{ "id": 8524508, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JERRY BEASLEY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Beasley", "decision_date": "1984-02-07", "docket_number": "No. 8319SC548", "first_page": "288", "last_page": "293", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "66 N.C. App. 288" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565770 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E. 2d 195", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 N.C. App. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550858 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/31/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 S.E. 2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563764 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E. 2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571511 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0612-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 483, "char_count": 9458, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20553534202187076 }, "sha256": "87ba9ba1692a8d9ab21925cd1f86f12014d6571e7e8bd16f6239c34cd8ed397c", "simhash": "1:7f2a514f5719849c", "word_count": 1580 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:19.573584+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge VAUGHN and Judge BECTON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JERRY BEASLEY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HILL, Judge.\nDefendant contends that he should have been convicted of driving without a proper driver\u2019s license instead of driving while his license was permanently revoked, relying on Ennis v. Garrett, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 279 N.C. 612, 184 S.E. 2d 246 (1971). We do not agree and affirm the decision of the trial court.\nDefendant\u2019s reliance on Ennis is misplaced. In that case defendant was convicted for driving under the influence for a period-of one year effective 2 January 1970. He would have been eligible for reinstatement of his driving privilege on 2 January 1971. On 6 March 1971 he was charged with driving while his license was revoked and driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He was found guilty on 19 March 1971 of careless and reckless driving and of driving without a valid operator\u2019s license. He had not applied for reinstatement of his driving privilege or paid the restoration fee of $10.00 as of 6 March 1971. Justice Lake, in affirming the lower court ruling that the order revoking the driving privilege of the petitioner was in excess of the Commissioner\u2019s authority, stated the following:\nWhen the period of revocation stated in the order of revocation terminates, the license is no longer \u201cin a state of suspension or revocation\u201d within the meaning of G.S. 20-28.1 (a). This does not mean that the former holder of the license may immediately resume driving. Before he may do so the fee required by G.S. 20-7(il) must be paid. In the interim, he is simply a person without a valid operator\u2019s or chauffeur\u2019s license.\n279 N.C. at 615-16, 184 S.E. 2d at 248.\nIn the case under review, defendant\u2019s license was permanently revoked, and there was no termination of the revocation as of 24 September 1982 when the defendant was arrested. Before entitlement to his license, defendant must have shown that prior to 24 September 1982 he had exhibited satisfactory proof that he had not been convicted within the past three years of a violation of the motor vehicle laws, liquor laws or drug laws of this or any other state and that he was not an excessive user of alcohol or drugs. This he has failed to do. Defendant has shown nothing entitling him to a restoration as of the date of his offense. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next argues the court erred in charging the jury that the defendant himself had shown personally that his license was revoked on the date in question and upon request by defendant\u2019s counsel to correct the error, did not properly do so. The three instances referred to are as follows:\nThe Court will instruct you that the parties by their evidence have indicated that the license were (sic), in fact, on that date permanently revoked.\n* * *\nAs to this point, again I\u2019ll instruct you and originally instruct you that the Defendant has indicated by evidence solicited in this trial that his license were (sic) revoked on that date.\n* * *\nSome of the evidence for the defendant tends to show that on September the 24th, 1982, Jerry Beasley and his now wife, Dora Beasley, had purchased an automobile; that at this time Jerry Beasley\u2019s license were (sic) in a state of revocation and they had been revoked since 1973.\nThe Court made an attempt to correct the impression that the defendant\u2019s evidence admitted that his license was in a permanent state of revocation by recalling the jury and issuing the following additional instruction:\nLadies and gentlemen of the jury, as an additional instruction to you, prior to the recess and during my instructions to you, I informed you concerning the defendant\u2019s revocation or I made some statements concerning the defendant\u2019s status of his license. The Court was not intending to indicate to you that the defendant had admitted knowledge of permanent revocation of his license.\nBased on our reasoning under the first assignment of error, it is only logical that the sum of the evidence offered by the parties substantiated that defendant\u2019s license was permanently revoked.