{ "id": 8526778, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES LEE WILLIAMS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Williams", "decision_date": "1984-04-03", "docket_number": "No. 8326SC839", "first_page": "519", "last_page": "523", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "67 N.C. App. 519" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "300 S.E. 2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 F. 2d 1013", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2240187 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1016" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/428/1013-01" ] }, { "cite": "617 F. 2d 1131", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1386678 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1134", "parenthetical": "two day delay not ground for suppression of evidence where no indication defendant attempted to withdraw his consent prior to search or that he was in any way prejudiced by the delay" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/617/1131-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 A. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7944812 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221", "parenthetical": "twenty hour delay while officers conducted other investigation permissible" }, { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/441/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 P. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181", "parenthetical": "consent executed on 9 August, not limited to a particular time, sufficient to support search on 11 August" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Colo. App. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo. App.", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189", "parenthetical": "consent executed on 9 August, not limited to a particular time, sufficient to support search on 11 August" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 S.E. 2d 728", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563894 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 U.S. 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172008 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" }, { "page": "858" }, { "page": "2043-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/412/0218-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 462, "char_count": 9559, "ocr_confidence": 0.813, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1558453290826105e-07, "percentile": 0.5828940220066884 }, "sha256": "0bd7b0441b3b2839da078175751763f6984a29481cc417ac6b6f288bc7a10ceb", "simhash": "1:bc65f1a961e69d68", "word_count": 1563 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:10:21.361774+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge VAUGHN and Judge Phillips concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES LEE WILLIAMS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Judge.\nDefendant contends the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his automobile. He concedes that he voluntarily executed a consent to search, and that \u201ca law-enforcement officer may conduct a search and make seizures, without a search warrant or other authorization, if consent to the search is given.\u201d G.S. 15A-221(a); see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 36 L.Ed. 2d 854, 858, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043-44 (1973); State v. Long, 293 N.C. 286, 293, 237 S.E. 2d 728, 732 (1977). He relies, however, on G.S. 15A-223(a), which provides that a search by consent \u201cmay not exceed, in duration or physical scope, the limits of the consent given.\u201d\nDefendant executed the consent to search at 8:47 p.m. on 12 July 1982. The search was conducted at 7:30 p.m. on 13 July 1982. Defendant argues that the twenty-three hour interval between the consent and the search exceeded the duration of the consent.\nThe temporal scope of a consent to search is a question of fact to be determined in light of all the circumstances. People v. Trujillo, 40 Colo. App. 186, 189, 576 P. 2d 179, 181 (1977) (consent executed on 9 August, not limited to a particular time, sufficient to support search on 11 August). \u201cA brief \u2018lapse of time between the consent and the search does not require a reaffirmation of the consent as a condition precedent to a lawful search.\u2019 \u201d Gray v. State, 441 A. 2d 209, 221 (Del. 1981) (twenty hour delay while officers conducted other investigation permissible). \u201cThe length of time a consent lasts depends upon the reasonableness of the lapse of time between the consent and the search in relation to the scope and breadth of the consent given.\u201d Gray, supra, 441 A. 2d at 221; see also United States v. White, 617 F. 2d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 1980) (two day delay not ground for suppression of evidence where no indication defendant attempted to withdraw his consent prior to search or that he was in any way prejudiced by the delay).\nWhere there is delay in executing a warrant for search, \u201cevidence should be excluded only if the delay resulted in legal prejudice to the complaining party.\u201d United States v. Bradley, 428 F. 2d 1013, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970). The same should apply where there is delay in conducting a search by consent.\nThe written consent to search here contained no limitations on the time for search. There is no evidence that defendant attempted to withdraw his consent prior to the search or that he attempted, verbally or in writing, to limit its duration. During much of the time lapse, the officers who conducted the search were engaged in other investigation regarding the crime. This consisted of a consensual search of defendant\u2019s apartment and the surrounding area, and interviews with defendant. No evidence tends to indicate in any way that the result of the search would have differed if it had been conducted at an earlier time.\nUnder these circumstances we hold that the search was conducted with reasonable expedition, and defendant has shown no prejudice from the brief delay between the consent and the search. We thus reject the contention that the motion to suppress should have been granted because the search exceeded the duration of defendant\u2019s consent.\nThe consent to search authorized \u201ca complete search of [defendant\u2019s] . . . vehicles . . . located at . . . the Mecklenburg County Police Department, Charlotte, N.C.\u201d After defendant executed the consent, and before officers conducted the search, an officer moved the vehicle searched from the premises of the police department to the department\u2019s impound area. Defendant argues that this placed the vehicle outside the physical scope of his consent.