{ "id": 8523560, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RICHARD RAYMOND SILER, III", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Siler", "decision_date": "1984-01-17", "docket_number": "No. 8321SC512", "first_page": "165", "last_page": "169", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "66 N.C. App. 165" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "214 S.E. 2d 85", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561233 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.E. 2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547", "parenthetical": "original emphasis" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8604316 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159", "parenthetical": "original emphasis" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E. 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1931, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626433 ], "year": 1931, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/201/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570160 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.E. 2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8604316 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0156-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 449, "char_count": 8649, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.791972754097701e-07, "percentile": 0.8360946912348944 }, "sha256": "125f1eab4facd57c484aacc5ed53f4ec4ba1b8a84133d799dc5b91e49c2c0e5d", "simhash": "1:177f7521230bb5ea", "word_count": 1458 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:19.573584+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge VAUGHN concurs.", "Judge Becton dissents." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RICHARD RAYMOND SILER, III" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HILL, Judge.\nThe first question presented in this case is whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses. Defendant asserts as error the trial judge\u2019s refusal to submit to the jury, as a possible lesser included offense, misdemeanor and felonious possession of cocaine pursuant to G.S. 90-95(d)(2).\nThe principle of defendant being entitled to have different permissible verdicts arising on the evidence presented to the jury under proper instructions applies when, and only when, there is evidence of guilt of the different permissible degrees. State v. Griffin, 280 N.C. 142, 185 S.E. 2d 149 (1971); State v. Smith, 201 N.C. 494, 160 S.E. 577 (1931). \u201cThe necessity for instructing the jury as to an included crime of lesser degree than that charged arises when and only when there is evidence from which the jury could find that such included crime of lesser degree was committed. The presence of such evidence is the determinative factor.\u201d State v. Hicks, 241 N.C. 156, 159, 84 S.E. 2d 545, 547 (1954) (original emphasis).\nApplying this rule to the facts of this case, we find that the record is void of any evidence tending to show that defendant may be guilty of a lesser included offense. The evidence is briefly summarized as follows: On 11 May 1982, defendant telephoned an acquaintance, asking, \u201cCan we play eighteen holes of golf this afternoon?\u201d Based on prior communications, the acquaintance interpreted the inquiry as a request for cocaine. He told defendant he would know later that day, and upon calling back, said he could secure eight ounces of cocaine. Defendant requested four additional ounces. Subsequently the two met at a designated place. Defendant used cocaine in the acquaintance\u2019s car, knew about cocaine in the front seat of the car, and knew the purpose of the meeting. Defendant and his acquaintance were arrested and eleven ounces of cocaine were seized from the car. The only evidence as to the amount of cocaine possessed by defendant is to the effect that defendant possessed cocaine in excess of 28 grams. There is not a scintilla of evidence from which the jury could conclude that defendant possessed cocaine in an amount less than 28 grams. Hence, the court properly refused to instruct the jury with reference to G.S. 90-95(d)(2).\nDefendant next submits that the court should have granted his motion to dismiss. This assignment of error challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the State, which viewed in a light most favorable to the State shows that defendant arranged to purchase between eight and twelve ounces of cocaine. He was in the process of doing exactly that when he was arrested. The evidence is clearly sufficient to support a guilty verdict. This assignment of error is without merit.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecuting witness to interpret conversations he had with the defendant. Defendant asserts such testimony was inadmissible in that it invaded the jury\u2019s province as fact-finder. We disagree.\nThe testimony elicited from the witness merely explained that a code was used by the witness and the defendant in discussing cocaine over the telephone. The trial judge allowed the witness to relate what the conversations meant to him. Without such testimony the jury would not have understood the significance of the conversations. When the jury is not as well qualified as the witness to draw inferences and conclusions from the facts, opinion testimony is admissible. E.g., State v. Watson, 287 N.C. 147, 214 S.E. 2d 85 (1975); see also 1 Stansbury\u2019s North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 124 (Brandis Rev. 1973). This assignment of error is overruled.