.573584+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Arnold and Hill concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PEGGY ANN HAIGHT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRASWELL, Judge.\nA single shot fired from a .410-gauge shotgun held in the hands of the defendant brought death to Winston McKenzie. The shooting occurred outside the Tee Pee Lounge on Gillespie Street in Fayetteville after it was closed for business, about 1:00 a.m. on 22 April 1982. From her conviction of voluntary manslaughter defendant appeals.\nSince defendant admitted the shooting her brief states that the issue at trial was not who did it, but rather why it happened. She contended she acted in self-defense. The issues raised in the appeal question the sufficiency of the evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and asks whether it was \u201cplain error\u201d for the judge to instruct the jury to consider whether the defendant was the aggressor and to consider whether McKenzie was in fact armed. We find no reversible error.\nOn the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction of voluntary manslaughter the scope of our review is established by State v. Johnson, 199 N.C. 429, 431, 154 S.E. 730, 731 (1930):\nThe general rule is that, if there be any evidence tending to prove the fact in issue, or which reasonably conduces to its conclusion as a fairly logical and legitimate deduction, and not merely such as raises a suspicion or conjecture in regard to it, the case should be submitted to the jury.\nThis case must be analyzed in conjunction with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed. 2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed. 2d 126 (1979), and other modern cases. State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 66-67, fn. 1, 296 S.E. 2d 649, 652 (1982). In approaching this task \u201call of the evidence favorable to the State, whether competent or incompetent, must be deemed true; discrepancies and contradictions therein are disregarded, and the State is entitled to every favorable inference of fact reasonably deduced from the evidence.\u201d State v. Hageman, 56 N.C. App. 274, 281, 289 S.E. 2d 89, 94, affirmed, 307 N.C. 1, 296 S.E. 2d 433 (1982).\nAs we look to the evidence we find it is undisputed that the defendant fired the shot from her .410-gauge shotgun, a deadly weapon, which killed McKenzie. The shot to the chest perforated the vena cava and the right lung, leading to death from bleeding and shock. To Officer Tiernan she said, \u201cI shot him.\u201d The shot pattern indicated to an S.B.I. firearms expert that the .410-gauge shotgun was fired from a distance of three to eight feet from the victim.\nAmong the possible verdicts submitted to the jury were guilty of second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. Malice is an element of second-degree murder. It is the law that when a defendant admits, or when the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a killing is done with a deadly weapon, that a jury may infer that such killing was both unlawful and done with malice. The State\u2019s evidence did not reveal the issue of self-defense or heat of passion. The State\u2019s evidence was fully sufficient to take the case to the jury on second-degree murder.\nIt was through the defendant\u2019s evidence that the offense is shown to have been mitigated to voluntary manslaughter, which offense does not require malice, but which may be evidenced by a showing that the defendant acted in the heat of passion upon adequate provocation. In addition, \u201c[voluntary manslaughter is . . . committed if the defendant kills in self-defense but uses excessive force under the circumstances or was the aggressor without murderous intent in bringing on the fight in which the killing took place.\u201d N.C.P.I. Crim. 206.10, p. 8 (Replacement June 1983).\nThe sufficiency of the evidence for voluntary manslaughter is demonstrated through the testimony of three eyewitnesses offered by the defendant, and by the defendant herself, all taken in conjunction with the State\u2019s evidence.\nDefendant was the sole proprietor of the Tee Pee Lounge. McKenzie came as a customer about 9:00 p.m. Donna Nobles, another customer, bought McKenzie two beers, and when she refused to buy him a third, was called a \u201cfat bitch.\u201d Things then got rowdy. Twice defendant called McKenzie down for harassing other customers. As defendant got concerned that McKenzie might cause more trouble, she called her close friend William McLaughlin to come and help her close early.\nMcLaughlin arrived about 1:00 a.m., and he and defendant closed the business. As McLaughlin was locking the front door, McKenzie grabbed Donna Nobles by the shoulders and shook her, saying words to the effect that she should tell her friends, \u201cyou been shook by a nigger.