{ "id": 8527338, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DENNIS LEE CHURCH", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Church", "decision_date": "1984-05-15", "docket_number": "No. 8323SC624", "first_page": "430", "last_page": "436", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "68 N.C. App. 430" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 S.E. 2d 540", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561131 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 L.Ed. 2d 674", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statement made by SBI Agent that he would \"let it be known\" did not show that defendant's statements were obtained by hope or fear" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 S.Ct. 2409", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statement made by SBI Agent that he would \"let it be known\" did not show that defendant's statements were obtained by hope or fear" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "406 U.S. 974", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6325673, 6325866, 6326091, 6326326, 6325272, 6326586, 6325500 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statement made by SBI Agent that he would \"let it be known\" did not show that defendant's statements were obtained by hope or fear" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/406/0974-03", "/us/406/0974-04", "/us/406/0974-05", "/us/406/0974-06", "/us/406/0974-01", "/us/406/0974-07", "/us/406/0974-02" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569703 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 S.E. 2d 309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "officer's statement to defendant that he would tell the solicitor if defendant cooperated did not render defendant's subsequent confession involuntary" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 N.C. App. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552105 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "officer's statement to defendant that he would tell the solicitor if defendant cooperated did not render defendant's subsequent confession involuntary" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/33/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E. 2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567546 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 L.Ed. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 S.Ct. 225", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "389 U.S. 908", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11391048, 11391169, 11391235, 11391111 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/389/0908-01", "/us/389/0908-03", "/us/389/0908-04", "/us/389/0908-02" ] }, { "cite": "377 F. 2d 16", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2028930 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/377/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 S.E. 2d 763", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 664", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568547, 8568648, 8568593, 8568439, 8568505 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0664-03", "/nc/285/0664-05", "/nc/285/0664-04", "/nc/285/0664-01", "/nc/285/0664-02" ] }, { "cite": "205 S.E. 2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 N.C. App. 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11299148 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/22/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 S.E. 2d 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568818 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 S.E. 2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4705131 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E. 2d 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" }, { "page": "81" }, { "page": "81", "parenthetical": "\"inducement to confess whether it be a promise, a threat or mere advice must relate to the prisoner's escape from the criminal charge against him\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568322 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1827, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 576, "char_count": 13226, "ocr_confidence": 0.817, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.277006297590142e-08, "percentile": 0.47884702930556955 }, "sha256": "62b5fb3a4ee617beaf97d8e78576c529b284fe1a1408928d1e4dafeec3af26ae", "simhash": "1:eba2916f130426da", "word_count": 2178 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:24:21.303361+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Arnold and Phillips concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DENNIS LEE CHURCH" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHNSON, Judge.\nThe issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his confession. We find no error and, therefore, affirm the judgment.\nAt the voir dire to determine the voluntariness of defendant\u2019s confession, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that on 12 July 1982, the defendant, Dennis Lee Church, was arrested at approximately 8:00 p.m. and charged with six felonies involving alleged violations of the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act. Defendant was held in custody at the Wilkes County Sheriffs Department under a $100,000 bond. The defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and was asked by Agent John Stubbs, a State Bureau of Investigation Specialist, whether he would be willing to cooperate with the investigation. The defendant asked Officer Stubbs whether he (the defendant) could be kept out of prison if he cooperated. The officer told defendant that the only thing they could promise was that the District Attorney would be made aware of his cooperation. The defendant did not give any statement that night.\nThe following day, defendant requested to talk with Officer Stubbs; he had decided to cooperate with the officer under the previously discussed terms. Officer Stubbs arrived and the defendant was given his Miranda rights. Defendant indicated that he understood his rights and signed a waiver form. Between the hours of 4:00 and 5:00 p.m., defendant made certain inculpatory statements concerning his involvement in the narcotics violation. The evidence also showed that the defendant expressed concern about the amount of the bond and that the officers advised the defendant that they could not assure that the bond would be lowered but that they would see what they could do.