\nAs to the second and third portions to which defendant objects, reference to defendant\u2019s evidence is a lapsus lingui which when taken in connection with the entire charge becomes harmless. The abortive effort by the trial judge to correct his prior mistakes partially clears the matter by showing the Court did not intend to indicate to the jury that the defendant admitted knowledge of permanent revocation of his license. A trial judge\u2019s instructions must be read contextually as a whole, and isolated erroneous portions will not be considered prejudicial error on appeal when the instruction read as a whole is correct. See State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 205, 176 S.E. 2d 765 (1970); State v. McCall, 31 N.C. App. 543, 230 S.E. 2d 195 (1976). When construed as a whole, the charge is adequate, and this assignment of error is overruled.\nWe find no error in allowing the arresting officer in this case to testify to a statement made by the defendant after his arrest and before having been given his Miranda rights. Nothing in the record indicates the officer asked anything more than defendant\u2019s name, address and date of birth for the purpose of running a check to see if he had a driver\u2019s license. The defendant on his own, as substantiated by the voir dire and later at trial, asked questions which the police officer answered. Statements volunteered by the defendant which are not responses to questions are not subject to limitations placed thereon by Miranda. State v. Fletcher, 279 N.C. 85, 181 S.E. 2d 405 (1971). This assignment of error is overruled.\nLastly, defendant argues the judge erred in instructing the jury that the Old Thomasville Highway and Bethel Road in Randolph County were highways. Operation of a motor vehicle on a public highway is one of the elements of the crime covered by G.S. 20-28(b). By failing to object to the charge prior to the retiring of the jury and before the verdict, defendant failed to adhere to the dictates of Appellate Rule 10(b)(2). Nevertheless, having reviewed this instruction, we hold that the challenged jury charge in the instant case was not \u201cplain error\u201d such as to require a new trial.\nDefendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nChief Judge VAUGHN and Judge BECTON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HILL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten by Special Deputy Attorney General Lester V Chalmers, Jr. for the State.", "Richard M. Warren for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JERRY BEASLEY\nNo. 8319SC548\n(Filed 7 February 1984)\n1. Automobiles and Other Vehicles \u00a7 3.4\u2014 driving while license permanently revoked \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nDefendant could properly be convicted of driving while his license was permanently revoked rather than merely driving without a proper license where defendant\u2019s license was permanently revoked in 1973; defendant was notified that he could request a hearing for restoration of his license three years from the date of revocation; defendant was arrested for driving while his license was permanently revoked on 24 September 1982; defendant received a letter from the Division of Motor Vehicles dated 4 October 1982 which informed him that his license would be restored on 5 October 1982; and defendant failed to show that he was entitled to a restoration of his license as of the date of the offense.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 168.5\u2014 harmless error in instructions\nThe trial court\u2019s instructions that defendant\u2019s evidence had shown that his license was in a permanent state of revocation on the date in question was harmless error when the charge is construed as a whole.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 75.7\u2014 statements not result of custodial interrogation\nStatements volunteered by defendant which were not responses to questions were not subject to the limitations of Miranda v. Arizona.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 163\u2014 instruction not \u201cplain error\u201d\nIn a prosecution of defendant for driving while his license was permanently revoked, an instruction by the trial court that Old Thomasville Highway and Bethel Road in Randolph County were highways did not constitute \u201cplain error\u201d such as to require a new trial even though defendant failed to object thereto at the trial.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Beaty, Judge. Judgment entered 25 January 1983 in Superior Court of RANDOLPH County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 January 1984.\nDefendant\u2019s driving license had been revoked because of a third conviction for Driving While Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor or Drugs. On 25 June 1973 defendant received notice advising him that \u201cafter three (3) years from the effective date of the revocation you may request a hearing. If you can prove good behavior for the three years prior to the hearing, you may be eligible to apply for a new Driver\u2019s License.\u201d\nOn 24 September 1982 defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while his license was permanently revoked, approximately nine years and three months after the revocation of his driver\u2019s license. He offered into evidence a letter from the Division of Motor Vehicles dated 4 October 1982, which provided his license would be restored on 5 October 1982. There were no express conditions to the restoration of his license other than (a) payment of a restoration fee of $25.00, and (b) furnishing a birth certificate or two other forms of identification.\nDefendant was convicted of driving a motor vehicle while his operator\u2019s license was permanently revoked. An active sentence of twelve months was imposed, and defendant appeals.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten by Special Deputy Attorney General Lester V Chalmers, Jr. for the State.\nRichard M. Warren for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0288-01", "first_page_order": 320, "last_page_order": 325 }