{
  "id": 8520812,
  "name": "TAMMY FAYE WILFONG (CARPENTER) and HARLEYSVILLE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. R. W. WILKINS, JR., Commissioner of Motor Vehicles",
  "name_abbreviation": "Wilfong v. Wilkins",
  "decision_date": "1984-08-21",
  "docket_number": "No. 8310SC949",
  "first_page": "127",
  "last_page": "130",
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      "cite": "70 N.C. App. 127"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
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    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:14:59.534868+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Webb and JOHNSON concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "TAMMY FAYE WILFONG (CARPENTER) and HARLEYSVILLE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. R. W. WILKINS, JR., Commissioner of Motor Vehicles"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PHILLIPS, Judge.\nEach of the statutes hereinafter referred to is a part of the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act of 1953. G.S. 20-279.1(3) defines a judgment under the Act as a final judgment for damages \u201carising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle.\u201d Under G.S. 20-279.15(3), a judgment for property damages in excess of $10,000 is deemed satisfied for the purposes of the Act when $10,000 has been credited against it. And G.S. 20-279.13, with certain exceptions, provides that upon receiving a certified copy of a judgment that has remained unsatisfied for a period of sixty days that the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles \u201cshall forthwith suspend the license ... of any person against whom such judgment was rendered.\u201d The statutory exceptions, none of which apply to this case, are: (1) When the insurance carried by the owner or driver is in a company approved to do business here that goes into liquidation after the accident and before judgment, G.S. 20-279.13(b); (2) where the judgment creditor consents in writing for the judgment debtor to retain his license, G.S. 20-279.13(c); and (3) where an order is entered permitting the judgment to be paid in installments, G.S. 20-279.16. Since Carpenter\u2019s situation as a judgment debtor in a motor vehicle accident case clearly falls within the purview of G.S. 20-279.13, and has not been excepted therefrom by any other statute, the Commissioner was required, we believe, to suspend Carpenter\u2019s driver\u2019s license as plaintiff requested. Thus, the order compelling him to do so is affirmed.\nThough defendant concedes in his brief that \u201ca literal interpretation or construction\u201d of the statutes above referred to would seem to require the suspension of Carpenter\u2019s license to operate a motor vehicle, he contends that we should find that that was not what the General Assembly intended. In so arguing, defendant points to the fact that, under the facts recorded, Carpenter was in compliance with other provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act of 1953, which also authorizes the imposition of certain sanctions on those deemed to be in violation thereof. Defendant correctly asserts that Carpenter was not in violation of the Act while operating the car, since he was in lawful possession of it, and thus was an \u201cinsured\u201d under plaintiff Wilfong\u2019s policy, which met the financial requirements of G.S. 20-279.1(11). Defendant also correctly contends that while the Commissioner is empowered by G.S. 20-279.5 to suspend the driving privileges of motor vehicle owners and operators who are involved in accidents resulting in personal injury, death or property damage exceeding $500, even though fault h\u00e1s not been determined, when his office has no proof of their financial responsibility within a certain time after the accident occurs, Carpenter was not subject to such a suspension because G.S. 20-279.6(1) provides that the security requirements of G.S. 20-279.5 do not apply when no injury or damage is done to anyone other than the operator or owner of the vehicle. And it is also true, as defendant maintains, that G.S. 20-279.21(b)(4)(e) does not require liability insurance policies issued under the Act to insure against loss \u201cto property owned by, rented to, in charge of, or transported by the insured.\u201d Nevertheless, these statutes, which have nothing to do with unsatisfied judgments in automobile cases, do not justify us concluding that the General Assembly did not intend that which is plainly stated in G.S. 20-279.13. A statute as free from ambiguity as G.S. 20-279.13 is requires no construction, only adherence. Under the record presented, the statute required defendant to automatically suspend Carpenter\u2019s license to operate a motor vehicle upon receiving certification that the judgment against him was unsatisfied, and the order of mandamus was correctly entered.\nDefendant\u2019s other contentions \u2014 relating to a possible coverage dispute under plaintiff Wilfong\u2019s policy and the status of Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company\u2019s alleged status as a sub-rogee of Wilfong \u2014 are outside the record and will not be considered. The terms of Wilfong\u2019s insurance policy, except that they comply with the state\u2019s financial responsibility laws, were not mentioned in the court below and are not in the record; and the only mention of Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company in the stipulated facts is that it is the company plaintiff Wilfong obtained her policy through.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Webb and JOHNSON concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PHILLIPS, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General William B. Ray, for defendant appellant.",
      "DeBank, McDaniel, Heidgerd, Holbrook & Anderson, by William Eugene Anderson, for plaintiff appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "TAMMY FAYE WILFONG (CARPENTER) and HARLEYSVILLE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. R. W. WILKINS, JR., Commissioner of Motor Vehicles\nNo. 8310SC949\n(Filed 21 August 1984)\nAutomobiles \u00a7 2\u2014 driver\u2019s license of judgment debtor \u2014 suspension required\nWhere plaintiffs estranged husband either negligently or intentionally caused one of plaintiffs vehicles to collide with her other vehicle, plaintiff obtained a judgment against her husband for damages to her automobiles, and the judgment remained unsatisfied for longer than 60 days, defendant was required pursuant to G.S. 20-279.13 to suspend the husband\u2019s driver\u2019s license as plaintiff requested.\nAppeal by defendant from Brannon, Judge. Judgment entered 26 May 1983 in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 June 1984.\nThis is a civil action to compel the defendant to suspend the driver\u2019s license of a judgment debtor pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 20-279.13. The pertinent facts stipulated to by the parties are as follows: On 4 February 1980, plaintiff Tammy Faye Wilfong (Carpenter) owned two motor vehicles, a 1971 Pinto and a 1979 Camaro. She had in effect an automobile liability insurance policy issued by plaintiff Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company, which covered both vehicles and met the requirements of our financial responsibility laws. On that day, James Rudolph Carpenter, plaintiff Wilfong\u2019s estranged husband, was operating and in lawful possession of the Pinto on a public street or highway when he either negligently or intentionally caused the Pinto to collide with the Camaro and damaged both vehicles. At that time, Carpenter neither owned an automobile nor had an automobile liability insurance policy in effect. Wilfong sued Carpenter and obtained judgment against him for the damages that her automobiles sustained. After the judgment remained unsatisfied for a period in excess of sixty days, it was certified to the Department of Motor Vehicles by the Clerk of Superior Court, with plaintiffs request, as a judgment creditor, that Carpenter\u2019s driving privileges be suspended pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 20-279.13. Defendant Commissioner declined to suspend such privileges, however, and plaintiff sued for a writ of mandamus to require him to do so. After a hearing before Judge Brannon, an order was entered directing defendant to suspend Carpenter\u2019s license to operate a motor vehicle in the state.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General William B. Ray, for defendant appellant.\nDeBank, McDaniel, Heidgerd, Holbrook & Anderson, by William Eugene Anderson, for plaintiff appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0127-01",
  "first_page_order": 159,
  "last_page_order": 162
}