\nWe have carefully examined defendant\u2019s other contentions and find no basis for reversal. The defendant has received a fair and impartial trial, free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nChief Judge VAUGHN concurs.\nJudge Becton dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "HILL, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Becton\ndissenting.\nI disagree with the majority\u2019s statements that \u201cthe record is void of any evidence tending to show that defendant may be guilty of a lesser included offense\u201d and that \u201c[t]here is not a scintilla of evidence from which the jury could conclude that defendant possessed cocaine in an amount less than 28 grams.\u201d Ante p. 2. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.\nAll of the approximately 11 ounces of cocaine involved in this case was found in a car driven by co-defendant, Luke Caudle. No cocaine was found in the car in which defendant Siler had been a passenger. The only testimony regarding defendant\u2019s knowledge and intent to traffic in cocaine was the testimony of the State\u2019s witness, co-defendant Luke Caudle.\nThe following facts are undisputed. Approximately four ounces of cocaine was found under the driver\u2019s seat, the remainder of the cocaine was found in the trunk of Caudle\u2019s car. Of the approximately four ounces found under the driver\u2019s seat, over three ounces was found in a blue bank bag, and the remainder was found in a small separate plastic baggie. Defendant, himself, testified that after he got in Caudle\u2019s car, he snorted cocaine that Caudle gave him from the small plastic baggie.\nSignificantly, defendant testified that he knew nothing about the cocaine in the blue bank bag under the driver\u2019s seat nor the cocaine in the trunk of the car. He testified that the cocaine he snorted was the only cocaine he knew about. There was no evidence offered as to the amount of cocaine in the small bag; indeed, the substance in the small bag was not analyzed.\nLike the majority, I find Caudle\u2019s testimony clearly sufficient to support the charges of trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. However, I cannot, as the majority must have done, and as a jury is free to do, reject as untrue, defendant\u2019s testimony that he only knew about the small amount of cocaine in the plastic baggie. As significant as the fact that the State had the burden of proving the nature of the substance and its weight is the testimony of Caudle suggesting that the small amount of cocaine in the plastic baggie was for his personal use, not for \u201ctrafficking.\u201d\nThe evidence, in my view, supports the submission to the jury of the lesser included charges of felony possession of cocaine or misdemeanor possession of cocaine. When there is evidence from which the jury can find that a crime of a lesser degree has been committed, then the trial court must instruct the jury as to the lesser included crime or crimes. State v. Hicks, 241 N.C. 156, 84 S.E. 2d 545 (1954). Defendant presented evidence that the only cocaine he was aware of was the small amount in the plastic baggie and that he knew nothing of the approximately 11 ounces found elsewhere in Caudle\u2019s car. \u201cThe presence of such evidence is the determinative factor,\u201d and compels this dissent. Id. at 159, 84 S.E. 2d at 547. I vote for a\nNew trial.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge Becton" } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten by Special Deputy Attorney General John R. B. Matthis and Assistant Attorney General Philip A. Telfer for the State.", "Bruce C. Fraser for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RICHARD RAYMOND SILER, III\nNo. 8321SC512\n(Filed 17 January 1984)\n1. Narcotics 8 4.7\u2014 failure to instruct on lesser offenses proper\nIn a prosecution for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and trafficking in cocaine in violation of G.S. 90-95(h)(3)(b), the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury with reference to possession of cocaine in violation of G.S. 90-95(b)(2) since the only evidence as to the amount of cocaine possessed by defendant was to the effect that defendant possessed cocaine in excess of 28 grams.\n2. Narcotics 8 4\u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nIn a prosecution for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and trafficking in cocaine in violation of G.S. 90-95(h)(3)(b), the evidence was sufficient to be sent to the jury where the evidence tended to show that defendant arranged to purchase between eight and twelve ounces of cocaine, and he was in the process of doing exactly that when he was arrested.\n3. Narcotics \u00a7 3.1\u2014 competency of evidence\nThe trial court properly allowed a witness to explain that a code was used by the witness and defendant in discussing cocaine over the telephone.\nJudge Becton dissenting.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Rousseau, Judge. Judgment entered 9 December 1982 in Superior Court, Forsyth County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 December 1983.\nDefendant was charged with and convicted of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and trafficking in cocaine in violation of G.S. 90-95(h)(3)(b). He appeals from judgments entered on the verdicts of the jury. Facts necessary for the decision will be set out in the opinion.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten by Special Deputy Attorney General John R. B. Matthis and Assistant Attorney General Philip A. Telfer for the State.\nBruce C. Fraser for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0165-01", "first_page_order": 197, "last_page_order": 201 }