{ "id": 8547393, "name": "RUBY MAE LITTLEJOHN v. PIEDMONT PUBLISHING COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Littlejohn v. Piedmont Publishing Co.", "decision_date": "1969-12-17", "docket_number": "No. 6921SC551", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "5", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "7 N.C. App. 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "165 S.E. 2d 757", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 N.C. App. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550876 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/4/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 S.E. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 N.C. App. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555193 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/3/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 S.E. 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 N.C. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624752 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/207/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 N.C. 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8683980 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/30/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 S.E. 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8649989 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/96/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 S.E. 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8659378 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/127/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E. 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 N.C. 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2221597 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/209/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 S.E. 2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 N.C. 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8597441 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/217/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E. 2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566370 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S.E. 16", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N.C. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621658 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/200/0356-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 482, "char_count": 11386, "ocr_confidence": 0.576, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.4793276177203605e-08, "percentile": 0.2806667492969667 }, "sha256": "e6d9fb5c1003bd57fd650f3fe7123cebaa4226715ea6c4d82a661acf1b688f53", "simhash": "1:3d61cc36e6ceabaf", "word_count": 1858 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:45:53.911218+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Campbell and PARKER, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "RUBY MAE LITTLEJOHN v. PIEDMONT PUBLISHING COMPANY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GRAHAM, J.\nThe first three paragraphs of defendant\u2019s further answer and defense allege in somewhat narrative form the circumstances surrounding the publication of the article in question and also facts tending to show that the reporter and photographer who were responsible for the article were led, through conversations with William R. Fulk, to reasonably conclude that Fulk had divorced his wife on grounds of adultery.\nDefendant contends that unless it pleads facts showing a lack of bad faith in publishing the article, it will be precluded from offering any evidence to rebut plaintiff\u2019s allegations of malice and to protect itself from an award of punitive damages. Such is not the case. In this jurisdiction punitive damages may not be awarded on a showing of implied malice alone. To support such an award it must be shown by the plaintiff that the publication in question was prompted by actual malice, or that the defamation was recklessly or carelessly published. Hartsfield v. Hines, 200 N.C. 356, 157 S.E. 16; Bouligny, Inc., v. Steelworkers, 270 N.C. 160, 154 S.E. 2d 344; Roth v. News Co., 217 N.C. 13, 6 S.E. 2d 882 (and cases therein cited). It follows that the defendant may under a general denial of malice, and absent any affirmative pleading on its part, offer evidence to rebut a showing by the plaintiff that the publication was made maliciously. \u201cIt may be difficult to determine what facts may be shown under a general denial, but since the plaintiff is required to prove all the material facts\u2019 of his case which are controverted, the defendant may show any facts which go to deny the existence of the cause of action, ...\u201d 1 McIntosh, N.C. Practice & Procedure 2d, \u00a7 1236, p. 669.