{ "id": 8526968, "name": "BETTY McDOWELL, Administratrix of the ESTATE OF JOHN ANDERSON, JR., SHARON ANDERSON and CURTIS McDOWELL, minor beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF JOHN ANDERSON, JR., by and through their guardian, BETTY McDOWELL v. THE ESTATE OF JOHN ANDERSON, SR. and the Administrator of said estate, NATHAN E. ANDERSON", "name_abbreviation": "McDowell v. Estate of Anderson", "decision_date": "1984-08-07", "docket_number": "No. 8326SC367", "first_page": "725", "last_page": "732", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "69 N.C. App. 725" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "254 S.E. 2d 35", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568906, 8568939, 8568972, 8569016, 8569052 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0585-01", "/nc/296/0585-02", "/nc/296/0585-03", "/nc/296/0585-04", "/nc/296/0585-05" ] }, { "cite": "249 S.E. 2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 N.C. App. 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551164 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/39/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 S.E. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571562, 8571594, 8571531, 8571628, 8571669 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0584-02", "/nc/305/0584-03", "/nc/305/0584-01", "/nc/305/0584-04", "/nc/305/0584-05" ] }, { "cite": "286 S.E. 2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 N.C. App. 716", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527871 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/55/0716-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 A.L.R. 3d 823", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 S.E. 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1910, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269285 ], "year": 1910, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/152/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 S.E. 2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 N.C. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621242 ], "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/234/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 S.E. 2d 508", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 N.C. App. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555626 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/3/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 S.E. 2d 392", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571622, 8571591, 8571662, 8571764, 8571798 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0614-02", "/nc/289/0614-01", "/nc/289/0614-03", "/nc/289/0614-04", "/nc/289/0614-05" ] }, { "cite": "221 S.E. 2d 739", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 N.C. App. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549922 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/28/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 S.E. 2d 99", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 N.C. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570975 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/256/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 S.E. 2d 753", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567437, 8567576, 8567475, 8567544, 8567514 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0658-01", "/nc/285/0658-05", "/nc/285/0658-02", "/nc/285/0658-04", "/nc/285/0658-03" ] }, { "cite": "206 S.E. 2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 N.C. App. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11306279 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/22/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 S.E. 2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570014 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 S.E. 2d 352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" }, { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 N.C. 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559522 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/266/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 S.E. 2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 N.C. 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626133 ], "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/219/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 S.E. 2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" }, { "page": "205" }, { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627407 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" }, { "page": "689" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0686-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 772, "char_count": 17833, "ocr_confidence": 0.823, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.120349932148731e-08, "percentile": 0.38149714520035727 }, "sha256": "ddf7258323426d8610f578154784a0639f9ec1c503054b46f9738e3336f79a41", "simhash": "1:90ac506161350149", "word_count": 2924 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:17:04.613219+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Hedrick and Hill concur." ], "parties": [ "BETTY McDOWELL, Administratrix of the ESTATE OF JOHN ANDERSON, JR., SHARON ANDERSON and CURTIS McDOWELL, minor beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF JOHN ANDERSON, JR., by and through their guardian, BETTY McDOWELL v. THE ESTATE OF JOHN ANDERSON, SR. and the Administrator of said estate, NATHAN E. ANDERSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHNSON, Judge.\nThe issue presented for review is whether an innocent beneficiary may reach wrongful death proceeds of her deceased brother through the estate of the deceased father, who was a negligent beneficiary. We conclude that because the father is barred from recovery by his wrongdoing, the innocent beneficiary who must claim through the negligent beneficiary\u2019s estate is also barred.