\u201d Nobles then got into the back seat of McLaughlin\u2019s automobile, parked a few feet from the front door of the Lounge.\nMcKenzie turned his verbal abuse to the defendant and was moving toward her as she and McLaughlin started to the car. Defendant was carrying her shotgun. McLaughlin was carrying the daily receipts and a paper bag with some beer. McKenzie referred to the shotgun as a \u201cpea shooter,\u201d and commented \u201c[t]hat ain\u2019t shit. I\u2019ll take it and ram it up your ass.\u201d He also crudely proposed to have sexual intercourse with the defendant\u2019s \u201cgray-headed mammy.\u201d He was calling her \u201call kinds of bitches and things.\u201d\nIn the face of this background defendant started to swing her shotgun toward McKenzie. The gun hit McLaughlin on the leg, and he \u201cgrabbed a\u2019hold of it.\u201d McLaughlin guessed she was going to shoot McKenzie \u201cbecause he was calling her all kinds of bitches and things, you know.\u201d McLaughlin pointed the gun at McKenzie and told him to \u201c[l]et\u2019s let things cool down and you go on home and we\u2019ll go on home.\u201d McKenzie pushed the gun away, told McLaughlin he was afraid to shoot and \u201cdidn\u2019t have nerve enough,\u201d calling McLaughlin\u2019s bluff. McLaughlin put the gun in the car and started to walk around the back of the car and get into it. The defendant who, in the meanwhile had entered the front seat of the car, picked up the gun, stood up with one foot on the ground, raised the gun up and shot, hitting McKenzie in the chest. After the shooting, McKenzie, although mortally wounded, chased the defendant as she ran backwards. He caught her about the center of the street and began to beat defendant with his hands and fists, and then fell down and died.\nThe defendant explained that McKenzie was wearing a jacket that covered his belt. As he came toward the car he stuck his hand down in his shirt. Defendant, thinking he was reaching for a weapon, was afraid that the victim was going to harm her seriously and that in order to stop him she had to shoot him. No weapon was found afterwards.\nFrom all the evidence we hold that it was reasonable for the jury to infer that the defendant killed McKenzie with a .410-gauge shotgun, a deadly weapon; that at the moment of pulling the trigger she acted in the heat of passion engendered by the victim\u2019s words and threatening behavior; and that she then felt anger, rage, or furious resentment which rendered her mind incapable of cool reflection. Her fear of a threatened assault also provided the basis for heat of passion action upon adequate provocation, which negated the malice of second-degree murder and supported the first theory of voluntary manslaughter. See State v. Pope, 24 N.C. App. 217, 222, 210 S.E. 2d 267, 271 (1974), cert. denied, 286 N.C. 419, 211 S.E. 2d 799 (1975); State v. Spicer, 50 N.C. App. 214, 273 S.E. 2d 521, appeal dismissed, 302 N.C. 401, 279 S.E. 2d 356 (1981).\nThe second theory of voluntary manslaughter, that the defendant was the aggressor without murderous intent, is supported by the fact that the defendant had already gotten into McLaughlin\u2019s automobile for the purpose of leaving the scene, that no overt act was being committed against her at the moment she picked up the gun in the car, that she had to partially step out of the car to shoot, and that she shot at close range. The victim was also unarmed. Proper instructions on self-defense were given, and it was for the jury to decide if she became the aggressor. Likewise, on the third theory of voluntary manslaughter, the defendant\u2019s use of excessive force, also became a question for the jury to decide. As an issue of fact, only the jury could properly determine the reasonableness of the force used. Under any of the three theories, the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter.\nAs to the second issue presented for review, we hold that the trial court\u2019s instructions to the jury to consider whether the defendant was the aggressor and to consider whether McKenzie was in fact armed were not \u201cplain error.\u201d In fact, it was not any brand of error because the evidence supported the charge. Furthermore, we note that after the jury had been charged, but before their deliberations or verdict, the trial judge immediately stated outside the presence of the jury:\nCOURT: Gentlemen, you may now state your objections to errors, omissions, and misstatements, or raise any other matter concerning the instructions that you desire. Mr. Richardson.\nMr. RICHARDSON: Your Honor, the State is content.\nCOURT: Mr. Brady. [The trial counsel, there being different counsel on appeal.]\nMr. BRADY: We have no objections, your Honor, at all [Emphasis added.]