{ "id": 8524542, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. FREDDIE DELANE GILCHRIST", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Gilchrist", "decision_date": "1984-11-06", "docket_number": "No. 8414SC100", "first_page": "180", "last_page": "184", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "71 N.C. App. 180" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "295 S.E. 2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573306 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 S.E. 2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566719 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 S.Ct. 46", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 L.Ed. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "429 U.S. 809", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6085, 7371, 6739, 5782, 5823 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/429/0809-04", "/us/429/0809-01", "/us/429/0809-03", "/us/429/0809-05", "/us/429/0809-02" ] }, { "cite": "222 S.E. 2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569669 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E. 2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569762 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E. 2d 501", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2644255 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 S.E. 2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 S.E. 2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574166 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 S.E. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.C. App. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547423 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/45/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 S.E. 2d 848", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 N.C. App. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548739 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/28/0317-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 533, "char_count": 11153, "ocr_confidence": 0.822, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.785233827686237e-07, "percentile": 0.8355566289772106 }, "sha256": "6bc60df7550b10a6669ae4b930f7403baa6e8853330c19e10b522443432e91eb", "simhash": "1:771b936936e61357", "word_count": 1804 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:51:06.115640+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Arnold and Wells concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. FREDDIE DELANE GILCHRIST" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HILL, Judge.\nOn 24 August 1982 around 9:00 p.m. an informant known only as \u201cLarry\u201d introduced the defendant to Agent Gunter of the S.B.I. who was working undercover on a drug investigation in Durham. The defendant got into a car with Agent Gunter and Larry, and the three proceeded to an address where the defendant said he could get some cocaine. When the three arrived at their destination, Agent Gunter asked the defendant to get him a twenty-five dollar bag of cocaine. The defendant went into a house (hereinafter the \u201cCarolina house\u201d) and returned with a bag of white powder which he represented to be cocaine. Agent Gun-ter took the bag and paid the defendant twenty-five dollars. The defendant then asked Agent Gunter if he wanted some marijuana. Agent Gunter answered affirmatively and requested a ten dollar bag. Agent Gunter, Larry and the defendant drove to another address which the defendant said was his home. The defendant went into an apartment and returned with a bag containing brown vegetable matter which he represented to be marijuana. The defendant gave Agent Gunter the bag and Agent Gunter gave him ten dollars. The encounter between Agent Gunter and the defendant lasted approximately thirty minutes. The substances were later analyzed and testimony at trial indicated that the white powder was cocaine and the brown vegetable matter was marijuana.\nAn arrest warrant was issued for a person named Freddie DeWitt. At trial Agent Gunter testified that the informant, Larry, told him that the defendant\u2019s name was Freddie DeWitt. Testimony at trial indicated that the Magistrate\u2019s Office re-issued the warrant with the defendant\u2019s correct name, Freddie Delane Gilchrist, on it after the arrest of the defendant.\nIn his first assignment of error defendant contends the trial court erred when it sustained objections to questions about the reliability or motivation of the informant known as \u201cLarry.\u201d Defendant does not question the police officers\u2019 testimony that they could not give Larry\u2019s full name because they did not know it, thus preventing defendant from being able to find Larry and call him to the witness stand. Rather, he argues that the court should have allowed him to elicit other information concerning Larry\u2019s reliability as an informer from the State\u2019s witnesses because Larry was a participant in the alleged offenses and defendant needed this information to prepare a proper defense.\nThe evidence at trial shows that Agent Gunter was in the company of the defendant for approximately thirty minutes during which time the Agent personally transacted the drug buys charged against the defendant. Agent Gunter\u2019s testimony concerning his identification of defendant as the person who sold him drugs was based upon his own observations and not upon information received by him from the informant. The informant\u2019s only participation in the drug transactions concerned herein was to introduce the State\u2019s witness to the defendant and to remain in their presence while the illegal transactions occurred. Therefore, the informant\u2019s reliability or credibility was not an issue in this case. State v. Orr, 28 N.C. App. 317, 220 S.E. 2d 848 (1976), cited by defendant in his argument, is distinguishable on the facts from the case sub judice because there the defendant claimed the informant had entrapped him, thus making the informant\u2019s credibility an issue.\nThe prosecution is privileged to withhold the identity of an informant unless the informant was a participant in the crime or unless the informant\u2019s identity is essential to a fair trial or material to defendant\u2019s defense. State v. Beam, 45 N.C. App. 82, 262 S.E. 2d 50 (1980). A defendant must make a sufficient showing that the particular circumstances of his case mandate disclosure before the identity of a confidential informant must be revealed. State v. Watson, 303 N.C. 533, 279 S.E. 2d 580 (1981). When the defendant fails to make a sufficient showing of need to justify disclosure of the .informant\u2019s identity he acquires no greater rights to compel disclosure of details about the informant than he initially had. State v. Beam, 45 N.C. App. 82, 262 S.E. 2d 350 (1980). In the present case, the defendant has failed to establish that any additional information about the informant was relevant to his defense or essential to a fair determination of his case. Because the informant was not a participant in the offense and the informant\u2019s reliability or credibility was not at issue, we hold the trial court properly sustained objections to questions about the informant.