\nOn 30 January 1981, John Aaron Anderson, Sr. was operating a 1972 Chevrolet on North Carolina Highway 16. With him in the car as passengers were Mary Hunter Anderson, his wife, and John Aaron Anderson, Jr., their son. The parties agree that as the Chevrolet proceeded in a southeasterly direction, it collided with a 1974 Kenworth fuel tanker proceeding in a northwesterly direction. Plaintiff, however, alleges that John, Sr. was negligent in operating his vehicle in that he failed to keep it under proper control and that he failed to give an approaching vehicle one-half of the highway. Plaintiff contends that as the vehicles were approaching each other, John, Sr. ran off the right side of the road, lost control of his vehicle, and skidded across the road directly into the path of the oncoming fuel tanker truck, causing the truck to strike the car broadside. Defendant, on the other hand, makes no contention as to the exact sequence of events leading up to the collision, but nevertheless denies that John, Sr. was negligent. Defendant does not allege that the driver of the fuel tanker truck was in any way negligent.\nIt is undisputed that as a result of the collision, the son, John, Jr., and the wife, Mary, died within minutes of the accident. John, Sr. survived the crash itself, but died three hours later from injuries sustained in the collision.\nBoth plaintiff and defendant filed motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment with regard to two issues: (1) that G.S. 1-539.21 abolishes the common law defense of parent-child immunity in personal injury actions involving motor vehicles and (2) that G.S. 1-539.21\u2019s abolition of the common law defense of parent-child immunity is not unconstitutional as a violation of the guaranty of equal protection pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution. The trial court granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on these two issues. Defendant also moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff was barred from recovery of wrongful death proceeds through her father\u2019s estate because the father was the sole beneficiary and he was barred from recovery by his own negligence. The court granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment and concluded as a matter of law that plaintiff was not entitled to wrongful death proceeds because the estate of the father was the sole direct beneficiary of the wrongful death proceeds arising from the son\u2019s death, and the father\u2019s estate was prevented from recovery due to the father\u2019s wrongdoing. The plaintiff appeals from the court\u2019s grant of defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nRule 56(c) provides that a motion for summary judgment shall be granted \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56(c). The material issues of fact in the case sub judice were effectively established when the plaintiff failed to respond to defendant\u2019s 20 July 1982 request for admission made pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 36. Therefore, the question becomes whether the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\nPlaintiff contends that she should not be barred from recovery of proceeds from the wrongful death of her brother due to the negligence of her father. Plaintiff also claims that barring all recovery to her would unjustly enrich the father\u2019s automobile liability insurance carrier. We disagree with both contentions.\nPlaintiff recognizes that, as a general rule, a tortfeasor beneficiary will not be allowed to profit from his legally unacceptable conduct. Davenport v. Patrick, 227 N.C. 686, 689, 44 S.E. 2d 203, 205 (1947). However, plaintiff argues that the negligence of one party should not be imputed to an innocent beneficiary so as to bar her right to recover. Pearson v. Stores Corp., 219 N.C. 717, 722, 14 S.E. 2d 811, 814 (1941). Further, plaintiff contends that preventing her recovery would penalize an innocent party for her father\u2019s negligence.\nPlaintiff overlooks the fact that she simply is not a direct beneficiary of her brother\u2019s estate and is therefore not entitled to recover for his wrongful death. The right of action at issue exists by virtue of G.S. 28A-18-2, which provides that the proceeds of a wrongful death action are to be disposed of as directed by the Intestate Succession Act. The relevant section of the Intestate Succession Act, G.S. 29-15(3), provides that if the intestate dies without being survived by a spouse, lineal descendants, or both parents, but is survived by one parent, the surviving parent shall take the entire share.\nDue to the fact that the brother\u2019s surviving parent, John, Sr. died subsequent to John, Jr.\u2019s death, it is necessary to consider at what point in time beneficiaries under the Intestate Succession Act are determined. The Supreme Court, in Davenport v. Patrick, supra, held that the identity of beneficiaries is to be determined at the time of the intestate\u2019s death. 227 N.C. at 689, 44 S.E. 2d at 205. See also Bank v. Hackney, 266 N.C. 17, 145 S.E. 2d 352 (1965); Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C. 361, 139 S.E. 2d 676 (1965). Here, the intestate son, John, Jr., had no lineal descendants and no spouse at the time of his death. His mother died at approximately the same time as he did and, aside from his sister, only John, Jr.\u2019s father survived him. Therefore, the father is the sole beneficiary of the estate of the son under the statute. The fact of the father\u2019s subsequent death is irrelevant to the determination of the beneficiaries of the son\u2019s estate at the time of his death.