{
  "id": 8525114,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT HAL BRAME",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hal Brame",
  "decision_date": "1984-11-06",
  "docket_number": "No. 8414SC88",
  "first_page": "270",
  "last_page": "275",
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:51:06.115640+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Becton and Phillips concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT HAL BRAME"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nDefendant assigns error to the denial of his motion to dismiss the case wherein he was charged with escape. The evidence with respect to this charge, when considered in the light most favorable to the State, tends to show that Orange County Deputy Sheriffs Charles Blackwood and Phyllis Coates took the defendant into their custody at the Durham County Jail for the purpose of transporting him to Orange County for trial. The defendant was handcuffed and placed in the back seat of the officers\u2019 automobile. While still in Durham County the defendant used a key secreted upon his person to unlock his handcuffs to effect his escape. He then placed the barrel of a twenty-five caliber pistol into Officer Blackwood\u2019s ear and forced him to drive the car along a circuitous route. Defendant eventually forced Blackwood from the vehicle and drove to a location at which he had arranged to meet his girlfriend.\nDefendant was tried on a bill of indictment that charged him with violating N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 14-256, which in pertinent part provides:\nIf any person shall break any prison, jail or lockup maintained by any county or municipality in North Carolina, being lawfully confined therein, or shall escape from the lawful custody of any superintendent, guard or officer of such prison, jail or lockup, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.\nIn State v. Brown, 82 N.C. 585 (1880), our Supreme Court held that this statute applied only \u201cto the act of breaking out the jail or county prison and not from mere personal restraint or imprisonment under law.\u201d Id. at 588.\nThe evidence in the present case tends to show only that the defendant escaped from Orange County Sheriffs deputies. There is no evidence in this record from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant escaped from the Durham County Jail, or from \u201cthe lawful custody of any superintendent, guard or officer of such . . . jail.\" (Emphasis added.) Under the circumstances of this case, wherein the defendant was clearly charged with violating N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 14-256, we hold the evidence is at variance with the charge, and the court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nDefendant next assigns as error the denial of his motion to dismiss the charge of kidnapping Charles Blackwood. He argues there is not sufficient evidence to support the verdict and the judgment in this case.\nThe evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to the State, with regard to the charge of kidnapping Charles Black-wood tends to show the following: After defendant placed a gun to Deputy Blackwood\u2019s head, he told the officer, \u201cI want to get away. If I don\u2019t I will kill you.\u201d Soon thereafter, the occupants of the car became aware that they were being followed by a red Toyota truck. After efforts to \u201close\u201d the truck were unsuccessful, defendant ordered Deputy Blackwood to stop the car. Defendant then ordered Deputy Coates to get out of the car and to deliver a message to the driver of the truck, the message being that defendant would kill Deputy Blackwood if the driver of the truck persisted in following the police vehicle. As soon as Deputy Coates left the car, defendant ordered Deputy Blackwood to \u201cgo,\u201d and the officer and the defendant immediately left the scene. After several turns defendant directed the deputy to stop the car, telling him, \u201cI want you to get out and run. Don\u2019t look back. If you do, I will kill you.\u201d Deputy Blackwood complied with the defendant\u2019s instructions.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 14-39, the statute under which defendant was charged with kidnapping Blackwood, in pertinent part provides:\n(a) Any person who shall unlawfully confine, restrain, or remove from one place to another, any other person 16 years of age or over without the consent of such person . . . shall be guilty of kidnapping if such confinement, restraint or removal is for the purpose of:\n(1) Holding such other person for ransom or as a hostage or using such other person as a shield; or\n(2) Facilitating the commission of any felony or facilitating flight of any person following the commission of a felony;\nThe evidence is clearly sufficient to permit the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant \u201cconfine[d], restrained], or remove[d] from one place to another\u201d Deputy Black-wood, and that \u201csuch confinement, restraint or removal\u201d was for the purpose of holding the officer as a hostage and for the purpose of facilitating flight following the commission of a felony. This assignment of error has no merit.\nBy Assignment of Error No. 7, defendant contends the court failed to apply and explain the law arising on the evidence in the case wherein defendant was charged with second degree kidnapping. This assignment of error purports to be based on two exceptions. Exception No. 6C relates to the court\u2019s ruling at the instruction conference denying defendant\u2019s request for the following instruction:\nThe State must prove to you and beyond a reasonable doubt that restraint or removal from one place to another place was not an inherent, inevitable feature of such other crime that was being committed.\nException No. 6A refers to the court\u2019s ruling, after instructions had been given, denying defendant\u2019s request for \u201csome definition ... on removal from one place to another and restraint ... in accord with State vs. Erwin, and State vs. Fulcher.\u201d We have carefully reviewed the court\u2019s instructions to the jury in light of this assignment of error and the exceptions on which it is based, and find no prejudicial error in the instruction as given.