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant argues the trial court erred in allowing Officer Edwards to testify that he had previously seen cocaine in the Carolina house where one of the drug transactions allegedly took place. In drug cases, this Court has allowed evidence concerning the reputation of a place or neighborhood when such evidence tends to show the intent of the person charged. State v. Lee, 51 N.C. App. 344, 276 S.E. 2d 501 (1981). In this case evidence that the Carolina house was known to be a location where illegal drugs could be purchased was relevant and admissible to show defendant\u2019s knowledge and intent at the time of the offense. Although Officer Edwards may not have been qualified to identify the specific substance seen as cocaine, the effect of his testimony was simply to establish that the Carolina house was known as a place where drugs could be bought. Therefore, we find that the admission of this testimony did not constitute prejudicial error.\nNext, defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing Officer Edwards to testify concerning the statements of others about \u201cFreddie.\u201d Defendant, on cross-examination, elicited testimony from Agent Gunter and Officer Edwards concerning the use of the name \u201cFreddie DeWitt\u201d on the initial arrest warrant. It appears that defense counsel by delving into this subject was attempting to infer that the offense could have been committed by someone else. The State did not proceed to explain how the name \u201cFreddie DeWitt\u201d got on the arrest warrant until after the matter was introduced by the defendant. In State v. Stanfield, 292 N.C. 357, 364, 233 S.E. 2d 574, 579 (1977), our Supreme Court stated:\n[Where defense counsel on cross-examination of a witness brings out evidence tending to show that someone else was suspected of committing the crime charged, the State is entitled to introduce evidence in explanation or rebuttal thereof, even though such evidence would have been irrelevant had it been offered initially by the State. In such a case, the defendant has \u201copened the door\u201d to this testimony and will not be heard to complain.\nIn the present case the State had the right to explain the evidence brought out on cross-examination by defense counsel and to rebut any negative inferences arising therefrom. While defendant may be correct in arguing that the witness gave extraneous information in his rebuttal, we do not believe the admission of such evidence prejudiced the defendant.\nDefendant\u2019s final assignment of error is that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to introduce evidence of his good character. Defense counsel asked defendant while he was on the witness stand whether he had been \u201carrested, tried or convicted of anything.\u201d While counsel could ask about defendant\u2019s prior convictions, he could not properly inquire about prior arrests or trials. See State v. Alford, 289 N.C. 372, 222 S.E. 2d 222, death sentence vacated, 429 U.S. 809, 50 L.Ed. 2d 69, 97 S.Ct. 46 (1976). Defense counsel was given an opportunity to rephrase his question in a more acceptable form at trial, but he failed to do so. Moreover, the record does not show what his answer would have been as is required. State v. Shaw, 293 N.C. 616, 239 S.E. 2d 439 (1977), overruled on other grounds, 306 N.C. 629, 636-37, 295 S.E. 2d 375, 379 (1982). Defendant cannot complain that testimony of his good character was excluded at trial when his own counsel failed to properly elicit this information.\nWe hold defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges Arnold and Wells concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HILL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Roy A. Giles, Jr., for the State.", "Clayton, Myrick and McClanahan, by Jerry B. Clayton and Ronald G. Coulter, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. FREDDIE DELANE GILCHRIST\nNo. 8414SC100\n(Filed 6 November 1984)\n1. Narcotics 8 3.1\u2014 reliability of informant \u2014 irrelevant when officer's testimony about defendant based on personal observation\nIn a prosecution for sale and delivery of cocaine and marijuana, and for possession with intent to sell, the trial court properly sustained objections to questions about the reliability or motivation of an informant because the informant\u2019s only participation in the drug transactions was to introduce an S.B.I. agent to defendant and to remain in their presence while the agent personally transacted the drug buys charged against defendant.\n2. Narcotics 8 3.1\u2014 officer\u2019s prior knowledge of drugs at scene of drug buy \u2014 admissible\nIn a prosecution for sale and delivery of cocaine and marijuana, and for possession with intent to sell, the court did not err by allowing an officer to testify that he had previously seen cocaine in a house where a drug transaction allegedly took place, although the officer may not have been qualified to identify the substance as cocaine. Evidence that the house was known to be a location where illegal drugs could be purchased was relevant and admissible to show defendant\u2019s knowledge and intent.\n3. Criminal Law 8 87.4\u2014 redirect examination \u2014irrelevant information on subject raised by defendant \u2014 extraneous information \u2014no prejudice\nWhere an arrest warrant was issued in the name Freddie DeWitt based on an informant\u2019s statements, and the magistrate reissued the warrant in defendant\u2019s correct name, Freddie Delane Gilchrist, after defendant\u2019s arrest, the court did not err in allowing an officer to testify concerning the statements of others about \u201cFreddie\u201d because defendant had already elicited testimony on the subject. The State was entitled to rebuttal, and while some of the information given on rebuttal may have been extraneous, there was no prejudice.\n4. Criminal Law 8 85.1\u2014 defense counsel\u2019s question to defendant regarding prior arrests and trials \u2014 properly excluded\nDefendant cannot complain that testimony of his good character was excluded where his counsel asked whether he had been \u201carrested, tried, or convicted of anything,\u201d did not rephrase his question when given the opportunity to do so, and did not include in the record what his answer would have been.\nAppeal by defendant from Barnette, Judge. Judgment entered 23 August 1983 in Superior Court, DURHAM County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 September 1984.\nDefendant was convicted of sale and delivery of cocaine, possession with intent to sell cocaine, sale and delivery of marijuana, and possession with intent to sell marijuana. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment with a six month active term. From the judgment entered, he appealed.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Roy A. Giles, Jr., for the State.\nClayton, Myrick and McClanahan, by Jerry B. Clayton and Ronald G. Coulter, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0180-01", "first_page_order": 214, "last_page_order": 218 }