\nThe brief makes plain that the objection to the instruction concerning the aggressor is bottomed on an allegation of the insufficiency of the evidence. We merely point to the recital of the evidence earlier to demonstrate a sufficiency of facts to support the charge. In giving this instruction the judge was properly applying the law to the evidence. We observe that in neither State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 300 S.E. 2d 375 (1983), which opinion created the \u201cplain error\u201d rule as to Rule 10(b)(2), N.C. Rules of App. Proc., nor State v. Black, 308 N.C. 736, 303 S.E. 2d 804 (1983), which extended the \u201cplain error\u201d rule to encompass Rule 10(b)(1), N.C. Rules of App. Proc., did the Supreme Court find \u201cplain error\u201d to exist.\nThe challenge to the instruction that the jury was to consider whether the victim had a weapon is without merit. Although the evidence shows no weapon was found on or belonging to the victim, the defendant and another witness had testified to seeing McKenzie stick his hands down in his shirt. This fact inferentially caused the defendant to reasonably apprehend and fear an assault upon her. The instruction as given sufficiently covered the doctrine of apparent necessity in the overall instructions on self-defense. As further stated in Odom, supra, at 660-61, 300 S.E. 2d at 378, \u201c[i]t is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court.\u201d\nNo error.\nJudges Arnold and Hill concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRASWELL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten by Assistant Attorney General Luden Capone, III for the State.", "Appellate Defender Adam Stein by Assistant Appellate Defender James H. Gold for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PEGGY ANN HAIGHT\nNo. 8312SC354\n(Filed 17 January 1984)\n1. Homicide 8 21.9\u2014 voluntary manslaughter \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court properly submitted the issue of voluntary manslaughter to the jury where the evidence tended to show that defendant was the sole proprietor of a bar in which the victim was a customer; that the victim got rowdy and defendant called a friend to come and help her close early; that as the bar was being closed, the victim started shouting at defendant and other patrons; that defendant started to swing her shotgun towards the victim, and it hit a friend on the leg and her friend \u201cgrabbed a hold of it\u201d; that her friend pointed the gun at the victim and told him to let things cool down; that her friend put the gun in the car and started to walk around the back of the car to get into it; that defendant who, in the meanwhile had entered the front seat of the car, picked up the gun, stood up with one foot on the ground, raised the gun up and shot, hitting the victim in the chest; that the victim, although mortally wounded, chased the defendant as she ran backwards, caught her about the center of the street and began to beat defendant with his hands and fists until he fell down and died; and that defendant testified that the victim was wearing a jacket that covered his belt, and as he came toward the car he stuck his hand down in the shirt and defendant thought he was reaching for a weapon. From all the evidence it was reasonable for the jury to infer that the defendant killed the victim with a deadly weapon; that at the moment of pulling the trigger she acted in the heat of passion engendered by the victim\u2019s words and threatening behavior; and that she felt anger, rage, or furious resentment which rendered her mind incapable of cool reflection. The second theory of voluntary manslaughter, that the defendant was the aggressor without murderous intent, was supported by the fact that defendant had already gotten into her friend\u2019s automobile for the purpose of leaving the scene, that no overt act was being committed against her at the moment she picked up the gun in the car, that she had to partially step out of the car, and that she shot at close range. The third theory of voluntary manslaughter, the defendant\u2019s use of excessive force, also became a question for the jury to decide.\n2. Homicide 8 28.3\u2014 instructions concerning defendant as aggressor and fact that victim unarmed \u2014no plain error\nThe trial court\u2019s instructions to the jury to consider whether the defendant was the aggressor and to consider whether the victim was in fact armed were not \u201cplain error\u201d since the evidence supported the charge. Further, no objection was made to the charge given.\nAPPEAL by defendant from McLelktnd, Judge. Judgment entered 1 September 1982 in Superior Court, CUMBERLAND County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 November 1983.\nAttorney General Edmisten by Assistant Attorney General Luden Capone, III for the State.\nAppellate Defender Adam Stein by Assistant Appellate Defender James H. Gold for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0104-01", "first_page_order": 136, "last_page_order": 141 }