{ "id": 8525506, "name": "WARD WESLEY MATHIS v. NORTH CAROLINA DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES and COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES, R. W. WILKINS, JR.", "name_abbreviation": "Mathis v. North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles", "decision_date": "1984-11-20", "docket_number": "No. 8428SC602", "first_page": "413", "last_page": "417", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "71 N.C. App. 413" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "254 S.E. 2d 160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567027 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E. 2d 544", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572712 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 S.E. 2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569058, 8568932, 8568969, 8569105, 8569144, 8569019 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0397-04", "/nc/279/0397-01", "/nc/279/0397-02", "/nc/279/0397-05", "/nc/279/0397-06", "/nc/279/0397-03" ] }, { "cite": "182 S.E. 2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558", "parenthetical": "quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed." }, { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566492 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233", "parenthetical": "quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E. 2d 740", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 N.C. App. 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552911 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/48/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E. 2d 133", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561171 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 F. 2d 1048", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "455 F. Supp. 338", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4028715 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/455/0338-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 520, "char_count": 9087, "ocr_confidence": 0.809, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0800576937064e-07, "percentile": 0.7589438612058077 }, "sha256": "09e55e947c7c0041a76a344eafc3dda77cf620d3a30113df488a2d204e336fca", "simhash": "1:f9ab52ef35799d01", "word_count": 1496 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:51:06.115640+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Braswell and Eagles concur." ], "parties": [ "WARD WESLEY MATHIS v. NORTH CAROLINA DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES and COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES, R. W. WILKINS, JR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "VAUGHN, Chief Judge.\nPlaintiff principally contends that the evidence does not show that he \u201cwillfully refused\u201d to submit to a chemical test and is therefore insufficient to sustain the license suspension order entered against him. G.S. 20-16.2 (Cum. Supp. 1981).\nIn support of his position, plaintiff points out that he was willing to take the test at 7:15 p.m., within 30 minutes of his first explicit refusal at 6:46 p.m. Plaintiff contends that there was no evidence that he either heard or acknowledged Officer Lefler\u2019s request until that time or knowingly let the 30 minute time limit expire. According to plaintiff, \u201cthere is only evidence that he was told of the 30 minute time limit\u201d and there is \u201cno evidence that petitioner voluntarily elected not to take the test.\u201d We believe plaintiffs arguments to be patently untenable and clearly contrary to existing case law.\nG.S. 20-16.2 (Cum. Supp. 1981) does not require that a suspected drunk driver submit to a chemical test. Montgomery v. North Carolina Dep\u2019t of Motor Vehicles, 455 F. Supp. 338 (W.D.N.C. 1978), aff\u2019d, 599 F. 2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979). It does, however, provide that a suspect who \u201cwillfully refuses\u201d a request to submit to the test will have his driving privileges automatically revoked for a period of six months. The standard of \u201cwillful refusal\u201d in this context is clear. Once apprised of one\u2019s rights and having received a request to submit, a driver is allowed 30 minutes in which to make a decision. A \u201cwillful refusal\u201d occurs whenever a driver \u201c(1) is aware that he has a choice to take or to refuse to take the test; (2) is aware of the time limit within which he must take the test; (3) voluntarily elects not to take the test; and (4) knowingly permits the prescribed thirty-minute time limit to expire before he elects to take the test.\u201d Etheridge v. Peters, 301 N.C. 76, 81, 269 S.E. 2d 133, 136 (1980).\nIn the present case, plaintiff was requested to take the test and acknowledged an understanding of his rights. Plaintiff was told of the 30 minute time limit and was repeatedly asked if he would take the test before it expired. Plaintiffs initial 20 minute silence in response to those requests does not toll the 30 minute period. Otherwise, any suspect could evade the possible repercussions of testing by simply refusing to cooperate. Cf Rice v. Peters, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 48 N.C. App. 697, 269 S.E. 2d 740 (1980). Obviously, one may refuse the test by inaction as well as by words. \u201cRefusal,\u201d in this context, has been defined as \u201cthe declination of a request or demand, or the omission to comply with some requirement of law, as the result of a positive intention to disobey.\u201d Joyner v. Garrett, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 279 N.C. 226, 233, 182 S.E. 2d 553, 558, reh. denied, 279 N.C. 397, 183 S.E. 2d 241 (1971) (quoting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed.). A finding that a driver \u201cdid refuse\u201d to take the test is equivalent to a finding that the driver \u201cwillfully refused\u201d to take the test. Id. at 233, 182 S.E. 2d at 559.