\nThe written consent to search contained no limitation on the place. There is no evidence that defendant attempted, verbally or in writing, to restrict the search as to location. The statement in the consent form regarding the vehicle\u2019s location was descriptive of the subject of search rather than proscriptive as to place.\nFurther, the officer who moved the vehicle testified that the reason was to \u201c[p]ut it in a sealed area where [he] could process it later.\u201d He left the vehicle \u201csealed,\u201d and it remained so when he opened it to conduct the search. None of the seals had been \u201ctampered with.\u201d Thus, no evidence tends to indicate in any way that the result of the search would have differed if it had been conducted at the department rather than the impound area.\nUnder these circumstances we hold that removal of the vehicle was reasonable, and defendant has shown no prejudice therefrom. We thus reject the contention that the motion to suppress should have been granted because the search exceeded the physical scope of defendant\u2019s consent.\nDefendant contends the court erred in denying his request that it charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter. When making the request, defense counsel expressed doubt as to \u201cwhether voluntary manslaughter is an appropriate charge,\u201d but made the request for the record. In response to the court\u2019s request for the State\u2019s position, the District Attorney stated: \u201cMy feeling is, Judge, that you have to strengthen the testimony in order for it to justify [a] voluntary manslaughter charge.\u201d The court then suggested reopening the evidence because of the possibility that doing so \u201cmight give rise to a manslaughter charge.\u201d After further discussion defense counsel requested, and the court in its discretion granted, permission to reopen the evidence.\nFollowing additional testimony, defendant did not renew the request; and the court did not charge on voluntary manslaughter. When it completed the charge, the court inquired whether the attorneys desired \u201cany changes, alterations or additions.\u201d Defense counsel replied: \u201cThe defendant is satisfied with the charge, your Honor.\u201d\nDuring deliberations the jury returned to the courtroom to request additional instructions. Upon completing the further instructions, the court again asked, in the jury\u2019s presence, if either the State or defendant had \u201canything further they would like the Court to instruct on.\u201d Defense counsel replied in the negative.\nFollowing the jury\u2019s departure, the court again called for \u201cany additions, deletions or anything with regard to the additional instructions,\u201d and \u201c[a]ny objections to any portion of it.\u201d Defense counsel responded: \u201cNo requests from the defendant.\u201d\nUnder these circumstances defendant cannot assign error to the omission complained of. N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(2). Upon the record as a whole, the omission was not \u201cplain error.\u201d State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 659-62, 300 S.E. 2d 375, 378-79 (1983). This assignment of error is therefore overruled.\nFinally, the court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial.\nNo error.\nChief Judge VAUGHN and Judge Phillips concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General W. Dale Talbert, for the State.", "Larry Thomas Black for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES LEE WILLIAMS\nNo. 8326SC839\n(Filed 3 April 1984)\n1. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 13\u2014 time limit of consent to search\nThe temporal scope of a consent to search is a question of fact to be determined in light of all the circumstances.\n2. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 13\u2014 delay in conducting search by consent\nWhere there is a delay in conducting a search by consent, seized evidence should be excluded only if the delay resulted in legal prejudice to the complaining party.\n3. Searches and Seizures \u00a713\u2014 search not exceeding duration of consent\nA search twenty-three hours after defendant executed a consent to search did not exceed the duration of the consent where the written consent contained no limitations on the time for search; there was no evidence that defendant attempted to withdraw his consent prior to the search or that he attempted to limit its duration; during much of the time lapse, the officers who conducted the search were engaged in other investigation regarding the crime; and there was no evidence indicating that the result of the search would have differed if it had been conducted at an earlier time.\n4. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 13\u2014 search not exceeding physical scope of consent\nWhere defendant executed a consent to search authorizing search of his vehicle \u201clocated at . . . the Mecklenburg County Police Department,\u201d a search of defendant\u2019s automobile after an officer moved the vehicle from the premises of the police department to the department\u2019s impound area did not exceed the physical scope of defendant\u2019s consent since the statement in the consent form regarding the vehicle\u2019s location was descriptive of the subject of search rather than proscriptive as to place; there was no evidence that defendant attempted, verbally or in writing, to restrict the search as to location; and there was no evidence indicating that the result of the search would have differed if it had been conducted at the department rather than the impound area. G.S. 15A-223(a).\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 163\u2014 failure to object to charge \u2014 waiver of objection\nDefendant cannot assign error to the trial court\u2019s failure to charge on voluntary manslaughter where defense counsel on three occasions stated that defendant was satisfied with the charge and had no requests for further instructions. App. Rule 10(b)(2).\nAPPEAL by defendant from Gaines, Judge. Judgment entered 10 March 1983 in Superior Court, MECKLENBURG County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 March 1984.\nDefendant appeals from a judgment of imprisonment entered upon his conviction of second degree murder.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General W. Dale Talbert, for the State.\nLarry Thomas Black for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0519-01", "first_page_order": 551, "last_page_order": 555 }