{ "id": 8526484, "name": "LARRY EARL BUFFINGTON v. MARSHA R. BUFFINGTON", "name_abbreviation": "Buffington v. Buffington", "decision_date": "1984-07-03", "docket_number": "No. 8321DC978", "first_page": "483", "last_page": "489", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "69 N.C. App. 483" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "289 S.E. 2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569908 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573594 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E. 2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563176 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 S.E. 2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564139 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52-10", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Wake Forest L. Rev. 857", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Wake Forest L. Rev.", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 S.E. 2d 310", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 N.C. App. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555986 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/25/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 S.E. 2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560682 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E. 2d 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520808 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-277", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 S.E. 2d 446", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2645720 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0646-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 595, "char_count": 13734, "ocr_confidence": 0.808, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.2907032680515943e-07, "percentile": 0.9163899130798745 }, "sha256": "c8d20559a1ba8d4273b009cae180c590e57066d363244bbbcfa46c2af3c9da54", "simhash": "1:834cf576625aff41", "word_count": 2216 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:17:04.613219+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge VAUGHN and Judge HEDRICK concur." ], "parties": [ "LARRY EARL BUFFINGTON v. MARSHA R. BUFFINGTON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WELLS, Judge.\nDefendant\u2019s appeal raises for the first time the question whether the passage of the Equitable Distribution Act, which permits property settlements executed \u201c[b]efore, during or after marriage,\u201d alters our state\u2019s former public policy, expressed in the prior decisional law of this state, which permitted such agreements only where the parties had already separated or separated immediately after execution of the agreement.\nBefore determining whether the trial court\u2019s summary judgment orders were correct, we examine the procedural status of defendant\u2019s appeal. As a general rule, a party may properly appeal only from a final order, which disposes of all the issues as to all parties, or an interlocutory order affecting a substantial right of the appellant. Roberts v. Heffner, 51 N.C. App. 646, 277 S.E. 2d 446 (1981), N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-277 (1983), \u00a7 7A-27(d) (1981). The purpose of the substantial right doctrine is to prevent fragmentary or premature appeals, by permitting the trial division to have done with a case fully and finally before it is presented to the appellate division, Blackwelder v. Dept. of Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 299 S.E. 2d 777 (1983).\nIn ruling on the parties\u2019 summary judgment motions, the trial judge noted that \u201c. . . the record fails to establish any genuine issue of material fact that would support the legal conclusion that the separation agreement of the parties ... is not valid as to the division of the property of the parties . . .\u201d By its rulings, the trial court necessarily determined that the separation agreement was valid as a matter of law and that defendant\u2019s counterclaim for equitable distribution should therefore be denied. The only issues left remaining for trial were those relating to plaintiffs claim for specific performance of the separation agreement, or, alternatively, damages for breach. The trial court\u2019s orders did not constitute a final judgment as they did not dispose of all issues as to all the parties in the lawsuit, Roberts v. Heffner, supra. However, it has been held that an order which completely disposes of one of several issues in a suit affects a substantial right, Oestreicher v. Stores, 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E. 2d 797 (1976). The trial court\u2019s order also affects a substantial right of defendant by preventing adjudication of defendant\u2019s counterclaim and plaintiffs claims in a single lawsuit, see Funderburk v. Justice, 25 N.C. App. 655, 214 S.E. 2d 310 (1975), Comment, \u201cInterlocutory Appeals in North Carolina: The Substantial Right Doctrine,\u201d 18 Wake Forest L. Rev. 857 (1982).\nIn considering defendant\u2019s appeal, we also note that defendant has violated Rule 10 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure by failing to include in the record on appeal proper exceptions following the record of judicial action to which they are addressed, and by failing to include a plain, concise statement of the basis of her assignments of error at the close of the record on appeal. Normally, appellate review is limited to those exceptions set out and made the basis of assignments of error in accordance with Rule 10. Nevertheless, because of the importance of the issues presented by defendant\u2019s appeal, we exercise our discretion under Rule 2 of the Appellate Procedure and consider the appeal despite its procedural defects.