\nAt the conclusion of the voir dire, the trial judge, in overruling defendant\u2019s motion, made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: the defendant was in custody at the Wilkes County jail on 12 July and 13 July 1982, having been charged with serious drug law violations; no statement had been taken from the defendant on 12 July; on July 13, Agent Stubbs talked with the defendant after defendant waived his Miranda rights; the officer testified that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, freely and voluntarily waived his rights to an attorney. The court found that the officers indicated that the defendant did not appear sleepy, confused or in pain, but that the defendant was alert and responsive and was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The court further found that there were no threats made to the defendant to elicit his statement and that the officer did tell the defendant that if he (the defendant) cooperated, the District Attorney would be notified of such cooperation. The officers further told the defendant that they would see if they could get his bond reduced. Finally, the court found that the defendant had offered no evidence which indicated that his statement was not freely and voluntarily given. The court concluded as a matter of law that the statement the defendant gave on the afternoon of 13 July 1982, while in custody, was freely and voluntarily given after a full and complete examination of defendant\u2019s understanding of his right to remain silent and his right to the assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the confession was admitted into evidence. At trial, the defendant presented no evidence.\nThe defendant\u2019s principal argument is that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to suppress the inculpatory statements on the grounds that the officers held out a hope of benefit in exchange for his confession \u2014 that if he cooperated the District Attorney would be notified of his cooperation and that they would see if they could get the defendant\u2019s bond lowered, and that these circumstances rendered the confession involuntary.\nIt is well established that \u201ca confession cannot be received in evidence where the defendant has been influenced by any threat or promise; ... a confession obtained by the slightest emotions of hope or fear ought to be rejected.\u201d State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 259, 260 (1827). Accord State v. Booker, 306 N.C. 302, 293 S.E. 2d 78 (1982). \u201cWhen a defendant properly objects to the admission of the confession or moves to suppress same, the trial judge should conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine whether the confession is voluntary.\u201d Id. at 308, 293 S.E. 2d at 81. The court determines whether the confession was voluntary, and thus admissible, by looking at the totality of circumstances. State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 304 S.E. 2d 134 (1983). \u201cIn making this determination the trial judge must find facts; and when the facts are supported by competent evidence, they are conclusive on the appellate courts. However, the conclusions of law drawn from the findings of fact are reviewable by the appellate courts.\u201d State v. Booker, supra at 308, 293 S.E. 2d at 81.\nIn the instant case, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that the defendant\u2019s confession was voluntarily given. The defendant contends that the conclusion is erroneous. He contends that this confession was involuntary; that he would not have made the statement if he did not expect a hope or benefit \u2014 reduction of his bail and notice to the District Attorney that he had cooperated \u2014 in exchange for his confession.\nWith respect to the bond contention, the law in this state is quite clear. It has been held that \u201cany improper inducement generating hope must promise relief from the criminal charge to which the confession relates, not to any merely collateral advantage.\u201d State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C. 442, 458, 212 S.E. 2d 92, 102 (1975). Accord State v. Booker, supra at 308, 293 S.E. 2d at 81 (\u201cinducement to confess whether it be a promise, a threat or mere advice must relate to the prisoner\u2019s escape from the criminal charge against him\u201d).\nIn State v. Cannady, 22 N.C. App. 53, 54, 205 S.E. 2d 358, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 664, 207 S.E. 2d 763 (1974), this Court held that the fact that \u201cdefendants might have made their statements with the hope that lower bond would be set . . . does not render their statements involuntary.\u201d Similarly, in United States v. Ferrara, 377 F. 2d 16, 18 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 908, 88 S.Ct. 225, 19 L.Ed. 2d 225 (1967), the court held that the defendant\u2019s statement was not involuntary because the federal agent told him that if he cooperated, the agent was sure his bond would be reduced.\nHere, the promise by the officers to \u201csee\u201d if they could lower defendant\u2019s bond was not related to defendant\u2019s escape from the charges against him, State v. Booker, supra, but only referred to a purely collateral advantage which was \u201centirely disconnected from the possible punishment or treatment defendant might receive.\u201d Id. The lower bond merely meant that defendant would not have to await trial while incarcerated. It did not have any effect on the charges or ultimate punishment. The fact that defendant may have made his statement with the hope that lower bond would be set does not render his statement involuntary. State v. Cannady, supra. Accordingly, the trial court properly found and concluded that the statement by Officer Stubbs regarding defendant\u2019s bond did not render the confession involuntary.\nDefendant also contends that his confession was involuntary because Officer Stubbs told him that if he cooperated, the District Attorney would \u201cbe notified\u201d of his cooperation. We do not agree.