\nIn Case Nos. 83CRS3932 and 83CRS3933, wherein defendant was charged with two counts of assault with a deadly weapon on a law enforcement officer, defendant has brought forward and argued no assignment of error, and we find no error.\nFinally, defendant contends the trial court erred in sentencing him to a term exceeding the presumptive term in the case wherein defendant was charged with and convicted of second degree kidnapping. The trial court found four aggravating factors and no mitigating factors and, upon concluding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, imposed a prison sentence of fifteen years, a term exceeding the presumptive sentence of nine years. Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding the following aggravating factors:\n1. The defendant induced Carol Yates who participated in the commission of the offense; a female who had no prior criminal record.\n4. The offense was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.\n5. The offense was committed against a present or former law enforcement officer.\n9. The defendant was armed with or used a deadly weapon at the time of the crime.\nDefendant contends that the first factor found by the trial court, relating to Carol Yates\u2019 participation in the commission of the offense, is unsupported by the evidence in the record. We agree. The record is devoid of any evidence showing that Ms. Yates participated in any way in or had any knowledge of defendant\u2019s actions in kidnapping Officer Blackwood. The trial court\u2019s error in finding this factor in aggravation requires that the case be remanded for resentencing. It is thus unnecessary for us to discuss defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error relating to sentencing.\nThe result is: In Case No. 83CRS3934, wherein defendant was charged with and convicted of escape, the judgment is vacated; in Case Nos. 83CRS3932 and 83CRS3933, wherein defendant was charged with and convicted of assault with a deadly weapon on a law enforcement officer, the judgments are affirmed; in Case No. 83CRS3930, wherein defendant was charged with and convicted of second degree kidnapping, we find no error but remand the case for resentencing.\nVacated in part, affirmed in part, no error in part and remanded for resentencing.\nJudges Becton and Phillips concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HEDRICK, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas B. Wood, for the State.",
      "Appellate Defender Adam Stein, by Assistant Appellate Defender Lorinzo L. Joyner, for defendant, appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT HAL BRAME\nNo. 8414SC88\n(Filed 6 November 1984)\n1. Escape \u00a7 8\u2014 escape from county jail officers \u2014 insufficient evidence\nThe State\u2019s evidence was insufficient to support defendant\u2019s conviction of escape from a county jail or an officer of such facility in violation of G.S. 14-256 where it tended to show that defendant was confined in the Durham County Jail, that Orange County officers took defendant into their custody to transport him to Orange County for trial, and that defendant escaped from the officers\u2019 car while still in Durham County, since there was no evidence that defendant escaped from the Durham County Jail or from the lawful custody of an officer of such jail.\n2. Kidnapping \u00a7 1.2\u2014 confining to hold as hostage \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe State\u2019s evidence was sufficient to support defendant\u2019s conviction of kidnapping a deputy sheriff under the theory that defendant confined, restrained and removed the deputy for the purpose of holding him as a hostage where it tended to show that the victim and another deputy were transporting defendant from one county to another for trial; defendant placed a gun to the victim\u2019s head and stated that he wanted to get away; when the occupants of the police vehicle became aware that they were being followed by a red truck, defendant ordered the victim to stop the vehicle and ordered the other deputy to tell the driver of the truck that defendant would kill the vie-tim if the truck driver persisted in following the police vehicle; when the other officer left the police vehicle, defendant ordered the victim to \u201cgo,\u201d and the victim and defendant immediately left the scene; and defendant eventually forced the victim from the vehicle.\n3. Kidnapping \u00a7 1.3\u2014 failure to give requested instructions\nThe trial court in a kidnapping case did not err in refusing to give defendant\u2019s requested instruction that the State had to prove that the restraint or removal from one place to another was not an inherent, inevitable feature of such other crime that was being committed; nor did the trial court err in failing to give a requested instruction defining removal from one place to another and restraint.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 138\u2014 aggravating factor \u2014 inducing participation by another\u2014 insufficient evidence\nThe evidence did not support the trial court\u2019s finding as an aggravating factor in sentencing defendant for kidnapping that defendant induced a female who had no prior criminal record to participate in the commission of the offense.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Hobgood (Robert H.), Judge. Judgments entered 21 September 1983 in Superior Court, Durham County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 September 1984.\nDefendant was charged in proper bills of indictment with kidnapping, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon on a law enforcement officer and felonious escape. Defendant was found guilty of second degree kidnapping, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon on a law enforcement officer and misdemeanor escape. From judgments imposing a fifteen-year prison term for second degree kidnapping, two concurrent two-year terms for assault with a deadly weapon on a law enforcement officer and a one-year term for misdemeanor escape, defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas B. Wood, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Adam Stein, by Assistant Appellate Defender Lorinzo L. Joyner, for defendant, appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0270-01",
  "first_page_order": 304,
  "last_page_order": 309
}