\nWhile evidence for the purpose of rebutting a showing of malice may be admitted under a general denial, the law in this jurisdiction is that in an action for libel or slander a defendant must plead mitigating circumstances and affirmative defenses in order to offer evidence thereof to reduce the amount of compensatory damages. Harrell v. Goerch, 209 N.C. 741, 184 S.E. 489; Upchurch v. Robertson, 127 N.C. 127, 37 S.E. 157; Knott v. Burwell, 96 N.C. 272, 2 S.E. 588; Smith v. Smith, 30 N.C. 29. The right to do so is expressly given by G.S. 1-158 which states in part as follows:\n\u201cThe defendant may in his answer allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory, and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages; and whether he proves the justification or not, he may give in evidence the mitigating circumstances.\u201d\nThe result is that without proper allegations of an affirmative defense or mitigating circumstances, a defendant may offer evidence tending to show good faith, but only for the purpose of negating malice, and not at all when malice has not been pleaded or proved by the plaintiff. Such evidence, without proper affirmative allegation, may not be considered on the issue of compensatory damages.\nIt is obvious that the facts pleaded in the first three paragraphs of defendant\u2019s further answer, if proved, would tend to mitigate general damages as well as rebut any showing of malice. Defendant is entitled to plead such facts for this purpose. In fact it is necessary that it do so in order to present evidence in mitigation. We therefore conclude that the allegations stricken from the first three paragraphs were proper and should not have been stricken.\nPlaintiff contends, however, that her motion was properly \u25a0allowed in that the pleadings stricken were irrelevant, redundant and evidentiary. It is true that such matter may be stricken from a pleading on motion of the person aggrieved thereby. G.S. 1-153; Revis v. Asheville, 207 N.C. 237, 176 S.E. 738; Bank v. Easton, 3 N.C. App. 414, 165 S.E. 2d 252. Here, plaintiff did not direct her motion to any specific allegation claimed by her to be irrelevant, redundant or evidentiary. Therefore, if the paragraphs involved contained any proper allegations they should not have been stricken in their entirety. Johnson v. Petree, 4 N.C. App. 20, 165 S.E. 2d 757. The allegations are certainly relevant and are in no sense redundant. While they may appear somewhat evidentiary, we fail to see how the circumstances surrounding the publication of the article could otherwise be pleaded. The nature of such mitigating facts requires that they be pleaded in greater detail than is often necessary with respect to other types of affirmative defenses.\nAllegations ordered stricken from paragraph 4 of the further answer allege that the article in question did not contain the new married name of plaintiff and any damage the plaintiff has suffered, largely, if not entirely, resulted from the institution of this suit and not from the publication of the article. The article has been pleaded in its entirety by the plaintiff and will be before the jury. It is unnecessary to call attention in the answer to what the article does or does not contain and to argue inferences to be drawn therefrom. Such arguments will undoubtedly be available to the defendant at the proper time and no prejudice will result from having this matter stricken from the answer.\n\u25a0 That portion of the court\u2019s order striking allegations from paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of defendant\u2019s further answer is reversed. That portion striking portions of paragraph 4 is affirmed.\nReversed in part and affirmed in part.\nCampbell and PARKER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GRAHAM, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wilson & Morrow by John F. Morrow for -plaintiff appellee.", "Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice by W. P. Sandridge and Charles F. Vance, Jr., for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RUBY MAE LITTLEJOHN v. PIEDMONT PUBLISHING COMPANY\nNo. 6921SC551\n(Filed 17 December 1969)\n1. Libel and Slander \u00a7 18\u2014 punitive damages \u2014 actual malice\nPunitive damages for libel may not be awarded on a showing of implied malice alone, but it must be shown that the publication in question was prompted by actual malice or that the defamation was recklessly or carelessly published.\n2. Libel and Slander \u00a7 15\u2014 evidence to rebut malice \u2014 general denial\nIn an action for libel, defendant may, under a general denial of malice and absent any affirmative pleading, offer evidence to rebut a showing by plaintiff that the publication was made maliciously.\n3. Libel and Slander \u00a7 15\u2014 evidence to rebut malice \u2014 general denial \u2014 compensatory damages\nWhile evidence for the purpose of rebutting a showing of malice in an action for libel or slander may be admitted under a general denial, defendant must plead mitigating circumstances and affirmative defenses in order to offer evidence thereof to reduce the amount of compensatory damages.