\nPlaintiff asks this Court to relax the rule that beneficiaries are determined at the time of death and thereby bypass the father in the line of intestate succession, although he survived his son by approximately three hours. Plaintiff contends that to do otherwise under the facts of this case would be making a \u201cfetish\u201d of the common law. However, despite the appeal of plaintiffs request, to adopt the reasoning of the plaintiff would require that this Court overrule Davenport and Hackney. In Hackney, a case similar to the case sub judice, the wife was killed in an automobile accident caused by the negligence of her husband. The husband died the same day, but a short time after the wife died. One defense raised by the executor of the husband\u2019s estate to the wrongful death action was that any recovery on behalf of the couple\u2019s children would have to be reduced by the share that the husband would otherwise be entitled to take under the Intestate Succession Act. The Supreme Court apparently did not find it a \u201cfetish\u201d to reduce the children\u2019s recovery, even though the husband-tortfeasor was in no position to benefit by his wrongdoing and all the proceeds of the recovery were destined for the deceased couple\u2019s children. Rather, the Court reaffirmed the rule that the beneficiaries in a wrongful death action are to be determined at the time of the intestate\u2019s death, even though the husband died the same day as the wife. Bank v. Hackney, supra, at 20, 145 S.E. 2d at 355.\nIt may appear unfair that the daughter is denied a wrongful death recovery because the father lived for three hours after the son died, but it would seem equally unfair for the daughter to be denied a recovery if the father lived for an additional week, a month or a year, and then died. At some arbitrarily selected point, the courts would have to deny recovery, so that the decedent\u2019s estate could be settled and the personal representative released. We find no principled distinction between these situations. Relaxation of the rule in this case would undoubtedly lead to further uncertainty in the administration of decedent\u2019s estates, however appealing such a holding would be under the facts of this case.\nWith these considerations in mind, we are of the opinion that adoption of a rule allowing for the determination of beneficiaries at some time other than death must come through the legislature, rather than the judiciary. Until such time that the rule is changed, this Court is constrained to find that the father is the sole beneficiary of any wrongful death action on the son\u2019s behalf.\nAccordingly, the plaintiff is not a beneficiary of her brother\u2019s estate and is not entitled to wrongful death proceeds directly from his estate. Instead, she is the direct beneficiary of her father\u2019s estate. Therefore, the issue becomes whether the negligent party\u2019s estate may serve as a conduit for recovery flowing to the non-negligent plaintiff. We conclude that plaintiff may not recover through the negligent party\u2019s estate.\nPublic policy in North Carolina, buttressed by uniform judicial decisions, will not allow a wrongdoer to enrich himself as a result of his own negligent conduct. Davenport, supra, at 689, 44 S.E. 2d at 205. Although the father was the sole beneficiary of his son\u2019s estate, he may not benefit as a result of his own wrongdoing. Recovery must be reduced by the wrongdoer\u2019s share, which in this case is equal to the entire estate. Therefore, the plaintiff can receive no recovery through the father\u2019s estate under the Wrongful Death Act.\nThe second issue raised by plaintiff is whether the father\u2019s automobile liability insurance carrier would be unjustly enriched if plaintiff is not allowed to recover. Plaintiff advocates the establishment of a constructive trust to be held by the father\u2019s estate for the benefit of the plaintiff.\nPlaintiff implicitly assumes that there are insurance proceeds which will accrue to the insurance carrier if they are not disbursed to a beneficiary. Plaintiff argues that as long as the tort-feasor father was negligent, and his negligence was the proximate cause of the son\u2019s death, the insurance carrier is liable for the father\u2019s damages and a \u201cfund\u201d is created to compensate for the damages. The cases cited by plaintiff in support of this argument, however, involve either life insurance, Gardner v. Insurance Co., 22 N.C. App. 404, 206 S.E. 2d 818, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 658, 207 S.E. 2d 753 (1974), or tenancy by entirety, In re Estate of Perry, 256 N.C. 65, 123 S.E. 2d 99 (1961); Homanich v. Miller, 28 N.C. App. 451, 221 S.E. 2d 739, cert. denied, 289 N.C. 614, 223 S.E. 2d 392 (1976); Porth v. Porth, 3 N.C. App. 485, 165 S.E. 2d 508 (1969). Plaintiff confuses liability insurance with life insurance and her reliance upon the cited cases is misplaced. In the case of life insurance, once the event of risk which is insured against \u2014 death\u2014 occurs, there is an insurance \u201cfund\u201d created which is similar in concept to a savings account. 44 C.J.S., Insurance, \u00a7 25, p. 484. This fund must be distributed to the decedent\u2019s beneficiary or beneficiaries. The insurance carrier may not retain monies it is obligated to pay under life insurance policy simply because of some unusual circumstance which \u201cmuddies the waters\u201d of the usual pattern of distribution. Bullock v. Insurance Co., 234 N.C. 254, 67 S.E. 2d 71 (1951); Anderson v. Parker, 152 N.C. 1, 67 S.E. 53 (1910); see also 7 Strong\u2019s N.C. Index 3d, Insurance \u00a7 35, p. 396. In those cases, if the beneficiary is barred from recovery for his wrongdoing, the life insurance carrier is nevertheless liable for the proceeds in the absence of fraud or specific contract provisions to the contrary. Annot., 27 A.L.R. 3d 823 (1969). To do otherwise would unjustly enrich the life insurance carrier.\nIn the case sub judice, however, the insurance policy in question is not a life insurance policy; it is an automobile liability insurance policy. Accordingly, the question is not who is entitled to the proceeds of the father\u2019s insurance, but rather, whether the father, and therefore the insurance carrier, are liable at all. Automobile liability insurance is a form of insurance which indemnifies against liability incurred by the insured due to injury to the person or property of another. An automobile liability insurance policy is a contract which provides indemnification against liability, as opposed to indemnification against loss or death. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.; 44 C.J.S., Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 21, 24, p. 481. If the insured father is not found, by law, to be liable to anyone for the son\u2019s wrongful death, the liability insurance carrier is not responsible for indemnifying the father, or his estate. Hence, until that determination is made, no insurance \u201cfund\u201d is created and the insurance carrier is not unjustly enriched. In Bank v. Hackney, supra, the recovery by the non-negligent children for the wrongful death of their mother was reduced by the share of their negligent, deceased father. The court explicitly assumed that the father possesses automobile liability insurance. 266 N.C. at 22-23, 145 S.E. 2d at 357. Yet the Hackney Court did not consider the insurer unjustly enriched because its liability was reduced by the negligent beneficiary\u2019s share. No constructive trust was imposed. Here, as in Hackney, we find no unjust enrichment of the insurance carrier and, therefore, no need for a constructive trust.\nFor the above reasons, plaintiff is not entitled to recover wrongful death proceeds. We find that the trial court did not err in granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. The order appealed from is\nAffirmed.\nJudges Hedrick and Hill concur.\n. Defendant appellee cross-assigned error to the grant of summary judgment for plaintiff on these two issues. However, defendant concedes that both issues were addressed and resolved against him in Carver v. Carver, 55 N.C. App. 716, 286 S.E. 2d 799, cert. denied, 305 N.C. 584, 292 S.E. 2d 569 (1982), and Ledwell v. Berry, 39 N.C. App. 224, 249 S.E. 2d 862 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 585, 254 S.E. 2d 35 (1979), respectively. Although defendant nevertheless endeavors to preserve these issues for review, he has not briefed them. Therefore, this Court will not reexamine these previously decided questions.\n. Solutions exist which would give appellant the result she desires. For example, Section 2-104 of the Uniform Probate Code (U.P.C.) provides: \u201cAny person who fails to survive the decedent by 120 hours is deemed to have predeceased the decedent for purposes of . . . intestate succession, and the decedent\u2019s heirs are determined accordingly.\u201d Unif. Probate Code \u00a7 2-104, 8 U.L.A. 64 (1983). If the U.P.C. was in effect in North Carolina, the plaintiff, not the father, would be the beneficiary in this instance. However, the U.P.C. has not been legislatively adopted in North Carolina.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHNSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Chambers, Ferguson, Watt, Wallas, Adkins and Fuller, P.A., by Karl Adkins, for plaintiff appellant.", "Kennedy, Covington, Lobdell and Hickman, by William C. Livingston, for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BETTY McDOWELL, Administratrix of the ESTATE OF JOHN ANDERSON, JR., SHARON ANDERSON and CURTIS McDOWELL, minor beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF JOHN ANDERSON, JR., by and through their guardian, BETTY McDOWELL v. THE ESTATE OF JOHN ANDERSON, SR. and the Administrator of said estate, NATHAN E. ANDERSON\nNo. 8326SC367\n(Filed 7 August 1984)\n1. Death \u00a7 11\u2014 wrongful death \u2014 no recovery by negligent beneficiary \u2014 no recovery by innocent beneficiary\nPlaintiff daughter was not entitled to wrongful death proceeds arising from her brother\u2019s death in an automobile accident because the estate of her father was the sole direct beneficiary of the wrongful death proceeds arising from the son\u2019s death, and the father\u2019s estate was prevented from recovery due to the father\u2019s wrongdoing.\n2. Descent and Distribution \u00a7 1\u2014 beneficiaries in wrongful death action \u2014 determination at time of death\nBeneficiaries in a wrongful death action are to be determined at the time of the intestate\u2019s death, even though beneficiary and intestate may die the same day.\n3. Insurance \u00a7 104\u2014 automobile liability insurance \u2014 no determination of insured\u2019s liability \u2014 no unjust enrichment of insurance carrier\nThere was no merit to plaintiffs contention that her father\u2019s automobile liability insurance carrier would be unjustly enriched if she were not allowed to recover proceeds for the wrongful death of her brother, since an automobile liability insurance policy is a contract which provides indemnification against liability as opposed to indemnification against loss or death; if the insured father was not found by law to be liable to anyone for his son\u2019s wrongful death, the liability insurance carrier was not responsible for indemnifying the father or his estate; and, until that determination was made, no insurance \u201cfund\" was created and the insurance carrier was not unjustly enriched.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Snepp, Judge. Order entered 25 January 1983 in Superior Court, MECKLENBURG County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 March 1984.\nThis action arises from an automobile accident on 30 January 1981 in which plaintiffs intestate, John Aaron Anderson, Jr. was killed. Betty McDowell, as administratrix of the Estate of John Aaron Anderson, Jr., and as guardian of the minor sister, Sharon Annette Anderson, and of the minor half brother, Curtis McDowell, filed a complaint pursuant to the North Carolina Wrongful Death Statute G.S. 28A-18-2. Curtis McDowell is no longer a party for the purposes of appeal.\nChambers, Ferguson, Watt, Wallas, Adkins and Fuller, P.A., by Karl Adkins, for plaintiff appellant.\nKennedy, Covington, Lobdell and Hickman, by William C. Livingston, for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0725-01", "first_page_order": 753, "last_page_order": 760 }