\nIn State v. Branch, 306 N.C. 101, 291 S.E. 2d 653 (1982), the issue was whether the officers\u2019 statement to the defendant that, \u201cthe only promise we could make was that we would talk with the District Attorney if he made a statement which admitted his involvement,\u201d induced the defendant to involuntarily make a confession in the hopes of lighter punishment. The court held that the statement could not have reasonably led the defendant to believe that he would receive easier treatment. \u201cAny suspect of similar age and ability would expect that the substance of any statement he made would be conveyed to the District Attorney in the course of normal investigative and prosecutorial procedures.\u201d 306 N.C. at 109, 291 S.E. 2d at 659. See also State v. Young, 33 N.C. App. 689, 236 S.E. 2d 309 (1977) (officer\u2019s statement to defendant that he would tell the solicitor if defendant cooperated did not render defendant\u2019s subsequent confession involuntary) and State v. Muse, 280 N.C. 31, 185 S.E. 2d 214 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 974, 92 S.Ct. 2409, 32 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1972) (statement made by SBI Agent that he would \u201clet it be known\u201d did not show that defendant\u2019s statements were obtained by hope or fear). Finally, we note that in State v. Jackson, supra, the court held that an officer\u2019s statement \u201cit would certainly come out in court that he cooperated,\u201d did not provide a basis to hold that the defendant\u2019s confession was induced by hope.\nThe case at bar is virtually indistinguishable from Branch, Young, Muse and Jackson. In each case, the confessions were held to be admissible. Accordingly, we hold that the confession at bar is also admissible. The record clearly shows that the officers did not promise the defendant that he would not receive an active prison sentence, but only that they would make the District Attorney \u201caware\u201d of his cooperation. As in Branch and Young, the defendant could not have reasonably thought that Officer Stubbs\u2019 statement was a promise for a lighter sentence. We conclude that the defendant\u2019s statement was neither induced nor rendered involuntary by the officer\u2019s statement, and that the confession was properly received into evidence by the trial judge.\nFinally, we find no merit in defendant\u2019s contention that the trial judge failed to make any explicit findings of fact as to whether he was under the influence of pain pills or valium at the time of the confession. As was noted in State v. Chamberlain, 307 N.C. 130, 143, 297 S.E. 2d 540, 548 (1982), \u201c[i]f there is a conflict between the state\u2019s evidence and defendant\u2019s evidence on material facts, it is the duty of the trial court to resolve the conflict and such resolution will not be disturbed on appeal.\u201d This resolution may be express or implied, but in any event, once made, is conclusive on appeal. Id.\nIn the instant case, the trial judge, after hearing and weighing the evidence and observing the demeanor of the witnesses, found as a fact that \u201cthe officer indicated that he [defendant] appeared alert and appeared to be understanding what was going on and that in the officer\u2019s opinion the defendant was not under the influence of any drug or alcohol . . Implicit in this \u201cfinding\u201d is the trial judge\u2019s resolution of the conflict in the evidence in the State\u2019s favor. While the better practice would be for the trial judge to state such a resolution expressly, the finding is, nevertheless, supported by the evidence and conclusive on appeal.\nIn conclusion, we have carefully reviewed the record and find\nNo error.\nJudges Arnold and Phillips concur.\n. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966).", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHNSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Barry S. McNeill, for the State.", "Vannoy, Moore and Colvard, by Anthony R. Triplett, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DENNIS LEE CHURCH\nNo. 8323SC624\n(Filed 15 May 1984)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 75.2\u2014 confession \u2014 possibility of lower bond \u2014 no improper inducement\nThe trial court properly found and concluded that a statement by an officer regarding defendant\u2019s bond did not render defendant\u2019s confession involuntary where the promise by the officers to \u201csee\u201d if they could lower defendant\u2019s bond was not related to defendant\u2019s escape from the charges against him, but only referred to a purely collateral advantage which was \u201centirely disconnected from the possible punishment or treatment defendant might receive.\u201d\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 75.2\u2014 voluntariness of confession \u2014 officer\u2019s promise to talk with district attorney\nAn officer\u2019s promise that the district attorney would \u201cbe notified\u201d of defendant\u2019s cooperation did not render defendant\u2019s confession involuntary since the defendant could not have reasonably thought that the statement was a promise for a lighter sentence.\nAppeal by defendant from Mills, Judge. Judgment entered 12 November 1982 in Superior Court, Wilkes County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 January 1984.\nOn 12 July 1982, defendant, Dennis Lee Church, was arrested and charged with six felonies involving alleged violations of The Controlled Substances Act. While in custody, the defendant made certain statements concerning his involvement with the charges. On 9 November 1982, a jury trial was held. At trial, defendant objected to the introduction of his statement. A voir dire was then conducted for the purpose of ruling on the admissibility of the statement. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge overruled defendant\u2019s objection and allowed the statement into evidence. At the close of all the evidence, defendant entered a plea of guilty pursuant to a plea arrangement with the State. As a part of the plea arrangement, defendant appeals from the adverse ruling on his motion to suppress.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Barry S. McNeill, for the State.\nVannoy, Moore and Colvard, by Anthony R. Triplett, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0430-01", "first_page_order": 462, "last_page_order": 468 }