\n4. Libel and Slander \u00a7 15\u2014 evidence to rebut malice \u2014 pleadings \u2014 consideration on issue of damages\nWithout proper allegations of an affirmative defense or mitigating circumstances, a defendant in a libel action may offer evidence tending to show good faith only for the purpose of negating malice and only when malice has been pleaded or proved by the plaintiff, and such evidence, without proper affirmative allegation, may not be considered on the issue of compensatory damages.\n5. Libel and Slander \u00a7 14\u2014 pleading's \u2014 good faith publication\nIn this action for libel based upon an article printed by defendant newspaper stating that plaintiff\u2019s ex-husband had divorced her for adultery, when in fact plaintiff had obtained a divorce from her ex-husband on the ground of two years separation, the trial court erred in striking from defendant\u2019s further answer allegations of facts tending to show that the reporter and photographer responsible for the article were led, through conversations with plaintiff\u2019s ex-husband, reasonably to conclude that he had divorced plaintiff on the ground of adultery, defendant being entitled to plead such facts for the purpose of mitigating compensatory damages as well as for rebutting any showing of malice.\n6. Pleadings \u00a7 41\u2014 general motion to strike\nWhere motion to strike paragraphs of defendant\u2019s further answer is not directed to any specific allegation claimed to be redundant, irrelevant or evidentiary, the paragraphs should not be stricken in their entirety if they contain any proper allegations.\n7. Libel and Slander \u00a7 14\u2014 evidentiary pleadings \u2014 motion to strike \u2014 good faith publication\nIn this action for libel, the trial court erred in striking from defendant\u2019s further answer allegations of the circumstances surrounding the publication of the article and facts tending to show lack of bad faith in publishing the article, notwithstanding such allegations are somewhat evi-dentiary, since the nature of such mitigating facts requires that they be placed in greater detail than other types of defenses.\n8. Libel and Slander \u00a7 14\u2014 motion to strike \u2014 inference from published article \u2014 damages\nIn this action for libel based upon a newspaper article stating that plaintiff\u2019s ex-husband divorced his wife for adultery, the trial court did not err in striking from defendant\u2019s further answer allegations that the article in question did not contain the new married name of plaintiff and that any damage plaintiff has suffered resulted from the institution of this suit and not from publication of the article, it being unnecessary to call attention in the answer to what the article, which was pleaded by plaintiff in its entirety, does or does not contain and to argue inferences to be drawn therefrom.\nON certiorari to review an order of Seay, J., at the 9 June 1969 Session of Foesyth County Superior Court.\nPlaintiff filed this civil action on 19 February 1969. Her complaint alleges in substance that the corporate defendant publishes the Winston-Salem Journal, a newspaper of general circulation; \u2022that on or about 27 January 1969 defendant caused to be published in said paper an article entitled \u201cThe Other Side of Divorce\u201d; that a picture of plaintiff's ex-husband, William R. Fulk, accompanied the-article and. a statement appeared therein that \u201c[a]fter 14 years of marriage and two years of separation, Fulk divorced his wife for adultery\u201d; that plaintiff is the person referred to in the article as having been divorced on grounds of adultery; that statements in the article were untrue, libelous, defamatory, and were made without just cause and provocation and with malice toward plaintiff. Plaintiff also alleges that a retraction published by defendant at the plaintiff\u2019s request was not full, fair or adequate. She prays for recovery of compensatory and punitive damages in substantial sums.\nDefendant answered on 20 March 1969 admitting that it published the alleged article and that the plaintiff was not divorced by William R. Fulk on grounds of adultery but had obtained a divorce from him on the grounds of two years separation. Other allegations bearing on the question of the alleged libel were denied. In addition, the defendant\u2019s answer contained a further answer and defense consisting of four paragraphs. Plaintiff moved to strike all of the further answer and defense except for an admission in paragraph 3 that plaintiff was not divorced for adultery but obtained a divorce on grounds of a two years separation, and the first sentence of paragraph 4 relating to the retraction.\nPlaintiff\u2019s motion to strike was allowed in its entirety by order of Judge Thomas W. Seay, dated 11 June 1969. Defendant\u2019s petition to this court for certiorari to review Judge Seay\u2019s order was granted on 16 July 1969.\nWilson & Morrow by John F. Morrow for -plaintiff appellee.\nWomble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice by W. P. Sandridge and Charles F. Vance, Jr., for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 23, "last_page_order": 27 }