\nPlaintiffs position is not aided by evidence showing his later willingness to take the test at 7:15 p.m. See, e.g., Seders v. Powell, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 298 N.C. 453, 259 S.E. 2d 544 (1979); Etheridge, supra. Nor is this plaintiff aided by his alleged lack of either understanding or knowledge that the prescribed time limit was expiring. For example, in Seders, supra, the petitioner similarly and unsuccessfully argued that due to continuing efforts to contact his attorney, he was unaware that his 30 minute time period had expired. Yet, as in the present case, the Court noted that Seders had been informed of both the existence of the 30 minute deadline and the consequences of his failure to submit. Like Seders, plaintiff, nevertheless, elected to run the risk of awaiting his attorney\u2019s call. The actions of each \u201cconstituted a conscious choice purposefully made and [their] omission to comply with this requirement of our motor vehicle law amounts to a willful refusal.\u201d Seders at 461, 259 S.E. 2d at 550. The trial court\u2019s conclusion that plaintiff willfully refused to submit is supported by the evidence and will not be disturbed on appeal. Henderson County v. Osteen, 297 N.C. 113, 254 S.E. 2d 160 (1979).\nPlaintiff alternatively contends that he was not properly requested to submit to the test as directed by statute. G.S. 20-16.2(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides that \u201c[t]he arresting officer, in the presence of the person authorized to administer a chemical test, shall request that the person arrested submit to a test. . . .\u201d Plaintiff argues that this language requires a \u201cpresent request\u201d and was violated in light of testimony in which Officer Stout stated that \u201c[a]fter I informed [plaintiff] of his rights [Officer Lefler] requested him to submit to the test when I offered it to him.\u201d We find this argument to be unfounded. The Legislature did not intend to prescribe such precise terminology or to impose \u201csuch a rigid sequence of events as contended\u201d by plaintiff. Rice at 700, 269 S.E. 2d at 742. Such contrived precision is unnecessary for the protection of suspects and is clearly detrimental to the effective enforcement of drunk driving laws. See Montgomery v. North Carolina Dep\u2019t of Motor Vehicles, 455 F. Supp. 338 (W.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 599 F. 2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979).\nThe trial court properly affirmed the order revoking plaintiffs license.\nJudgment affirmed.\nJudges Braswell and Eagles concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "VAUGHN, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roberts, Cogbum, McClure & Williams, by Max 0. Cogbum and Isaac N. Northmp, Jr., for petitioner appellant.", "Attorney General Edmisten, by Deputy Attorney General Jean A. Benoy, for respondent appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WARD WESLEY MATHIS v. NORTH CAROLINA DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES and COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES, R. W. WILKINS, JR.\nNo. 8428SC602\n(Filed 20 November 1984)\nAutomobiles and Other Vehicles \u00a7 2.4\u2014 willful refusal to take breathalyzer test-sufficiency of evidence\nPlaintiffs license was properly revoked for willful refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test where plaintiff was told of the 30-minute time limit and the consequences of his failure to submit, plaintiff explicitly refused to submit to the test 20 minutes and again 30 minutes after his rights were read to him, and plaintiff expressed a willingness to take the test some 20 minutes after the 30-minute limit had expired. G.S. 20-16.2.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Allen (C. Walter), Judge. Judgment entered 22 March 1984 in Superior Court, BUNCOMBE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 October 1984.\nWard Wesley Mathis (plaintiff) was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages, in violation of G.S. 20-138 (Cum. Supp. 1981). Plaintiffs license was revoked for a period of six months as a result of his \u201cwillful refusal\u201d to submit to a breathalyzer test. G.S. 20-16.2 (Cum. Supp. 1981). The revocation order was confirmed after a trial de novo in Superior Court pursuant to G.S. 2046.2(e) (Cum. Supp. 1981) and G.S. 20-25.\nOn 7 August 1983, at approximately 6:05 p.m., plaintiff was stopped and arrested after being observed driving erratically on U.S. Highway 19-23 by Woodfin Police Officer E. C. Lefler. Plaintiff was thereafter charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcoholic beverages, in violation of G.S. 20-138 (Cum. Supp. 1981), and was transported to the Buncombe County Courthouse in Asheville. In the courthouse \u201cBreathalyzer Room,\u201d Officer Lefler, as the arresting officer, \u201crequested Mr. Mathis to take the breathalyzer test.\u201d At 6:26 p.m., Officer Lefler and the breathalyzer operator, Officer Stout, had each informed plaintiff of his rights under G.S. 20-16.2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981), both verbally and in writing. Plaintiff responded that he understood his rights and signed an acknowledgment form to that effect. Officer Lefler again requested plaintiff to take the test \u201cwhen [Officer Stout] offered it to him.\u201d In response to these requests, plaintiff did not take the test but attempted to reach his attorney. Twenty minutes later, plaintiff explicitly refused to submit to the test because \u201chis lawyer told him not to.\u201d Ten minutes later, 30 minutes after plaintiffs rights were read to him, plaintiff was again requested to take the test and, despite reminders of the consequences of his actions, refused.\nAfter this final refusal, Officer Stout prepared a refusal affidavit and delivered it to Magistrate Nell Bagwell who processed it. Magistrate Bagwell then commented that she knew plaintiff personally. She walked back to the Breathalyzer Room and, at 7:15 p.m., convinced plaintiff to submit to the test. Officer Stout, however, refused to accede to the magistrate\u2019s request.\nFollowing the revocation of his driving privileges for a period of six months, plaintiff petitioned the Superior Court for a trial de novo pursuant to G.S. 2046.2(e) (Cum. Supp. 1981) and G.S. 20-25. The trial court found that plaintiff \u201cwithout just cause or excuse, voluntarily, understanding^ and intentionally refused\u201d to submit to the breathalyzer test and upheld the suspension. Plaintiff appeals.\nRoberts, Cogbum, McClure & Williams, by Max 0. Cogbum and Isaac N. Northmp, Jr., for petitioner appellant.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Deputy Attorney General Jean A. Benoy, for respondent appellee." }, "file_name": "0413-01", "first_page_order": 447, "last_page_order": 451 }