\nWe turn now to the merits of defendant\u2019s appeal, to determine if the trial court correctly determined that no genuine issues of material fact remained for trial and that plaintiff was entitled to judgment as to defendant\u2019s counterclaim, as a matter of law. Defendant sought an equitable distribution of the parties\u2019 marital property on the grounds that the separation agreement was invalidated when defendant and plaintiff lived together for 18 days after its execution. Under the common law of our state, courts generally refused to uphold a property settlement contingent upon divorce if the parties were living together at the time of its execution and had no intent of separating immediately thereafter, see 2 R. Lee, North Carolina Family Law \u00a7 188 (4th ed. 1980), and cases cited therein. Such agreements were thought to facilitate divorce by guaranteeing the spouses certain property upon dissolution of the marriage. Id. Antenuptial agreements regulating the parties\u2019 property rights during marriage, on the other hand, have long been permitted in our state, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52-10(a) (1983 Cum. Supp.), Lee, supra at \u00a7 181.\nPlaintiff contends, however, that our former public policy was modified by the enactment of G.S. \u00a7 50-20(d), which provides:\nBefore, during or after marriage the parties may by written agreement, duly executed and acknowledged in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 52-10 and 52-10.1, or by a written agreement valid in the jurisdiction where executed, provide for distribution of the marital property in a manner deemed by the parties to be equitable and the agreement shall be binding on the parties.\nDefendant argues that G.S. \u00a7 50-20(d) did not change public policy because the statute refers to G.S. \u00a7 52-10 and G.S. \u00a7 52-10.1, which prohibit separation agreements contrary to public policy.\nIn interpreting statutory language, the duty of the court is to effectuate the intent of the legislature, Newlin v. Gill, 293 N.C. 348, 237 S.E. 2d 819 (1977). In ascertaining the legislative intent, it is presumed that the legislature acted with full knowledge of prior and existing law, State v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641, 174 S.E. 2d 793 (1970). A statute should be considered as a whole and none of its provisions construed in a way that would render them useless or redundant if they can reasonably be considered as adding meaning to the act in harmony with its purpose, State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 187 S.E. 2d 706 (1972).\nApplying these rules to the case before us, we hold that by the enactment of G.S. \u00a7 50-20(d), the General Assembly manifested a clear intent to change the former rule which required the actual separation of the parties to a marriage in order for a property settlement to be effective between spouses. Defendant argues that the legislature inserted clear language permitting separation agreements \u201c[b]efore, during or after marriage\u201d in the first part of G.S. \u00a7 50-20(d), only to take it out in the next clause by a reference to G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 52-10 and 52-10.1. Such an interpretation runs counter to the rules of statutory construction and common sense. We hold that the public policy of our state, as expressed by G.S. \u00a7 50-20(d), permits spouses to execute a property settlement at any time, regardless of whether they separate immediately thereafter or not. It follows that defendant cannot avoid her separation agreement solely on the grounds that she continued to live with plaintiff for 18 days after the agreement was signed.\nTurning to defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on her counterclaim for equitable distribution, we hold that summary judgment was properly granted. Summary judgment is proper if \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The burden of proof rests upon the movant. Lowe v. Bradford, 305 N.C. 366, 289 S.E. 2d 363 (1982). A request for equitable distribution of property may not be granted in the face of a prior, valid agreement disposing of the parties\u2019 marital property, G.S. \u00a7 50-20(d). Therefore, summary judgment in favor of defendant\u2019s claim for equitable distribution would be improper unless defendant showed that no valid property settlement existed, no material issues of fact remained concerning her right to equitable distribution, and that she was entitled to equitable distribution as a matter of law. The material facts are not in dispute and defendant has failed to show that she is entitled to equitable distribution as a matter of law. Defendant attacks the separation agreement solely on the ground that it was invalidated by her cohabitation with plaintiff for 18 days after execution of the agreement. Based on our foregoing discussion of the law concerning the validity of property settlements agreements contingent upon divorce, it is clear that the trial court correctly concluded that defendant was not entitled to equitable distribution as a matter of law.\nWe hold the trial court also correctly granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment as to defendant\u2019s counterclaim, leaving for trial only plaintiffs claim for specific performance or, alternatively, damages for breach of the separation agreement.