{
  "id": 8525349,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CABARRUS LYNDALE BRUTON",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Bruton",
  "decision_date": "1984-02-07",
  "docket_number": "No. 838SC732",
  "first_page": "449",
  "last_page": "452",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "66 N.C. App. 449"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "307 S.E. 2d 156",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1983,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "309 N.C. 421",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        4766681
      ],
      "year": 1983,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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        "/nc/309/0421-01"
      ]
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:19.573584+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Arnold and Whichard concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CABARRUS LYNDALE BRUTON"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BECTON, Judge.\nDefendant appeals from a judgment imposing a ten-year sentence following his conviction of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. Defendant\u2019s principal assignments of error concern the trial court\u2019s response to a prospective juror\u2019s statement during jury selection. Defendant\u2019s other assignments of error concern the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction and the trial court\u2019s consideration of defendant\u2019s prior conviction as an aggravating factor in sentencing defendant. For the reasons that follow, we find no error in the trial.\nr-H\nDefendant s arguments that the trial court committed reversible error (a) in denying the defendant\u2019s motion for mistrial made during the trial court\u2019s voir dire because of jury misconduct, and (b) because the trial court\u2019s curative instructions contained opinions of fact prejudicial to the defendant, are closely related and are, therefore, treated together.\nA. The transcript of the voir dire shows the following exchange between the trial judge and the members of the jury panel.\nDo any of you know the defendant, you twelve now in the box know the defendant, Cabarrus Lyndale Bruton?\nJUROR: Yes, sir.\nCOURT: How?\nJUROR: He is my sister\u2019s grandson.\nCOURT: Would that fact that he is related to you by blood or marriage cause you any embarrassment?\nJUROR: Yes, sir.\nCOURT: I\u2019ll let you step aside. Anyone else?\nJUROR Number 3: He was the driver of a motor vehicle in a collision in which two of my relatives were killed.\nCOURT: Would the fact that you know him cause you any embarrassment to sit on the jury or keep you in any way from being fair and impartial to him?\nJuror Number 3: Yes.\nCOURT: I\u2019ll let you step aside.\nThe response by juror number 3 does not constitute \u201cmisconduct of a juror\u201d that warrants a mistrial. Rather, as the State suggests in its brief, prospective juror number 3 was responding in an orderly manner to the trial judge\u2019s voir dire questions \u201cand did not make an accusatory impromptu outburst villifying the defendant.\u201d We find it significant that the prospective juror\u2019s statement does not even suggest that defendant was charged or convicted of a criminal offense. It does not even suggest that defendant was negligent, guilty of misconduct, or in any way responsible for the accident. Not all statements or remarks made by individual prospective jurors in the presence of the jury panel constitute grounds for a challenge to the panel. 50 C.J.S. Juries \u00a7 262 (1947 & Supp. 1983).\nAs a further ground for our holding, we point out that the defendant had the burden of establishing that he was prejudiced in some way. The record does not show that the defendant was denied an opportunity to explore any possible prejudice. The record does not show that defendant used his peremptory challenges or that he challenged any jurors for cause. Simply put, the defendant has not established misconduct on the part of juror number 3, or that the statement made by juror number 3 prejudiced him in any way.\nB. Defendant also argues that the trial court\u2019s curative instructions impressed \u201cupon the panel that the fact that the defendant had been involved in a motor vehicle collision in which someone was killed, . . . expressed [the trial court\u2019s] opinion on a statement, the truth of which had not been proven.\u201d In our view, the trial court\u2019s instructions were entirely correct and lead to but one conclusion \u2014 mere involvement in an automobile accident does not mean wrongful participation, and such previous involvement has no bearing on the case being tried. Even with time to contemplate, we can think of no better statement than that given by the trial judge in this case. The instructions as given follow:\nNow ladies and gentlemen, let me say to you specifically you\u2019ve heard the answer that the lady gave about this defendant having been involved in a motor vehicle collision. I want to say to you that the fact that he may have been involved in a motor vehicle collision at one time and that somebody was killed, has nothing to do with this case.\nThat is a matter that happened sometime ago and has nothing to do with this case. The fact that he has been involved in such an accident is a matter that should not affect your thinking in this case.\nI\u2019ve been involved in a motor vehicle collision in which someone has been killed. I\u2019ve been the driver of a car that\u2019s been involved in a motor vehicle collision in which someone has been killed, and that does not have anything to do with this case or with my ability to sit on this case in any way, and so I specifically instruct you that that should not be of concern to you anyway. The fact that a person has been involved in an accident has nothing to do with this case in the world.\nNow, is there anybody sitting there right now that is going to hold anything against this defendant in any way because he was involved in a motor vehicle in which someone was killed. The fact that he was involved does not mean that anything was wrong and you should not be prejudiced by that. Is there anyone that will be?\nC. Because of our holding in parts I-A and I-B, supra, it is not necessary to discuss defendant\u2019s further assignments of error that the trial court committed reversible error in denying defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief based on juror misconduct and the trial court\u2019s curative instructions.\nII\nDefense counsel candidly admits that he \u201ccannot find any valid basis, factual or legal, upon which to support\u201d his argument that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. \u201c[I]n light of the ten-year sentence imposed upon [defendant, he asks] this Court carefully [to] review the evidence to determine if it is, in fact, sufficient to sustain the defendant\u2019s conviction.\u201d We have, and we agree with defense counsel. Rodney Meadows\u2019 testimony, as corroborated by Detective Louis Koonce, Jr., clearly shows that the defendant shot Rodney Meadows. The evidence was therefore sufficient to be submitted to the jury.\nIII\nOn the basis of State v. Thompson, 309 N.C. 421, 307 S.E. 2d 156 (1983), we reject defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court committed reversible error in considering defendant\u2019s prior conviction as an aggravating factor at the sentencing hearing.\nIn the trial of this case, we find\nNo error.\nJudges Arnold and Whichard concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BECTON, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten, by Special Deputy Attorney General Charles J. Murray, for the State.",
      "Joretta Durant for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CABARRUS LYNDALE BRUTON\nNo. 838SC732\n(Filed 7 February 1984)\nCriminal Law 8 101.1\u2014 statement by prospective juror \u2014 mistrial not warranted\nA prospective juror\u2019s statement, made in response to a voir dire question by the trial court as to whether any of the prospective jurors knew defendant, that defendant was the driver of a motor vehicle in a collision in which two of the juror\u2019s relatives were killed did not constitute misconduct of a juror warranting a mistrial in a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. Furthermore, the trial court\u2019s instructions to the effect that the fact that defendant may have been involved in a motor vehicle collision in which someone was killed had nothing to do with this case did not contain opinions of fact prejudicial to the defendant.\nAppeal by defendant from Winberry, Judge. Judgment entered 10 March 1983 in Superior Court, LENOIR County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 January 1984.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Special Deputy Attorney General Charles J. Murray, for the State.\nJoretta Durant for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0449-01",
  "first_page_order": 481,
  "last_page_order": 484
}