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge VAUGHN and Judge HEDRICK concur.\n. \u00a7 52-10. Contracts between husband and wife generally; releases.\u2014\nContracts between husband and wife not forbidden by G.S. 52-6 and not inconsistent with public policy are valid, and any persons of full age about to be married, and, subject to G.S. 52-6, any married persons, may, with or without a valuable consideration, release and quitclaim such rights which they might respectively acquire or may have acquired by marriage in the property of each other; and such releases may be pleaded in bar of any action or proceeding for the recovery of the rights and estate so released.\n\u00a7 52-10.1. Separation agreements; execution by minors.\u2014\nAny married couple, both of whom are 18 years of age or over, is hereby authorized to execute a separation agreement which shall be legal, valid, and binding in all respects as if they were both 21 years of age, provided, that if either the husband or the wife, or both, are under the age of 21 years, the separation agreement must be acknowledged by the husband before a clerk of the superior court and executed by the wife before a clerk of the superior court in conformity with G.S. 52-6.", "type": "majority", "author": "WELLS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Morrow and Reavis, by John F. Morrow and Clifton R. Long, Jr., for plaintiff", "Barbara C. Westmoreland for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LARRY EARL BUFFINGTON v. MARSHA R. BUFFINGTON\nNo. 8321DC978\n(Filed 3 July 1984)\n1. Appeal and Error \u00a76.2\u2014 all issues not determined \u2014 substantial right affected-appeal proper\nWhere the trial court by its rulings necessarily determined that the parties\u2019 separation agreement was valid as a matter of law and that defendant\u2019s counterclaim for equitable distribution should therefore be denied, and the only issues left remaining for trial were those relating to plaintiffs claim for specific performance of the separation agreement or, alternatively, damages for breach, the trial court\u2019s orders did not constitute a final judgment as they did not dispose of all issues as to all the parties in the lawsuit; however, defendant could properly appeal since an order which completely disposes of one of several issues in a suit affects a substantial right, and the trial court\u2019s order also affected a substantial right of defendant by preventing adjudication of defendant\u2019s counterclaim and plaintiffs claims in a single lawsuit.\n2. Husband and Wife \u00a7 10.1\u2014 property settlement \u2014 time of separation irrelevant\nBy the enactment of G.S. 50-20(d) the General Assembly manifested a clear intent to change the former rule which required the actual separation of the parties to a marriage in order for a property settlement to be effective between spouses, and the public policy of our state permits spouses to execute a property settlement at any time, regardless of whether they separate immediately thereafter or not; therefore, defendant could not avoid her separation agreement solely on the grounds that she continued to live with plaintiff for 18 days after the agreement was signed.\n3. Divorce and Alimony \u00a7 21.9\u2014 valid property settlement \u2014 no equitable distribution of property\nA request for equitable distribution of property may not be granted in the face of a prior valid agreement disposing of the parties\u2019 marital property.\nAppeal by defendant from Harrill, Judge. Order entered 13 June 1983 in Forsyth County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 June 1984.\nPlaintiff and defendant were married on 13 June 1970 in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania and later moved to Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The parties experienced marital difficulties and executed a separation agreement disposing of their property on 12 November 1981. After signing the agreement, the parties continued to live together in the marital home until 30 November 1981, when the defendant moved out.\nThereafter, defendant refused to comply with the terms of the agreement and plaintiff filed suit on 10 December 1982, seeking a divorce and specific performance of the separation agreement or, alternatively, damages for breach of the agreement. In her answer, defendant admitted that grounds existed for a divorce based on one year\u2019s separation under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-6 (1983 Supp.), but contended that the separation agreement was invalidated by her continued cohabitation with plaintiff for 18 days after execution of the agreement. Defendant counterclaimed for an order declaring the separation agreement void, and for equitable distribution of the parties\u2019 marital property pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20 (1983 Supp.).\nOn 31 January 1983, the parties were granted an absolute divorce and in May, 1983, both plaintiff and defendant moved for summary judgment on defendant\u2019s counterclaims. Following a hearing on 6 June 1983, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on her counterclaim. The court then granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment as to defendant\u2019s counterclaim.\nFrom entry of the order denying defendant\u2019s motion and granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, defendant appealed.\nMorrow and Reavis, by John F. Morrow and Clifton R. Long, Jr., for plaintiff\nBarbara C. Westmoreland for defendant." }, "file_name": "0483-01", "first_page_order": 511, "last_page_order": 517 }